United States v. Kennedy

955 F. Supp. 1331, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20703, 1996 WL 807352
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Mexico
DecidedOctober 31, 1996
DocketCr. 94-534 JP
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 955 F. Supp. 1331 (United States v. Kennedy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Mexico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Kennedy, 955 F. Supp. 1331, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20703, 1996 WL 807352 (D.N.M. 1996).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PARKER, District Judge.

The subject of this memorandum opinion and order is defendant’s motion to reconsider (Doc. #73) filed May 19, 1995. Defendant seeks reconsideration of the memorandum opinion and order (Doc. .# 72) filed May 12, 1995 in which I denied defendant’s motion to suppress physical evidence. Defendant argued in his motion to suppress (Doc. #31) that the nareotics-deteeting canine, Bobo, who positively alerted to defendant’s luggage, was unreliable, and therefore, unable to provide the necessary probable cause to support issuance of a search warrant. DEA Special Agent Kevin Small had prepared an affidavit for search warrant based almost *1332 exclusively on Bobo’s positive alert to defendant’s luggage. Defendant asserted that Bobo’s handler, Detective Rob Lujan, had failed to properly document Bobo’s field searches, thereby making it impossible to accurately determine how many times Bobo had alerted when no seizable amounts of contraband were found. Consequently, defendant argued, the lack of daily records precluded the government from demonstrating that Bobo was sufficiently reliable to independently support an affidavit for search warrant and justify a neutral magistrate’s finding of probable cause. In an attempt to recreate Bobo’s field searches, the government and defendant expended considerable time and effort locating documents related to Bobo’s prior searches; e.g., search warrants, DEA investigative reports, etc. These efforts produced documents and reports establishing that in 40 out of the 56 times that Bobo alerted, seizable amounts of contraband were discovered. Based on Bobo’s extensive, albeit not complete, re-created history, I determined, with reservations about Detective Lujan’s failure to follow instructions about proper procedures, that Bobo was a sufficiently reliable narcoties-detecting canine to support a finding of probable cause. I also found that Agent Small did not knowingly or intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, include false information in his affidavit for search warrant. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). Defendant now requests that I reconsider my previous denial of his motion to suppress physical evidence.

DISCUSSION

Defendant asserts that the memorandum opinion and order denying his motion to suppress contained an incomplete Franks analysis regarding whether Agent Small’s affidavit for search warrant was deficient. The memorandum opinion and order stated that

[tjhere is a presumption of validity regarding the affidavit in support of a search warrant. Franks, at 171, 98 S.Ct. at 2684. In order to void a search warrant, a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the affiant included a “false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth.” A defendant must also prove that if the false material is stricken, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause. Id. at 155-56 [98 S.Ct. at 2676-77], “Suppression ... remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 [104 S.Ct. 3405, 3421, 82 L.Ed.2d 677] (1984). Several courts have agreed that the “deliberate falsehood” and the “reckless disregard” standards set out in Franks apply to material omissions as well. See, e.g., Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 582 (10th Cir.1990).

Defendant does not contend that a Franks v. Delaware analysis was incorrect, but rather asserts that the standard used was incomplete because it considered only Agent Small’s knowledge and failed to consider information known to Detective Lujan regarding Bobo’s training, 1 field searches, and records which Detective Lujan had not imparted to Agent Small. Defendant argues that what Detective Lujan knew was critical on the question of Bobo’s reliability and should not have been omitted from Agent Small’s affidavit. In the affidavit for search warrant, Agent Small testified that “Bobo is a certified narcotics canine with the Albuquerque Police Department and is trained to alert to the odors associated with Marijuana, Heroin, Cocaine, and/or Methamphetamine.” Agent Small also stated that Bobo had alerted to defendant’s “large American Tourister hard-sided suitcase.” Based on Bobo’s positive alert Agent Small approached defendant’s roomette and proceeded to ask defendant questions related to his travel plans and destination. In response to Agent Small’s questions, defendant stated that he was “dropping a bag” for an individual named Will. Agent Small concluded that based on Bobo’s alert to defendant’s luggage, and defendant’s statements regarding Will, probable cause existed to seize defendant’s luggage and to obtain a search warrant.

*1333 After thoroughly reviewing Agent Small’s testimony and Bobo’s records, I determined that Agent Small did not knowingly or recklessly include false information in his affidavit for search warrant. Specifically, I found that: (1) Agent Small was unaware that Detective Lujan had not followed proper recordkeeping protocol; (2) Agent Small was unaware that Bobo had alerted on more than two occasions when no seizable amounts of contraband were found; 2 and (3) Agent Small had no reason to suspect Bobo’s reliability, especially since he previously had relied on Bobo’s alerts to support 10-15 search warrants and was aware of only two occasions when no seizable quantity of contraband was found. Based on these findings, I concluded that Judge Lorenzo Garcia, the magistrate who issued the search warrant, was justified in finding probable cause to issue a' search warrant based on Agent Small’s affidavit.

Defendant correctly argues that the Franks analysis in the May 12, 1995 memorandum opinion and order was incomplete because it did not take into consideration Detective Lujan’s knowledge of Bobo’s training, field searches, and records, which was not mentioned in the affidavit.

“If we held that the conduct of ... the affiant[ ] was the only relevant conduct for the purpose of applying the teachings of Franks, we would place the privacy rights protected by that case in serious jeopardy. As the Supreme Court noted in Franks, ‘police [eanjnot insulate one officer’s deliberate misstatements merely by relaying it through an officer-affiant personally ignorant of its falsity.’ 438 U.S. at 164 n. 6, 98 S.Ct. at 2680.”

United States v. DeLeon, 979 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Calisto, 838 F.2d 711

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
955 F. Supp. 1331, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20703, 1996 WL 807352, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-kennedy-nmd-1996.