United States v. LaVaughn Odom

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: March 5, 2026
• Docket: 25-5338
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0105n.06

No. 25-5338

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Mar 05, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE Plaintiff-Appellee, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE MIDDLE v. ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE ) LAVAUGHN V. ODOM, ) OPINION Defendant-Appellant. ) )

Before: GRIFFIN, BUSH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, we consider whether LaVaughn Odom’s

192-month sentence for drug trafficking and other crimes, which was below the applicable U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines range, was procedurally or substantively unreasonable. It was not, so we

AFFIRM.

I.

Five years ago, Nashville police officers discovered Odom by searching the phone of a

woman who had died of a drug overdose. The search led them to believe that Odom had dealt her

heroin. The officers confirmed this suspicion through a confidential informant who later carried

out two controlled buys of heroin from Odom. That information led to a warrant to search Odom’s

car and home. While carrying out the warrant, officers met Odom coming out of his home and

attempted to detain him. He fled but was quickly caught, with $6,000 cash on his person. More

cash (over $25,000) was in his car, along with cocaine, fentanyl, and a pistol. No. 25-5338, United States v. Odom

Federal prosecutors charged Odom with one count of possession with intent to distribute a

controlled substance, one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and one count of

possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Odom pleaded guilty to these

charges without reaching a plea agreement.

Probation Services prepared a Presentence Investigation Report for sentencing that

calculated Odom’s Sentencing Guidelines range at 262 to 327 months. This was higher than it

might otherwise be because Odom qualified as a career offender based on his three prior drug-

trafficking convictions. Both Odom and the government agreed that this was an accurate

calculation of Odom’s Guidelines range. Despite agreeing with the calculation, Odom argued to

the district court, both in his sentencing memorandum and during sentencing, that the Guidelines

range should be given “little (if any) weight because it is extremely and overly harsh” given the

applicable career-offender Guideline. R. 45, Sentencing Memorandum, PageID 118. Odom

requested a significant downward variance to a sentence of 100 months because of the harsh nature

of the career-offender Guideline, as well as his age and personal circumstances. The government

agreed that a downward variance was appropriate for Odom and requested a sentence of 240

months.

Before determining the appropriate sentence, the district court first considered the 28

U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including Odom’s personal history and characteristics, particularly

Odom’s seven prior drug convictions since the age of 20. It then considered Odom’s objections

to the use of the career-offender Guideline and his request that it be given little to no weight. The

district court noted that “the Sentencing Commission is taking a hard look at career offender,” and

that it made sense for the Commission to do so. R. 59, Sentencing Tr., PageID 273. To determine

whether Odom was correct that the career-offender Guideline led to an excessive punishment, the

2 No. 25-5338, United States v. Odom

district court compared Odom to other similarly situated career offenders using circuit-wide

sentencing data. The district court then declined to impose the substantial variance requested by

Odom because it would “result in a 40-month sentence for both a gun charge and a drug charge,”

given that Count III carried a mandatory consecutive term of 60 months. Id. at 272–73. The

district court found this 40-month sentence to be unjustified because it was too far below the

average sentence for career offenders.

Despite this finding, and after weighing Odom’s objections and the appropriate factors, the

district court agreed to vary downward. It sentenced Odom to 192 months’ imprisonment, finding

that 100 months, as requested by Odom, was insufficient given his prior crimes, the nature and

circumstances of his offense, his status as a parolee, and the need to protect the public and promote

respect for the law. The district court also found that the government’s request of 240 months

would lead to sentencing disparities with other similarly situated defendants.

The district court concluded by asking if either side had any objections to the sentence.

Odom objected that the sentence was substantively unreasonable but made no other objections.

Odom now brings this appeal arguing that his sentence is both procedurally and

substantively unreasonable.

II.

We turn first to procedural reasonableness. Because Odom failed to make a procedural

reasonableness objection at sentencing, we review for plain error. See United States v. Gardner,

32 F.4th 504, 529 (6th Cir. 2022). Odom argues that the district court made two plain procedural

mistakes: (1) it did not adequately address his argument that the career-offender Guideline should

be rejected in his case, and (2) it relied on overinclusive sentencing data when considering potential

3 No. 25-5338, United States v. Odom

sentencing disparities. We need not delve too deep into the plain-error analysis because neither of

these claimed errors amounts to a procedural error at all.

A.

The district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range for Odom at 262 to 327 months.

Odom did not object to this calculation, but argued that the Guideline range that includes the

career-offender Guideline “is extremely and overly harsh” such that it “produces an excessive

sentence.” R. 45, Odom Sentencing Memorandum, PageID 118. To support this argument, Odom

noted that the U.S. Sentencing Commission has expressed its concern about sentencing disparities

arising from the career-offender Guideline. But Odom ultimately agreed that the career-offender

Guideline applied to him and asked for a downward variance based on a within-Guidelines

sentence being excessive.

Odom now contends that his argument to the district court was to reject the career-offender

Guideline altogether and that the district court plainly erred by not responding to this argument.

