United States v. Juan Sanchez

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 4, 2023
• Docket: 22-30146
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 4 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 22-30146

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 1:21-cr-00146-BLW-1

v. MEMORANDUM* JUAN JOSE SANCHEZ, AKA GHOST,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho B. Lynn Winmill, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 18, 2023**

Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Juan Jose Sanchez appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges

the sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for unlawful possession

of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Sanchez argues the district court erred by imposing a below-Guidelines fine

to be paid according to a set schedule. We review for plain error, see United States

v. Hernandez-Arias, 757 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2014), and conclude there is none.

Sanchez fails to demonstrate a present or future inability to comply with the

payment schedule set by the district court. See United States v. Haggard, 41 F.3d

1320, 1329 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that “[a] court may fine a presently

indigent defendant if it finds that the defendant has sufficient earning capacity to

pay the fine in the future” and affirming where the defendant “made no showing of

future inability to pay”).

Sanchez also challenges his custodial term and contends that the district

court should have treated his prior juvenile conviction as a reflection of his

difficult and traumatic background, rather than an aggravating factor. The record

does not support his contention. The court only briefly mentioned his prior

juvenile conviction when discussing Sanchez’s lengthy criminal history and

expressly considered his difficult background as a mitigating factor. The court’s

treatment of his juvenile offense was not an abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The 96-month term is substantively reasonable

under the totality of the circumstances and in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

factors, including the need to protect the public. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

AFFIRMED.

2 22-30146