NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0118n.06
No. 23-5112
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Mar 13, 2024 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY JUSTIN BRYANT, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION ) )
Before: BATCHELDER, MOORE, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. This case addresses Justin Bryant’s
(“Bryant”) appeal from his sentence of life in prison. Bryant, along with John Holbrooks
(“Holbrooks”), purchased what they believed to be heroin on October 12, 2021 before being pulled
over, arrested, and brought to Pike County Detention Center. There, Bryant negotiated with
another individual, Jayshawn Robinson (“Robinson”), to exchange drugs that he had brought into
the prison for Robinson’s putting money on his and Holbrooks’s accounts to enable them to bond
out. Robinson gave Bryant sufficient funds to bond out (although Robinson was unable to put the
full amount of Holbrooks’s bond on Holbrooks’s account), and Bryant left the detention pod on
October 12, 2021. While Bryant was still in prison, an inmate put up a sheet over the bathroom
door, and Bryant was observed going into the covered bathroom with numerous other individuals
in their pod. Holbrooks and Robinson testified that Bryant was using what they believed to be
heroin with other inmates in the bathroom. Shortly after Bryant bonded out, another inmate, James No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
“Youngin” Cornett (“Cornett”), was found unresponsive in the pod and ultimately died after
several days on life support. Cornett’s blood tested positive for fentanyl and para-fluorofentanyl.
A federal jury convicted Bryant of Conspiracy to Distribute Heroin, Fentanyl, and Para-
Fluorofentanyl and of Distribution of Fentanyl and Para-Fluorofentanyl, the use of which resulted
in the death of another person. Based on Bryant’s PSR and the Sentencing Guidelines, the district
court sentenced Bryant to life in prison. Bryant timely appeals.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 12, 2021, Bryant, along with Holbrooks,1 decided to go to a house in Island
Creek, Pike County, Kentucky, where they “picked up some heroin.” R. 126 (Trial Tr. at 21)
(Holbrooks Direct) (Page ID #882). Bryant went into the house while Holbrooks waited in the
car. Id. The two had “put [their] money together” to purchase “seven grams or so” of heroin. Id.
at 22 (Holbrooks Direct) (Page ID #883). Holbrooks testified that he would use about a tenth of a
gram at a time, meaning that Bryant and Holbrooks had purchased about seventy doses worth of
heroin. Id. at 24–25 (Holbrooks Direct) (Page ID #885–86). According to Holbrooks, they were
getting the heroin partially for personal use and partially “to get rid of it.” Id. at 25 (Holbrooks
Direct) (Page ID #886).
After Bryant went into the house and purchased the heroin, he and Holbrooks went to Fill
Zone, a gas station. Bryant went inside and “stayed in there [for] about an hour or so” while
Holbrooks waited for him in the car. Id. at 23 (Holbrooks Direct) (Page ID #884). Holbrooks
1 Holbrooks’s plea agreement required him to “help [the government] investigate and prosecute other people” in order to get credit for “assisting the government.” R. 126 (Trial Tr. at 35) (Holbrooks Cross) (Page ID #896).
2 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
went into the Fill Zone once, to see if Bryant was ready to go. Id. at 24 (Holbrooks Direct) (Page
ID #885). Eventually, Bryant “bought some stuff” from the gas station, and the two left, with
Holbrooks driving. Id. “As soon as [Holbrooks] pulled out on the road,” they were pulled over
by training officer Officer Daniel Fields (“Fields”) and a new officer, Officer Thacker (“Thacker”).
Id. at 3, 24 (Fields Direct, Holbrooks Direct) (Page ID #864, 885). When Thacker turned on the
emergency lights, Holbrooks continued to drive at a slow rate down the highway for some time
before pulling over. Id. at 3–4 (Fields Direct) (Page ID #864–65). Fields observed the “passenger
of the vehicle [Bryant] moving around a lot,” which Fields did not view as “normal when
conducting a traffic stop.” Id. at 4 (Fields Direct) (Page ID #865–66).
When Fields went to the vehicle’s passenger side, he “observed . . . two large fixed blade
knives” near Bryant’s left hand, along with “a small, clear container, contain[ing] a gray, white
powder substance” in Bryant’s lap. Id. at 5 (Fields Direct) (Page ID #866). Fields testified that
based on his “training and experience,” he believed the “gray and white powder substance” he
observed in Bryant’s lap to be heroin. Id. at 6 (Fields Direct) (Page ID #867). At this point, Fields
told Bryant to exit the car and informed Bryant that he was under arrest. Id. When Bryant got out
of the car, Fields testified that Bryant “immediately kind of reached for his waistband area,” and
that Fields “secured [Bryant’s] left hand and used [Fields’s] other hand to push [Bryant] up against
the vehicle.” Id. at 13 (Fields Cross) (Page ID #874). Once Fields had handcuffed and searched
Bryant, Fields also found a “crystalline substance . . . wrapped in aluminum foil in the passenger
side of the vehicle.” Id. at 6 (Fields Direct) (Page ID #867). Fields seized the items and sent them
3 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
to the Kentucky State Police (“KSP”) to be tested. Id. at 8 (Fields Direct) (Page ID #869).2 He also
conducted a search incident to Bryant’s arrest but did not strip search Bryant or “look inside any
body cavities.” Id. at 10 (Fields Direct) (Page ID #871). Fields did not find any drugs on Bryant’s
person when conducting the search. Id. at 14 (Fields Cross) (Page ID #875). Bryant was charged
with “possession of a controlled substance first” for both heroin and methamphetamine. Id. at 10
(Fields Direct) (Page ID #871). Holbrooks was also arrested and charged on a DUI charge, as well
as for possession of “whatever . . . was laying in the vehicle.”3 Id. at 26 (Holbrooks Direct) (Page
ID #887).
