NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 20a0540n.06
No. 19-5979
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Sep 18, 2020 ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN KARL HOOD, ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE ) Defendant-Appellant. ) )
Before: SUHRHEINRICH, LARSEN, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Defendant Karl Hood was charged with possession of a firearm
by a felon and possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute. Again and again he insisted
on proceeding to trial without counsel. After both a psychologist’s expert opinion and a magistrate
judge’s report deemed Hood mentally competent, the district court granted his request for
self‑representation. A jury then convicted Hood on both counts. He now argues on appeal that
the district court denied him his right to a fair trial by honoring his Sixth Amendment right to
represent himself. We disagree and AFFIRM.
I.
In July 2016, an informant told police that Karl Hood was selling crack cocaine from his
house. The police observed the area and enlisted the informant to buy crack from Hood. Based
on this information, the officers obtained a warrant to search Hood’s house, and upon execution,
they found a large bag of crack cocaine, digital scales, over $1,000 in cash, and two firearms. The No. 19-5979, United States v. Hood
government charged Hood with possession of a firearm by a felon, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and
possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B).
Hood’s appointed attorney moved to suppress the guns and drugs based on a lack of
probable cause supporting the warrant. The district court denied the motion, and Hood does not
challenge that ruling on appeal.
Hood and his counsel did not always see eye to eye. While the suppression motion was
pending, Hood submitted a pro se motion expressing displeasure with his appointed counsel. His
attorney then filed a motion for psychiatric examination, which the magistrate judge granted.
Hood filed two additional pro se motions before being transported to a medical facility for
evaluation; each was denied for failure to act through counsel.
At the facility, both clinical and correctional staff “routinely observed” Hood for a month.
A psychologist, Dr. Miriam Kissin, also examined Hood and detailed her observations from
several interviews, as well as the observations of the staff, in a fourteen-page report. According
to Dr. Kissin’s report, Hood was “cooperative and related appropriately,” he “maintained
appropriate eye contact,” and his speech was “coherent, logical, and goal directed.” Although he
had a history of mental health problems, Hood denied “having experienced any psychotic
symptoms in years.” Nor did Dr. Kissin observe any “psychotic symptoms” or signs of “any other
significant mental illness.” Hood’s intellectual functioning fell within the “Borderline range,” but
Dr. Kissin found “no impairment” in his “capacity for effective interpersonal communication,
capacity to follow instructions, or other areas of daily functioning.” Dr. Kissin observed no
“problematic or bizarre behaviors” from Hood and noted that he had a history of “feign[ing] mental
illness for secondary gain.”
-2- No. 19-5979, United States v. Hood
Dr. Kissin also stated that during his interviews, Hood “was able to effectively process the
information presented to him,” and produced “an abundance of meaningful and often sophisticated
information relevant to his legal case.” For example, he held a “thorough knowledge and
understanding” of the charges he was facing, their felony status, his potential to face prison time
if convicted, what was reported in the police affidavit supporting the warrant, what happened
during the execution of the warrant, and that he could plead guilty or not guilty. He also described
the role of his attorney in defending him, the U.S. attorney in prosecuting him, the jury in
determining guilt, and the judge in both sentencing and ensuring the parties were “correct and
abiding the law.” And, he explained that the trial court had previously denied his motion to
suppress the guns and crack cocaine. From all of this, Dr. Kissin concluded that Hood held an
understanding of the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him.
Dr. Kissin likewise determined that Hood was competent to assist his attorney in preparing
his defense. Despite his “mistrust” of his attorney, he expressed a “clear understanding of the legal
process in general.” Hood could describe various procedures, including the process of plea
bargaining, the role and nature of evidence, the burden of proof, and his general responsibility to
“act ‘civil’” in court. In addition, he understood his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
trial by jury. And he “discussed several avenues of defense he intend[ed] to pursue.” Though he
continued to press his belief that “there was ‘no legal reason’ for law enforcement to enter his
home for a search,” Dr. Kissin found nothing to suggest “factors related to mental illness [were]
driving [Hood’s] thinking or decision-making process in his legal case.” Dr. Kissin ultimately
expressed her opinion that Hood was competent to stand trial. Once Dr. Kissin filed her report,
Hood’s attorney waived a competency hearing, and the district court agreed with Dr. Kissin’s
conclusion.
-3- No. 19-5979, United States v. Hood
A month later, Hood’s attorney moved to withdraw as counsel, recounting a breakdown in
communication with her client. The court granted the withdrawal motion and appointed new
counsel to represent Hood.
Hood’s new attorney requested a second psychiatric examination, citing, as had his first
lawyer, an inability to consult with Hood and make case-relevant decisions. The magistrate judge
denied the request but encouraged counsel to engage a mental health expert for an independent
evaluation. Hood’s attorney did so, yet during an attempted evaluation by another psychologist,
Dr. Kathryn Smith, Hood refused to be examined. His counsel then requested a competency
hearing, asking that the court determine whether Hood was competent “to face trial and/or
represent himself as he ha[d] requested at prior hearings.”
