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[PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
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No. 20-14004 ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus LAKESIA L. HARDEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cr-00003-DHB-BKE-2 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 20-14004 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 2 of 19
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Before GRANT, LUCK, and HULL, Circuit Judges. LUCK, Circuit Judge: The Supreme Court has said that a warrantless search of a probationer’s home, supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and authorized by a probation condition, is reasonable un- der the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001). The question here is whether a warrantless search of a probationer’s home that is otherwise reasonable as to the pro- bationer is rendered unreasonable merely because a non-proba- tioner is occupying the home. Joining our sister circuit, we hold that it is not where the occupant knows about the probation. See Smith v. City of Santa Clara, 876 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2017). An officer searched Tremayne Linder’s home without a war- rant because he was on probation, one of his conditions authorized warrantless home searches, and the officer had reasonable suspi- cion that marijuana was in the home. Those circumstances made the search reasonable. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 122. It was not ren- dered unreasonable merely because Linder’s girlfriend (Lakesia Harden), who knew Linder was on probation, was an occupant of the home. For that reason, the district court properly denied the motions to suppress the drugs found in Linder’s home and the statements that resulted from finding the drugs. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On March 21, 2016, a Georgia superior court sentenced Linder to twenty years of probation after he pleaded guilty to USCA11 Case: 20-14004 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 3 of 19
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burglary and attempted armed robbery. His probation came with the condition that he “not violate the criminal laws of any govern- mental unit.” But he violated that condition by using marijuana. So, on January 12, 2018, the state court imposed additional proba- tion conditions. For example, Linder had to “enroll in, attend, and complete all phases” of a drug treatment program. And he had to “submit to a search of his . . . person, residence, papers, vehicle, and[] effects . . . , any time of the day or night with or without a search warrant whenever requested to do so by a [p]robation [s]upervisor or any law enforcement officer.” That condition al- lowed for “the use of anything seized as evidence in a judicial or disciplinary proceeding.” Linder signed the orders imposing the new conditions, ac- knowledging that his probation may be revoked if he violated them. But he violated his conditions again by missing mandatory meetings of his drug treatment program. So, on April 5, 2018, the state court issued a warrant for his arrest. At the time, Linder shared his home with Harden, his girl- friend, and the couple shared the same bedroom. Harden knew Linder was on probation. When Probation Officer Timothy Ray visited Linder’s home before April 2018, Harden answered the door “a few times” and would “bring [Linder] to the door so [Officer Ray] could talk to him” about his probation. On April 9, 2018, Officer Ray and Dublin Police Department Sergeant Eric Roland went to execute the arrest warrant at Linder’s home. As soon as they walked up to the front door, Sergeant USCA11 Case: 20-14004 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 4 of 19
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Roland smelled a “very strong odor” of marijuana. Officer Ray smelled it, too. Harden met the officers at the door. Linder was not at the home, although Harden’s child was there and her sister, Tamara Harden, was visiting. Harden told the officers that Linder was at a drug treatment meeting. But Officer Ray placed a call and confirmed that Linder was not at the meeting. Harden then invited the officers inside the home, saying, “you can come look if you want to.” Sergeant Ro- land entered the home while Officer Ray stayed by the door. Once inside, Sergeant Roland noticed that the marijuana smell “intensified” to a “very pungent odor,” “probably the strong- est smell [he’s] smelled inside of a residence since [he has] been working in policing.” He told Harden that the officers were “prob- ably about to conduct [a] search” of the home. Before the search, Sergeant Roland confirmed with Officer Ray that Linder’s proba- tion conditions included a warrantless search condition. And Ser- geant Roland again confirmed—this time with Officer Ray’s super- visor—that Linder had “search conditions on his residence.” Ser- geant Roland then announced into his radio, while in the living room in Harden’s presence, that he planned to search the home based on Linder’s probation search condition. Harden did not re- spond or object in any way to Sergeant Roland’s announcement. Sergeant Roland’s search did not last long. Because the ma- rijuana smell was “powerful,” he found its source in “probably [thirty] seconds.” He went from the living room to a “little hallway area” and “smelled in each bedroom until [he] got to” Harden and USCA11 Case: 20-14004 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 5 of 19
