United States v. Kuhn

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: October 1, 2003
• Docket: 02-1031
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 United States v. Kuhn No. 02-1031 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0348P (6th Cir.) File Name: 03a0348p.06 William A. Brisbois, BRISBOIS & BRISBOIS, Saginaw, Michigan, for Appellee. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS _________________ FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT OPINION _________________ _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , X BOGGS, Chief Circuit Judge. Michael J. Kuhn was - sentenced to six months at a halfway house and six months of Plaintiff-Appellant, supervised release following his conviction for improperly - - No. 02-1031 discharging a pollutant into navigable waters, causing an v. - employee to falsify test results in records submitted to the > government, and signing and submitting a report to the , government that he knew contained false test results. The MICHAEL J. KUHN , - Defendant-Appellee. - government now appeals a four-level downward departure granted by the district court to Kuhn. For the reasons set N forth below, we reverse, and remand the case for Appeal from the United States District Court resentencing. for the Eastern District of Michigan at Bay City. No. 99-20060—David M. Lawson, District Judge. Kuhn was the Superintendent of the Bay City, Michigan, Wastewater Treatment Plant (the Plant). The wastewater that Argued: May 6, 2003 comes into the Plant goes through a number of stages before being released into the Saginaw River. On or about Decided and Filed: October 1, 2003 August 25, 1996, during the midnight shift, staff at the Plant began cleaning the chlorine contact chamber, which is the Before: BOGGS, Chief Circuit Judge; GUY and penultimate stage of the process. The Plant had a National DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges. Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit that governed its operation under the Clean Water Act (CWA). _________________ The plant was obligated to notify the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) within five days of any COUNSEL accidental spill or bypass of the treatment system. At the end of August 1996, sludge from the chlorine contact chamber ARGUED: Jennifer J. Peregord, UNITED STATES was illegally pumped into a ditch while the chlorine contact ATTORNEY, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. William A. chamber was being cleaned. This was done on Kuhn’s Brisbois, BRISBOIS & BRISBOIS, Saginaw, Michigan, for orders. In November 1996, Kuhn had the soil from the ditch Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jennifer J. Peregord, UNITED excavated and hauled away. STATES ATTORNEY, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant.

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Pursuant to the Plant’s NPDES permit, the Plant was 18 U.S.C. § 2; second, that between the same dates he required to submit monthly discharge monitoring reports to knowingly caused the sewage sludge to be discharged from the DEQ. As superintendent, Kuhn certified the accuracy of the ditch into the Saginaw River, in violation of 33 U.S.C. the information in these reports. The reports contained data § 1311(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; third, that on June 9, 1997, he regarding laboratory findings charting both the material caused an employee to assist in falsifying test results that coming into the Plant (“influent”) and the material being were included in records that, under the CWA, were required discharged from the Plant (“effluent”). A Plant technician to be filed, in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4) and drew Kuhn’s attention to very high numbers for BOD-51 on 18 U.S.C. § 2; and fourth, that on June 10, 1997, he signed a sample drawn May 3, 1997. Kuhn asked the technician to and submitted to the DEQ a discharge monitoring report, change the results, and the technician refused. The technician required by the CWA, which he knew contained the false test made a copy of the original printout, suspecting that the results, in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4). numbers might be altered in the final report to the DEQ. Later, another technician gave the final report for the month After a three-week jury trial, the jury returned a verdict of of May to Kuhn for his review and signature. He told her that guilty on all counts. Kuhn filed a post-verdict motion for the test results for suspended solids, total phosphorous, and judgment of acquittal. The district court granted this motion BOD-5 for May 3 must be wrong and asked her to change the in part, dismissing count two on double jeopardy grounds. numbers to the averages for the month. She refused. The presentence report (PSR) calculated Kuhn’s sentencing However, when she checked the final report, the data for range at 30-37 months, with a total offense level of nineteen. May 3 had been changed to the monthly averages.2 Kuhn This number was reached by finding a base offense level of then asked yet another technician to change the test results, six for count one (U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.3(a)). The PSR then which he did. The technician wrote a memo memorializing recommended two four-level increases for specific offense the fact that he had changed the test results at Kuhn’s characteristics: pursuant to § 2Q1.3(b)(1)(B), due to the