Opinion by Judge PREGERSON; Dissent by Judge WARDLAW.
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:
Each of Lawrence Ezekial Reid and Wayne Blake (“Appellants”) appeals his conviction for being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5) and 924(a)(2). Appellants contend, inter alia, that the government’s warrantless search of their apartment violated the Fourth Amendment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.
BACKGROUND
The events in this case occurred as a result of the U.S. Marshals’s efforts to locate Aldrick Lloyd Edwards, an individual who was suspected of committing various narcotics and weapons violations. In September 1997, Deputy Robert Kitts learned that a close associate of Edwards, known as Mikey, resided in apartment 101 at 4424 44th Street in San Diego, California. In November of that year, Deputy Kitts went to the apartment complex to verify that Mikey lived in apartment 101. Kitts showed a photograph of Mikey to the apartment manager, who confirmed that Mikey was the person who had signed the lease. In addition to interviewing the apartment manager, Deputy Kitts and his fellow officers spoke with tenants of the apartment complex. The residents who the officers interviewed verified that Mi-key resided in apartment 101 with other individuals. Deputy Kitts testified that he drove by the apartment complex “every time [he] was in the neighborhood” to ensure that Mikey had not moved. Additionally, he contacted the manager of the apartment complex on multiple occasions to verify that Mikey continued to reside there.
During his extensive and ongoing investigation of the apartment complex, Deputy Kitts observed two automobiles parked in the space assigned to apartment 101 — a bronze Lexus and a bronze Acura Legend. [1023]*1023Deputy Kitts noted the license plate on the Lexus and learned that a woman named Sarah Buie was the registered owner.
On June 15, 1998, agents from the U.S. Marshals, the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”), and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) went to apartment 101 to speak with Mikey. The officers did not have a search warrant or an arrest warrant when they went to the apartment. Deputy Kitts knockéd on the front door of the apartment and a man, later identified as Junior Grant, answered. Because Deputy Kitts was aware of Mi-key’s appearance, he knew that Grant was not Mikey or Aldrick Edwards, the alleged fugitive who was an associate of Mikey.
After Grant opened the door, Deputy Kitts asked him if he knew who owned the Lexus that was parked in the parking space for apartment 101. Grant stated that he did not know who owned that automobile. Deputy Kitts testified that he smelled the aroma of burning marijuana at that time.2 Shortly thereafter, Deputy Kitts displayed his law enforcement badge and identified himself as a federal agent. Grant immediately slammed and locked the door. A few seconds later, Deputy Kitts received a call over his radio informing him that another deputy marshal covering the rear exit observed a man running from the back of the apartment. The description of the man was consistent with the appearance of Junior Grant.
Deputy Kitts ran to the back of the apartment where he found another deputy detaining Grant. Grant was standing in a spread eagle position facing the sliding glass door at the rear of the apartment with another officer standing behind him. Deputy Kitts handcuffed Grant. Deputy Kitts testified that he told Grant that he was handcuffed for his safety and the safety of the officers, but that he was not under arrest. Deputy Kitts testified that there was no probable cause to arrest Grant at that time. Additionally, Deputy Kitts testified that he did not hear any sounds which suggested that other individuals were inside the apartment.
The officers asked Grant for his identification, and Grant told them that it was inside the apartment. Grant told the officers that his name was “Alvin David Bryant.” The officers then asked him if there was anyone else inside the apartment. Grant told them that there was not. Deputy Kitts testified that Grant then gave the officers permission, at their request, to enter the apartment to retrieve his identification and to make sure that no one else was inside.
Grant’s testimony about the events differed from the officers’ testimony. Grant testified that when the officers detained him at the back of the apartment, they told him that he was. going to go to prison. Grant also testified that he refused to sign a consent to search form and that he told the officers that he could not give them permission to search the apartment because it was not his residence. Grant’s testimony, however, was somewhat confused.