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Linder’s shared bedroom. As soon as he smelled inside the couple’s bedroom, Sergeant Roland “could tell that the odor was coming from that area.” He walked in and traced the smell to a closet that the couple also shared. Inside the closet, Sergeant Roland found a camouflage tote bag that contained a black backpack. And, inside the backpack, he found twelve small bags of marijuana and meth- amphetamine wrapped in electrical tape. After he found the drugs, Sergeant Roland arrested Harden 1 and read her Miranda rights. Harden initially said the drugs weren’t hers and that she didn’t know who they belonged to. But she later admitted that she was holding the drugs in the closet for a “close friend.” Harden was indicted for possessing marijuana and metham- phetamine with the intent to distribute them, in violation of 21 U.S.C. section 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. section 2. She moved to sup- press the marijuana and meth found during Sergeant Roland’s search, plus her post-arrest statements as fruits of the allegedly un- lawful search. But the district court denied the suppression mo- tions. At trial, the government admitted the drugs and Harden’s statements into evidence, and the jury found her guilty as charged in the indictment. Harden appeals the denial of her suppression motions.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). USCA11 Case: 20-14004 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 6 of 19
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STANDARD OF REVIEW When we review the denial of suppression motions, we re- view the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its appli- cation of the law de novo. United States v. Spivey, 861 F.3d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir. 2017). “[W]e review the entire record, including trial testimony,” not just “the record made at the suppression hear- ing.” United States v. Newsome, 475 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007).
DISCUSSION Harden argues on appeal that the warrantless probation search of the bedroom she occupied with Linder violated the Fourth Amendment. We disagree. A. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “As the text makes clear, ‘the ultimate touch- stone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.’” Riley v. Cali- fornia, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014) (marks omitted) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). In “the ordinary case,” a warrantless search is unreasonable. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983)). And warrantless searches of homes “are presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). But not always. “When faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the [Supreme] Court has found that USCA11 Case: 20-14004 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 7 of 19
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certain . . . circumstances may render a warrantless search . . . rea- sonable.” McArthur, 531 U.S. at 330–31 (listing examples); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (explaining that, although “reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant,” “a warrant is not required to establish the rea- sonableness of all government searches; and when a warrant is not required . . . , probable cause is not invariably required either”). One circumstance that can render a warrantless search rea- sonable, as recognized in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), is where law enforcement has reasonable grounds to search a proba- tioner’s home and the warrantless search is authorized by state law. In Griffin, a probationer’s “home [was] searched by probation offic- ers acting without a warrant.” Id. at 870. The officers had received “information from a detective . . . that there were or might be guns in [the probationer]’s apartment,” and a state regulation provided that probationers’ homes could be searched without a warrant “as long as there [we]re ‘reasonable grounds.’” Id. at 871 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he search . . . was ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment be- cause it was conducted pursuant to a valid [state] regulation gov- erning probationers.” Id. at 880. “A probationer’s home, like any- one else’s, is protected by the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 873. But, the Court explained, it has “permitted exceptions when ‘special needs, beyond the nor- mal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable- USCA11 Case: 20-14004 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 8 of 19