direction. Kuhn signed the final, altered report on June 10, offense involving a discharge or release of a pollutant; and 1997, and submitted it to the DEQ. pursuant to § 2Q1.3(b)(4), due to the offense involving a discharge without a permit or in violation of a permit. The Kuhn was subsequently indicted in a four-count indictment PSR recommended two additional two-level increases: that charged: first, that between August 23 and 30, 1996, pursuant to § 3B1.1(c) for Kuhn’s role as an organizer, leader, Kuhn knowingly caused plant workers to dispose of sewage manager, or supervisor in a criminal activity; and pursuant to sludge improperly, which resulted in the sludge flowing into § 3B1.3 due to his abuse of a position of public trust in a a ditch on the plant property and then into the Saginaw River, manner that significantly facilitated the commission or a navigable waterway, in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1345(a) and concealment of this offense. This resulted in a recommended adjusted offense level of eighteen for count one. 1 “BOD-5" refers to a test which mea sures a wastewater sam ple’s For counts three and four, the PSR recommended a base “Bio chem ical Oxygen Demand” over a 5 -day period . offense level of six (§ 2Q1.3(a)) with the same two increases 2 for leadership role and abuse of a position of public trust. Kuhn maintains that the high numbers were only for the influent This resulted in a recommended adjusted offense level of ten flow and that the numbers for the effluent flow were in line with the for counts three and four. According to the grouping rules, mon thly averages. He therefore purportedly concluded that the influent flow numbe rs must have b een incorrect. found at § 3D1.4, one offense level was added to the group No. 02-1031 United States v. Kuhn 5 6 United States v. Kuhn No. 02-1031

with the highest adjusted offense level. Therefore, the sixteen. The defense then moved for a downward departure recommended combined adjusted offense level was nineteen. based on Kuhn’s acts of a charitable or public service nature within the community. At the sentencing hearing, the defense objected to the addition of the increases for the two specific offense The court denied the motion, but went on to state that it characteristics. The court overruled this objection, finding doubted that a 21- to 27-month term of incarceration “serves that application of the two specific offense characteristics did the ends of justice in this case.” The court stated that it not constitute double-counting. Next, the government questioned the two two-level adjustments for role in the objected to the PSR’s omission of its requested 11-level offense and abuse of a position of public trust. It stated that enhancement pursuant to § 2Q1.3(b)(2) because the offense “the offense in this case did not necessarily entail an abuse of resulted in a substantial likelihood of death or serious bodily trust that was separate and apart from the defendant’s position injury. The court overruled the government’s objection. that permitted him to be a leader or organizer of the activity.” Next, the government objected to the PSR’s failure to include Therefore, the court concluded, scoring the two adjustments a two-level increase for obstruction of justice, pursuant to in a single case constituted an over-counting. Moreover, the § 3C1.1 and application note 4(b), based on Kuhn’s false court stated that, although applying the two specific offense testimony given at trial. The court overruled the characteristics did not constitute double-counting, it “put government’s objection. undue weight on the offense characteristics for this specific offense,” because the offense for which Kuhn was convicted The defense did not object to the two two-level increases consisted of a single discharge. The court also noted that it for Kuhn’s leadership role and abuse of a position of public felt that the sentence in the case trust. The defense, however, did move for a downward adjustment or departure, based on § 2Q1.3, application notes ought to be fashioned around the fact that the discharge 4 and 7, which advise the court that upward and downward in this case resulted from essentially a single incident that departures are appropriate depending upon the harm or risk occurred over a day or two, and was motivated by the associated with the offense. The court departed downward defendant’s desire to make the plant more efficient so two levels with regard to each offense characteristic, for a that it would perform the function of enhancing the total of four levels subtracted from the adjusted offense level environmental quality as opposed to degrading it. for count one. The court explained that testing of the affected areas did not indicate any presence of PCBs, that the chlorine Therefore, the court departed downward by four additional contact chamber was the last stage that polluted water reached levels. before it was released into the environment, and that there were serious questions in the court’s mind “as to whether any In its judgment, the court added more reasons for granting of the contents of that ditch ever made it into the Saginaw the additional four-level downward departure, indicating that River.” “[t]he circumstances of this case, including the defendant’s motivation and purpose, takes this case out of the ‘heartland’ At this point, the adjusted offense level for count one stood of offenses contemplated by the Sentencing Guidelines.” at fourteen. The court then calculated that, pursuant to First, the court reiterated that Kuhn “was motivated by a § 3D1.4, two levels were to be added to that for grouping desire to clean up and improve the efficient operation of the purposes. This resulted in a combined offense level of Bay City Wastewater Treatment Plant.” Apparently, the court No. 02-1031 United States v. Kuhn 7 8 United States v. Kuhn No. 02-1031