In the “early morning hours” of October 12, Bryant was sent to Pike County Detention
Center. Id. at 9 (Fields Direct) (Page ID #870). Holbrooks was first taken to Pikeville Medical
Center before ultimately being “transported to the Pike County Detention Center.” Id. at 11 (Fields
Cross) (Page ID #872). Bryant and Holbrooks were both strip searched and placed in the same
holding cell before being moved to a quarantine cell, Pod 16, which held approximately twelve to
fourteen other people. Id. at 36–37 (Holbrooks Cross) (Page ID #897–98). Neither Holbrooks nor
Bryant was cavity searched or X-rayed. Id. at 36 (Holbrooks Cross) (Page ID #897); see also R.
127 (Trial Tr. at 34–35) (Wood Redirect) (Page ID #998–99). Holbrooks testified that while they
were in Pod 16, he and Bryant had “done a line” of heroin in the bathroom, and that Bryant had
2 The parties stipulated to the fact that the “off-white powder” was tested and that the KSP laboratory “found it to contain heroin . . . ; fentanyl . . . ; and methamphetamine”; and to the fact that the “crystalline substance” was tested and that the KSP laboratory “found it to contain methamphetamine.” Id. at 18 (Page ID #879); see also R. 86 (Stipulated Facts ¶ 3) (Page ID #204). 3 Fields testified that he cannot recall “all the charges” that Holbrooks was actually charged with. Id. at 15 (Fields Cross) (Page ID #876).
4 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
“give[n] some of it to [Holbrooks].” R. 126 (Trial Tr. at 28) (Holbrooks Direct) (Page ID #889).
Pod 16 had only one bathroom area, where the communal toilets, shower, and sinks were all
located. Id. at 37 (Holbrooks Cross) (Page ID #898). Holbrooks also testified that he was not the
only person to take heroin in the bathroom, and that there were “three or four more” individuals
from Pod 16 who entered the bathroom and “done a line.” Id. at 28 (Holbrooks Direct) (Page ID
#889). Although Holbrooks did not know for certain where the heroin had come from, he testified
at trial that he “kind of figured” that Bryant had brought it into the cell. Id. at 29 (Holbrooks
Direct) (Page ID #890).
Robinson,4 a fellow inmate in Pod 16 who is in prison for conspiracy to distribute over 500
grams of methamphetamine, testified that Bryant had brought heroin into the jail that Robinson
“wanted to buy.” Id. at 42 (Robinson Direct) (Page ID #903). Robinson stated that prior to
Bryant’s arrival in Pod 16, there was no “heroin available for purchase” in Pod 16 and that he did
not “see any heroin inside of Pod 16.” Id. at 42–43 (Robinson Direct) (Page ID #903–04). When
Bryant arrived in Pod 16, Robinson testified that “everyone . . . surrounded him” and “hugged up
on him like they was waiting on something.” Id. at 43 (Robinson Direct) (Page ID #904).
According to Robinson, after sitting on a bed and talking with others in Pod 16 for around
ten minutes, Bryant went into the bathroom, where he stayed for “like an hour or so.” Id. At 4:37
p.m. on October 12, Bryant went into the restroom and another inmate, Toby Newsome, “covered
the doorway with a sheet.” R. 127 (Trial Tr. at 107) (Fields Direct) (Page ID #1071). About an
hour later, Holbrooks entered the bathroom, which Bryant had not exited yet. Id. at 111 (Fields
4 Robinson testified at Bryant’s trial with the hope that doing so would result in a lower sentence. Id. at 41 (Robinson Direct) (Page ID #902).
5 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
Direct) (Page ID #1075). When Robinson walked in, Bryant was “doing nothing but sitting on the
toilet,” but when Robinson went to walk back to his bed, he claims that Bryant and another person
were “doing lines on the Chirp [the in-jail phone inmates can use for messaging].” R. 126 (Trial
Tr. at 44) (Robinson Direct) (Page ID #905). After that, Robinson testified that “everybody went
over there, and they all started doing lines” in the bathroom area. Id. Bryant was the “only one”
that Robinson observed with the heroin. Id. At around 5 p.m., both Bryant and Holbrooks exited
the bathroom. R. 127 (Trial Tr. at 111) (Fields Direct) (Page ID #1075). At 5:10 p.m., Bryant and
Cornett entered the restroom together. Id. at 112 (Fields Direct) (Page ID #1076). At 5:43 p.m.,
Bryant returned to the restroom, at which point an inmate named “Lamenko” had put the sheet
back up. Id. at 117 (Fields Direct) (Page ID #1081).5 From 5:50 p.m. to 6:02 p.m., Holbrooks
was in the bathroom, during which time “at least four different inmates” entered the bathroom with
him. Id. at 142–43 (Fields Cross) (Page ID #1106–07). At around 6:11 p.m., Cornett entered the
bathroom area with two other inmates. Id. at 143–44 (Fields Cross) (Page ID #1107–08).