After Grant allegedly gave the officers permission to search, the officers went inside the apartment. They observed a firearm, currency, packing boxes, clear plastic bags, and other items that they believed to be associated with marijuana trafficking. After observing these items, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Deputy Kitts left the apartment to obtain a search warrant. The other officers remained at the scene.
Deputy Kitts prepared an affidavit in support of his request for a search warrant. In that affidavit Kitts did not state that he and the other officers went inside the apartment to retrieve Grant’s identification. Rather, the affidavit indicated that Grant “said no one else was in the residence and consented to a search -for other [1024]*1024persons.” Agent William Mickle, who was at apartment 101 on June 15, 1998, also prepared a report. Like Deputy Kitts’s affidavit, Mickle’s report did not mention that the officers went inside the apartment to retrieve Grant’s identification. Additionally, Mickle’s report did not mention that Grant had consented to the search of apartment 101.
While the search warrant was being prepared, at approximately 10:00 a.m., Appellant Wayne Blake arrived and attempted to enter the apartment. When the officers, asked him who he was, he handed Agent Mickle his wallet and refused to answer any questions. In the wallet Agent Mickle found an identification card that was purportedly issued by the police department in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Agent Mickle testified that he knew that the police in the U.S. Virgin Islands do not issue such cards and thus ascertained that the identification card was false. Subsequently, Agent Mickle arrested Blake.
About one hour later, at 11:15 a.m., Appellant Lawrence Ezekiel Reid entered the front door of the apartment and encountered the officers inside. After hearing Agent Mickle announce that he was the “police,” Reid ran through the front door. Agent Mickle chased Reid and apprehended him in an area outside the apartment. As did Appellant Blake, Reid gave the officers identification purportedly issued by the police in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Agent Mickle then arrested Reid for possession of false documents.
The officers executed the search warrant at approximately 1:30 p.m. The officers found a silver Ruger GP-100 .367 magnum revolver and a silver Raven .25 semi-automatic handgun in the south bedroom of the apartment.
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Opinion by Judge PREGERSON; Dissent by Judge WARDLAW.
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:
Each of Lawrence Ezekial Reid and Wayne Blake (“Appellants”) appeals his conviction for being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5) and 924(a)(2). Appellants contend, inter alia, that the government’s warrantless search of their apartment violated the Fourth Amendment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.
BACKGROUND
The events in this case occurred as a result of the U.S. Marshals’s efforts to locate Aldrick Lloyd Edwards, an individual who was suspected of committing various narcotics and weapons violations. In September 1997, Deputy Robert Kitts learned that a close associate of Edwards, known as Mikey, resided in apartment 101 at 4424 44th Street in San Diego, California. In November of that year, Deputy Kitts went to the apartment complex to verify that Mikey lived in apartment 101. Kitts showed a photograph of Mikey to the apartment manager, who confirmed that Mikey was the person who had signed the lease. In addition to interviewing the apartment manager, Deputy Kitts and his fellow officers spoke with tenants of the apartment complex. The residents who the officers interviewed verified that Mi-key resided in apartment 101 with other individuals. Deputy Kitts testified that he drove by the apartment complex “every time [he] was in the neighborhood” to ensure that Mikey had not moved. Additionally, he contacted the manager of the apartment complex on multiple occasions to verify that Mikey continued to reside there.
During his extensive and ongoing investigation of the apartment complex, Deputy Kitts observed two automobiles parked in the space assigned to apartment 101 — a bronze Lexus and a bronze Acura Legend. [1023]*1023Deputy Kitts noted the license plate on the Lexus and learned that a woman named Sarah Buie was the registered owner.
On June 15, 1998, agents from the U.S. Marshals, the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”), and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) went to apartment 101 to speak with Mikey. The officers did not have a search warrant or an arrest warrant when they went to the apartment. Deputy Kitts knockéd on the front door of the apartment and a man, later identified as Junior Grant, answered. Because Deputy Kitts was aware of Mi-key’s appearance, he knew that Grant was not Mikey or Aldrick Edwards, the alleged fugitive who was an associate of Mikey.