concluded that Kuhn was taking a shortcut, engaging in We review a district court’s decision to grant a downward conduct not authorized by the permit issued to the plant, and departure for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. violated the Clean Water Act in so doing. The court went on Reed, 264 F.3d 640, 646 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Koon v. to say: United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996)). A sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the guidelines range only if Given the defendant’s background, however, his length the court finds “that there exists an aggravating or mitigating of service in the area of public waste management, and circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken other minor factors such as his community involvement into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in and exemplary personal record of achievements in the formulating the guidelines . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (quoting community, the Court finds credible the defendant’s 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). A district court abuses its discretion professed motive that the efficient, pollution-free when it fails to give notice of its intention to depart. See operation of the Bay City Wastewater Treatment Plant Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 135 n.4 (1991); United was his ultimate goal. States v. Yang, 281 F.3d 534, 547 (6th Cir. 2002). The district court departed downward based on three reasons. We Therefore, the court imposed a sentence based on offense consider the validity of these reasons separately below. level twelve and a criminal history category of I. Kuhn was sentenced to six months at a halfway house, six months of 1. Departure based on enhancements for Kuhn’s role in supervised release, and the minimum fine of $6,000. the offense and abuse of a position of public trust. The government filed a timely notice of appeal, appealing The district court failed to give notice to the government of the unguided four-level downward departure.3 It first argues its intention to depart on this basis. Rule 32 of the Federal that the district court gave no notice to the government of its Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that: intention to depart on the basis of Kuhn’s role in the offense and abuse of a position of public trust enhancements, nor on Before the court may depart from the applicable the basis of the application of the specific offense sentencing range on a ground not identified for departure enhancements of § 2Q1.3. The government argues that even either in the presentence report or in a party's prehearing if it had received proper notice, the downward departure on submission, the court must give the parties reasonable these bases was improper. Finally, the government argues notice that it is contemplating such a departure. The that the additional reasons for the downward departure added notice must specify any ground on which the court is in the district court’s judgment were not supported by any contemplating a departure. factual bases and are discouraged factors for downward departures under the sentencing guidelines, and that the Fed. R. Crim. P. 32. The district court’s failure to notify the district court did not give notice of its intent to depart government that it was planning to depart on this basis was downward on these bases. error. See Yang, 281 F.3d at 547. Even if the district court had given the government notice, the downward departure based on these enhancements was 3 improper. During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel The initial four-level downward departure, pursuant to § 2Q1.3, conceded, and the district court found, that both app lication notes 4 and 7 , was a gu ided departure. No. 02-1031 United States v. Kuhn 9 10 United States v. Kuhn No. 02-1031

enhancements were proper in this case. However, the district departing downward seems to indicate that it believes the court stated that the enhancements, if applied cumulatively, enhancement should not have been applied. If this is the case, over-counted because “the offense in this case did not then the district court should not have applied the necessarily entail an abuse of trust that was separate and apart enhancement in the first place. However, it is clear that the from the defendant’s position that permitted him to be a enhancement was properly applied. Kuhn was a government leader or organizer of the activity.” In its judgment, the employee, charged with the safe and efficient operation of a district court added to its rationale, stating that the abuse of wastewater treatment operation. He was convicted of trust enhancement should be discounted because “a knowingly causing sewage sludge to be discharged into a significant number of members of the general public did not navigable waterway and falsifying reports. The statutes that enjoy a beneficial or quasi-fiduciary relationship with the were violated were in place to protect the general public from defendant in his role as a public servant.” this sort of activity. It is difficult to see how members of the general public were not in a beneficial relationship with The abuse of a position of public trust enhancement Kuhn, as significant numbers of the public depended upon “applies to persons who abuse their positions of trust . . . to Kuhn to prevent or ameliorate water pollution in the area. facilitate significantly the commission or concealment of a Moreover, his high-level position with respect to his public crime.