At some point after Bryant had been observed entering and exiting the bathroom, Bryant
and Robinson had a conversation on Robinson’s bed, during which Robinson asked Bryant how
much heroin he had on him. R. 126 (Trial Tr. at 49) (Robinson Direct) (Page ID #910). Bryant
pulled out a Ziploc bag and showed it to Robinson. Id. When Robinson asked what Bryant wanted
for it, Bryant told him to “[b]uy [him] and [his] friend [Holbrooks] out.” Id. Robinson then got
on the phone with his ex-girlfriend, KeAira Houston (“Houston”), and told her to put money on
5 The trial testimony states that when Bryant returned to the restroom, an inmate named Lamenko had put “the curtain back up,” but does not state exactly when or by whom the sheet was taken down during this timeframe. R. 127 (Trial Tr. at 116–17) (Fields Direct) (Page ID #1080– 81).
6 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
both Bryant’s and Holbrooks’s books. Id. at 50 (Robinson Direct) (Page ID #911). Bryant
ultimately received the $400 required for him to make bail, and, in exchange, he gave the baggie
of heroin to Robinson. Id. at 52 (Robinson Direct) (Page ID #913). Robinson’s intent was to sell
the heroin within the jail. Id. He also testified that he intended to “stretch it” by adding “Tylenol
or something to it” in order to weaken the heroin, because he had observed that it was strong. Id.
at 53 (Robinson Direct) (Page ID #914). Houston also attempted to put $600 on Holbrooks’s
account for Holbrooks to bond out as well, but she was unable to put more than $500 on
Holbrooks’s book per day. Id. at 57 (Robinson Direct) (Page ID #918). Robinson put the $500
on, and instructed Houston to try the other $100 when the time limit expired. Id. at 58 (Robinson
Direct) (Page ID #919). Robinson testified that he put the heroin in a “jar of hair grease” and
threw the jar under the sink in the common bathroom area, to which everyone in Pod 16 had access.
Id.
After Robinson put the money on Bryant’s account, Bryant bonded out of the prison on
October 12, 2021. Id. at 38 (Holbrooks Cross) (Page ID #899). Before he left, Bryant told
Holbrooks that “he had money put on [Bryant’s] books and [Holbrooks’s] books to get [them]
out.” Id. at 30 (Holbrooks Direct) (Page ID #891). Upon leaving Pod 16, Bryant gave Holbrooks
“a couple tenths or something” of heroin, which Holbrooks “did.” Id. at 32 (Holbrooks Direct)
(Page ID #893). Holbrooks testified that he did not see Bryant with any more heroin other than
what he gave to Holbrooks and what he had in the bathroom. Id. Holbrooks observed people
going in and out of the bathroom but did not see what they were doing in the bathroom “with [his]
own eyes,” id. at 28, 32 (Holbrooks Direct) (Page ID #889, 893), nor did he ask Bryant how Bryant
7 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
got the heroin that he gave to Holbrooks upon leaving, id. at 33 (Holbrooks Direct) (Page ID #894).
Robinson also remained in Pod 16. Id. at 60 (Robinson Direct) (Page ID #921).
The night after Bryant left Pod 16, Cornett was perceived to be sleeping in his bed. Id. at
45, 67 (Robinson Direct, Cross) (Page ID #906, 928).6 After the other individuals in Pod 16 tried
and failed to wake Cornett up, they got the attention of the correctional officers (“COs”), who
came into Pod 16 to get Cornett out. Id. at 67 (Robinson Cross) (Page ID #928). Kimberly Stump
(“Stump”), a nurse at Pike County Detention Center, testified that Cornett was “unresponsive and
not breathing” when she arrived at Pod 16. R. 127 (Trial Tr. at 22) (Stump Direct) (Page ID #986).
She called for EMS and applied an automated external defibrillator to Cornett but was unable to
get a pulse from Cornett. Id. Cornett eventually started to breathe a little bit and EMS administered
a dose of Narcan, which “reverses the effect of opioid overdose.” Id. EMS then took Cornett to
Pikeville Medical Center. Id. at 23 (Stump Direct) (Page ID #987). Stump also testified that on
the day before, October 12, Cornett came to her office and said that he was on blood pressure
medication at the Letcher County Detention Center. Id. Pike County Detention Center had not
received his medication yet, and Cornett’s relatively normal blood pressure (130 over 80) was not
at the level where Stump could administer blood pressure medication without having his
medication list. Id. at 23–24 (Stump Direct) (Page ID #987–88).
After the COs had removed Cornett, but before they removed everyone else from Pod 16,
Robinson testified that one of the other inmates found some drugs right near Cornett’s bunk and
swallowed them. R. 126 (Trial Tr. at 68) (Robinson Cross) (Page ID #929). Robinson also stated
6 Cornett suffered from heart problems, low blood sugar, and high blood pressure. R. 127 (Trial Tr. at 13–14) (Lindsey Cross) (Page ID #977–78).
8 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
that the drugs the other inmate found “looked like the same stuff [that he had bought from Bryant].”
Id. at 72 (Robinson Redirect) (Page ID #933). When everyone returned to the pod, Robinson gave
the inmate who swallowed the drugs some shampoo to help get them out of his stomach. Id. at 69
(Robinson Cross) (Page ID #930). When the other inmate vomited up the drugs, Robinson testified
that they were “wet” and that he “[c]ouldn’t do nothing with it,” so the other inmate flushed the
drugs. Id.