After Grant opened the door, Deputy Kitts asked him if he knew who owned the Lexus that was parked in the parking space for apartment 101. Grant stated that he did not know who owned that automobile. Deputy Kitts testified that he smelled the aroma of burning marijuana at that time.2 Shortly thereafter, Deputy Kitts displayed his law enforcement badge and identified himself as a federal agent. Grant immediately slammed and locked the door. A few seconds later, Deputy Kitts received a call over his radio informing him that another deputy marshal covering the rear exit observed a man running from the back of the apartment. The description of the man was consistent with the appearance of Junior Grant.
Deputy Kitts ran to the back of the apartment where he found another deputy detaining Grant. Grant was standing in a spread eagle position facing the sliding glass door at the rear of the apartment with another officer standing behind him. Deputy Kitts handcuffed Grant. Deputy Kitts testified that he told Grant that he was handcuffed for his safety and the safety of the officers, but that he was not under arrest. Deputy Kitts testified that there was no probable cause to arrest Grant at that time. Additionally, Deputy Kitts testified that he did not hear any sounds which suggested that other individuals were inside the apartment.
The officers asked Grant for his identification, and Grant told them that it was inside the apartment. Grant told the officers that his name was “Alvin David Bryant.” The officers then asked him if there was anyone else inside the apartment. Grant told them that there was not. Deputy Kitts testified that Grant then gave the officers permission, at their request, to enter the apartment to retrieve his identification and to make sure that no one else was inside.
Grant’s testimony about the events differed from the officers’ testimony. Grant testified that when the officers detained him at the back of the apartment, they told him that he was. going to go to prison. Grant also testified that he refused to sign a consent to search form and that he told the officers that he could not give them permission to search the apartment because it was not his residence. Grant’s testimony, however, was somewhat confused.
After Grant allegedly gave the officers permission to search, the officers went inside the apartment. They observed a firearm, currency, packing boxes, clear plastic bags, and other items that they believed to be associated with marijuana trafficking. After observing these items, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Deputy Kitts left the apartment to obtain a search warrant. The other officers remained at the scene.
Deputy Kitts prepared an affidavit in support of his request for a search warrant. In that affidavit Kitts did not state that he and the other officers went inside the apartment to retrieve Grant’s identification. Rather, the affidavit indicated that Grant “said no one else was in the residence and consented to a search -for other [1024]*1024persons.” Agent William Mickle, who was at apartment 101 on June 15, 1998, also prepared a report. Like Deputy Kitts’s affidavit, Mickle’s report did not mention that the officers went inside the apartment to retrieve Grant’s identification. Additionally, Mickle’s report did not mention that Grant had consented to the search of apartment 101.
While the search warrant was being prepared, at approximately 10:00 a.m., Appellant Wayne Blake arrived and attempted to enter the apartment. When the officers, asked him who he was, he handed Agent Mickle his wallet and refused to answer any questions. In the wallet Agent Mickle found an identification card that was purportedly issued by the police department in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Agent Mickle testified that he knew that the police in the U.S. Virgin Islands do not issue such cards and thus ascertained that the identification card was false. Subsequently, Agent Mickle arrested Blake.
About one hour later, at 11:15 a.m., Appellant Lawrence Ezekiel Reid entered the front door of the apartment and encountered the officers inside. After hearing Agent Mickle announce that he was the “police,” Reid ran through the front door. Agent Mickle chased Reid and apprehended him in an area outside the apartment. As did Appellant Blake, Reid gave the officers identification purportedly issued by the police in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Agent Mickle then arrested Reid for possession of false documents.
The officers executed the search warrant at approximately 1:30 p.m. The officers found a silver Ruger GP-100 .367 magnum revolver and a silver Raven .25 semi-automatic handgun in the south bedroom of the apartment. The officers also discovered a document appearing to be a birth certificate from the U.S. Virgin Islands for Wayne Blake.
