NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________
No. 25-1877 ____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
KEVIN AGUILAR, Appellant ____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. No. 3:23-cr-00320-002) District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp ____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) June 9, 2026
Before: HARDIMAN, BOVE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Filed: June 12, 2026)
___________
OPINION ∗ ____________
∗This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Kevin Aguilar appeals his criminal judgment. Counsel for Aguilar has filed a brief
with a motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We will
grant counsel’s motion and affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I
A grand jury charged Aguilar with fifteen counts related to fraud, money
laundering, and aggravated identity theft, resulting in nearly $4,000,000 in losses. The
indictment included charges that Aguilar defrauded COVID-19 relief programs, including
the Paycheck Protection Program and Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program.
About a week before jury selection, Aguilar pleaded guilty to all fifteen counts
without a plea agreement. The District Court sentenced Aguilar to 192 months’
imprisonment after determining that his advisory sentencing range under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines was 192 to 234 months’ imprisonment (24 months of which
was mandatory). Aguilar timely appealed.
Aguilar’s counsel submitted an Anders brief, stating that she found no
nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. Aguilar filed a pro se brief.
II
Anders requires us to determine whether Defendant’s counsel “thoroughly
examined the record in search of appealable issues” and “explain[ed] why the issues are
frivolous.” United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). If so, we must
independently confirm that nothing in the record “might arguably support the appeal.”
2 Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. If we determine there are no nonfrivolous issues, we will grant
counsel’s Anders motion and dispose of the appeal. 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a) (2011).
III
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Anders brief here recognizes
the three potential areas for argument based on Aguilar’s open guilty pleas: (1) the
District Court’s jurisdiction; (2) the validity of the pleas; and (3) the reasonableness and
legality of the sentence. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989).
There is no nonfrivolous jurisdictional argument. The District Court had
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 as Aguilar was charged with federal offenses
(violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1344 and 2, 1343 and 2, 1956(h), 1957(a), and 1028A(a)(1)
and 2).
There is no nonfrivolous basis to challenge Aguilar’s guilty pleas. Counsel points
out in her Anders brief that Aguilar entered knowing and voluntary pleas after a
comprehensive colloquy with the Court. The Court confirmed Aguilar’s competence,
advised him of his constitutional rights and the potential consequences of waiving those
rights, and ensured there was a factual basis for the pleas. Aguilar was advised of the
charges, the penalties he faced, and the rights he was waiving. So the requirements of
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Constitution were satisfied.
Finally, as pointed out in counsel’s Anders brief, there is no nonfrivolous basis to
challenge Aguilar’s sentence because it was procedurally and substantively sound. The
District Court complied with the process outlined in United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d
237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006), and met the requirements of Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of
3 Criminal Procedure. The Court ensured that Aguilar received and reviewed the PSR with
counsel.
The only contested issue at sentencing was whether Aguilar was entitled to
acceptance of responsibility—the PSR said he was, but the District Court disagreed. In
denying Aguilar a 2-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the District Court
emphasized that Aguilar had: (1) waited until the eve of trial to inform the Court that he
would enter guilty pleas; and (2) transferred property subject to forfeiture to an
irrevocable trust. We agree with counsel that there is no nonfrivolous argument that the
Court committed clear error when it found that Aguilar was not entitled to a reduction in
his offense level for acceptance of responsibility. See United States v. DeLeon-Rodriguez,
70 F.3d 764, 767 (3d Cir. 1995) (clear acceptance of responsibility is a factual question
for the sentencing court).
Aguilar claims the Court erred in denying the 2-point reduction because it
misunderstood the nature of his unilateral transfer of assets to an irrevocable trust he
created, and that the transfer reflected his attempt to assist the Government. Aguilar Pro
Se Brief at 2. The District Court rejected that excuse for this post-plea conduct at
sentencing. At the bail hearing held right before sentencing, the Court also addressed the
asset transfers, emphatically stating: “[H]e had no right. After that forfeiture order was
signed, why would he do this at all? I don’t believe for one minute that he was doing this
to help the government.” Supp. App. 19.
The Court provided defense counsel and Aguilar the opportunity to address the
Court. Aguilar’s counsel advocated for a bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence. She urged
4 that her client had shown acceptance of responsibility by proffering all the details of the
fraudulent schemes prior to changing his pleas, and stated that his decision to transfer
assets to the irrevocable trust was actually a misguided effort to assist the Government.
Aguilar’s counsel also noted that, aside from all the frauds, Aguilar was dealing with his
own health issues, had taken care of his sick mother from 2016 through 2023, and was a
hard worker. For his part, Aguilar apologized for the harm he caused and committed to
paying the restitution he owed.
As pointed out in the Anders brief, in sentencing Aguilar to 192 months’
imprisonment—at the bottom of the Guidelines range and well below the statutory
maximum of 360 months’ imprisonment—the District Court thoughtfully considered the
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________
No. 25-1877 ____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
KEVIN AGUILAR, Appellant ____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. No. 3:23-cr-00320-002) District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp ____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) June 9, 2026
Before: HARDIMAN, BOVE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Filed: June 12, 2026)
___________
OPINION ∗ ____________
∗This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Kevin Aguilar appeals his criminal judgment. Counsel for Aguilar has filed a brief
with a motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We will
grant counsel’s motion and affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I
A grand jury charged Aguilar with fifteen counts related to fraud, money
laundering, and aggravated identity theft, resulting in nearly $4,000,000 in losses. The
indictment included charges that Aguilar defrauded COVID-19 relief programs, including
the Paycheck Protection Program and Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program.