At the competency hearing, Hood asked to represent himself, repeatedly talked out of turn,
and would not follow the court’s instruction to await his turn to speak. The court removed him
from the courtroom to watch outside on a live video feed, and Hood’s attorney attested that Hood
had refused to speak with him.
Hood’s attorney then called Dr. Smith to testify. Dr. Smith stated she “ha[d] some things
to say,” but was not “able to offer an opinion” about Hood’s competence because he had refused
to meet with her. She praised Dr. Kissin’s “excellent evaluation” of Hood’s competency as “very
thorough” and “very clear.” But she opined that some of Hood’s “subsequent behavior” might
have “called into question” his competence—specifically, his “disrupt[ing] court,” his “refus[al]
to work with his attorney,” and his “fixation” on the validity of the search warrant. Smith did,
however, concede that “it might be [Hood] . . . is choosing to behave this way because he thinks
it’s a strategy that’s going to be effective somehow.”
-4- No. 19-5979, United States v. Hood
Following Dr. Smith’s testimony, Hood returned to the courtroom and was permitted to
testify. He explained that his competence was “irrelevant” to the case he was trying to build. He
recognized that “if the search warrant [was] valid,” then he might “have to do time,” but he
continued to insist that it was “an invalid search warrant.”
The prosecution then called Dr. Kissin to the stand. She detailed the findings of her report
and reiterated her conclusion that Hood had no “delusional, bizarre, unusual thinking on his part
about his charges,” nor did he have any other “symptoms of mental illness.” She noted she had
heard some of Hood’s disruptive behavior in the courtroom, but “as far as a red flag, [she] didn’t
see anything alarming.” Dr. Kissin further explained that “[p]eople act out in court all the time.”
And neither “acting out in court” nor “insisting on a defense strategy that is not viable” were
necessarily indicative of mental incompetence. This was especially true given the concern that
Hood had not exhibited “genuine symptoms” of psychosis in the past.
The magistrate judge found Hood mentally competent. He based this conclusion on three
factors: (1) Dr. Kissin’s report, (2) Dr. Smith’s inability to offer an opinion, and (3) Hood’s
general ability to “act appropriately” in court in other hearings. Hood was “adamant . . . upon
representing himself,” and all of his disruptive behavior “focused solely on the issue of
representation by counsel.” This “mirror[ed] an identical manipulative strategy” a fellow inmate
had used. The magistrate judge ultimately concluded that Hood’s behavior was “not rooted in
mental illness, but rather in some intentional strategy formulated by [him].” The district court
adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation.
The magistrate judge then held a separate hearing to consider Hood’s request for
self‑representation. To make Hood “fully aware of the various hazards and disadvantages . . . of
-5- No. 19-5979, United States v. Hood
self‑representation,” the magistrate judge followed the Bench Book’s1 guidance to ensure Hood
was knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to counsel. The court asked him about his formal
legal training (none, but Hood claimed he was studying law while in jail), his education level (tenth
grade), and his experience representing himself in court (none). The court then asked whether
Hood understood each of the following: his right to an attorney; the charges against him and
potential penalties; sentencing procedures; the court’s inability to assist in his defense; the Federal
Rules of Evidence and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and how they would not be relaxed
because he was proceeding pro se; and finally, that a trained lawyer would likely “defend [him]
far better than [he] could defend [himself].” To every question, Hood responded that he
understood.
At one point in the hearing, Hood told the court he wanted to challenge the legality of the
warrant. The court responded:
[Y]our motion to suppress has been heard and ruled on. The Court is not going to hear again the same motion to suppress. You keep bringing up the same thing every time we come to court. . . . The Court has ruled that the officers did have probable cause to come into your house . . . . That issue has been decided.
The magistrate judge then warned Hood: “If . . . your legal strategy is to keep bringing up the
motion to suppress that has already been decided, that’s not going to go well for you,” and Hood
responded, “Okay.” At the conclusion of questioning, the court cautioned Hood that “it [was]
extremely unwise for [him] to try to represent [himself],” and “strongly urge[d]” him not to do it.
Hood nevertheless confirmed that he still wanted to proceed without counsel, and that this waiver
was “entirely voluntary.” The court allowed him to proceed pro se.
1 “Whenever a district court in the Sixth Circuit is faced with an accused who wishes to represent himself, the court must ask the defendant a series of questions drawn from, or substantially similar to, the model inquiry set forth in the Bench Book for United States District Judges.” United States v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360, 366 (6th Cir. 2004). -6- No. 19-5979, United States v. Hood
At a pretrial conference, the court asked Hood if he still wanted to proceed without counsel.
