USCA4 Appeal: 19-4377 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/08/2023 Pg: 1 of 7
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4377
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LAQUIN LAMAR CORBIN, a/k/a Shorty, a/k/a Roy Lamar Jones,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:18-cr-00217-D-2)
Submitted: April 20, 2023 Decided: August 8, 2023
Before WYNN and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Mary J. Darrow, Raleigh, North Carolina; Craig M. Cooley, COOLEY LAW OFFICE, Cary, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 19-4377 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/08/2023 Pg: 2 of 7
PER CURIAM:
Laquin Lamar Corbin was convicted after a jury trial of possession on or about
March 28, 2017, of a firearm and ammunition and aiding and abetting, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 922(g)(1), 924. The district court sentenced Corbin to 120 months’
imprisonment. On appeal, Corbin challenges his conviction, arguing that the district court
erred in admitting into evidence testimony from his co-defendant regarding his drug
trafficking in 2017 and that he is entitled to relief pursuant to Rehaif v. United States,
139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), which was decided after he was convicted and sentenced. * We
affirm.
We review the district court’s admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Ebert, 61 F.4th 394, 403 (4th Cir. 2023). “A district court abuses its discretion
when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally, fails to consider judicially recognized factors
constraining its exercise of discretion, relies on erroneous factual or legal premises, or
commits an error of law.” United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 2018).
Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits the admission into evidence
of another “crime, wrong, or other act . . . to prove a person’s character in order to show
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R.
In a supplemental pleading filed after he filed his opening brief, Corbin, invoking *
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserted that his Rehaif claim was meritless but requested that this court review the record to determine if this conclusion was correct. Because so-called quasi- or hybrid-Anders briefing is not proper, see United States v. Turner, 677 F.3d 570, 576-77 (3d Cir. 2012), and Corbin has not waived or abandoned his Rehaif claim, see United States v. Duroseau, 26 F.4th 674, 678 n.2 (4th Cir. 2022), we review it.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 19-4377 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/08/2023 Pg: 3 of 7
Evid. 404(b)(1) (eff. Dec. 1, 2011). Such “propensity evidence is excluded because it
might overpersuade a jury and cause them to prejudge one with a bad general record.”
United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 995 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted). But the Rule allows the admission of evidence of other acts or crimes if used to
prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). To be admissible under Rule
404(b), the evidence must be: (1) relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character;
(2) necessary to prove an element of the charged offense; (3) reliable; and (4) admissible
under Fed. R. Evid. 403, in that the probative value of the evidence must not be
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial nature. Queen, 132 F.3d at 997.
“Critically, however, not all prior bad act evidence is encompassed by Rule 404(b).”
United States v. Brizuela, 962 F.3d 784, 793 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “Instead, the rule is only applicable when the challenged evidence is extrinsic,
that is, separate from or unrelated to the charged offense.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). By contrast, “acts that are a part of, or intrinsic to, the alleged crime do not fall
under Rule 404(b)’s limitations on admissible evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Evidence is intrinsic when it arises “out of the same series of transactions as the
charged offense” or when it is “necessary to complete the story of the crime on trial.”
United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 885 (4th Cir. 1994) (cleaned up). For evidence to
be admissible to “complete the story” of a charged offense, the evidence must be “probative
of an integral component of the crime on trial or provide information without which the
3 USCA4 Appeal: 19-4377 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/08/2023 Pg: 4 of 7
factfinder would have an incomplete or inaccurate view of other evidence or of the story
of the crime itself.” Brizuela, 962 F.3d at 795.
Corbin argues that the testimony from his co-defendant regarding his drug dealing
in 2017 was inadmissible because it was evidence of prior bad acts and was not relevant to
the sole issue at trial—namely, whether he knowingly possessed firearms and
ammunition—or any other element of the offense charged. We reject these arguments.