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cause requirement impracticable.’” Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment)). The special needs exception justified the state’s regu- lation because “[s]upervision [of probationers] is a ‘special need’ of the [s]tate permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large.” Id. at 875; see also id. at 879–80. Unlike the public at large, a probationer’s liberty is restricted by conditions imposed as part of an ongoing criminal sentence, “requir[ing] . . . supervision” of his activities “to assure that the restrictions are in fact observed.” Id. at 874–75 (“Probation is simply one point (or, more accurately, one set of points) on a continuum of possible punishments ranging from sol- itary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory community service.”). Those “restrictions are meant to assure that the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabili- tation and that the community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at large.” Id. at 875 (“[T]he importance of supervision has grown as probation has become an increasingly common sentence for those convicted of serious crimes.” (citation omitted)). Griffin’s “‘special needs’ holding made it ‘unnecessary to consider whether,’” even without a state regulation, warrantless searches of a probationer’s home “[a]re otherwise reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Knights, 534 U.S. at 117–18 (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 878, 880). But both the Su- preme Court and this court have since considered that question. The Supreme Court addressed it in Knights, where the probationer had been convicted of a drug offense. Id. at 114. A condition of his USCA11 Case: 20-14004 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 9 of 19
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probation, which he acknowledged by signing the probation order, was that he “would ‘[s]ubmit his . . . person, property, place of res- idence, vehicle, [and] personal effects[] to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant.’” Id. Shortly after he was placed on probation, the probationer’s apartment was surveilled by a detective. Id. at 114–15. The detec- tive observed suspicious activity tying the probationer to a recent arson. Id. Specifically, he saw the probationer’s friend exit the apartment with what looked like pipe bombs. Id. at 115. And he saw the probationer’s friend bring padlocks stolen from the crime scene, a Molotov cocktail, and a gas can to the apartment. Id. Re- lying on those observations, plus the probation search condition, the detective searched the apartment without a warrant. Id. The Supreme Court applied its “general Fourth Amend- ment approach of ‘examining the totality of the circumstances’”— balancing the probationer’s reasonable expectation of privacy against the government’s need for the search—and held that “no more than reasonable suspicion” was required to search the apart- ment. Id. at 118–21 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)). As to the probationer’s privacy interests, the Court again emphasized that “[i]nherent in the very nature of probation is that probationers ‘do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citi- zen is entitled.’” Id. at 119 (marks omitted) (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874). That is because, “[j]ust as other punishments for crim- inal convictions curtail an offender’s freedoms, a court granting probation may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the USCA11 Case: 20-14004 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 10 of 19
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offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.” Id. The Knights probationer, in particular, was expressly informed of a warrantless search condition—a “salient circumstance” that “signif- icantly diminished [his] reasonable expectation of privacy” in his apartment. Id. at 118–20. On the other side of the balance, the state’s need for search- ing the probationer’s apartment was substantial. See id. at 120–21. Reemphasizing what it explained in Griffin, the Supreme Court said that “[t]he [s]tate has a dual concern with a probationer.” Id. It grants probation on “the hope that [the probationer] will . . . be in- tegrated back into the community” but, on the other hand, there is “the concern, quite justified, that he will be more likely to engage in criminal conduct than an ordinary member of the community.” Id. (“[I]t must be remembered that ‘the very assumption of the in- stitution of probation’ is that the probationer ‘is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law.’” (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 880)). “And probationers have even more of an incentive to . . . quickly dispose of incriminating evidence than the ordinary criminal because probationers are aware that they may be subject to supervision and face revocation of probation, and possible incar- ceration” if the evidence is discovered. Id. at 120. These height- ened interests, stacked up against “the probationer’s significantly diminished privacy interests,” justified the “lesser than probable- cause standard”—reasonable suspicion—and “render[ed] a warrant requirement unnecessary.” Id. at 121. USCA11 Case: 20-14004 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 11 of 19
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For our part, in United States v. Carter, 566 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2009), we extended Knights to circumstances where there was no search condition authorizing the warrantless search of the proba- 2 tioner’s home. The Carter probationer had been convicted of fel- ony battery and cocaine possession. Id. at 971–72. “[H]e did not have a condition of probation that required him to submit to war- rantless searches of his home,” but he did have conditions “re- quir[ing] him to answer all inquiries made by his probation officer[] and submit to visits by the probation officer at his home, work- place, or elsewhere.” Id. at 974–75. Despite no condition specifi- cally allowing warrantless home searches, officers searched the probationer’s home without a warrant because they had reasona- ble suspicion he was trafficking drugs. Id. at 972, 975. Applying the balancing test from Knights, we concluded the search was reasonable. Id. at 971. We acknowledged that the pro- bationer had a “higher” reasonable expectation of privacy than the Knights probationer because his home wasn’t subject to a warrant- less search condition. Id. at 974–75. “[N]evertheless,” we