In the aftermath of Cornett’s removal from Pod 16, Drug Enforcement Administration
(“DEA”) Agent Douglas Dalrymple (“Dalrymple”) interviewed Bryant and Holbrooks, among
other individuals. R. 126 (Trial Tr. at 76) (Dalrymple Direct) (Page ID #937). Bryant told
Dalrymple that “Holbrooks had brought some heroin into the cell in his body cavity” and that
“Bryant had negotiated a transaction with [] Robinson” to exchange the drugs for money for both
Bryant and Holbrooks to post bond. Id. at 78 (Dalrymple Direct) (Page ID #939). Dalrymple also
testified that in his experience, heroin and fentanyl are often “mixed together to try and maximize
[] profits.” Id. at 87 (Dalrymple Direct) (Page ID #948).
Cornett was on life support for several days at Pikeville Medical Center before he died on
October 20, 2021. Id. at 79 (Dalrymple Direct) (Page ID #940). Someone had drawn Cornett’s
blood when he arrived at the center, which Dalrymple subpoenaed and sent to the KPS Crime Lab.
Id. at 80 (Dalrymple Direct) (Page ID #941). NMS Labs, a private forensic toxicology company,
conducted testing on Cornett’s blood samples. R. 127 (Trial Tr. at 36) (Schroder Direct) (Page ID
#1000). William Schroeder (“Schroeder”), a forensic toxicologist at NMS Labs, testified that both
samples had been collected from Cornett at 1:05 a.m. on October 14, 2021. Id. at 41 (Schroeder
Direct) (Page ID #1005). He stated that fentanyl was detected in Cornett’s blood samples, at 3.4
9 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
nanograms per milliliter. Id. at 47 (Schroeder Direct) (Page ID #1011). There was also 4-ANPP,
which is a “precursor for fentanyl production,” at 1.4 nanograms per milliliter. Id. The lab also
found 1.1 nanograms per milliliter of para-Fluorofentanyl, which is a “non-prescription synthetic
opioid that’s commonly used in the recreational drug market” and is “similar structurally to
fentanyl and acetyl-fentanyl,” in Cornett’s blood. Id. at 50–51 (Schroeder Direct) (Page ID #1014–
15). The testing did not detect any heroin, which Schroeder indicated was to be expected because
“heroin breaks down very quickly in the body.” Id. at 54 (Schroeder Cross) (Page ID #1018).
There was also an unconfirmed indication of a very low level of morphine in the blood. Id. at 59
(Schroeder Redirect) (Page ID #1023).
Dr. Meredith Frame (“Frame”), the state medical examiner who conducted Cornett’s
autopsy, testified that in her opinion, Cornett “died of complications of the acute combined toxic
events of para-Fluorofentanyl and fentanyl.” Id. at 72 (Frame Direct) (Page ID #1036). When
Frame reviewed the toxicology report, the levels “[a]bsolutely” gave her cause for concern. Id. at
73 (Frame Direct) (Page ID #1037). Cornett suffered an anoxic brain injury because the cells in
his brain “didn’t get enough oxygen in that time period while his heart wasn’t working.” Id. at 74
(Frame Direct) (Page ID #1038). Frame testified that this corresponds with the presence of
fentanyl and para-Fluorofentanyl, because these drugs “slow your respirations until . . . you go
unresponsive and into cardiac arrest,” which “would be the initiating event” for a death like
Cornett’s. Id. at 74–75 (Frame Direct) (Page ID #1038–39). At the time of his death, Cornett also
had pneumonia, which Frame testified was not abnormal in someone who was on respiratory
support for several days. Id. at 76 (Frame Direct) (Page ID #1040). Overall, Frame testified that
10 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
her opinion that Cornett would not have died had he not had fentanyl and para-Fluorofentanyl in
his system. Id. at 78 (Frame Cross) (Page ID #1042).
After a trial, a jury convicted Bryant of: (1) Count One, Conspiracy to Distribute Heroin,
Fentanyl, and Para-Fluorofentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and (2) Count Two,
Distribution of Fentanyl and Para-Fluorofentanyl, the use of which resulted in the death of another
person, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). R. 117 (Judgment at 1) (Page ID #725). Bryant’s
Presentence Investigative Report (“PSR”) calculated his base offense level to be 43, pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, which imposes the maximum offense level upon defendants who are convicted
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) when the “offense of the conviction establishes that death or
serious bodily injury resulted from the use of the substance” and that defendant has “one or more
prior convictions for a similar offense.” R. 114 (PSR at ¶ 66) (Page ID #687).
