United States v. Kay

Ninth Circuit

United States v. Kay

537 F.2d 1077

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJune 23, 1976

DocketNo. 75-3844

StatusPublished

Cited by16 cases

This text of 537 F.2d 1077 (United States v. Kay) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Kay, 537 F.2d 1077 (9th Cir. 1976).

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Opinion

OPINION

Before BARNES, HUFSTEDLER and CHOY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

We do not think that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to permit Kay to withdraw his guilty plea. Kay did not attempt to withdraw his plea until after his codefendants had been sentenced. At that time he realized that adherence to his plea bargain would result in his imprisonment. Under these circumstances, his situation is akin to that of a defendant who seeks to withdraw his plea after sentencing. The district judge could reasonably have concluded that withdrawal of the plea would have permitted “appellant to use the guilty plea as a means of testing the weight of the potential sentence — a primary policy ground for denying plea changes.” United States v. Simmons, 497 F.2d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 1974).

We find no merit to Kay’s contention that he was inadequately represented by his counsel.

Affirmed.

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OPINION

Before BARNES, HUFSTEDLER and CHOY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

We do not think that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to permit Kay to withdraw his guilty plea. Kay did not attempt to withdraw his plea until after his codefendants had been sentenced. At that time he realized that adherence to his plea bargain would result in his imprisonment. Under these circumstances, his situation is akin to that of a defendant who seeks to withdraw his plea after sentencing. The district judge could reasonably have concluded that withdrawal of the plea would have permitted “appellant to use the guilty plea as a means of testing the weight of the potential sentence — a primary policy ground for denying plea changes.” United States v. Simmons, 497 F.2d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 1974).

We find no merit to Kay’s contention that he was inadequately represented by his counsel.

Affirmed.

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537 F.2d 1077, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-kay-ca9-1976.

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