NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________
No. 24-1909 ____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JULIUS POSTELL, Appellant ____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Crim. No. 2:20-cr-00360-001) District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro ____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) September 8, 2025 ____________
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, PORTER and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed May 18, 2026) ____________
OPINION* ____________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. CHAGARES, Chief Judge.
Julius Postell pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal, he argues that his conviction is unconstitutional under the
Second Amendment of the United States Constitution. For the reasons below, we will
affirm.
I.
We write primarily for the parties and so recite only those facts pertinent to our
decision. Philadelphia police officers suspected that Postell was engaging in a drug deal,
as they observed him outside a gated backyard with a plastic bag in his hand. Postell at
first turned toward the officers, but he then walked in another direction and discarded a
firearm onto the sidewalk. The officers stopped Postell, recovered the firearm, and
verified that Postell had prior felony convictions. After he was arrested, Postell was
indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Postell first moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) violated the
Second Amendment as applied to him. The District Court denied Postell’s motion.
Postell then entered into a plea agreement with the Government, which limited any
appeal to the denial of his motion to dismiss. The District Court sentenced Postell to
sixty-six months of imprisonment. Postell timely appealed.
2 II.1
Postell argues that the Second Amendment prohibits his prosecution under
§ 922(g)(1), which forbids any individual convicted of an offense punishable by more
than a year of imprisonment from possessing firearms. Postell and the Government agree
that he is one of “the people” to whom the Second Amendment applies. U.S. Const.
amend. II; see Range v. Attorney General (“Range II”), 124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2025) (en
banc). An analysis of a Second Amendment challenge proceeds in two steps: (1)
whether “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct,”2 and (2)
whether the law “is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation.” N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 24 (2022). Postell
relies on this Court’s decision in Range v. Attorney General (“Range I”), 69 F.4th 96 (3d
Cir. 2023) (en banc),3 to suggest that our Nation’s history and tradition do not support
permanently disarming felons who have completed their sentences. But we held that
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction to review Postell’s conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). Whether a statute is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment is a question of law reviewed de novo. Lara v. Comm’r Pa. State Police, 125 F.4th 428, 433 n.7 (3d Cir. 2025). 2 The Government “does not deem it necessary to press the point at this time” that Postell’s possession of a firearm to facilitate an attempted drug deal is conduct that the Second Amendment does not protect. Gov’t Br. 19 n.8. Like the District Court, we therefore do not consider the issue. 3 During the interim of this appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded in Range I for further consideration in light of United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). Garland v. Range, 144 S. Ct. 2706, 2707 (2024) (mem.). In Range II, this Court came to a similar conclusion as in Range I. We therefore construe Postell’s argument relying on Range I to apply equally to Range II.
3 history and tradition did not support permanently disarming an individual under
§ 922(g)(1) when the record included evidence of a minor food-stamp fraud conviction
from decades prior and did not indicate that he posed a physical danger to others. Id. at
106; accord Range II, 124 F.4th at 232.
Postell’s criminal history, by contrast, is recent and substantial. It includes
aggravated assault, conspiracy, false imprisonment, drug delivery resulting in death,
involuntary manslaughter, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver,
theft, and many other crimes. Postell cycled in and out of prison for the past three
decades as a result of committing these offenses. And unlike in Range, these convictions
are “closely associated with physical danger,” with some involving direct interpersonal
violence. Range II, 124 F.4th at 230; see also United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637,
658 (6th Cir. 2024) (“[T]here is little debate that violent crimes are at least strong
evidence that an individual is dangerous, if not totally dispositive on the question.”).
Postell argues that despite his convictions for violent offenses, § 922(g)(1) cannot
constitutionally apply to him because “[a] lifetime prohibition is not consistent with this
Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Postell Br. 11. Whether that
contention is true is not relevant to Postell’s as-applied challenge, which is cabined to the
particulars of his case. See United States v. Moore, 111 F.4th 266, 272–73 (3d Cir. 2024)
(“[A]n as-applied challenge requires us to ask whether a statute’s ‘application to a
particular person under particular circumstances deprived that person of a constitutional
right.’” (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 405 (3d Cir. 2011))).
4 The question properly framed is whether disarming someone whose criminal
history is recent and violent less than a year after his imprisonment “is part of the
historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.”
Range II, 124 F.4th at 228 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 19). The Supreme Court’s
analysis in Rahimi confirms that the answer is yes. In Rahimi, the Court rejected a
Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(8)(C)(i), which criminalizes firearm
possession by those subject to a court order finding that they “represent[] a credible threat
to the physical safety” of an intimate partner or the children of the defendant or his
partner.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________
No. 24-1909 ____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JULIUS POSTELL, Appellant ____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Crim. No. 2:20-cr-00360-001) District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro ____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) September 8, 2025 ____________
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, PORTER and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed May 18, 2026) ____________
OPINION* ____________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. CHAGARES, Chief Judge.
Julius Postell pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal, he argues that his conviction is unconstitutional under the
Second Amendment of the United States Constitution. For the reasons below, we will
affirm.