2 Cf. United States v. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d 1302, 1309–11 (11th Cir. 2005) (con- cluding that warrantless search of probationer’s computer inside his home was reasonable because, although there was no condition requiring warrantless searches of the computer, specifically, he had already “violated the terms of his release” and “the terms of his probation severely restricted his ability to access the Internet”); Castillo v. United States, 816 F.3d 1300, 1303–06 (11th Cir. 2016) (concluding that warrantless search of the defendant’s home was rea- sonable because, as part of a pretrial intervention program, his privacy expecta- tion was diminished by “conditions that allowed home visits from an officer” and by being “subject to supervision”). USCA11 Case: 20-14004 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 12 of 19
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explained, “[the probationer]’s expectation of privacy was [still] re- duced by the condition . . . requiring him to submit to home visits by his probation officer.” Id. On the other hand, the government’s interest “in monitoring [the probationer] on account of his drug and violence-related crimes” was “high.” Id. at 975. So, because the balance was similar to Knights, we found that no more than rea- sonable suspicion was required for the warrantless search. Id. Following Knights and Carter, neither the Supreme Court nor this court have considered whether a warrantless search of a probationer’s home “that is otherwise reasonable as to the proba- tioner[ is] unreasonable as to a non-probationer occupant of the residence.” See Smith, 876 F.3d at 991. But the Ninth Circuit ad- dressed that question in Smith. See id. at 991–94. The Smith probationer—who was on probation for grand theft and forgery—drove the getaway car for a friend who stabbed someone. Id. at 989. Officers knew the terms of her probation al- lowed warrantless searches of her home. Id. at 988. So, they went to the house she “reported [as] her address to probation,” and her mother answered the door. Id. at 989. The mother “refused to admit the officers . . . without a warrant” and told them that the probationer didn’t live there. Id. at 988–89. But the officers searched the home anyway. Id. at 988. The mother and her minor granddaughter (who was also present) then sued the officers and the city under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and a similar state statute, al- leging the search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 989–90. USCA11 Case: 20-14004 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 13 of 19
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Applying the balancing test from Knights, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the otherwise reasonable warrantless search of the probationer’s home was not rendered unreasonable simply be- cause her mother and granddaughter occupied the same home. See id. at 993–94. The court balanced the mother and granddaughter’s reasonable privacy expectations against the government’s need for the search. Id. As for the privacy interests, the court acknowledged that, usually, “[a] non-probationer . . . has a higher expectation of privacy than someone who is on probation.” Id. at 994. Neverthe- less, the court explained, the mother and granddaughter’s privacy interests “in the home that [they] share[d] with [a] probationer” were diminished and outweighed by the government’s “heightened in- terest” in locating someone convicted of “serious offenses,” who reoffended by participating in a violent stabbing, and who was more likely than the average citizen to offend again. Id. (emphasis added). We agree with the Ninth Circuit that an otherwise reasona- ble warrantless search of a probationer’s home is not rendered un- reasonable merely because the home is occupied by another person who knows about the probation. The reasonable expectation of privacy inside the probationer’s home is similar to what it would be if the home was not occupied by another person—it is dimin- ished. That’s because “[i]nherent in the very nature of probation is that probationers ‘do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.’” Knights, 534 U.S. at 119 (marks omitted) (quot- ing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874). “Just as other punishments for criminal convictions curtail an offender’s freedoms,” the sentencing court USCA11 Case: 20-14004 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 14 of 19