About a week before jury selection, Aguilar pleaded guilty to all fifteen counts
without a plea agreement. The District Court sentenced Aguilar to 192 months’
imprisonment after determining that his advisory sentencing range under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines was 192 to 234 months’ imprisonment (24 months of which
was mandatory). Aguilar timely appealed.
Aguilar’s counsel submitted an Anders brief, stating that she found no
nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. Aguilar filed a pro se brief.
II
Anders requires us to determine whether Defendant’s counsel “thoroughly
examined the record in search of appealable issues” and “explain[ed] why the issues are
frivolous.” United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). If so, we must
independently confirm that nothing in the record “might arguably support the appeal.”
2 Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. If we determine there are no nonfrivolous issues, we will grant
counsel’s Anders motion and dispose of the appeal. 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a) (2011).
III
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Anders brief here recognizes
the three potential areas for argument based on Aguilar’s open guilty pleas: (1) the
District Court’s jurisdiction; (2) the validity of the pleas; and (3) the reasonableness and
legality of the sentence. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989).
There is no nonfrivolous jurisdictional argument. The District Court had
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 as Aguilar was charged with federal offenses
(violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1344 and 2, 1343 and 2, 1956(h), 1957(a), and 1028A(a)(1)
and 2).
There is no nonfrivolous basis to challenge Aguilar’s guilty pleas. Counsel points
out in her Anders brief that Aguilar entered knowing and voluntary pleas after a
comprehensive colloquy with the Court. The Court confirmed Aguilar’s competence,
advised him of his constitutional rights and the potential consequences of waiving those
rights, and ensured there was a factual basis for the pleas. Aguilar was advised of the
charges, the penalties he faced, and the rights he was waiving. So the requirements of
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Constitution were satisfied.
Finally, as pointed out in counsel’s Anders brief, there is no nonfrivolous basis to
challenge Aguilar’s sentence because it was procedurally and substantively sound. The
District Court complied with the process outlined in United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d
237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006), and met the requirements of Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of
3 Criminal Procedure. The Court ensured that Aguilar received and reviewed the PSR with
counsel.
The only contested issue at sentencing was whether Aguilar was entitled to
acceptance of responsibility—the PSR said he was, but the District Court disagreed. In
denying Aguilar a 2-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the District Court
emphasized that Aguilar had: (1) waited until the eve of trial to inform the Court that he
would enter guilty pleas; and (2) transferred property subject to forfeiture to an
irrevocable trust. We agree with counsel that there is no nonfrivolous argument that the
Court committed clear error when it found that Aguilar was not entitled to a reduction in
his offense level for acceptance of responsibility. See United States v. DeLeon-Rodriguez,
70 F.3d 764, 767 (3d Cir. 1995) (clear acceptance of responsibility is a factual question
for the sentencing court).
Aguilar claims the Court erred in denying the 2-point reduction because it
misunderstood the nature of his unilateral transfer of assets to an irrevocable trust he
created, and that the transfer reflected his attempt to assist the Government. Aguilar Pro
Se Brief at 2. The District Court rejected that excuse for this post-plea conduct at
sentencing. At the bail hearing held right before sentencing, the Court also addressed the
asset transfers, emphatically stating: “[H]e had no right. After that forfeiture order was
signed, why would he do this at all? I don’t believe for one minute that he was doing this
to help the government.” Supp. App. 19.
The Court provided defense counsel and Aguilar the opportunity to address the
Court. Aguilar’s counsel advocated for a bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence. She urged
4 that her client had shown acceptance of responsibility by proffering all the details of the
fraudulent schemes prior to changing his pleas, and stated that his decision to transfer
assets to the irrevocable trust was actually a misguided effort to assist the Government.
Aguilar’s counsel also noted that, aside from all the frauds, Aguilar was dealing with his
own health issues, had taken care of his sick mother from 2016 through 2023, and was a
hard worker. For his part, Aguilar apologized for the harm he caused and committed to
paying the restitution he owed.
As pointed out in the Anders brief, in sentencing Aguilar to 192 months’
imprisonment—at the bottom of the Guidelines range and well below the statutory
maximum of 360 months’ imprisonment—the District Court thoughtfully considered the
sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Finally, the Court advised Aguilar of his
appeal rights. Like Aguilar’s counsel, we do not see on this record a nonfrivolous
argument to show that “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same
sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons” the District Court provided. United
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
IV
Aguilar’s pro se brief—which raises various arguments for the first time—offers
no nonfrivolous issues for this appeal.
First, we do not address on direct review Aguilar’s challenge of ineffective
assistance of counsel. See United States v. Langley, 52 F.4th 564, 575 n.7 (3d Cir. 2022).
Second, Aguilar argues the Court erred by impermissible double-counting when it
applied two enhancements, one for the money laundering, U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C),
5 and another for the sophisticated means of committing the frauds, U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3).
This likewise does not present a non-frivolous argument that the Court plainly erred,
because the Guidelines do not prohibit applying both of these enhancements, see United
States v. Wong, 3 F.3d 667, 671 (3d Cir. 1993), and they depended on separate facts and
criminal conduct. See United States v. Otunyo, 63 F.4th 948, 957 (D.C. Cir. 2023)
(applying both Guidelines provision § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) and § 2S1.1(b)(3) is not error).
Finally, Aguilar asserts he was denied self-representation, complaining the Court
held ex parte hearings relating to the subject and failed to docket a letter he sent. But the
hearings on request for counsel to withdraw or to proceed without counsel were only ex
parte as to the Government and not as to him. And at his guilty plea hearing, held after he
sent a letter to the Court about self-representation, he assured the Court he was “fully
satisfied with the representation and advice given to [him] by [his] attorneys.” App. 38,
42.
* * *
Counsel’s Anders brief is adequate and there are no nonfrivolous issues for appeal.
We will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the District Court’s judgment.