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, comment. (backg’d.). “[A function of wastewater treatment, “contributed in some position of public or private trust is] characterized by significant way to facilitating the commission” of his offense. professional or managerial discretion (i.e., substantial U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, comment. (n.1). discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference).” Id. at comment. (n.1). As the district court The aggravating role enhancement “increase[s] the offense impliedly found when it applied the enhancement, Kuhn level based upon the size of the criminal organization . . . and satisfied these elements. the degree to which the defendant was responsible for committing the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. The district court’s reasoning that the abuse of trust (backg’d.). It generally addresses a defendant’s relative enhancement should be discounted because “a significant responsibility for the crime. Again, the district court found number of members of the general public did not enjoy a that Kuhn satisfied these elements when it applied the beneficial or quasi-fiduciary relationship with the defendant enhancement. The aggravating role enhancement relates to in his role as a public servant” is invalid under our opinion in Kuhn’s role as a supervisor over others in the operation of the United States v. White, 270 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2001). There Plant. Kuhn directed others to discharge the contents of the we held that “the general public may be victims of a chlorine contact chamber into the ditch, and directed government employee’s crimes for purposes of deciding technicians to change test results. whether the employee’s sentence may be enhanced pursuant to § 3B1.3.” Id. at 371. The defendant in White was a Applying these two enhancements cumulatively does not general superintendent at a drinking water treatment plant “over-count,” as each enhancement has elements that are not who was convicted of filing false reports. Although the necessary for the determination of the other. In White, this question there was whether the enhancement should apply to court addressed the appropriateness of applying both a White, while here we are reviewing a downward departure leadership and an abuse-of-trust enhancement. See White, after the enhancement has already been applied, the court’s 270 F.3d at 371-73. The district court in White applied the holding is relevant here. The district court’s statement in § 3B1.3 enhancement solely because it found the defendants No. 02-1031 United States v. Kuhn 11 12 United States v. Kuhn No. 02-1031

used a special skill in committing their offenses. Id. at 370. 2. Departure based on the specific offense enhancements When it declined also to apply the enhancement because of of Section 2Q1.3 the abuse of a position of public trust, the district court foreclosed the government from seeking an aggravating role Section 2Q1.3 addresses the offense for which Kuhn was enhancement under § 3B1.1. Ibid. (citing § 3B1.3 “if this convicted. The relevant specific offense characteristics are: adjustment is based solely on the use of a special skill, it may not be employed in addition to an adjustment under § 3B1.1 b) Specific Offense Characteristics (Aggravating Role).”) We reversed, and remanded the case (1) (A) If the offense resulted in an ongoing, continuous, to the district court, directing that it apply the abuse-of-trust or repetitive discharge, release, or emission of a pollutant enhancement and to “consider the propriety of also enhancing into the environment, increase by 6 levels; or White’s sentence pursuant to Section 3B1.1.” Id. at 373. (B) if the offense otherwise involved a discharge, release, or emission of a pollutant, increase by 4 levels. “Absent an instruction to the contrary, the adjustments from (2) If the offense resulted in a substantial likelihood of different guideline sentences are applied cumulatively (added death or serious bodily injury, increase by 11 levels. together).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment. (n.4). As the district (3) If the offense resulted in disruption of public utilities court found that Kuhn satisfied the requirements for the or evacuation of a community, or if cleanup required a enhancements, it was an abuse of discretion to find that the substantial expenditure, increase by 4 levels. application of the enhancements together constituted double- (4) If the offense involved a discharge without a permit counting and therefore merited a downward departure. A or in violation of a permit, increase by 4 levels . . . . sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the guidelines range only if the court finds “that there exists an U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.3. aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the The district court enhanced Kuhn’s base offense level by Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines . . . .” four levels for both § 2Q1.3(b)(1)(B) and § 2Q1.3(b)(4), as U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). It is clear the offense involved “a discharge” and “a discharge . . . in that the Sentencing Commission took into consideration the violation of a permit.” In doing so, the district court application of two or more enhancements for the same specifically stated that applying both specific offense conduct. The district court did not identify any facts or characteristics did “not constitute double counting.” circumstances that would take Kuhn’s case outside of the “heartland” of offenders who violate their position of public The application notes to each enhancement authorize trust while simultaneously supervising others in illegal downward or upward departures based on several factors. For activity. § 2Q1.3(b)(1)(B), applicable if the offense involved a discharge of a pollutant, application note 4 contemplates an The district court erred first by not notifying the upward or downward departure based on “the harm resulting government that it intended to depart on this basis. Even if from the . . . discharge, the quantity and nature of the proper notice had been provided, the district court abused its substance or pollutant, the duration of the offense and the risk discretion in departing on this basis. associated with the violation . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.3, comment. (n.4). For § 2Q1.3(b)(4), applicable if the offense involved a discharge without a permit or in violation of a No. 02-1031 United States v. Kuhn 13 14 United States v. Kuhn No. 02-1031

permit, application note 7 contemplates an upward or accounted for the frequency of the discharges and the nature downward departure based on “the nature and quantity of the of the harm posed by Kuhn’s offenses. We agree. substance involved and the risk associated with the offense . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.3, comment. (n.7). The district court A district court abuses its discretion when it departs based granted Kuhn two two-level guided downward departures on a factor already considered by the Commission in the pursuant to these two application notes, noting that the guidelines. Koon, 518 U.S. at 111. The district court noted environmental harm did not seem to be very great. The that the offense-level characteristics accounted for the fact government does not challenge these two guided departures. that Kuhn’s offense was not ongoing or repetitive, yet went on to say that it was “persuaded that the sentence ought to be The district court then gave as one reason for its additional fashioned around the fact that the discharge in this case unguided four-level downward departure, the application of resulted from essentially a single incident that occurred over both these specific offense characteristics, stating that “[a]ll a day or two . . . .” But as we indicated in United States v. discharges or emissions of a pollutant, in the context of a Rapanos, 235 F.3d 256 (6th Cir. 2000),5 quoting § 5K2.0, violation of the applicable statutory section in this case, “[D]issatisfaction with the available sentencing range or a necessarily must be accomplished in violation of or absent a preference for a different sentence than that authorized by the permit. Where a single discharge occurred, the scoring of guidelines is not an appropriate basis for a sentence outside both these factors puts undue weight on these offense the applicable guideline range.” Id. at 260. In Rapanos, we characteristics in this case.”4 found that the district court abused its discretion when it granted two additional one-level downward departures after The government first argues that the district court failed to granting two two-level downward departures pursuant to give notice that it intended to depart downward for this application notes 4 and 7. Ibid. We noted that although the reason. However, the defendant moved for a downward guided departures were authorized by the facts found by the departure on this basis and objected to the PSR on this basis; district court, the facts found did not authorize the additional thus, the government was sufficiently on notice that this issue unguided departures, because “[a] district court abuses its would be addressed at the sentencing hearing. See Fed. R. discretion when it takes into account a factor already Crim. P. 32. considered by the Commission in the guidelines.” Id. at 259- 61. The government also argues that the court had already determined that applying both offense characteristics did not In this case, the guidelines take into account the factors that constitute double-counting and had already granted Kuhn a concerned the district court. Section 2Q1.3(b)(1)(B) two-level downward adjustment for each of subsections (b)(1)(B) and (b)(4), and it contends that this more than 5 On bases not relevant here, this judgment was vacated by the United States Supreme Court, Rapanos v. United States, 533 U.S. 913 (200 1), 4 and remanded to this court. W e in turn remanded the case to the district The government argues that the district court erred in stating that “a court, United States v. Rapanos, 16 Fed. Appx. 345, 2001 WL 868006 single discha rge occurred,” stating that trial testimon y confirm ed that (6th Cir. July 13, 2001). The district court set aside the defendant’s sludge was discharged on two separate occasions, although the conviction and d ismissed the case . United States v. Rapanos, 190 F. government does not cite any trial testimony to this effect. However, Supp. 2d 101 1 (E.D. M ich. 20 02). On appe al, we reversed. United States whether the trial testimony reflects this fact is not dispositive on this issue. v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 44 7 (6th Cir. 2003). No. 02-1031 United States v. Kuhn 15 16 United States v. Kuhn No. 02-1031