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imposes conditions on a probationer that “deprive [him] of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.” Id.; see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 48 (2007) (listing standard conditions for federal probationers, such as “report[ing] regularly to their probation of- ficer, permit[ting] unannounced visits to their homes, refrain[ing] from associating with any person convicted of a felony, and re- frain[ing] from excessive drinking” (citing U.S.S.G. § 5B1.3)). These conditions “require . . . supervision” of the probationer’s ac- tivities “to assure that the restrictions are in fact observed.” Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874–75. The need for supervision does not change just because another person happens to occupy the probationer’s home. In addition, where the occupant knows about the probation, as Harden did here, she understands that she has a diminished ex- pectation of privacy inside the probationer’s home—just as she would in other places that are closely supervised and where one expects diminished privacy. Cf. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (explaining that “searches made at the border, pur- suant to the long-standing right of the sovereign to protect it- self . . . , are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border”); United States v. Herzbrun, 723 F.2d 773, 775–76 (11th Cir. 1984) (discussing how “airport security checkpoints and load- ing gates are sui generis under the [F]ourth [A]mendment” partially because “the person to be searched . . . voluntarily come[s] to and enter[s] the search area” (quoting United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275–76 (5th Cir. 1973))); United States v. Prevo, 435 F.3d 1343, 1348 (11th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that a prison visitor had a USCA11 Case: 20-14004 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 15 of 19
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“negligible” privacy expectation in her car, considering how she drove past two signs warning her that it could be searched). The fact that the probationer’s home is occupied by a non-probationer also does not change the government’s need for the search—it’s substantial. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Knights and Griffin, the government “has a dual concern with a pro- bationer”—“rehabilitation and protecting society from future criminal violations.” Knights, 534 U.S. at 119–21; see Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874–75 (“[Probation] restrictions are meant to assure that the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at large.”). These “goals . . . justify the exercise of supervision,” even inside a probationer’s home, and “the importance of supervision has grown as probation has become an increasingly common sentence for those convicted of serious crimes.” Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875. Here, for example, Linder was already convicted of serious crimes—bur- glary and attempted armed robbery—and reoffended by violating his drug-related probation conditions twice. Cf. id. at 879 (“In some cases—especially those involving drugs . . . —the probation agency must be able to act based upon a lesser degree of certainty than the Fourth Amendment would otherwise require in order to intervene before a probationer does damage to himself or society.” (emphasis added)); Smith, 876 F.3d at 994 (emphasizing that “the police knew . . . th[e probationer] was serving a felony probation term for serious offenses”); Carter, 566 F.3d at 975 (same, as to a probationer convicted of felony battery and cocaine possession). USCA11 Case: 20-14004 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 16 of 19
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Indeed, “the very assumption” of probation is that the pro- bationer is a greater public safety threat because he “is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law.” Griffin, 483 U.S. at 880; cf. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 853–54 (2006) (concluding that the government’s interest in reducing recidivism among parol- ees justified a suspicionless search because they are likely to reoffend and “grave safety concerns . . . attend recidivism”). Given that risk, the government must be able “to respond quickly” to ev- idence a probationer has actually reoffended because “the possibil- ity of expeditious searches” deters recidivism, Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876 (“A warrant requirement would interfere to an appreciable de- gree with the probation system . . . .”), and the probationer is more likely to “dispose of incriminating evidence” than the average crim- inal, knowing that he “face[s] revocation” if it’s discovered, Knights, 534 U.S. at 120. So, as the Smith court concluded, the balance shakes out the same way it did in Knights. See Smith, 876 F.3d at 993–94. The gov- ernment’s “interest[] in reducing recidivism and thereby promot- ing reintegration and positive citizenship [of a] probationer[]” out- weighs the reduced privacy expectations inside a probationer’s home, “warrant[ing] privacy intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated under the Fourth Amendment.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 853 (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 879; Knights, 534 U.S. at 121); see Smith, 876 F.3d at 993–94. Thus, we hold that a warrantless search of a probationer’s home, based on reasonable suspicion and a pro- bation condition allowing warrantless searches, is not rendered USCA11 Case: 20-14004 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 17 of 19
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unreasonable because the home was occupied by another person 3 who knew about the probation. B. Applied here, the warrantless search of Linder’s home, while it was occupied by Harden, was reasonable. Linder was on proba- tion, and one of his conditions was that he had to “submit to a search of his . . . residence. . . , any time of the day or night with or without a search warrant whenever requested to do so by a
