United States v. Koffie

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 16, 2026
• Docket: 23-4199
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 16 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-4199 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:17-cr-00291-MO-1 v. MEMORANDUM* HENRY KONAH KOFFIE, AKA Narcoboss, AKA Dnmkingpin,

Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 13, 2026** Portland, Oregon

Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Henry Konah Koffie appeals from his jury trial convictions on two counts of

distributing a controlled substance resulting in death; one count of distribution of a

controlled substance analogue resulting in serious bodily injury; and five counts of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). distributing a controlled substance—violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 813, 841(a)(1), and

(b)(1)(C). As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. Under Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 792 (2024), it is unconstitutional

for a testifying expert to base her conclusions solely on her review of another non-

testifying analyst’s report. As both parties agree, the district court erred when it

permitted Simonique Washington to testify about the contents of the government’s

Pittsburgh controlled buy.

But the Confrontation Clause violation here was harmless. See Delaware v.

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (explaining that Confrontation Clause

errors are subject to harmless-error analysis). The government never charged

Koffie with any violations arising from the Pittsburgh controlled buy, and to the

extent evidence from that buy supported Koffie’s conviction on other counts,

overwhelming evidence made it clear that the jury would have nonetheless

convicted Koffie. See United States v. Johnson, 875 F.3d 1265, 1279 (9th Cir.

2017) (finding harmlessness where “the government presented compelling

additional evidence” to support its claim).

2. We need not determine whether the district court erred in denying

Koffie’s motion to suppress laboratory results from a package seized at the border

for six months, as any such error was harmless. See United States v. Job, 871 F.3d

2 23-4199 852, 865 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that a district court’s error in denying a motion to

suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment does not require reversal if it was

harmless). The lab results that Koffie argues should have been suppressed were

neither dispositive nor necessary for the government to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that Koffie was distributing fentanyl. And regardless of any improper

seizure of the underlying parcel, the government presented the jury with other

compelling evidence to support Koffie’s distribution counts. We are “convinced

that [any] improperly admitted evidence did not contribute to the verdict.” Id.

(citation omitted).

3. The district court did not err in denying Koffie’s motion for a Franks

hearing, as the search warrant did not contain any intentional or reckless

misstatements or omissions of material facts. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,

155-56 (1978). To obtain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a substantial

preliminary showing that (1) “the affiant officer intentionally or recklessly made

false or misleading statements or omissions”; and (2) “the false or misleading

statement or omission was material, i.e., necessary to finding probable cause.”

United States v. Norris, 942 F.3d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v.

Perkins, 850 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2017)).

Even if there were any errors on prong one, none of these errors were

material, as probable cause to search Koffie’s home, his mother’s home, and his

3 23-4199 car existed based on the other evidence alone.

4. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Koffie’s motion

for attorney participation in voir dire without explanation. “It is wholly within the

judge’s discretion to reject supplemental questions proposed by counsel if the voir

dire is otherwise reasonably sufficient to test the jury for bias or partiality.” United

States v. Powell, 932 F.2d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1991).

Here, the judge’s voir dire was reasonably sufficient to test the jury for bias

or partiality, as the district court directly probed jurors about potential racial biases

and about any potentially strong feelings about drugs and drug laws. And the

district court did not abuse its discretion when it did not explain why it was

denying the motion. Powell, 932 F.2d at 1340 (noting that the district court has

considerable discretion in how to conduct voir dire).

AFFIRMED. 1

1 We grant Koffie’s pending motion to file a pro se supplemental brief (Dkt. 21), which has already been submitted (Dkt. 35). We also conclude that the remaining issues raised in Koffie’s pro se supplemental brief are unpersuasive.

4 23-4199