United States v. Landsberger

534 F. Supp. 142
CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedJanuary 6, 1982
DocketCiv. 3-81-313
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 534 F. Supp. 142 (United States v. Landsberger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Landsberger, 534 F. Supp. 142 (mnd 1982).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RENNER, District Judge.

Before the Court are the Government’s motions for: (1) Summary judgment of permanent injunction; and (2) to hold defendant in contempt for violation of preliminary injunction. Larry Meuwissen, Esq. and James P. Sites, Esq., appear for the government and Gerald J. Landsberger, defendant, appears pro se.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant is the promoter of a plan which he calls the “Foreign Tax Haven Double Trust.” Under the plan, one “sells” his lifetime services as an employee to a trust called Professional and Technical Services. The trustee of that trust, International Dynamics, Inc., then purchases the accounts receivable of Professional and Technical Services Group at a discount. As part of the plan, the person who has sold his services files with his employer an exemption certificate indicating sufficient exemptions (as many as 99) to eliminate withholding taxes on the person’s salary. He then endorses his paycheck over to International Dynamics, Inc.

International Dynamics, Inc., which is also a trust, transfers the purchased accounts receivable to its beneficiary, IDI Credit Union. Prior to this transfer, International Dynamics, Inc. customarily retains a 10% processing fee. Finally, IDI Credit Union gives a check to the person in an amount equal to 90% of the original gross paycheck.

On July 27, 1981, the Court issued a preliminary injunction restraining defendant from selling and promoting the “Foreign Tax Haven Double Trust” or any similar device; from representing that the trust eliminates or reduces one’s tax liability; from preparing any federal tax returns on which the Trust is used to reduce tax liability and from servicing the Trust, or receiving, endorsing or forwarding the checks relating to the Trust. To the extent applicable, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made in conjunction with that Injunction are incorporated herein.

Plaintiff alleges that, on July 20, 1981, after notice of the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction had been sent out, defendant participated in a change of signature cards for the IDI Credit Union account at Northwestern National Bank of St. Paul, which authorized his son, Paul Landsberger, to be a signatory. Plaintiff further alleges that since that signature authorization change and after the issuance of the preliminary injunction defendant and his son have acted in concert to continue promotion of the Trust. Paul Landsberger has been signing checks on behalf of the *144 IDI Credit Union for 90% of clients’ income. Defendant has endorsed at least two documents for purposes of representing that the double trust eliminates or reduces tax liabilities.

II.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary Judgment may only be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly emphasized the drastic nature of the summary judgment remedy. It should not be granted unless the moving party has established his right to a judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy. Jackson v. Star Sprinkler Corp. of Florida, 575 F.2d 1223, 1226 (8th Cir. 1978); New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Null, 554 F.2d 896, 901 (8th Cir. 1977). The Court must give the non-moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608-09, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The Eighth Circuit does recognize, however, that the remedy serves a salutary purpose of avoiding useless and time-consuming trials. Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126, 1129 (8th Cir. 1976).

Applying these standards to the facts of this case, the Court finds that summary judgment of permanent injunction for the Government is proper. Preliminarily, the Court notes that it has jurisdiction to grant such an injunction under both sections 7402(a) and 7407 of the Internal Revenue Code, Title 26, United States Code. Under section 7402(a) the Court has jurisdiction to issue injunctions “as may be necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the Internal Revenue laws.” Section 7407 permits a district court to permanently enjoin a person from acting as a tax return preparer where he has engaged in fraudulent and deceptive conduct that substantially interferes with the proper administration of the tax laws.

Defendant admits he is involved in promoting a Foreign Tax Haven Double Trust (“Double Trust”) tax reduction plan. Affidavit of Gerald J. Landsberger, ¶ 2. He also admits that the plan involves a contract whereby an individual “sells” his lifetime service to a Trust in an attempt to avoid taxes. Transcript of Proceedings, dated July 27, 1981, at 13-14; Complaint Ex. B, Intrusted Personal Services Contract. Defendant has, in fact, twice declined at oral argument to state which, if any, of facts alleged by plaintiff regarding the operation of the Double Trust he disputes. Plaintiff’s only dispute is with the Government’s legal conclusion that the Double Trust is illegal.

The documents which form the Double Trust package marketed by defendant, see Plaintiff’s Complaint, Exhibit B, permit no other conclusion than that the scheme is illegal. The principle is well settled that “income must be taxed to him who earns it.” Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-740, 69 S.Ct. 1210, 1212-13, 93 L.Ed. 1659 (1949). Defendant cannot avoid this doctrine by including in the Intrusted Personal Services Contract a clause which specifies that the client thereby enslaves himself for life to a trust which then “owns” him as well as the fruits of his physical labors. According to plaintiff, this clause saves the individual from tax liability because in signing such a clause, he has conveyed away the “tree” as well as the “fruit”. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115, 50 S.Ct. 241, 74 L.Ed. 731 (1930).

Apart from the fact that this clause is patently absurd, and conceivably in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, it has no effect on the legality of the Double Trust. A person cannot make a scheme legal by simply saying it is so. The Supreme Court has stated:

[Ojne vested with the right to receive income [does] not escape the tax by any kind of anticipatory arrangement, however skillfully devised, by which he pro *145

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