The co-defendant’s testimony regarding Corbin’s drug trafficking in which the
co-defendant had involvement provided needed contextual information bearing on an
integral component of the crime on trial—whether Corbin knowingly possessed firearms
and ammunition—by explaining the circumstances under which Corbin came to possess
firearms in his apartment prior to the date charged in the indictment, how the
co-defendant—the only other occupant of the apartment with knowledge regarding the
firearms’ presence there and a witness testifying to the identity of the owner of the firearms
and their presence and placement in the apartment and on Corbin’s person—knew of that
possession, and by providing testimony establishing Corbin’s constructive possession of
firearms on March 28. This testimony was needed to complete the story of the crime on
trial and was thus intrinsic. Accordingly, Rule 404(b) did not apply to the admission of
this evidence, and no abuse of discretion is present.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
USCA4 Appeal: 19-4377 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/08/2023 Pg: 1 of 7
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4377
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LAQUIN LAMAR CORBIN, a/k/a Shorty, a/k/a Roy Lamar Jones,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:18-cr-00217-D-2)
Submitted: April 20, 2023 Decided: August 8, 2023
Before WYNN and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Mary J. Darrow, Raleigh, North Carolina; Craig M. Cooley, COOLEY LAW OFFICE, Cary, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 19-4377 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/08/2023 Pg: 2 of 7
PER CURIAM:
Laquin Lamar Corbin was convicted after a jury trial of possession on or about
March 28, 2017, of a firearm and ammunition and aiding and abetting, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 922(g)(1), 924. The district court sentenced Corbin to 120 months’
imprisonment. On appeal, Corbin challenges his conviction, arguing that the district court
erred in admitting into evidence testimony from his co-defendant regarding his drug
trafficking in 2017 and that he is entitled to relief pursuant to Rehaif v. United States,
139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), which was decided after he was convicted and sentenced. * We
affirm.
We review the district court’s admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Ebert, 61 F.4th 394, 403 (4th Cir. 2023). “A district court abuses its discretion
when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally, fails to consider judicially recognized factors
constraining its exercise of discretion, relies on erroneous factual or legal premises, or
commits an error of law.” United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 2018).
Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits the admission into evidence
of another “crime, wrong, or other act . . . to prove a person’s character in order to show
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R.
In a supplemental pleading filed after he filed his opening brief, Corbin, invoking *
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserted that his Rehaif claim was meritless but requested that this court review the record to determine if this conclusion was correct. Because so-called quasi- or hybrid-Anders briefing is not proper, see United States v. Turner, 677 F.3d 570, 576-77 (3d Cir. 2012), and Corbin has not waived or abandoned his Rehaif claim, see United States v. Duroseau, 26 F.4th 674, 678 n.2 (4th Cir. 2022), we review it.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 19-4377 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/08/2023 Pg: 3 of 7
Evid. 404(b)(1) (eff. Dec. 1, 2011). Such “propensity evidence is excluded because it
might overpersuade a jury and cause them to prejudge one with a bad general record.”
United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 995 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted). But the Rule allows the admission of evidence of other acts or crimes if used to
prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). To be admissible under Rule
404(b), the evidence must be: (1) relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character;
(2) necessary to prove an element of the charged offense; (3) reliable; and (4) admissible
under Fed. R. Evid. 403, in that the probative value of the evidence must not be
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial nature. Queen, 132 F.3d at 997.
“Critically, however, not all prior bad act evidence is encompassed by Rule 404(b).”
United States v. Brizuela, 962 F.3d 784, 793 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “Instead, the rule is only applicable when the challenged evidence is extrinsic,
that is, separate from or unrelated to the charged offense.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). By contrast, “acts that are a part of, or intrinsic to, the alleged crime do not fall
under Rule 404(b)’s limitations on admissible evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Evidence is intrinsic when it arises “out of the same series of transactions as the
charged offense” or when it is “necessary to complete the story of the crime on trial.”
United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 885 (4th Cir. 1994) (cleaned up). For evidence to
be admissible to “complete the story” of a charged offense, the evidence must be “probative
of an integral component of the crime on trial or provide information without which the
3 USCA4 Appeal: 19-4377 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/08/2023 Pg: 4 of 7
factfinder would have an incomplete or inaccurate view of other evidence or of the story
of the crime itself.” Brizuela, 962 F.3d at 795.
Corbin argues that the testimony from his co-defendant regarding his drug dealing
in 2017 was inadmissible because it was evidence of prior bad acts and was not relevant to
the sole issue at trial—namely, whether he knowingly possessed firearms and
ammunition—or any other element of the offense charged. We reject these arguments.