Hood said yes, and the court appointed standby counsel. Hood then persisted in arguing that he
wanted to discuss the warrant at trial; the court refused, warning him that he would be cut off if he
attempted to challenge the warrant’s validity. During trial, Hood tried to bring up the search
warrant several times and was repeatedly stopped by the trial judge.
The jury convicted Hood on both counts. After sentencing, Hood, acting pro se, filed a
timely notice of appeal. Now represented by counsel, Hood challenges the district court’s decision
permitting him to represent himself at trial, arguing that he was not actually competent to do so.
II.
In Faretta v. California, the Supreme Court held “that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling
defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so.” 422 U.S. 806,
817 (1975). This right, the Court said, is grounded in the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 821. Before
permitting self-representation, though, the trial court must satisfy itself that the defendant: (1) has
expressly waived his right to counsel in a knowing and intelligent manner, and (2) is mentally
competent. United States v. Tucci-Jarraf, 939 F.3d 790, 794 (6th Cir. 2019). In making this
determination, the defendant’s “ability to represent himself has no bearing upon his competence
to choose self-representation.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993). Rather, so long as
the defendant is competent and effectively waives counsel, he “has the right, the constitutional
right, to go it alone.” Tucci-Jarraf, 939 F.3d at 794.
In this case, Hood concedes that he “knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to
counsel.” Only the competence question concerns us.
“Mental incompetence is a ‘high’ bar to clear.” Id. at 795 (quoting United States v. Miller,
531 F.3d 340, 350 (6th Cir. 2008)). A defendant is competent to stand trial so long as no “mental
-7- No. 19-5979, United States v. Hood
disease or defect” renders him unable to “understand the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him” or to “assist properly” in defending himself. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a); see
also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171–72 (1975); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402
(1960). A defendant meeting this standard is also competent to waive the right to counsel. See
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398 (“[W]e reject the notion that competence to . . . waive the right to counsel
must be measured by a standard that is higher than (or even different from) the Dusky standard.”);
Tucci-Jarraf, 939 F.3d at 795–96. Because a showing of incompetence “requires proof of a ‘deep[]
breakdown’ in cognition, even patients with chronic severe mental illness often fall short of the
threshold.” Tucci-Jarraf, 939 F.3d at 795 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Coleman, 871 F.3d 470, 477 (6th Cir. 2017)); accord United States v. Stafford, 782 F.3d 786, 789,
791 (6th Cir. 2015) (upholding trial court’s determination that the defendant was competent to
stand trial and proceed pro se despite a “litany of mental health issues”).
We also grant a trial court great deference in its assessment of a defendant’s competence.
See Stafford, 782 F.3d at 791; United States v. Dubrule, 822 F.3d 866, 877–78 (6th Cir. 2016).
After all, through personal observation, the trial judge “will often prove best able to make more
fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individualized circumstances of a particular
defendant.” Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177 (2008).
It is clear that Hood was able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceeding
against him and had the ability to properly assist in his defense. Dr. Kissin’s report detailed at
length how Hood “was able to effectively process the information presented to him” and “offer[]
an abundance of meaningful and often sophisticated information relevant to his legal case.”
Throughout Dr. Kissin’s month-long evaluation, “[h]is speech was coherent, logical, and goal
directed,” and there was “no impairment” in Hood’s “capacity for effective interpersonal
-8- No. 19-5979, United States v. Hood
communication, capacity to follow instructions, or other areas of daily functioning.” He evidenced
“thorough knowledge and understanding” of the events resulting in his arrest, the precise charges
filed against him, and the potential consequences if he was found guilty—including prison time.
Further, Hood expressed a “clear understanding” of the trial process. He could articulate the
respective roles of his attorney, the government, the jury, and the judge. And he could also explain
various procedures and constitutional rights, including the process of plea bargaining, the role and
nature of evidence, the burden of proof, his right to remain silent, his right to a jury trial, and his
general responsibility to “act ‘civil’” in court. At bottom, Dr. Kissin found “no indication of
psychotic statements or signs consistent with any other significant mental illness.” Hood was
“without any symptoms for many years,” and nothing suggested that “factors related to mental
illness [were] driving [Hood’s] thinking or decision-making process in his legal case.” The district
court was entitled to afford substantial weight to Dr. Kissin’s considered evaluation, especially
when Hood later confirmed his understanding at a competency hearing before the court. See
Dubrule, 822 F.3d at 876.