In the north bedroom, the officers located a silver Smith & Wesson .357 magnum revolver and a silver .22 caliber revolver in a dresser. The officers also found another false identification card with Reid’s picture on it in the north bedroom. Five other pictures of Reid were found in the dresser as well. Additionally, the officers found 39 boxes, nine rolls of tape, nine bags of packing material, Federal Express service bills, and Western Union money transfer receipts in the north bedroom.
The officers also found. packaging and shipping materials, miscellaneous papers, an electronic scale with a 220 pound capacity, marijuana residue, and $30,000 in cash in the apartment. Based on this evidence, DEA agent Jack Kozey began an administrative forfeiture of the currency found at the residence as well as the vehicles parked in the stalls associated with apartment 101. Specifically, the DEA seized Reid’s 1994 Lexus and the 1994 Acura used by Blake.
A federal grand jury in the Southern District of California returned an Indictment against Appellants on July 1, 1998, for violations of 18 U:S.C. §§ 922(g)(5) and 924(a)(2), charging Blake with being an illegal alien in possession of two firearms, and Reid with being an illegal alien in possession of one firearm. Appellants filed pretrial motions to suppress the fruits of the warrantless search of the apartment. An evidentiary hearing was held over the course of three days on August 10, 24, and 27, 1998. After the hearing, the district court took the matter under submission. On September 9, 1998, Blake filed an additional pre-trial motion to suppress the fruits of an inventory search of the 1994 Acura that was seized by Agent Kozey.
The district court denied Blake and Reid’s pretrial motions. Blake and Reid were convicted as charged in the Indictment by a jury on September 24, 1998. On December 14, 1998, the district judge sentenced Blake to 33 months in custody and a 3 year term of supervised release and sentenced Reid to 21 months in custody and a 3 year term of supervised release. Blake and Reid then filed this appeal.
[1025]*1025DISCUSSION
Appellants contend that the government’s warrantless search of apartment 101 violated the Fourth Amendment. We agree.
“A warrantless search of a house is per se unreasonable and absent exigency or consent, warrantless entry into the home is impermissible under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir.1990) (internal citations omitted). Evidence that is recovered following an illegal entry into a home is inadmissible and must be suppressed. See id. In the present case, the district court denied Appellants’ motion to suppress because it determined that Grant consented to the search and that his consent was valid. Appellants challenge this conclusion arguing that Grant did not have authority to consent and that even if he did, his consent was not voluntary. The government urges us to affirm the court’s ruling that Grant’s consent was valid. In the alternative, the government asserts that the warrantless search was permissible either as a protective sweep or because it was justified due to exigent circumstances.
A. Grant’s Consent Was Not Valid
The government does not contend that Grant was a resident of apartment 101 or that he had actual authority to consent to the search of that apartment. Rather, the government argues that we should affirm the district court’s conclusion that Grant had “apparent authority” to consent to the search. “A determination of apparent authority presents mixed questions of fact and law and is reviewed de novo.” United States v. Fiorillo, 186 F.3d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir.1999).
“The existence of consent to a search is not lightly to be inferred and the government always bears the burden of proof to establish the existence of effective consent.” Shaibu, 920 F.2d at 1426 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761, 764 (9th Cir.1993). The existence of apparent authority entails a three-part analysis.
First, did the searching officer believe some untrue fact that was then used to assess the consent-giver’s use of and access to or control over the area searched? Second, was it under the circumstances objectively reasonable to believe that the fact was true? Finally, assuming the truth of the reasonably believed but untrue fact, would the consent-giver have had actual authority?
Fiorillo, 186 F.3d at 1144 (quoting United States v. Dearing, 9 F.3d 1428, 1429-30 (9th Cir.1993)). As the Supreme Court noted in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990), even if a person invites law enforcement inside and explicitly asserts that he lives there, “the surrounding circumstances could [ ] be such that a reasonable person would doubt its truth and not act upon it without further inquiry.”
