United States v. Leach
This text of 24 F.2d 965 (United States v. Leach) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Chester Leach, charged by information filed against him by the district attorney with the unlawful possession of “property designed for the manufacture of intoxicating liquor, in violation of section 25, tit. 2, of the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA § 39), now moves, prior to his trial, that the search warrant, under color of which a seizure was made, be quashed, and the district attorney restrained from offering in evidence at the trial the articles so seized.
The ground upon which the warrant is specifically attacked is that “it did not particularly describe or name the person upon whom the search warrant was to be made;” The basis of this objection of the defendant is, of course, the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which reads: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” More particularly the objection rests upon section 3, tit. 11, of Public Law numbered 24 of the Sixty-Fifth Congress, approved June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. 228 [18 USCA § 613]), which title, by express provision of section 25, tit. 2, of the National Prohibition Act, governs . search warrants in liquor cases. Section 3 provides: “A search warrant cannot be issued but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or describing the person and particularly describing the property and the place to he searched-.”
The government makes no contention that the warrant adequately names or describes the person, but says that the warrant in the case at bar authorized and commanded the search of a place, not of a person, and that in such cases it is not necessary that the warrant name or describe a person. I find no cases in opposition to this contention of the government, and it has been sustained by many courts. Petition of Barber (D. C.) 281 F. 550; Gandreau v. United States (C. C. A.) 300 F. 21; United States v. Camarota (D. C.) 278 F. 388; and In re Hollywood Cabaret (C. C. A.) 5 F.(2d) 651.
Yet, for a reason, of such gravity that it cannot be ignored by the court, notwithstanding it was not specifically assigned by the defendant, the warrant is, I think, wholly void, and must be quashed. Section 25 of title 2 of the National Prohibition Act expressly provides: “No search warrant shall issue to search any private dwelling occupied as such unless it is being used for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, or unless it is in part used for some business purpose such as a store, shop, saloon, restaurant, hotel,' or boarding house. The term ‘private dwelling’ shall be construed to include the room or rooms used and occupied not transiently but solely as a residence in an apartment house, hotel, or boarding house.” The [966]*966warrant, copy of which is printed in the margin,1 authorized and commanded the executing officers to enter and search the premises described in the warrant. The premises there described are “the premises of Leach, the same being a one-story frame house, together with several other one-story frame buildings, being the first residence 2 on the right side of a dirt road. * * * ”. The facts relied upon to constitute probable cause for the issuance of the warrant and the search of the residence are that the affiant “smelled a very strong odor of fermenting mash emanating from several outbuildings on the above-described premises.” But such facts are not sufficient to bring the residence or private dwelling commanded to be searched within any exception to the general rule laid down by section 25 of title 2 of the Volstead Act, and consequently do not justify the issuance of the warrant for the search of the dwelling. Foster v. State (Okl. Cr. App.) 226 P. 602; Voorhies v. United States (C. C. A. 5) 299 F. 275; Roberts v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 75, 266 S. W. 880; Staker v. United States (C. C. A. 6) 5 F.(2d) 312. Under the Volstead Act, a private dwelling, not shown to be within the exceptions stated in the statute, is not subject to search, even if it is known that intoxicating liquor is being manufactured therein. United States v. Palma (D. C.) 295 F. 149. Moreover, being insufficient to search the dwelling proper, the warrant was wholly void and insufficient to permit a search of any part of the premises. State v. Pierce (Mo. App.) 269 S. W. 406.
The reason and the extent to which, under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, private dwellings are zealously guarded from intrusion by officers of the law, are set forth in Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) pp. 610-636; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, L. R. A. 1915B, 834, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1177; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319; and Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 41 S. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647. These amendments, whose preservation is indispensable to the continuance of a free people, remain unrepealed and unmodified. The court is not at liberty to permit the destruction of these amendments or statutes passed in pursuance thereof by the disintegrating forces of encroachment, howsoever indirect, subtle, or gradual the encroachment may be.
Again, the warrant was directed “to Colonel Samuel O. Wynne, Federal Prohibition Administrator, and His Deputies, or Any or Either of Them.” The jurisdiction of Col. Wynne embraces the state of Delaware and the eastern part of the state of Pennsylvania. The warrant was executed, not by Col. Wynne, but by one of the numerous officers of the designated class. In Gandreau v. United States (C. C. A. 1) 300 F. [967]*96721, a warrant directed to tlhe marshal of the district “or any of his deputies, or any federal prohibition agent, or any civil officer of the United States, duly authorized to enforce any law thereof” was held valid, under sections 6 and 7 of title 11 of Public Law numbered 24 of the Sixty-Fifth Congress, approved June 15, 1917. 40 Stat. 229 (18 USCA §§ 616, 617). Yet, if that ruling is sound, it is difficult to see why a direction to “any civil officer of the United States” would not he good. But it seems to me that such a direction would run counter to sections 6 and 7 of title 11 of the Espionage Act. 40 Stat. 229. The validity of a warrant directed not to one or more individual or specific officers but to a class came before Judges Thompson and Dickinson in United States v. Innelli (D. C.) 286 F. 731. They found it unnecessary to decide the question.
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24 F.2d 965, 1928 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1037, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-leach-ded-1928.