United States v. La Favor

96 F.2d 425, 1938 U.S. App. LEXIS 3490
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedApril 25, 1938
DocketNo. 8609
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 96 F.2d 425 (United States v. La Favor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. La Favor, 96 F.2d 425, 1938 U.S. App. LEXIS 3490 (9th Cir. 1938).

Opinion

WILBUR, Circuit Judge.

This action was brought by a veteran to recover $7,000 upon his war risk insurance [426]*426policy which lapsed April 30, 1919, for nonpayment of premium. The jury found that the veteran became totally and permanently disabled on March 21, 1919, prior to the lapsing of the policy. Judgment for plaintiffs followed. The insured reinstated $3,-000 of the lapsed term insurance which was in force until his death. He died January 11, 1932, after the commencement of this action. His widow was substituted as administratrix, and his mother, the beneficiary tmder the lapsed term insurance policy, was joined as plaintiff. The government appeals.

The government assigns error in the denial of its motion for instructed verdict in its favor. .

It is clear from the evidence that for long periods of time the veteran’s physical condition and his earning capacity had been seriously impaired. The question is whether that impairment had reached such a stage that total and permanent disability at the time of his discharge or before April 30, 1919, was reasonably certain.

At the time of his discharge and on five subsequent dates when he made application for the reinstatement of his lapsed converted insurance, the veteran certified to his physical condition. The certificate upon his discharge was to the effect that he was in good health. The other certifi-' cates were to the effect that at the dates specified he was not suffering total and permanent disability. These statements were made on the following dates: January 25, 1921, October 5, 1922, October 25, 1924, June 27, 1925, and April 6, 1926.

The evidence was largely directed to a proof of his condition after the time of his discharge. There is very little evidence as to his condition in April, 1919. He had been ill before that time and spent six months of his eighteen months of service in the hospital; the first 98 days were at Camp Lewis. After this period, he was restored to duty as cured and was a part of the Expeditionary 'Force to France. In France he suffered injuries as result of his service. He was gassed, suffered from shock, and probably from traumatic injury to the back. There was no expert evidence adducéd as to his condition at the time of discharge,. except the certificate of the physician who examined him then and who certified that he was not disabled.

There” is no question under the evidence but that the veteran suffered from .serious disability during a large part of the time after his discharge and until his death. The difficulty is in relating this condition back to the time of discharge, at which time he certified to his own good health, and the physician examining him gave him a clean-bill of health.

The question of whether or not the conditions found at the later examinations in 1931 related back to and indicated his condition prior to the lapsing of his war risk insurance is primarily a medical question. Upon this subject the appellees introduced the testimony of two experts.

Dr. John F. Steel testified that he made his first examination of the veteran October 10, 1931, after this suit was brought; the veteran having been referred to him by his attorney. The witness also participated in the autopsy in 1932.

He testified that the veteran told him in 1931 that: “* * * He had been having pain in his chest, at times very severe, over the left chest and extending into the arm on the left arm, to the elbow and sometimes down through the wrist, extending into the fingers. He has had attacks of pain ever since he was in the army. * * * At times he has typical attacks of angina pectoris, which come on after eating. * * * ” He also testified: “In making my diagnosis of angina pectoris, I made it on the history of subjective -symptoms, when I first made my diagnosis. I made it on the history alone. That history started in his war service, pain in his chest.” He testified that there were no objective symp^ toms of the veteran upon which a diagnosis of angina pectoris could be made. He was asked the following question: “Q. Taking the patient’s history and your examinations of him into consideration, of what duration would you say his heart condition was?” To which he replied: “A. I would say that he had this ever since he was in the army. I would say it was of long duration.”

He then testified that most work in a lumber mill would be too heavy for a patient with coronary disease, angina pectoris, and that wh.ere a person having angina pectoris worked at such heavy work, “It would be apt to increase his number of attacks, and of course, the final cause is death.”

Taking the testimony of this witness as a whole, so far as it relates to the condition of the patient in 1919, it amounts to no more than a statement that the veteran [427]*427told him in 1931 that he had pains in 1919 characteristic of angina pectoris. Such statements of past pain, even if made to assist a physician to treat the patient, are generally excluded, Wigmore on Evidence, § 1772, and if admitted have little more probative value than other hearsay evidence.

Dr. W. H. Goering, an orthopedic surgeon, testified for the plaintiffs that he examined the veteran October 14, 1931, at Tacoma, and found traumatic arthritis of the spine. He further stated: “From the history and from my findings at the time I saw him, I would say that his condition as I found him at the time I made the examination was something that lasted over a period of years, not just of recent origin.” He testified that when he saw the patient, “I would say, generally, he couldn’t follow any hard occupation that involved heavy work, laborious work, from my findings at the time.” He testified:

“From the examination that I gave Mr. LaFavor in October, 1931, I would say that that arthritis had been in process a period of years.

“Q. You couldn’t though, without speculating, say just when? A. I could s'ay, definitely, it wasn’t recent. I could not tell when, exactly; nobody could. Arthritis is what is called a progressive disease.”

The testimony of Dr. Goering is not sufficient to relate the patient’s arthritis back to the year 1919, for he expressly disavows any ability to make such a retrospective diagnosis. In view of the fact that the veteran was frequently in government hospitals and under the care of physicians who failed to discover angina pectoris during the ten or twelve years at times when he was under such treatment _and observation, the testimony of Dr. Steel, in so far as it relates the heart condition back to 1919, is not substantial evidence even if it could be characterized as a scintilla of evidence of such condition in 1919.

The medical testimony of the plaintiffs’ witnesses is insufficient to justify a verdict of total and permanent disability in 1919. It remains to consider the effect of other evidence on that subject.

The government medical records of the veteran show that after his entry into the service he was admitted to the base hospital at Camp Lewis in January, 1918, and treated for various illnesses, including pleurisy, scarlet fever, influenza, diphtheria, and arthritis. While serving in France he was injured by a shell explosion and gassed, and was treated in base hospitals for neuresthenia, pleurisy, arthritis in the left hip joint, and other complaints. However, when examined upon his discharge, he was certified as not disabled, and he signed a statement to that effect.

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Related

United States v. Nelson
102 F.2d 515 (Eighth Circuit, 1939)

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Bluebook (online)
96 F.2d 425, 1938 U.S. App. LEXIS 3490, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-la-favor-ca9-1938.