But that is not what Odom requested. He asked only that the district court give his career-offender

status “little (if any) weight . . . .” R. 45, Odom Sentencing Memorandum, PageID 118. Odom

did not present his policy arguments relating to the career-offender Guideline as primary

arguments, but as supporting arguments for his claim that the sentence was excessive and would

create disparities with other defendants who committed similar crimes.

Legal arguments, like all arguments, are typically organized by making a main argument

and then sub-arguments that support the main argument. Odom’s sentencing memorandum

followed this formula. He argued as his main point that the career-offender Guideline produces

an excessive sentence. To support this argument, he made three sub-arguments: (1) he pointed to

the Sentencing Commission’s attempts to reform the career-offender Guideline to avoid these

4 No. 25-5338, United States v. Odom

excessive sentences; (2) he said that many courts were varying below the Guidelines range when

a career-offender enhancement applied; and (3) he argued that the facts of his prior convictions

show that his career-offender status is based on low-level drug crimes. None of these sub-

arguments showed an intent to challenge the calculation of the Guidelines range or to argue that

the career-offender Guideline should not apply at all. They each were meant to support a

downward variance from the correctly calculated Guidelines range. See id. at 120–21 (“Mr. Odom

submits that the range produced by [the career-offender Guideline] is not entitled to much weight

and that [the district court] should vary below it to the requested sentence.”).

This lines up with how the district court understood Odom’s arguments. At sentencing, it

summarized Odom’s position as requesting a variance because the career-offender designation

“can result in a [G]uideline range that perhaps is disproportionately high.” R. 59, Sentencing Tr.,

PageID 271. Odom never objected to this characterization or clarified that he wanted the district

court to not apply the career-offender Guideline at all. The district court considered Odom’s

argument that the career-offender Guideline results in an excessive sentence, accepted it, and

varied downward from the Guideline range.

The district court did not plainly err by failing to address an argument that Odom did not

plainly make. See United States v. Embry, 728 F. App’x 544, 548 (6th Cir. 2018) (finding no

abuse of discretion for failing to consider arguments the defendant did not make).

B.

The district court also did not plainly err by considering circuit-wide sentencing data

relating to career offenders. To keep this brief, Odom does not point to a single case showing that

a district court plainly errs by relying on disaggregated sentencing data to determine whether a

sentence is out-of-line with other similarly situated defendants. Nor does he cite any case

5 No. 25-5338, United States v. Odom

explaining that violent career offenders are not similarly situated to drug-trafficking-only career

offenders. Because Odom offers no binding case law showing that the district court erred, we

cannot find plain error. See United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784, 794 (6th Cir. 2015) (“A lack

of binding case law that answers the question presented will also preclude our finding of plain

error.”).

III.

We next turn to the substantive reasonableness of Odom’s sentence. Odom makes two

arguments on this point as well. He first contends that his below-Guidelines sentence was

substantively unreasonable because the district court should not have given any weight to his

Guidelines range that included his status as a career offender. He next claims that the district court

gave too little weight to his age because men of his age are less likely to commit crimes. We reject

both arguments.

“A sentence may be considered substantively unreasonable when the district court selects

a sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider relevant

factors, or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” United States v.

Sexton, 894 F.3d 787, 797 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 520

(6th Cir. 2008)). For challenges to the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we review for an

abuse of discretion. United States v. Solano-Rosales, 781 F.3d 345, 355–56 (6th Cir. 2015). “A

defendant challenging a below-guidelines sentence as substantively unreasonable bears an even

more demanding burden than does a defendant challenging a within-guidelines sentence.” United

States v. Wells, 55 F.4th 1086, 1093–94 (6th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).

6 No. 25-5338, United States v. Odom

This demanding burden is not met here. Take Odom’s first argument. We have no trouble

concluding that a district court does not abuse its discretion when it gives weight to a defendant’s

correctly calculated Guidelines range. Enough said.

His second argument fares no better. The district court considered Odom’s history and

characteristics, noting that Odom has had “seven drug convictions since the age of 20.” R. 59,

Sentencing Tr., PageID 272. A study showing that people generally commit fewer crimes as they

age cannot show that a district court abused its discretion as it relates to an individual defendant.

Deciding otherwise would “elevate . . . statistical data over the text of the Guidelines themselves.”

United States v. Hymes, 19 F.4th 928, 936 (6th Cir. 2021). The Guidelines charge the district court

with weighing several factors and reaching an appropriate sentence. Odom’s suggestion that his

age should have played an almost dispositive role creates a problem where none existed, because

relying so heavily on his age that it could cut his sentence almost in half would place an

unreasonable amount of weight on this single factor. See Sexton, 894 F.3d at 797. Odom has not

shown that the district court’s weighing of these factors was unreasonable. See United States v.

Haile, 157 F.4th 820, 832 (6th Cir. 2025). Because he cannot show that the sentence was

unreasonable, the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to weigh Odom’s age so

heavily that it would result in a greater downward variance than what he already received.

IV.

For all these reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.