At sentencing, the district court noted that Bryant had prior convictions, including
“trafficking first charge relating to the sale of methamphetamine,” R. 125 (Sent’g Tr. at 66) (Page
ID #813), and considered additional testimonial evidence from Dalrymple regarding another
overdose death on August 7, 2021, id. at 20–35 (Dalrymple Direct) (Page ID #767–82). Dalrymple
stated that Bryant was listed as having delivered drugs to the deceased, Ralph Caldwell
(“Caldwell”). Id. at 20 (Dalrymple Direct) (Page ID #767). Dalrymple also testified that on
October 15, 2021, Bryant returned to Pike County Detention Center, either to visit or leave money
for somebody, and that staff found controlled substances in his sock during this visit and arrested
him. Id. at 28–29 (Dalrymple Direct) (Page ID #775–76). After testing, the lab determined that
the substances were found to contain heroin, fentanyl, and methamphetamine. Id. at 31 (Dalrymple
Direct) (Page ID #778). Dalrymple further testified that Bryant had an additional run-in with the
11 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
Pikeville Police Department on November 10, 2021, when, while executing an arrest warrant,
officers found substances that contained heroin, fentanyl, and methamphetamine in the room
where Bryant was arrested. Id. at 32–35 (Dalrymple Direct) (Page ID #779–82). When Bryant
was processed at the jail, a small baggie of drugs fell from his pant leg. Id. at 34 (Dalrymple
Direct) (Page ID #781).
Bryant’s PSR calculated a base offense level of 43, to which 2 levels were added because
the “object of the offense was the distribution of a controlled substance in a prison.” R. 114 (PSR
¶¶ 66–67) (Page ID #687). The Sentencing Guidelines provide that when a “total offense level is
calculated in excess of 43, the offense level . . . be treated as a level 43.” Id. ¶ 74 (Page ID #688).
The district court considered this guideline offense level of 43, as well as Bryant’s “individual
criminal history,” when sentencing Bryant to life imprisonment. R. 125 (Sent’g Tr. at 56, 107)
(Page ID #803, 854). In reaching its sentencing decision, the district judge noted that it had to take
into account restitution for Cornett’s family, id. at 61 (Page ID #808); the fact that Bryant had
“year after year convictions,” id. at 93 (Page ID #840); the “[shocking] [f]lagrancy of [the] crime,”
id. at 94 (Page ID #841); what would satisfy deterrence interests, id. at 95 (Page ID #842); what
would protect the community from Bryant’s “criminal lifestyle,” id. at 96 (Page ID #843); the
“nature and circumstances of the offense,” id. at 99 (Page ID #846); and Bryant’s history and
characteristics, which included “[a]t least three felonies” and a “troubling pattern” of re-offense,
id. at 100 (Page ID #847). The district court also noted that the Sentencing Guidelines did not
bind it to impose a life term and stated that it had considered the mitigating factors like the “trauma
of [Bryant’s] brother” and Bryant’s father’s “decision to take his life.” Id. at 105 (Page ID #852).
However, the district court ultimately chose not to deviate below the Sentencing Guidelines
12 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
because Bryant had remained “stubbornly dedicated to criminality” throughout his life. Id. at 105–
06 (Page ID #852–53).
On appeal, Bryant claims that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction
for “conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, leading to death”; (2) that his conviction for
trafficking methamphetamine (“Trafficking in a Controlled Substance (2nd Degree)”) does not
qualify as a “prior ‘similar offense’” for the purposes of an increased offense level when his current
conviction involved distributing fentanyl; and (3) that “the district court rendered a substantively
unreasonable sentence.” Appellant Br. at 3.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo challenges to the sufficiency of evidence. United States v. Ray, 803
F.3d 244, 262 (6th Cir. 2015). When we are reviewing jury decisions, though, “we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government and give the government the benefit of all
reasonable inferences from the testimony.” Id. We do “not ‘weigh the evidence, consider the
credibility of witnesses or substitute our judgment for that of the jury.’” Id. (quoting United States
v. Hilliard, 11 F.3d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 1993)).
We review a district court’s sentencing decisions for procedural and substantive
reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Walls, 546 F.3d 728, 736
(6th Cir. 2008). Several circumstances may make an imposed sentence procedurally unreasonable,
including if the district court “failed to calculate the Guidelines range properly; treated the
Guidelines as mandatory; failed to consider the factors prescribed at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); based
the sentence on clearly erroneous facts; or failed to adequately explain the sentence.” United States
13 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
v. Coppenger, 775 F.3d 799, 803 (6th Cir. 2015). “‘A sentence is substantively unreasonable if
the district court select[s] the sentence arbitrarily, bas[es] the sentence on impermissible factors,
fail[s] to consider pertinent [] factors or giv[es] an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent
factor.’” Walls, 546 F.3d at 736 (quoting United States v. Caver, 470 F.3d 220, 248 (6th Cir.
2006)). We presume that a sentence that is within the “properly calculated guidelines range” is
reasonable. Id. Whether we would have concluded that a different sentence was reasonable is
insufficient to justify reversing the district court’s sentencing decision. Id.
B. There was sufficient evidence to support Bryant’s conviction for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, leading to death.
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), it is unlawful to “manufacture, distribute, or dispense”
a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). “[I]f death . . . results from the use of such
[controlled] substance,” Congress authorizes a sentence of “a term of imprisonment of not less
than twenty years or more than life.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). The jury instructions for Count 2
in this case required the jury to find but-for causation, R. 87 (Jury Instructions at 18–19) (Page ID
#223–24), meaning that the government must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the death in
question “would not have occurred ‘without the incremental effect’ of the controlled substance.’”