The co-defendant’s testimony regarding Corbin’s drug trafficking in which the
co-defendant had involvement provided needed contextual information bearing on an
integral component of the crime on trial—whether Corbin knowingly possessed firearms
and ammunition—by explaining the circumstances under which Corbin came to possess
firearms in his apartment prior to the date charged in the indictment, how the
co-defendant—the only other occupant of the apartment with knowledge regarding the
firearms’ presence there and a witness testifying to the identity of the owner of the firearms
and their presence and placement in the apartment and on Corbin’s person—knew of that
possession, and by providing testimony establishing Corbin’s constructive possession of
firearms on March 28. This testimony was needed to complete the story of the crime on
trial and was thus intrinsic. Accordingly, Rule 404(b) did not apply to the admission of
this evidence, and no abuse of discretion is present.
Corbin also contends he is entitled to relief pursuant to Rehaif and that this court
should vacate his conviction because the district court did not instruct the jury on the
requirement that the Government had to prove his knowledge of his status as a person
prohibited from possessing a firearm. Because Corbin did not raise this issue in the district
4 USCA4 Appeal: 19-4377 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/08/2023 Pg: 5 of 7
court, we review it for plain error. See Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2096
(2021); United States v. Caldwell, 7 F.4th 191, 213 (4th Cir. 2021) (“[P]lain-error review
applies to unpreserved Rehaif errors.”). “To succeed in obtaining plain-error relief, a
defendant must show (1) an error, (2) that is plain, (3) and that affects substantial rights.”
Caldwell, 7 F.4th at 211. When a defendant has been convicted following a jury trial, he
must show that without the error, “there is a reasonable probability that he would have been
acquitted.” Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2097 (internal quotation marks omitted). “If those three
requirements are met, [we] may grant relief if [we] conclude[] that the error had a serious
effect on the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 2096-97
(internal quotation marks omitted).
In Rehaif, “the Supreme Court concluded that to obtain a § 922(g) conviction, the
[G]overnment ‘must show that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm [or ammunition]
and also that he knew he had the relevant [felon] status when he possessed [them].”
Caldwell, 7 F.4th at 213 (first, second, and fourth alterations added) (quoting Rehaif, 139
S. Ct. at 2194). “As the Supreme Court has noted, ‘[i]n a felon-in-possession case where
the defendant was in fact a felon when he possessed firearms, the defendant faces an uphill
climb in trying to satisfy the substantial-rights prong of the plain-error test based on an
argument that he did not know he was a felon. The reason is simple: If a person is a felon,
he ordinarily knows he is a felon.’” Id. (quoting Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2097). However, “the
mere undisputed fact that [the defendant] was a felon at the time of the [offense] is not
dispositive.” Id.
5 USCA4 Appeal: 19-4377 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/08/2023 Pg: 6 of 7
“[T]here may be cases in which a defendant who is a felon can make an adequate
showing on appeal that he would have presented evidence in the district court that he did
not in fact know he was a felon when he possessed firearms.” Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2097.
“But if a defendant does not make such an argument or representation on appeal, [this]
court will have no reason to believe that the defendant would have presented such evidence
to a jury, and thus no basis to conclude that there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that the
outcome would have been different absent the Rehaif error.” Id.; see United States v.
Hobbs, 24 F.4th 965, 973 (4th Cir.) (concluding that defendant failed to make required
showing where he testified he was not allowed to possess firearms and had “not proffered
‘a sufficient argument or representation’ that he would have presented a factual basis at
trial for contradicting . . . evidence that he knew he was a felon” (quoting Greer, 141 S. Ct.
at 2100)), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2825 (2022); Caldwell, 7 F.4th at 213 (concluding that
defendant could not make required showing where he never disputed validity of his felony
convictions and had served sentences longer than a year, “making it virtually impossible
to believe he did not know he had been convicted of crimes punishable by such sentences”).
Although there was plain error in this case under Rehaif, we conclude that Corbin
has not shown that his substantial rights were affected, that is, that absent the error, there
is a reasonable probability that he would have been acquitted. At trial, he stipulated that,
prior to March 28, he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year and his right to possess a firearm had not been restored. His
co-defendant also testified Corbin was aware he was prohibited from possessing firearms.
6 USCA4 Appeal: 19-4377 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/08/2023 Pg: 7 of 7
On appeal, Corbin has not argued or represented he would have presented a factual basis
at trial for contradicting the evidence that he knew he was a felon.
Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED