U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-1903
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
KENDRE CAIN, Appellant _____________________________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania Judge Christy Criswell Wiegand No. 2:24-cr-38
Before: Hardiman, Scirica, and Ambro, Circuit Judges Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) March 26, 2026 Decided Jun. 22, 2026 _____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION1
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
On seeing police officers on the street, Kendre Cain took off running. The officers
pursued and detained him, then discovered a firearm nearby. Surveillance video showed
Cain tossing the firearm during his flight. Cain moved to suppress the firearm and
surveillance video; the District Court denied the motion. For the following reasons, we
affirm that denial.
1 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under Third Circuit I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. I
In January 2024, two Pittsburgh police detectives set out to execute an arrest
warrant. As they searched for their target, they spotted Kendre Cain entering a gray Jeep.
Mistaking Cain for their target, the detectives followed him until he parked and got out of
the Jeep. At that point, one detective recognized Cain and yelled his name. Cain
immediately bolted, running down an outdoor stairwell and behind an apartment
building. The detectives split up and pursued on foot.
One detective caught up to Cain, pointed his taser in Cain’s direction, and shouted
for him to stop and get on the ground. Cain complied, and the detective patted him down.
During the pat-down, the detective asked Cain why he was running and told him they had
pursued him because he had run. After detaining Cain, officers discovered a firearm
nearby.
Surveillance video from the apartment building showed Cain running down the
stairwell. During that flight, Cain reached into his pocket and tossed a small black object
toward the alleyway where officers later confronted him. Cain does not dispute that the
object was the firearm found near him.
Cain was indicted on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to suppress the firearm and the
surveillance video. After a hearing and post-hearing briefing, the District Court denied
the motion. Cain pled guilty conditionally, reserving his right to appeal the denial.
He now brings that appeal. The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §
3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review a district court’s
2 order denying a motion to suppress under a mixed standard of review. We review
findings of fact for clear error, but exercise plenary review over legal determinations.”
United States v. Mendoza, 163 F.4th 782, 784 (3d Cir. 2026) (quoting United States v.
Dyer, 54 F.4th 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2022) (citation omitted)). And because “the District
Court denied the suppression motion,” we examine the facts “in the light most favorable
to the Government.” Id. (quoting Dyer, 54 F.4th at 158).
Cain’s primary argument is that his detention was unconstitutional. Regardless
whether it was, the Government lawfully acquired the firearm and surveillance video.
II
First, we address the firearm that Cain tossed as he ran. In order to suppress it
under the Fourth Amendment, Cain must show more than his ownership. Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105–06 (1980). He must have a privacy interest in the firearm at
the time it was seized. Id.
Abandonment of property terminates one’s Fourth Amendment privacy interest in
it. United States v. Fulani, 368 F.3d 351, 354 (3d Cir. 2004). Under Fourth Amendment
abandonment analysis—which is different from abandonment under property law—we
ask whether, in the totality of the circumstances, there was “clear and unequivocal
evidence” of intent to abandon. United States v. Harrison, 689 F.3d 301, 307 (3d Cir.
2012) (citing Fulani, 368 F.3d at 354). This determination is objective; it does not turn
on whether the defendant subjectively intended to abandon the property. Id. “In most
cases, disclaiming ownership or physically relinquishing the property is sufficient to
3 establish abandonment.” Id. (citing United States v. Liu, 180 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir.
1999)).
Accordingly, we have designated property “abandoned” where a bus passenger
told agents he did not have any baggage in the overhead rack, even though there was a
bag directly overhead bearing his name, Fulani, 368 F.3d at 354–55, and where a suspect
“discarded eight packets into an unlighted pantry” during a “brief flight” from police
through a kitchen, United States v. Martin, 386 F.2d 213, 214–15 (3d Cir. 1967). Of
particular relevance to this case, the Supreme Court has held that where a fleeing suspect
tosses an object moments before the seizure of his person, that object is (1) abandoned
and (2) not fruit of the poisonous tree, because abandonment preceded the potentially
unconstitutional detention. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628–29 (1991).2
This case fits neatly within Hodari D. and Martin. Cain tossed the firearm while
running, so he abandoned it. And no matter whether his eventual detention was
2 Cain contends the Supreme Court did not squarely hold the property abandoned in Hodari D., citing its statement that “the only issue presented is whether, at the time he dropped the drugs, the defendant had been ‘seized.’” 499 U.S. at 623. As the footnote accompanying that sentence explains, however, the Court used the word “only” to specify it was not deciding the issue whether any such seizure would have been constitutional; the State had conceded it would not be. Id. at 623 n.1. The Court took as uncontroversial that if the toss had preceded his seizure, “the drugs were abandoned by Hodari and lawfully recovered by the police.” Id. at 624. It relied on Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924), in which containers dropped by fleeing moonshiners were deemed abandoned. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 629.
4 constitutional, Cain relinquished his privacy interest in the firearm before he was
detained, so it cannot be fruit of the poisonous tree.3
To resist this conclusion, Cain cites a single unpublished opinion from the Fifth
Circuit to argue there is a difference between an intent to conceal something from law
enforcement and “an intent to discard, leave behind, or otherwise disavow” one’s privacy
interest in it. United States v. Ramirez, 2023 WL 5925902, at *4 (5th Cir. May 10, 2023).
As an initial matter, that case does not bind us.
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U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-1903
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
KENDRE CAIN, Appellant _____________________________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania Judge Christy Criswell Wiegand No. 2:24-cr-38
Before: Hardiman, Scirica, and Ambro, Circuit Judges Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) March 26, 2026 Decided Jun. 22, 2026 _____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION1
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
On seeing police officers on the street, Kendre Cain took off running. The officers
pursued and detained him, then discovered a firearm nearby. Surveillance video showed
Cain tossing the firearm during his flight. Cain moved to suppress the firearm and
surveillance video; the District Court denied the motion. For the following reasons, we
affirm that denial.
1 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under Third Circuit I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. I
In January 2024, two Pittsburgh police detectives set out to execute an arrest
warrant. As they searched for their target, they spotted Kendre Cain entering a gray Jeep.
Mistaking Cain for their target, the detectives followed him until he parked and got out of
the Jeep. At that point, one detective recognized Cain and yelled his name. Cain
immediately bolted, running down an outdoor stairwell and behind an apartment
building. The detectives split up and pursued on foot.
One detective caught up to Cain, pointed his taser in Cain’s direction, and shouted
for him to stop and get on the ground. Cain complied, and the detective patted him down.
During the pat-down, the detective asked Cain why he was running and told him they had
pursued him because he had run. After detaining Cain, officers discovered a firearm
nearby.
Surveillance video from the apartment building showed Cain running down the
stairwell. During that flight, Cain reached into his pocket and tossed a small black object
toward the alleyway where officers later confronted him. Cain does not dispute that the
object was the firearm found near him.
Cain was indicted on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to suppress the firearm and the
surveillance video. After a hearing and post-hearing briefing, the District Court denied
the motion. Cain pled guilty conditionally, reserving his right to appeal the denial.
He now brings that appeal. The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §
3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review a district court’s
2 order denying a motion to suppress under a mixed standard of review. We review
findings of fact for clear error, but exercise plenary review over legal determinations.”
United States v. Mendoza, 163 F.4th 782, 784 (3d Cir. 2026) (quoting United States v.
Dyer, 54 F.4th 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2022) (citation omitted)). And because “the District
Court denied the suppression motion,” we examine the facts “in the light most favorable
to the Government.” Id. (quoting Dyer, 54 F.4th at 158).
Cain’s primary argument is that his detention was unconstitutional. Regardless
whether it was, the Government lawfully acquired the firearm and surveillance video.
II
First, we address the firearm that Cain tossed as he ran. In order to suppress it
under the Fourth Amendment, Cain must show more than his ownership. Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105–06 (1980). He must have a privacy interest in the firearm at
the time it was seized. Id.
