United States v. Kakande

771 F. Supp. 2d 86, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27832, 2011 WL 1045450
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maine
DecidedMarch 17, 2011
Docket1:10-cr-00117
StatusPublished

This text of 771 F. Supp. 2d 86 (United States v. Kakande) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Kakande, 771 F. Supp. 2d 86, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27832, 2011 WL 1045450 (D. Me. 2011).

Opinion

ORDER ON GOVERNMENT’S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PERMIT EVIDENCE OUTSIDE THE CHARGED CONSPIRATORIAL PERIOD

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR., Chief Judge.

In this prosecution for conspiracy to defraud the United States, the Government seeks a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of evidence regarding the Defendant’s conduct before the dates of the alleged conspiracy. The Court concludes that the Government’s proposed evidence is likely admissible.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On July 13, 2010, a federal grand jury indicted Rashid Kakande for engaging in a conspiracy to commit marriage fraud in which United States citizens would enter into sham marriages with foreign nationals. Indictment (Docket # 2). In general, for the United States citizens, the motive was greed; they were paid to pretend they were married, id., and for the foreign nationals, the motive was citizenship; the marriage with a United States citizen increased their chances for a change in immigration status leading to citizenship. *88 Id. The indictment alleges that from December 5, 2003 to June 19, 2007, Mr. Ka-kande engaged in overt acts in which he arranged a number of sham marriages and profited for doing so. A jury has been selected and the ease is scheduled to begin on March 21, 2011.

In anticipation of trial, the Government filed a motion in limine seeking permission to admit evidence that on dates before those alleged in the Indictment, Mr. Ka-kande engaged in the same type of conduct. Gov’t’s Mot. in Limine to Permit Evid. Outside the Charged Conspiratorial Period (Docket # 59) (Gov’t’s Mot.). More specifically, the Government seeks to introduce evidence that Mr. Kakande arranged and participated in sham marriages between November 1999 and June 2003. Gov’t’s Mot. at 6-10. The Government argues that such evidence should be admitted under Rule 404(b) because it has special relevance; it demonstrates Mr. Ka-kande’s knowledge of the immigration process, his intent to participate in a sham marriage conspiracy, his modus operandi and common scheme, his lack of mistake, and his identity. Id. It contends that these issues are of primary importance in proving the facts alleged because Mr. Ka-kande “is globally denying involvement and putting the Government to its proof.” Id. at 7.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Rule 404(b)

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides in relevant part:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident ...

Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). “The threshold inquiry a court must make before admitting similar acts evidence under Rule 404(b) is whether that evidence is probative of a material issue other than character.” Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). The First Circuit analyzes the admissibility of 404(b) evidence pursuant to a two-pronged framework. United States v. DeCicco, 439 F.3d 36, 50 (1st Cir.2006); United States v. Sebaggala, 256 F.3d 59, 67 (1st Cir.2001); United States v. Mahone, 328 F.Supp.2d 77, 85-86 (D.Me.2004). Under the first prong, the Court “must determine whether the evidence in question has any ‘special relevance’ exclusive of defendant’s character or propensity.” DeCicco, 439 F.3d at 50 (citing Sebaggala, 256 F.3d at 67). Under the second prong, “even if some ‘special relevance’ is found, the evidence must nonetheless be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id. This is because Rule 404(b) “incorporates sub silentio the prophylaxis of ... Rule 403.” Sebaggala, 256 F.3d at 67. The Government seeks to introduce three categories of prior bad acts evidence. Gov’t’s Mot. at 7-10.

B. Marriage to Olivia Brooks

The Government first seeks to introduce evidence that on November 12, 1999, Mr. Kakande married U.S. Citizen Olivia Brooks and thereafter obtained a change in his own immigration status based on that marriage. Gov’t’s Mot. at 7. The Government says this has special relevance because it demonstrates that before the dates in the Indictment, Mr. Kakande had personal knowledge of the process by which a foreign national obtained a change of immigration status based on marriage. Id. The Government also asserts that the evidence will corroborate Mr. Kakande’s own admissions that foreign nationals *89 came to him seeking to be introduced to U.S. citizens to marry because they knew he had gotten his immigration status changed as a result of his marriage to a U.S. citizen. Id.

The Court agrees that evidence of Mr. Kakande’s marriage to Ms. Brooks and subsequent successful citizenship application based on that marriage will have special relevance. The Government bears the burden of proving all elements of the offense. One issue is whether Mr. Kakande has been sufficiently sophisticated in U.S. immigration policies to participate in the alleged marriage fraud conspiracy, and Mr. Kakande’s actual participation in the immigration process based on his marriage would be particularly relevant. This knowledge could also help identify him as a participant in the conspiracy to the extent it encouraged other foreign nationals to seek his experience in the immigration process and thereby gave him an opportunity to further the conspiracy. The Court concludes that evidence of the Defendant’s marriage to Ms. Brooks satisfies the first prong of the 404(b) analysis.

The second prong is a difficult analysis prior to trial. At this time the Court is unaware of the Defendant’s defenses to the charges, the specific contents of the Government’s proposed testimony, and of whether the Government has other ways of proving the Defendant had knowledge of the immigration process prior to the conspiracy. See United States v. Varou-dakis, 233 F.3d 113, 122 (1st Cir.2000) (“The prejudice to an opponent can be said to be ‘unfair’ when the proponent of the evidence could prove the fact by other, non-prejudicial evidence.” (internal quotations omitted)). Without context, the Court cannot conduct a fully-informed balancing of the evidence’s probative value against its potential for prejudice.

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Related

Huddleston v. United States
485 U.S. 681 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Old Chief v. United States
519 U.S. 172 (Supreme Court, 1997)
United States v. Varoudakis
233 F.3d 113 (First Circuit, 2000)
United States v. Sebaggala
256 F.3d 59 (First Circuit, 2001)
United States v. Decicco
370 F.3d 206 (First Circuit, 2004)
United States v. Decicco
439 F.3d 36 (First Circuit, 2006)
United States v. Fanfan
468 F.3d 7 (First Circuit, 2006)
United States v. Mahone
328 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D. Maine, 2004)

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Bluebook (online)
771 F. Supp. 2d 86, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27832, 2011 WL 1045450, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-kakande-med-2011.