United States v. Sadler, 24 F.4th 515, 545 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Volkman,
797 F.3d 377, 392 (6th Cir. 2015)). But-for causation does not require a finding that the Defendant
personally handed the drugs to the deceased, but “requires the government to prove only that the
specific drug underlying a defendant’s violation of § 841(a) is the same drug that was the but-for
cause of the victim’s death.” Id. at 545–46 (quoting United States v. Davis, 970 F.3d 650, 656
(6th Cir. 2020)). The full jury instructions dictated that for the jury to find Bryant guilty, they had
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Bryant “knowingly distributed a mixture or substance
14 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
containing a detectable amount of fentanyl and/or a detectable amount of para-fluorofentanyl”; (2)
Bryant “knew at the time of distribution that what he distributed contained a controlled substance”;
(3) Cornett “died as a result of his use of such controlled substances distributed by [] Bryant”; and
(4) Bryant was “part of the distribution chain that placed the mixture or substance containing a
detectible amount of fentanyl and/or . . . para-fluorofentanyl into the hands of [] Cornett.” R. 87
(Jury Instructions at 18) (Page ID #223). The causation inquiry here involves two questions:
(1) whether Cornett consumed drugs that were, at some point, distributed by Bryant; and
(2) whether those drugs were the but-for cause of Cornett’s overdose death. Sadler, 24 F.4th at
546. The death must have resulted from the “use of the unlawfully distributed drug” only, rather
than “from a combination of factors to which drug use merely contributed.” Burrage v. United
States, 571 U.S. 204, 216 (2014).
Bryant argues on appeal that a reasonable juror could not fairly tie him to the overdose
death of Cornett beyond a reasonable doubt. To do so, Bryant highlights several variables that he
contends break the causal chain: (1) the attenuated timeframe, during which Bryant bonded out of
Pod 16; (2) a later search of Pod 16 revealed “multiple items of contraband” and “failed to uncover
additional controlled substances that had been swallowed by another inmate”; and (3) Robinson
admitted that he intended to alter the drugs by adding Tylenol or some other substance to the
substance that he purchased from Bryant. Appellant Br. at 16. Bryant also inaccurately claims
that the parties stipulated the presence of methamphetamine in the shared bathroom. Id. A review
of the Stipulated Facts in question shows that the stipulated facts are referring to the substances
that were found on Bryant during the traffic stop, R. 86 (Stipulated Facts ¶ 3) (Page ID #204), and
what was found in the pomade can that Robinson stashed in the bathroom, id. ¶ 2 (Page ID #204),
15 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
both of which a reasonable fact finder could tie back to Bryant.7 He also challenges the
government’s use of a witness (Robinson) who is a “large-scale drug dealer.” Appellant Br. at 15.
However, given our deferential stance toward jury trials, we do not consider the credibility of the
government’s witnesses at this point. Ray, 803 F.3d at 262.
Based on the available evidence, and keeping in mind the deferential standard by which
we are bound when reviewing jury decisions, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence that a
reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Bryant was involved in
the distribution chain that led to Cornett ingesting controlled substances and subsequently dying.
Holbrooks testified that he and Bryant pooled their resources to purchase seven grams (or seventy
“doses”) of heroin, that Bryant subsequently spent an hour in a gas station, and that Bryant had
brought at least some of the controlled substance into Pod 16. R. 126 (Trial Tr. at 22–25)
(Holbrooks Direct) (Page ID #883–86). Video surveillance from Pod 16 showed that Bryant was
in Pod 16’s shared bathroom with a sheet covering the doorway for a significant amount of time
and that numerous inmates, including Cornett, entered the bathroom with Bryant. Robinson
testified that he observed Bryant “doing lines” with other inmates, that he negotiated with Bryant
to purchase heroin from Bryant in exchange for funds to bond Bryant and Holbrooks out, and that
the substance that Robinson later observed near Cornett’s bunk looked like the substance that
Robinson had purchased from Bryant. It is irrelevant whether Bryant had bonded out by the time
7 Contrary to Bryant’s representations on appeal, the stipulation does not state that “a quantity of methamphetamine was also located within [Pod 16’s] shared bathroom,” but rather that the drugs seized during the traffic stop contained methamphetamine. Appellant Br. at 16. In fact, there was no evidence presented at trial that methamphetamine was ever found within Pod 16.
16 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
Cornett died; the relevant inquiry here is whether Bryant had provided the drugs that ultimately
caused Cornett’s death.
Bryant and Holbrooks may have thought that what they were purchasing was heroin, but
Dalrymple testified that it was not uncommon for producers to mix fentanyl and heroin together.
In fact, the stipulated facts show that the substances Bryant was found with during the traffic stop
(which amounted to 1.259 grams, a significantly lower amount than what Holbrooks testified they
purchased) did, in fact contain heroin as well as fentanyl. R. 86 (Stipulated Facts ¶ 3) (Page ID
#204). And fentanyl was also found in Cornett’s blood samples. R. 127 (Trial Tr. at 47, 51)
(Schroeder Direct) (Page ID #1011, 1015). Even though Bryant and Holbrooks may have intended
to purchase heroin, not fentanyl, our precedent dictates that even if they did not know that the
contraband was laced with fentanyl, it was sufficient that Bryant “was aware that he was
purchasing controlled substances.” See United States v. Williams, 998 F.3d 716, 730 (6th Cir.
2021) (citing United States v. Villarce, 323 F.3d 435, 439 & n.1 (6th Cir. 2003)). Further, there is
no real dispute that Bryant sold drugs to Robinson. And although Robinson testified that he had
intended to add Tylenol or some other substance to the drugs he purchased from Bryant in order
“to stretch it” or “weaken it,” R. 126 (Trial Tr. at 53) (Robinson Direct) (Page ID #914), there is
no evidence that Robinson actually did so prior to Cornett’s ingestion of the drugs. Sufficient
evidence existed for a reasonable trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Bryant was
involved in distributing the drugs that Cornett consumed and that caused his death.