To be sure, Dr. Smith testified at the hearing that Hood’s behavior following Dr. Kissin’s
report might have “called into question” his competency—specifically, his “disrupt[ing] court,”
his “refus[al] to work with his attorney,” and his “fixation” on the warrant. But the district court
cannot be faulted for accepting Dr. Kissin’s conclusion instead, for several reasons. First, unlike
Dr. Kissin, Dr. Smith testified that she could not even “offer an opinion” about Hood’s competence
because he had refused her evaluation. Second, the magistrate judge conducting the hearing found
that Hood was generally “able to act appropriately in the courtroom” and his disruptions “focused
solely on the issue of representation by counsel.” The magistrate judge found it “evident” that this
disruption was a part of an “intentional strategy” on Hood’s part to “achieve some result that he
-9- No. 19-5979, United States v. Hood
views as a favorable outcome.” Third, Dr. Smith herself conceded that in view of Hood’s feigning
symptoms in the past, he might have been “choosing to behave this way because he thinks it’s a
strategy that’s going to be effective somehow.” And Dr. Kissin agreed that Hood’s behavior might
have been strategically calculated. Fourth, Dr. Kissin countered at the hearing that neither “acting
out in court” nor “insisting on a defense strategy that is not viable or reasonable” is necessarily
relevant to competence. And she did not find it relevant in Hood’s particular case. In such a battle
of the experts, we will not lightly disturb a district court’s finding of mental competence. See
Dubrule, 822 F.3d at 877.
In response, Hood relies on Indiana v. Edwards to claim that his conviction must be vacated
because, even if he was competent to stand trial, he was not sufficiently competent to act as his
own attorney. It is true that Edwards recognized a category of defendants who “‘fall[] in a gray
area between Dusky’s minimal constitutional requirement that measures a defendant’s ability to
stand trial and a somewhat higher standard that measures mental fitness for’ self-representation.”
Stafford, 782 F.3d at 791 (quoting Edwards, 554 U.S. at 172). But even if Hood were a “gray
area” defendant, Edwards did not hold that it violates the Constitution to permit such defendants
to self-represent. “Although trial judges may from time to time impose counsel on
mentally‑compromised defendants just competent enough to stand trial, they aren’t required to”
do so. Tucci-Jarraf, 939 F.3d at 796 (citations omitted); see also Stafford, 782 F.3d at 791
(“Edwards permitted—but did not require—courts to impose counsel on defendants with mental
issues who are nonetheless competent to stand trial.”). We know of no court that has read Edwards
differently. See United States v Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 590 n.11 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[A]s we do
here, several circuits have interpreted Edwards to confer discretion, not to impose a new duty.”)
(collecting cases).
-10- No. 19-5979, United States v. Hood
Hood’s invocation of United States v. Carradine, 621 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2010), thus cannot
help him. In the first place, Carradine is factually inapposite. There, the defendant “answered
virtually every question” related to the nature of his charges, potential punishments, and other facts
related to the case, “by stating that he did not understand.” Id. at 579. Here, by contrast, when the
magistrate judge posed questions from the Bench Book to ensure Hood’s comprehension, Hood
answered each and every one attesting that he did understand. But more to the point, in Carradine,
the district court denied defendant’s motion for self-representation. Id. at 578–79. We held that
this was a constitutionally permissible exercise of the district court’s discretion as recognized in
Edwards, see id., but nothing in Edwards commanded that result, see Tucci-Jarraf, 939 F.3d at
796; Stafford, 782 F.3d at 791; Bernard, 708 F.3d at 590 & n.11.
For similar reasons, Hood gains no ground by arguing that his “ability to present a defense
at trial” suffered because of his “fixation with the search warrant” and his inability to understand
the distinction between questions of law for the judge and questions of fact for the jury. A
defendant is not “prevented from competently waiving his right to counsel because he ‘articulate[s]
beliefs that have no legal support.’” United States v. Powell, 847 F.3d 760, 775 (6th Cir. 2017)
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. James, 328 F.3d 953, 955 (7th Cir. 2003)). Nor
is a defendant’s “steadfast[] insiste[nce]” on pursuing a particular legal argument alone reason to
doubt his mental competence. United States v. Heard, 762 F.3d 538, 542 (6th Cir. 2014). In cases
like this one “where a criminal defendant elects to represent himself, ‘the mere fact that [he]
espouses a far-fetched, or even bizarre, legal-defense theory is insufficient to clear the high hurdle
for incompetency.’” Dubrule, 822 F.3d at 876 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Davis, 515 F. App’x 486, 493 (6th Cir. 2013)). Thus, Hood’s choice to ignore the district court’s
admonitions and continue to attack the warrant does not by itself show mental incompetence. All it
-11- No. 19-5979, United States v. Hood
shows is that he “was simply unwilling to admit he was incorrect in his opinion.” Heard, 762 F.3d
at 542 (citation omitted).
Was Hood’s subsequent performance at trial a model for effective advocacy? Assuredly
not. “It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with
counsel’s guidance than by their own unskilled efforts.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834. However, the
district court did not err in honoring Hood’s constitutional right of self-representation.
***
We AFFIRM.
-12-