Abandonment of property terminates one’s Fourth Amendment privacy interest in
it. United States v. Fulani, 368 F.3d 351, 354 (3d Cir. 2004). Under Fourth Amendment
abandonment analysis—which is different from abandonment under property law—we
ask whether, in the totality of the circumstances, there was “clear and unequivocal
evidence” of intent to abandon. United States v. Harrison, 689 F.3d 301, 307 (3d Cir.
2012) (citing Fulani, 368 F.3d at 354). This determination is objective; it does not turn
on whether the defendant subjectively intended to abandon the property. Id. “In most
cases, disclaiming ownership or physically relinquishing the property is sufficient to
3 establish abandonment.” Id. (citing United States v. Liu, 180 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir.
1999)).
Accordingly, we have designated property “abandoned” where a bus passenger
told agents he did not have any baggage in the overhead rack, even though there was a
bag directly overhead bearing his name, Fulani, 368 F.3d at 354–55, and where a suspect
“discarded eight packets into an unlighted pantry” during a “brief flight” from police
through a kitchen, United States v. Martin, 386 F.2d 213, 214–15 (3d Cir. 1967). Of
particular relevance to this case, the Supreme Court has held that where a fleeing suspect
tosses an object moments before the seizure of his person, that object is (1) abandoned
and (2) not fruit of the poisonous tree, because abandonment preceded the potentially
unconstitutional detention. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628–29 (1991).2
This case fits neatly within Hodari D. and Martin. Cain tossed the firearm while
running, so he abandoned it. And no matter whether his eventual detention was
2 Cain contends the Supreme Court did not squarely hold the property abandoned in Hodari D., citing its statement that “the only issue presented is whether, at the time he dropped the drugs, the defendant had been ‘seized.’” 499 U.S. at 623. As the footnote accompanying that sentence explains, however, the Court used the word “only” to specify it was not deciding the issue whether any such seizure would have been constitutional; the State had conceded it would not be. Id. at 623 n.1. The Court took as uncontroversial that if the toss had preceded his seizure, “the drugs were abandoned by Hodari and lawfully recovered by the police.” Id. at 624. It relied on Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924), in which containers dropped by fleeing moonshiners were deemed abandoned. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 629.
4 constitutional, Cain relinquished his privacy interest in the firearm before he was
detained, so it cannot be fruit of the poisonous tree.3
To resist this conclusion, Cain cites a single unpublished opinion from the Fifth
Circuit to argue there is a difference between an intent to conceal something from law
enforcement and “an intent to discard, leave behind, or otherwise disavow” one’s privacy
interest in it. United States v. Ramirez, 2023 WL 5925902, at *4 (5th Cir. May 10, 2023).
As an initial matter, that case does not bind us. Further, its facts are easily distinguishable.
In Ramirez, the defendant threw his jacket into the yard of his mother’s house, where he
had lived most of his life and still visited almost daily. Id. at *2. In holding he did not
abandon the jacket, the panel reasoned he maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the place where he put it—“on the private side” of fenced-in “family property” where
he was “welcome.” Id. at *2–4. Ramirez specifically distinguished itself from a case where
the suspect “drop[s] his jacket on the public sidewalk and r[uns] away.” Id. at *2. That
aligns with what Cain did here: he ran and tossed his firearm into a public alleyway, where
he does not and cannot argue he had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Without that
expectation, the District Court did not err in denying suppression.
III
Nor did the District Court err in declining to suppress the surveillance video, even
assuming for the sake of argument that Cain’s detention was constitutionally defective.
3 “An arrest requires either physical force . . . or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority.” Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 (emphases in original). Cain does not dispute that the toss occurred before he submitted to the arresting officer’s assertion of authority. 5 First, Cain has no privacy interest in security footage of a public space. See Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the
public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”). Additionally, the lawfully
seized gun provided an independent basis for the police to seek footage of the nearby
areas even if Cain had gotten away and the detention had never occurred. Accordingly,
the footage derived from an “independent source” and is not subject to suppression. See
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 538–39, 542–43 (1988).
* * * * *
For these reasons, we affirm.