The second part of our but-for inquiry is fairly straightforward. According to the lab
reports, Cornett had fentanyl and para-fluorofentanyl in his system. R. 127 (Trial Tr. at 47, 51)
(Schroeder Direct) (Page ID #1011, 1015). Frame, the medical examiner, testified that she had
17 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
reviewed the toxicology report and that the drug levels in the blood “absolutely” gave her concern
because “[t]hey are lethal.” Id. at 73 (Frame Direct) (Page ID #1037). Cornett died on October
20, 2021, following several days on life support after he was discovered unconscious on October
13, 2021. Frame testified that Cornett had suffered an “anoxic brain injury” caused by a lack of
oxygen flow to his brain when he went into cardiac arrest. Id. at 74 (Frame Direct) (Page ID
#1038). This type of injury has a relationship to the presence of fentanyl and para-fluorofentanyl
because the effect of these drugs can slow one’s respirations until one suffers cardiac arrest. Id. at
74–75 (Frame Direct) (Page ID #1038–39). Overall, in Frame’s opinion, Cornett “would not have
died if the fentanyl and para-Fluorofentanyl would not have been in his blood.” Id. at 78 (Frame
Direct) (Page ID #1042). We affirm the district court’s judgment.
C. Bryant’s instant conviction for distributing fentanyl was sufficiently similar to his prior conviction of trafficking methamphetamine under our current precedent.
On appeal, Bryant also argues that his prior conviction for trafficking in a controlled
substance should not count as a sufficiently similar offense for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.8
Section 2D1.1 states that if “[a] defendant is convicted under 21 U.S.C. [§] . . . 841(b)(1)(C) . . .
and the offense of conviction establishes that death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use
of the substance and that the defendant committed the offense after one or more prior convictions
for a similar offense,” the base offense level should be calculated at 43. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(1)
(2021). In United States v. Johnson, “we conclude[d] that the Sentencing Commission intended
8 As of the updated 2023 Guidelines (effective November 1, 2023), the language has been updated to “felony drug offense,” rather than “similar offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(1)(B) (2023). Because these guidelines were not in effect at the time of Bryant’s sentencing, we rely on the language from the 2021 Guidelines.
18 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
the term ‘similar offense’ to be synonymous with the term ‘felony drug offense.’” 706 F.3d 728,
731 (6th Cir. 2013). A “felony drug offense” is defined as “an offense that is punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State . . . that
prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depressant
or stimulant substances.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(44). Bryant’s PSR used his conviction for “Trafficking
in a Controlled Substance (2nd Degree)” to determine that U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 set Bryant’s base
offense level at 43. R. 114 (PSR ¶ 108 and p.41) (Page ID #700, 716–17). At sentencing, the
district court noted that Bryant’s conviction for “Possession Controlled Substance (1st Degree),”
id. ¶ 107 (Page ID #699–700), would also count as a “similar offense” for sentencing purposes,
R. 125 (Sent’g Tr. at 14–15) (Page ID #761–62).
Bryant points out that the prior convictions that the PSR and the district court relied on
both “involved small quantities of methamphetamine.” Appellant Br. at 18; see also R. 125 (Sent’g
Tr. at 12–15) (Page ID #759–62). The district court found that United States v. Johnson dictated
that Bryant’s convictions “fit as similar offenses.” R. 125 (Sent’g Tr. at 15) (Page ID #762). At
sentencing and on appeal, Bryant argues that the two offenses would have to be “much more
similar,” R. 125 (Sent’g Tr. at 12) (Page ID #759), and that equating his prior convictions of
possessing and trafficking methamphetamine “outside of a custodial setting” to his current
conviction of “trafficking fentanyl within a detention center” relies on a “very broad reach of
Johnson,” Appellant Br. at 18. Instead, Bryant argues, a “sliding scale” approach, like the one that
the Sentencing Guidelines utilize for analyzing relevant conduct, should apply in evaluating the
similarities between prior and current convictions. Id. at 18–20.
19 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
As Bryant conceded at the sentencing hearing, R. 125 (Sent’g Tr. at 12–13) (Page ID #759–
60), we are currently bound by Johnson. Because Bryant’s previous convictions for possessing
and trafficking methamphetamine were felony drug offenses, see R. 114 (PSR ¶¶ 66, 107, 108)
(Page ID #687, 699–700),9 our precedent dictates that they be considered sufficiently “similar
offenses,” Johnson, 706 F.3d at 733; see also United States v. Stevens, No. 22-5410, 2023 WL
3200322, at *4 (6th Cir. May 2, 2023). We affirm the district court’s use of Johnson and its
calculation of Bryant’s base level.
D. The district court did not render a substantively unreasonable sentence.
Finally, Bryant argues that the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence
when it “failed to properly weigh and consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”
Appellant Br. at 21. Specifically, Bryant argues, the district court’s sentence was unreasonable
because: (1) it gave “too much weigh to [Bryant’s] alleged involvement in an additional overdose
case”; (2) it gave “undue weight to the number of [Bryant’s] prior convictions”; and (3) Bryant’s
sentence was “far more severe” than that of his co-defendants (Robinson and Holbrooks).