I.
We write primarily for the parties and so recite only those facts pertinent to our
decision. Philadelphia police officers suspected that Postell was engaging in a drug deal,
as they observed him outside a gated backyard with a plastic bag in his hand. Postell at
first turned toward the officers, but he then walked in another direction and discarded a
firearm onto the sidewalk. The officers stopped Postell, recovered the firearm, and
verified that Postell had prior felony convictions. After he was arrested, Postell was
indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Postell first moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) violated the
Second Amendment as applied to him. The District Court denied Postell’s motion.
Postell then entered into a plea agreement with the Government, which limited any
appeal to the denial of his motion to dismiss. The District Court sentenced Postell to
sixty-six months of imprisonment. Postell timely appealed.
2 II.1
Postell argues that the Second Amendment prohibits his prosecution under
§ 922(g)(1), which forbids any individual convicted of an offense punishable by more
than a year of imprisonment from possessing firearms. Postell and the Government agree
that he is one of “the people” to whom the Second Amendment applies. U.S. Const.
amend. II; see Range v. Attorney General (“Range II”), 124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2025) (en
banc). An analysis of a Second Amendment challenge proceeds in two steps: (1)
whether “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct,”2 and (2)
whether the law “is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation.” N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 24 (2022). Postell
relies on this Court’s decision in Range v. Attorney General (“Range I”), 69 F.4th 96 (3d
Cir. 2023) (en banc),3 to suggest that our Nation’s history and tradition do not support
permanently disarming felons who have completed their sentences. But we held that
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction to review Postell’s conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). Whether a statute is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment is a question of law reviewed de novo. Lara v. Comm’r Pa. State Police, 125 F.4th 428, 433 n.7 (3d Cir. 2025). 2 The Government “does not deem it necessary to press the point at this time” that Postell’s possession of a firearm to facilitate an attempted drug deal is conduct that the Second Amendment does not protect. Gov’t Br. 19 n.8. Like the District Court, we therefore do not consider the issue. 3 During the interim of this appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded in Range I for further consideration in light of United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). Garland v. Range, 144 S. Ct. 2706, 2707 (2024) (mem.). In Range II, this Court came to a similar conclusion as in Range I. We therefore construe Postell’s argument relying on Range I to apply equally to Range II.
3 history and tradition did not support permanently disarming an individual under
§ 922(g)(1) when the record included evidence of a minor food-stamp fraud conviction
from decades prior and did not indicate that he posed a physical danger to others. Id. at
106; accord Range II, 124 F.4th at 232.
Postell’s criminal history, by contrast, is recent and substantial. It includes
aggravated assault, conspiracy, false imprisonment, drug delivery resulting in death,
involuntary manslaughter, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver,
theft, and many other crimes. Postell cycled in and out of prison for the past three
decades as a result of committing these offenses. And unlike in Range, these convictions
are “closely associated with physical danger,” with some involving direct interpersonal
violence. Range II, 124 F.4th at 230; see also United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637,
658 (6th Cir. 2024) (“[T]here is little debate that violent crimes are at least strong
evidence that an individual is dangerous, if not totally dispositive on the question.”).
Postell argues that despite his convictions for violent offenses, § 922(g)(1) cannot
constitutionally apply to him because “[a] lifetime prohibition is not consistent with this
Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Postell Br. 11. Whether that
contention is true is not relevant to Postell’s as-applied challenge, which is cabined to the
particulars of his case. See United States v. Moore, 111 F.4th 266, 272–73 (3d Cir. 2024)
(“[A]n as-applied challenge requires us to ask whether a statute’s ‘application to a
particular person under particular circumstances deprived that person of a constitutional
right.’” (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 405 (3d Cir. 2011))).
4 The question properly framed is whether disarming someone whose criminal
history is recent and violent less than a year after his imprisonment “is part of the
historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.”
Range II, 124 F.4th at 228 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 19). The Supreme Court’s
analysis in Rahimi confirms that the answer is yes. In Rahimi, the Court rejected a
Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(8)(C)(i), which criminalizes firearm
possession by those subject to a court order finding that they “represent[] a credible threat
to the physical safety” of an intimate partner or the children of the defendant or his
partner. 602 U.S. at 690. The Court pointed to two historical analogues. One was surety
regimes, in which magistrates “require[d] individuals suspected of future misbehavior to
post a bond.” Id. at 695. The other was “going armed” laws, which prohibited menacing
others with firearms. Id. at 697. “Taken together, the surety and going armed laws
confirm what common sense suggests: When an individual poses a clear threat of
physical violence to another, the threatening individual may be disarmed.” Id. at 698.
That same historical tradition justifies Postell’s disarmament. Postell, through his
extensive criminal history, has shown that he poses “a clear threat of physical violence to
another” and “a special danger of misus[ing]” firearms. Id. Postell was recently
convicted of multiple dangerous felonies. Disarming individuals in Postell’s
circumstances, as the District Court concluded, is “consistent with the Nation’s historical
tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 689 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.