3 A half-dozen state courts have reached the same conclusion and struck the same balance. See State v. Adams, 788 N.W.2d 619, 624–25 (N.D. 2010) (“[The defendant non-probationer] voluntarily chose to live with a probationer, and he assumed the risk that he too would have diminished Fourth Amendment rights . . . .”); State v. Hamm, 589 S.W.3d 765, 779–81 (Tenn. 2019) (“We con- clude that the privacy intrusion [of a probation search] upon an individual sharing a bedroom (i.e., an area with common authority) with a probationer is not so invasive that it would not be tolerated under the Fourth Amend- ment.”); State v. Bursch, 905 N.W.2d 884, 890–92 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (“[W]e hold that a non-probationer who knowingly lives with a probationer has a di- minished expectation of privacy in areas of the residence shared with the pro- bationer.”); Milton v. State, 879 P.2d 1031, 1035 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (“Courts generally hold that a person who agrees to house a probationer retains a lim- ited expectation of privacy in his person, possessions, and residence. This ex- pectation of privacy is limited because the probation officer is entitled to search the probationer, the probationer’s possessions, and the probationer’s residence.”); State v. Yule, 905 So. 2d 251, 254–55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (ap- plying Knights and concluding the warrantless search of a probationer’s home didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment where he had a non-probationer co-oc- cupant); cf. Russi v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 716, 720–21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (reasoning that “a probationer’s residence should not be made sanctuary for [one’s] contraband” because he has a non-probationer co-occupant). USCA11 Case: 20-14004 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 18 of 19
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[p]robation [s]upervisor or any law enforcement officer.” Sergeant Roland searched Linder’s home based on that warrantless search condition. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 118 (describing a search condi- tion as a “salient circumstance”). And Harden knew Linder was on probation. When Officer Ray visited Linder’s home before April 2018, Harden would answer the door and “bring [Linder] to the door so [Officer Ray] could talk to him” about his probation. Cf. Carter, 566 F.3d at 974–75 (reasoning that a probationer’s expecta- 4 tion of privacy was reduced by a condition requiring home visits). Finally, Sergeant Roland had reasonable suspicion to search Linder’s home. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 121–22. Both Officer Ray and Sergeant Roland smelled marijuana while at the front door. And once Sergeant Roland was invited inside by Harden, the odor “intensified” to what was “probably the strongest” marijuana odor he ever smelled inside a home. The smell was so “powerful” that
4 We recognize that on appeal Harden argues that she personally did not con- sent to the search, Linder’s probation condition was not a search consent as to her, and she was not obligated to object to the search for the search to be un- reasonable. However, as discussed above, in a warrantless search of a proba- tioner’s home pursuant to a probation condition and reasonable suspicion, the reasonableness of the search does not require “consent” of either the proba- tioner or another occupant of the home who knows a cotenant is on proba- tion. See Smith, 876 F.3d at 994 (“Under [Griffin and Knights], probation searches are not analyzed as consent searches. . . . . Instead, the question is whether a warrantless probation search that affects the rights of a third party is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.”); see also Illinois v. Rodri- guez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990) (“What [a defendant] is assured by the Fourth Amendment itself . . . is not that no government search of his house will occur unless he consents; but that no such search will occur that is ‘unreasonable.’”). USCA11 Case: 20-14004 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/18/2024 Page: 19 of 19
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it took him only thirty seconds to find the drugs during the search. “[T]he smell of marijuana alone may provide a basis for reasonable suspicion.” United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 5 2010).
CONCLUSION Because Sergeant Roland had reasonable suspicion for the search, and Linder’s probation conditions allowed for warrantless searches, the warrantless search of Linder’s home was reasonable. The fact that Linder’s home was occupied by Harden, who knew about the probation, did not render the otherwise reasonable war- rantless search unreasonable. And because the search was reason- able, it did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The district court properly denied the motions to suppress. AFFIRMED.
5 The smell of marijuana alone also provided probable cause for Sergeant Ro- land’s search. See, e.g., United States v. Legeza, 559 F.2d 441, 442 (5th Cir. 1977) (“This Court has repeatedly held . . . that the odor of marijuana provides suf- ficient probable cause . . . .” (listing cases)); United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (reasoning there was “no doubt” of prob- able cause to search a house “when, as the door stood open, [an agent] de- tected what he knew from his law enforcement experience to be the odor of marijuana”).