Appellant Br. at 21–22.
Bryant was not tried or convicted for the Caldwell overdose death, about which Dalrymple
testified at Bryant’s sentencing hearing. R. 125 (Sent’g Tr. at 50) (Page ID #797). Under U.S.S.G.
§ 6A1.3(a), sentencing courts are permitted to “consider relevant information without regard to its
9 The PSR relies on Bryant’s conviction for two counts of Trafficking in a Controlled Substance (2nd Degree) to calculate the base offense level of 43. See R. 114 (PSR at 41) (Page ID #717) (referencing Bryant’s convictions “[a]s set forth in paragraphs #66 and #108”). At sentencing, however, the district court stated that Bryant’s conviction for “Possess[ing] [a] controlled substance,” id. ¶ 107 (Page ID #699), would also “fit as [a] similar offense[],” to which Bryant agreed, R. 125 (Sent’g Tr. at 14–15) (Page ID #761–62).
20 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has
sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a); see also
United States v. Hunt, 487 F.3d 347, 352 (6th Cir. 2007). Bryant on appeal does not point to any
reason why Dalrymple’s testimony should be considered unreliable. Rather, he argues that the
sentencing transcript shows that the district court acted unreasonably in treating this overdose
death as a “key aspect” and “likely a deciding factor” in its decision to give Bryant a life sentence.
Appellant Br. at 23.
Here, Dalrymple provided testimony about events surrounding another overdose death that
occurred on August 6 and 7, 2021, around two months before Cornett’s death. In reaching its
sentencing decision, the district court noted the connections between Bryant and Caldwell,
including the “strong objective proof” that there was a PayPal transaction between Bryant and
Caldwell and the “similarity in the blood testing [of Cornett and Caldwell].” R. 125 (Sent’g Tr. at
48–49) (Page ID #795–96). The court noted that the testimony related to Caldwell’s death was
not definitive or a jury finding but considered it to be “reliable proof” and “deserv[ing] [of]
consideration on the likely linkage between [] Bryant and that result.” Id. at 49 (Page ID #796).
The court explicitly stated that the focus was on Cornett’s death and the events of October 12,
2021, and noted that Bryant was not being sentenced for or convicted of Caldwell’s death. Id. at
50 (Page ID #797).
In addition to Dalrymple’s testimony about Caldwell, the sentencing court considered other
factors, including the loss of Cornett’s life, the “seriousness of the offense,” Bryant’s history and
criminal record, the “flagrant criminality” of Bryant’s distributing drugs in Pod 16, and lack of
deterrence Bryant seemed to have faced up until this point. R. 125 (Sent’g Tr. at 93–105) (Page
21 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
ID #840–52). The court also recognized the trauma that Bryant had experienced and granted
Bryant “treatment opportunities.” Id. at 96–97 (Page ID #843–44). Given that the Sentencing
Guidelines and our precedent permitted the district court to consider Dalrymple’s testimony about
Caldwell’s death earlier in August and Bryant’s attempts to bring drugs into jail two additional
times following Cornett’s death; the fact that we are bound to apply the abuse-of-discretion
standard; and the fact that the sentencing court also thoroughly took into account other factors (like
Bryant’s criminal history) when reaching its decision, we hold that the district court did not
unreasonably rely on Dalrymple’s testimony.
Next, Bryant claims that the district court erred in giving undue weight to his criminal
history and argues that many of the criminal-history points assigned to him “do not arise from
conduct which was particularly dangerous or egregious.” Appellant Br. at 25. The district court
discussed Bryant’s criminal history and recognized that Bryant was not a “high-volume dealer”
nor was he “violent” or “somebody who has been involved in guns.” R. 125 (Sent’g Tr. at 96)
(Page ID #843). However, it went on to note that Bryant had nevertheless “adher[ed] to a criminal
lifestyle and that lifestyle [was] putting others in his path at great risk.” Id. The district court did
not abuse its discretion in taking into account the number of Bryant’s convictions, in addition to
whether his criminal history was overall violent in nature.
Finally, Bryant contends that he should have been treated similarly to Holbrooks, who
received a sentence of twenty-six months of imprisonment, and Robinson, whose indictment in
this case was dismissed with prejudice as part of his plea agreement but who received a sentence
of “185 months for his involvement in an additional federal case.” Appellant Br. at 26. Sentencing
courts are permitted, but not required, to consider disparities between co-defendants. United States
22 No. 23-5112, United States v. Bryant
v. Simmons, 501 F.3d 620, 623–24 (6th Cir. 2007). Although not required, the district court here
did note Bryant’s argument at sentencing that Holbrooks and Robinson had received significantly
lighter sentences than he did. R. 125 (Sent’g Tr. at 98–99) (Page ID #845–46). The court
explained that while it understood the appeal of the argument, it viewed “[d]eath [as] a distinction
here.” Id. at 98 (Page ID #845). Because there was no proof that Holbrooks or Robinson had
“killed somebody with his trafficking,” the district court explained, it had given them lighter
sentences than it was giving to Bryant. Because the district court did not need to consider the
disparities between Bryant’s sentence and Holbrooks’s and Robinson’s sentences, and because it
explained why it was treating Bryant differently, we hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion. We affirm Bryant’s sentence.
III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.