contemplates its application in the event of “a discharge,” instruct that “[t]he offense level adjustments from more than meaning a single discharge as does section 2Q1.3(b)(4). The one specific offense characteristic within an offense guideline district court also was able to address its concerns by granting are cumulative (added together) unless the guideline specifies the two guided departures and by declining to apply a six- that only the greater (or greatest) is to be used.” U.S.S.G. level enhancement applicable to discharges that were § 1B1.1, comment. (n.4); see also United States v. Perkins, 89 “ongoing, continuous, or repetitive.” U.S.S.G. F.3d 303, 308 (6th Cir. 1996). § 2Q1.3(b)(1)(A). The sentencing guidelines more than adequately take into account the frequency of the discharges The application of both specific offense characteristics is and the threat of environmental harm posed by Kuhn’s either double counting or it is not. The district court cannot crimes. The district court’s comment that it had first apply both specific offense characteristics and then “considerable thoughts and doubt about whether the sentence, revisit its decision when deciding whether to grant a a custodial sentence, of 21 months to 27 months serves the downward departure. If the Sentencing Commission believed ends of justice in this case,” indicates a “dissatisfaction with the application of both constituted double counting, it would the available sentencing range or a preference for a different have added an application note, as contemplated in § 1B1.1. sentence than that authorized by the guidelines,” which we Without such an application note, it seems that the Sentencing noted in Rapanos “is not an appropriate basis for a sentence Commission has already taken the application of both specific outside the applicable guideline range.” 235 F.3d at 260 offense characteristics into account when it designed the (quoting the commentary to § 5K2.0). guidelines. “A district court abuses its discretion when it takes into account a factor already considered by the The district court also reasoned that the application of both Commission in the guidelines.” Rapanos, 235 F.3d at 259. enhancements placed undue weight on the offense The district court did not provide any indication of facts that characteristics because “[a]ll discharges or emissions of a would place Kuhn’s case outside the “heartland” of pollutant, in the context of a violation of the applicable environmental crimes involving one or two discharges. Any statutory section in this case, necessarily must be concerns with the fairness of whether one would always accomplished in violation of or absent a permit.” However, qualify for an enhancement pursuant to § 2Q1.3(b)(4) if one when it applied both specific offense characteristics, the qualified for an enhancement pursuant to § 2Q1.3(b)(1)(B) district court noted that the sentencing guidelines will contain are best addressed to Congress. an application note to direct the court when it should not apply both of two overlapping specific offense characteristics. The district court abused its discretion in departing The court stated that while it believed one could not violate downward on this basis. § 2Q1.3(b)(1)(B) without violating § 2Q1.3(b)(4), “that’s how the sentencing guidelines are constituted.” It then stated that 3. Departure based on Kuhn’s motivation and purpose “in this particular case . . . applying offense characteristics in B1B [sic] and also in subparagraph (4) does not constitute The district court offered as a further reason for granting a double counting.” downward departure Kuhn’s motivation and purpose. It stated that given his background, length of service in the area Section 2Q1.3(b)(1)(B) and section 2Q1.3(b)(4) are two of public waste management, and other factors such as his distinct offense level adjustments within an offense guideline community involvement and “exemplary personal record of and are intended to be applied cumulatively. The guidelines achievements in the community,” it found “credible the No. 02-1031 United States v. Kuhn 17

defendant’s professed motive that the efficient, pollution-free operation of the Bay City Wastewater Treatment Plant was his ultimate goal.” The court concluded that because of this pure motive, Kuhn’s case fell outside of the “heartland” of pollution offenses. First, we note that the district court erred by not giving notice to the government that it intended to depart on this basis. Second, we are unable to find any authorization in the guidelines for a downward departure based on a defendant’s good motive for committing a crime. We reserve judgment on whether some permissible ground may be found that would incorporate this reason. In any event, the government should have been afforded the opportunity to present its arguments to the district court. The district court must give the government the proper notice of any intended basis for departure, should it choose to do so again. 4. Conclusion Therefore, we VACATE Kuhn’s sentence and REMAND to the district court for resentencing.