The government contends that Grant had apparent authority to consent because he answered the front door and appeared to be alone in the apartment.3 This evidence, however, is insufficient because “the mere fact of access, without more, does not indicate that the access was authorized.” Dearing, 9 F.3d at 1430.
Moreover, the surrounding circumstances in this case were such that a reasonable person would not presume, without further inquiry, that Grant resided in apartment 101. Deputy Kitts knew that [1026]*1026an individual named Mikey resided in the apartment and knew that Grant was not Mikey.4 He also knew that the Lexus, which was parked in the parking space assigned to apartment 101, was registered to a woman. Also, before he identified himself as a federal agent, he asked Grant if he knew who owned the Lexus. Grant stated that he did not know who owned that automobile. This suggested that Grant did not reside there because, as Kitts testified, the Lexus was frequently parked in the parking space for apartment 101.
Additionally, Kitts testified that he drove by the apartment complex on numerous occasions and interviewed the property manager about the residents. At no time did Kitts testify that he had observed Grant in the apartment complex. Deputy Kitts also acknowledged that the property manager provided him with information about the names on the lease. He admitted that these names did not include “Junior Grant” or “Alvin David Bryant,” the name that Grant gave the officers when they detained him.
In light of Deputy Kitts’s knowledge about the residents of the. apartment and the surrounding circumstances, it was not objectively reasonable to believe that Grant resided in the apartment simply because he opened the door and appeared to be alone. We are mindful that “mere access” to a residence, without more, is insufficient to establish apparent authority. Bearing, 9 F.3d at 1430. Here, other than access, the officers had no reason to believe that Grant lived in the apartment. Indeed, the officers should have asked Grant if he lived in the apartment before they entered the apartment to conduct the search. They failed to do so. Thus, the determination that Grant had authority to consent to the search simply because he answered the door to the apartment was not objectively reasonable. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in ruling that Grant had apparent authority to consent to the search.
Furthermore, even if we were to find that Grant had apparent authority, we do not agree with the district court’s determination that Grant’s consent was voluntary. We will “not disturb a district court’s determination that a person’s consent to search was voluntary unless that determination was clearly erroneous.” Fiorillo, 186 F.3d at 1143.
To “establish the validity of a consent to search, the government bears the heavy burden of demonstrating that the consent was freely and voluntarily given.” United States v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1324, 1327 (9th Cir.1997). “Judicial concern [for] the sanctity of the home is so elevated that free and voluntary consent cannot be found by a showing of mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.” Shaibu, 920 F.2d at 1426; see also United States v. Spires, 3 F.3d 1234, 1237 (9th Cir.1993). Rather, the government “must show that there was no duress or coercion, express or implied” and that the consent was “unequivocal and specific” and “freely and intelligently given.” Shaibu, 920 F.2d at 1426.
Whether consent was voluntarily given “ ‘is to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.’ ” Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). We consider the following factors to assess whether the consent was voluntary: (1) whether the person was in custody; (2) whether the officers had then-guns drawn; (3) whether a Miranda warning had been given; (4) whether the person was told that he had the right not to consent; and (5) whether the person was told that a search warrant could be obtained. See United States v. Torres-Sanchez, 83 F.3d 1123, 1129-30 (9th Cir.1996). Although no one factor is determinative in [1027]*1027the equation, see United States v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir.1988), “many of this court’s decisions upholding consent as voluntary are supported by at least several of the factors,” Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.8d at 1327 n. 3.
In this case, the relevant considerations overwhelmingly favor the finding that Grant did not voluntarily consent to a search of the apartment. Although the government argues that Grant was not under arrest, the record shows that the officers ordered Grant up against the sliding glass door, placed him in a spread eagle position, frisked him, and then handcuffed him. Grant testified that the officers told him that he was “going to prison.” Additionally, all of the officers were armed; and the record suggests that at least one officer had his gun drawn. Moreover, the officers neither read Grant his Miranda rights nor informed him that he had the right not to consent to the search.
