United States v. Kaczmarski

939 F. Supp. 1176, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12072, 1996 WL 509534
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedAugust 15, 1996
DocketCriminal Action 95-616-01
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 939 F. Supp. 1176 (United States v. Kaczmarski) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Kaczmarski, 939 F. Supp. 1176, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12072, 1996 WL 509534 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

DALZELL, District Judge.

A jury convicted defendant Jan Kaezmarski and two co-defendants of, inter alia, bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. After a sentencing hearing this day, this Memorandum will explain in some detail how we resolved the contested sentencing issue of the amount of “loss” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(l).

I. Factual Background 1

Robert Sroka was arrested in April, 1995, in connection with a series of bank frauds and shortly thereafter began cooperating with the Government in an attempt to reduce the sentence he faced. As part of his plea agreement with the Government, Sroka promised to assist in the investigation of other crimes. To this end, Sroka solicited defendant Jan Kaczmarski in June, 1995, to *1178 commit a not particularly esoteric type of bank fraud. Sroka testified that he selected Kaczmarski because they had before succeeded in exactly the same type of bank fraud together. Unbeknownst to Kaczmarski and the other defendants, Sroka taped virtually all of his conversations with them. 2

The plan called for Kaczmarski to recruit someone to produce fraudulent identification documents for the purpose of opening bank accounts in Philadelphia. Sroka testified that they targeted Philadelphia banks because all that is needed to open an account in that City is a valid Social Security number that has actually been issued by the Social Security Administration and a picture identification in the same name as the Social Security card. By contrast, in New York City and elsewhere, banks require several more identification documents. For his part, Sroka agreed to obtain stolen checks from the mail for deposit and procure the Social Security cards. Once the checks had been deposited, the same individual who opened the accounts was supposed to withdraw all of the money on deposit.

To advance their plan, Kaczmarski recruited defendant Andrzej Sliwowski to procure the false identification and defendant Zdzislaw Rusznica (a/k/a “Mr. Ziggy”) to open the accounts. Like Sroka, Kaczmarski, Sliwowski and Rusznica are all Polish nationals. Sroka introduced to the group State Department Agent Robert Bradley, who was working undercover, to provide a validly-issued Social Security card in the unlikely name of Patrick McDonnell. Exh. 21. Sliwowski then altered a Polish (not Irish) passport using the Patrick McDonnell name and Rusznica’s photograph. Exh. 22. With the Social Security card and doctored passport in hand, Rusznica opened bank accounts at both CoreStates and Mellon Banks in Philadelphia in August, 1995.

Once the accounts had been opened, the plan called for Sroka to deposit stolen checks into them via an automated teller machine. After the checks had cleared, Rusznica was to enter each bank and withdraw in increments all of the money on deposit. Sroka, however, did not actually have a supply of stolen checks, although the FBI created the illusion that he did. The banks, in cooperation with the FBI, issued deposit slips that made it appear as if Sroka had deposited a total of $104,520 in checks into the accounts, even though, in fact, no money was actually deposited into either account. All together, Sroka “deposited” three checks totalling $48,-200 into CoreStates and another three checks totalling $56,320 into Mellon. Exhs. 23-28.

On September 15, 1995, the defendants, Sroka, and Bradley drove to Philadelphia intending to withdraw $9,800 from CoreStates and an additional $8,600 from Mellon. The defendants drove first to a CoreStates branch where Rusznica presented for payment a check for $9,800 made out to “Cash” drawn on the FBI-controlled accounts. Exh. 33. Federal officials closed in and arrested the defendants on the spot.

II. Legal Analysis

A. Amount of “Loss”

Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(l), the fraud guidelines are driven by the amount of “loss” to the victims attributable to the defendants. United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1250 (3d Cir.1995). The base offense level for a fraud crime is six, but that level is enhanced depending on the amount of “loss” the fraud caused.

The Government claims that the loss in Kaczmarski’s case was $104,520, arguing that he intended to withdraw all of the money said to be on account at the banks and would have done so if he had not been apprehended first. The Government therefore argues for a six-level specific offense characteristic enhancement. U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(l)(G).

Kaczmarski and his co-defendants, 3 not surprisingly, disagree. They contend that the enhancement should be limited, at most, *1179 to two levels pursuant to § 2Fl.l(b)(l)(C) because the loss was only $9,800, ie., the amount of the check that Rusznica presented to CoreStates for payment. At the antipode, the loss was zero, so the argument goes, because there was no possibility of any true “loss” because it was the fiction of a sting operation.

“Loss” is defined in the application notes to § 2F1.1 as “the value of the money, property, or services unlawfully taken.” U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, Application Note 7. This application note also refers the reader to the commentary to § 2B1.1, the guideline for larceny, embezzlement, and theft. Id. “The Commentary to § 2B1.1 emphasizes the amount taken from the victims as the primary measure of loss.” United States v. Maurello, 76 F.3d 1304, 1309 (3d Cir.1996) (emphasis in original). Although the fraud guideline’s explicit cross-reference to the theft guidelines “suggests that the same measurement of loss — amount taken — should be used in both cases”, our Court of Appeals has refused to impose the identical loss valuation analysis for both crimes in all cases. Id. (citing United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 529 (3d Cir.1991)).

More specifically, in fraud cases, ‘loss’ is, in the first instance, the amount of money the victim has actually lost (estimated at the time of sentencing), not the potential loss as measured at the time of the crime. 4 However, the ‘loss’ should be revised upward to the loss that the defendant intended to inflict, if that amount is higher than actual loss.

Kopp, 951 F.2d at 536 (footnote added). In applying Kopp’s “flexible, fact-driven concept of loss”, United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 825 (3d Cir.1995), we need not determine the loss with mathematical “precision” so long as we make a “reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available information.” U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, Application Note 8. 5

There is no question here that Mellon and CoreStates did not suffer any “actual loss”.

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Bluebook (online)
939 F. Supp. 1176, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12072, 1996 WL 509534, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-kaczmarski-paed-1996.