USCA4 Appeal: 23-4144 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/30/2024 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4144
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KENTREL DEANGELO JORDAN FAUCETTE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:18-cr-00292-WO-1)
Submitted: May 20, 2024 Decided: May 30, 2024
Before KING and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Ryan M. Gaylord, BELL, DAVIS & PITT, P.A., Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Mary Ann Courtney, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4144 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/30/2024 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
Kentrel Deangelo Jordan Faucette appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his
term of supervised release and sentencing him to 20 months of imprisonment followed by
12 months of supervised release. On appeal, Faucette’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant
to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds
for appeal but questioning whether the district court erred by considering evidence found
during an allegedly unconstitutional search, whether the district court clearly erred in
finding that Faucette violated the conditions of supervised release, and whether Faucette’s
sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. Faucette has filed a pro se
supplemental brief requesting vacatur of his revocation sentence because the state charges
underlying the revocation petition were dismissed. The Government has declined to file a
response brief. Finding no error, we affirm.
First, under the exclusionary rule, the Government is prohibited from introducing at
a criminal trial “evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.”
United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 335 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted). However, “the exclusionary rule does not apply in federal supervised release
revocation proceedings.” United States v. Armstrong, 187 F.3d 392, 393 (4th Cir. 1999).
Because the evidence challenged by Faucette was considered in a revocation proceeding,
not a criminal prosecution, Armstrong forecloses his constitutional challenge to the
evidence supporting the revocation of his supervised release.
Next, we review “a district court’s decision to revoke a defendant’s supervised
release for abuse of discretion,” its underlying factual findings for clear error, and
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4144 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/30/2024 Pg: 3 of 5
unpreserved challenges for plain error. United States v. Dennison, 925 F.3d 185, 190 (4th
Cir. 2019). A district court need only find a violation of a condition of supervised release
by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). After reviewing the record
and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
revoking Faucette’s supervised release. The Government presented undisputed testimony
at the revocation hearing that Faucette admitted distributing and using marijuana.
Therefore, based on Faucette’s new criminal conduct and use of a controlled substance, we
discern no abuse of discretion in the revocation of Faucette’s supervised release. See id.;
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.3(a)(1), p.s. (2021) (“Upon a finding of a Grade
A or B violation, the court shall revoke . . . supervised release.”).
Faucette’s counsel also questions the reasonableness of Faucette’s revocation
sentence. “A district court has broad . . . discretion in fashioning a sentence upon
revocation of a defendant’s term of supervised release.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d
202, 206 (4th Cir. 2017). We “will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory
maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436
(4th Cir. 2020). Before deciding whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable,
we must first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively
unreasonable, based on “the same procedural and substantive considerations that guide our
review of original sentences,” but taking “a more deferential appellate posture than we do
when reviewing original sentences.” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir.
2015) (cleaned up). Even if a revocation sentence is unreasonable, we will reverse only if
it is “plainly so.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 208 (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4144 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/30/2024 Pg: 4 of 5
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding
Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at
207 (footnote omitted). “A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if, in light of
the totality of the circumstances, the court states an appropriate basis for concluding that
the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” United States v. Coston, 964 F.3d
289, 297 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “a revocation
sentence that is within the recommended Guidelines range is presumed reasonable.”
United States v. Gibbs, 897 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We conclude that Faucette’s revocation sentence is both procedurally and
substantively reasonable. When imposing Faucette’s sentence, the district court correctly
calculated the policy statement range, considered the relevant statutory factors, imposed a
sentence within the statutory maximum, gave sufficiently detailed reasons for its decision,
and provided Faucette an opportunity to argue for a lower sentence. We also conclude that
Faucette fails to rebut the presumption of substantive reasonableness accorded to his
within-policy-statement-range sentence. See id.
Lastly, contrary to Faucette’s argument in his pro se supplemental brief, “a district
court may sentence a defendant to a revocation sentence for violating state, local, or federal
law even though the defendant has not been convicted of that new offense.” United States
v. Jackson, 952 F.3d 492, 500 (4th Cir. 2020); USSG § 7B1.1 cmt. n.1, p.s. The district
4 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4144 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/30/2024 Pg: 5 of 5
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4144 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/30/2024 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4144
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KENTREL DEANGELO JORDAN FAUCETTE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:18-cr-00292-WO-1)
Submitted: May 20, 2024 Decided: May 30, 2024
Before KING and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Ryan M. Gaylord, BELL, DAVIS & PITT, P.A., Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Mary Ann Courtney, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4144 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/30/2024 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
Kentrel Deangelo Jordan Faucette appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his
term of supervised release and sentencing him to 20 months of imprisonment followed by
12 months of supervised release. On appeal, Faucette’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant
to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds
for appeal but questioning whether the district court erred by considering evidence found
during an allegedly unconstitutional search, whether the district court clearly erred in
finding that Faucette violated the conditions of supervised release, and whether Faucette’s
sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. Faucette has filed a pro se
supplemental brief requesting vacatur of his revocation sentence because the state charges
underlying the revocation petition were dismissed. The Government has declined to file a
response brief. Finding no error, we affirm.
First, under the exclusionary rule, the Government is prohibited from introducing at
a criminal trial “evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.”
United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 335 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted). However, “the exclusionary rule does not apply in federal supervised release
revocation proceedings.” United States v. Armstrong, 187 F.3d 392, 393 (4th Cir. 1999).
Because the evidence challenged by Faucette was considered in a revocation proceeding,
not a criminal prosecution, Armstrong forecloses his constitutional challenge to the
evidence supporting the revocation of his supervised release.
Next, we review “a district court’s decision to revoke a defendant’s supervised
release for abuse of discretion,” its underlying factual findings for clear error, and
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4144 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/30/2024 Pg: 3 of 5
unpreserved challenges for plain error. United States v. Dennison, 925 F.3d 185, 190 (4th
Cir. 2019). A district court need only find a violation of a condition of supervised release
by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). After reviewing the record
and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
revoking Faucette’s supervised release. The Government presented undisputed testimony
at the revocation hearing that Faucette admitted distributing and using marijuana.
Therefore, based on Faucette’s new criminal conduct and use of a controlled substance, we
discern no abuse of discretion in the revocation of Faucette’s supervised release. See id.;
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.3(a)(1), p.s. (2021) (“Upon a finding of a Grade
A or B violation, the court shall revoke . . . supervised release.”).
Faucette’s counsel also questions the reasonableness of Faucette’s revocation
sentence. “A district court has broad . . . discretion in fashioning a sentence upon
revocation of a defendant’s term of supervised release.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d
202, 206 (4th Cir. 2017). We “will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory
maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436
(4th Cir. 2020). Before deciding whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable,
we must first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively
unreasonable, based on “the same procedural and substantive considerations that guide our
review of original sentences,” but taking “a more deferential appellate posture than we do
when reviewing original sentences.” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir.
2015) (cleaned up). Even if a revocation sentence is unreasonable, we will reverse only if
it is “plainly so.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 208 (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4144 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/30/2024 Pg: 4 of 5
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding
Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at
207 (footnote omitted). “A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if, in light of
the totality of the circumstances, the court states an appropriate basis for concluding that
the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” United States v. Coston, 964 F.3d
289, 297 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “a revocation
sentence that is within the recommended Guidelines range is presumed reasonable.”
United States v. Gibbs, 897 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We conclude that Faucette’s revocation sentence is both procedurally and
substantively reasonable. When imposing Faucette’s sentence, the district court correctly
calculated the policy statement range, considered the relevant statutory factors, imposed a
sentence within the statutory maximum, gave sufficiently detailed reasons for its decision,
and provided Faucette an opportunity to argue for a lower sentence. We also conclude that
Faucette fails to rebut the presumption of substantive reasonableness accorded to his
within-policy-statement-range sentence. See id.
Lastly, contrary to Faucette’s argument in his pro se supplemental brief, “a district
court may sentence a defendant to a revocation sentence for violating state, local, or federal
law even though the defendant has not been convicted of that new offense.” United States
v. Jackson, 952 F.3d 492, 500 (4th Cir. 2020); USSG § 7B1.1 cmt. n.1, p.s. The district
4 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4144 Doc: 26 Filed: 05/30/2024 Pg: 5 of 5
court thus did not err in revoking Faucette’s supervised release even though the underlying
state charges were later dismissed.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. * Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Faucette, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Faucette requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Faucette.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
* Although neither counsel nor Faucette raised any issues with the conditions of supervised release, pursuant to our Anders review, we placed this case in abeyance for our decision in United States v. Jackson, No. 22-4159, 2024 WL 1155767 (4th Cir. Mar. 19, 2024) (argued but unpublished). We discern no reversible plain error in this case. See United States v. McMiller, 954 F.3d 670, 676-77 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Neal, 810 F.3d 512, 521 (7th Cir. 2016).