United States v. Julius Collins

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: July 8, 2024
• Docket: 23-6011
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0293n.06

Case No. 23-6011

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FILED Jul 08, 2024 ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF JULIUS COLLINS, ) TENNESSEE Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION

Before: CLAY, McKEAGUE, and READLER, Circuit Judges.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Julius Collins pleaded guilty to being a felon in

possession of a firearm. In exchange for that plea, the government agreed not to recommend a

sentencing enhancement for attempted carjacking. During Collins’s sentencing proceedings,

however, the district court ordered the government to offer evidence regarding the enhancement,

which the district court ultimately did apply. On appeal, Collins argues that the government

breached the plea agreement by complying with the court order. We disagree and affirm.

I.

Law enforcement attempted to pull Julius Collins over for speeding. After a lengthy car

chase, Collins left his vehicle and fled on foot. Brandishing a gun, Collins approached a nearby

car stopped in traffic. Before Collins could overtake the driver, however, the vehicle sped away.

Collins was arrested not long thereafter. No. 23-6011, United States v. Collins

Following his arrest, Collins was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He

entered into a plea agreement with the government. Collins agreed to plead guilty to the firearm

offense and waive his right to appeal his sentence. In exchange, the government agreed to

recommend, among other things, (1) no sentencing enhancement for Collins’s attempted

carjacking, and (2) a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range.

Nonetheless, when it came to calculating a proposed Guidelines range, the probation office

applied an enhancement for attempted carjacking. Collins objected. The government, for its part,

reaffirmed that it would not pursue the enhancement.

That put matters in the district court’s hands. The district court ordered the government to

produce, at the sentencing hearing, “the incident video and complete police report, as well as the

presence of the on-scene officers.” The government reiterated that it did not believe the

enhancement applied but stated it would comply with the order. Collins objected, arguing that the

government’s contemplated compliance would breach the plea agreement.

At the sentencing hearing, the government, consistent with the district court’s order, called

the officer present at the traffic stop. The government also offered into the record the officer’s

body camera footage and police report. Weighing the information before it, the district court

agreed with the probation office and applied the enhancement.

The government and Collins both recommended a sentence of 46 months, which fell at the

low end of a Guidelines range calculated without the carjacking enhancement. The district court,

however, having decided that the enhancement applied, sentenced Collins to 100 months of

confinement, the low end of the enhanced sentencing range. Collins timely appealed.

2 No. 23-6011, United States v. Collins

II.

Whether the government breached the plea agreement is an issue we review de novo. See

United States v. Estrada-Gonzalez, 32 F.4th 607, 609 (6th Cir. 2022). We generally treat a plea

agreement like a contract, employing “traditional principles of contract law” to interpret and

enforce it “according to [its] literal terms.” United States v. Warren, 8 F.4th 444, 448 (6th Cir.

2021) (citations omitted). If there are any ambiguities in a plea agreement, we construe them

against the government. Id.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 sets forth parameters for pleas. Two provisions of

the Rule deserve mention. One is Rule 11(c)(1)(B), which authorizes the government, as part of a

plea agreement, to “recommend . . . that a particular sentence or sentencing range is appropriate or

that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor

does or does not apply.” But the government’s recommendation is just that; it “does not bind the

court.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(B). The other is Rule 11(c)(1)(C), which empowers the

government to “agree” in a plea agreement “that a specific sentence or sentencing range” is

appropriate, or that a particular provision of the Guidelines does or does not apply. If the

government does so, its commitment “binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement.”

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C).

Here, the text of the plea agreement unambiguously reflects that the parties were

proceeding under Rule 11(c)(1)(B). The plea agreement stated that the government “agree[d] to

recommend” (1) that no enhancement be applied for attempted carjacking, and (2) that Collins “be

sentenced at the low-end of [the] guideline range.” The government’s commitment, in other words,

was simply to make a recommendation. It did not commit itself to an outcome in a way that would

bind the district court in accordance with Rule 11(c)(1)(C). As a result, the district court remained

3 No. 23-6011, United States v. Collins

free to disagree with the government and calculate the Guidelines range differently. See, e.g.,

United States v. Golson, 95 F.4th 456, 462 n.4 (6th Cir. 2024) (noting that the district court is free

to calculate the Guidelines differently when there is a Rule 11(c)(1)(B) plea agreement).

That is precisely what happened here. The probation office proposed applying the

attempted carjacking sentencing enhancement. The government, consistent with its obligations

under the plea agreement, opposed the proposal. The district court then ordered the government

to offer evidence about the traffic stop. The government complied, with the caveat that it did not

believe the enhancement should apply. Likewise, the government recommended a sentence at the

low end of a sentencing range that did not factor in a carjacking enhancement. At every step, the

government acted consistently with the text of the plea agreement. Accordingly, we see no breach.

See United States v. Carpenter, 359 F. App’x 553, 556 (6th Cir. 2009) (concluding there was no

breach under similar circumstances).

Collins’s citations, see United States v. Ligon, 937 F.3d 714 (6th Cir. 2019); Santobello v.

New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), do not move the needle. In Ligon, the government, unlike here,

ultimately recommended a sentence beyond what it agreed to recommend in the plea agreement,

thereby breaching the agreement. 937 F.3d at 719. In Santobello, a new prosecutor, unaware of

the previous prosecutor’s commitment to make no sentencing recommendation, recommended a

sentence to the trial court. 404 U.S. at 258–59. Neither case, in other words, has any resemblance

to this one.

* * * * *

In the end, the government complied with its obligations under the plea agreement. We

thus affirm the judgment of the district court.