Under the totality of the circumstances we conclude that the government did not sustain its burden of proving that the consent was voluntarily given. Consequently, the district court’s determination that Grant voluntarily consented was ■ clearly erroneous.
B. The Warrantless Search Was neither a Protective Sweep nor Justified by Exigent Circumstances
In attempting to salvage the unconstitutional search of apartment 101, the government argues that the warrantless search of apartment 101 was valid as a protective sweep5 and that it was justified by exigent circumstances.
In Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990) the Supreme Court defined “protective sweep” as “a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted ■ to protect the safety of police officers or others.” 494 U.S. at 327,110 S.Ct. 1093. The Court further explained that:
as an incident to the■ arrest the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched. Beyond that, however, we hold that there must be articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.
Id. at 334, 1Í0 S.Ct. 1093 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Noushfar, 78 F.3d 1442, 1448 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting Buie and noting that “[a] protective sweep may last ‘no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises’ ”). In the present case, Deputy Kitts testified that when the officers detained Grant in the back of the apartment, Grant was not under arrest. Additionally, the government did not point to any facts that demonstrated that a reasonably prudent officer would have believed that the apartment “harbor[ed] an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” See Buie, 494 U.S. at 334, 110 S.Ct. 1093. Therefore,, the officers were not entitled to conduct a, protective sweep under Buie.
Moreover, it is clear that no exigent circumstances existed to justify the officers’ warrantless entry and search of apartment 101. “Exigent circumstances are those in which a substantial risk of harm to the persons involved or to the law enforcement process would arise if the police were to delay a search [ ] until a warrant' could be obtained.” United [1028]*1028States v. Gooch, 6 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir.1993) (citation omitted) see also United States v. Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d 1292, 1298 (9th Cir.1988). Mere speculation is not sufficient to show exigent circumstances. See United States v. Tarazon, 989 F.2d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir.1993). Rather, “[t]he government bears the burden of showing the existence of exigent circumstances by particularized evidence.” Id. This is a heavy burden and can be satisfied “only by demonstrating specific and articulable facts to justify the finding of exigent circumstances.” LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “the presence of exigent circumstances necessarily implies that there is insufficient time to obtain a warrant; therefore, the government must show that a warrant could not have been obtained in time.” Tarazon, 989 F.2d at 1049.
The government argues that the war-rantless search was justified because it was possible that other individuals were inside the apartment. The only “specific and articulable facts” that the government cites to justify this conclusion are: (1) Deputy Kitts smelled the aroma of burning marijuana coming from the apartment6; and (2) the Lexus was parked in the parking space for apartment 101.
The smell of burning marijuana cannot satisfy the heavy burden that the government must overcome because one person can smoke marijuana alone. Similarly, the fact that the Lexus was parked in the parking space for apartment 101, standing alone, is insufficient to establish exigent circumstances. Other than the two facts offered by the government, there was no evidence that other persons were inside the apartment. Deputy Kitts testified that he did not hear anything that indicated that another person was inside the apartment. And when Grant was detained at the back of the apartment he told the officers that there was no one else inside. Moreover, the officers did not have any information that Grant or anyone possibly inside the apartment was violent. The officers did not see any guns and Grant cooperated with the officers when he was detained outside.
Finally, the government did not explain why the officers could not have simply staked out the apartment while waiting for a warrant. In fact, the evidence established that Deputy Kitts obtained a warrant early that afternoon.
Accordingly, we conclude that the war-rantless entry and search of apartment 101 was not a protective sweep and was not justified by exigent circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The government’s warrantless search of apartment 101 violated the Fourth Amendment and any evidence resulting from that search is inadmissible.7 See Shaibu, 920 F.2d at 1425. Appellants Blake and Reid’s convictions are therefore REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.