United States v. Joyner

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: June 5, 2026
• Docket: Criminal No. 2023-0309
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : : v. : Criminal Action No.: 23-309 (RC) : SHAMELL NAQUAN JOYNER, : Re Document Nos.: 51, 88, 89 : Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SEVER COUNTS 4–6 (ECF NO. 51); DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT 24 OR 26 (ECF NO. 88); DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 1–2 AND 7–24 AND COUNTS 9–10 AND 19–24 (ECF NO. 89)

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Shamell Naquan Joyner is charged with ten counts of Hobbs Act robbery, two

counts of carjacking, two counts of interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle, ten counts of

brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, two counts of discharge of a firearm during a

crime of violence, and two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a

felon. See Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 27. A jury trial is scheduled to begin in this case

on June 29, 2026. In brief, Mr. Joyner stands accused of committing ten armed robberies and

two armed carjackings in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia between April 12,

2023, and May 2, 2023.

Before the Court are several pre-trial motions from Mr. Joyner. The parties have asked

the Court to render an expedited decision on three of those motions to help them adequately

prepare for trial. First, Mr. Joyner has moved to sever Counts 4–6, which relate to one of the

alleged carjackings, from the Superseding Indictment. See Def.’s Mot. Severance Offenses

(“Def.’s Mot. Severance”), ECF No. 51. Second, he has moved to dismiss one of Counts 24 or

26 as multiplicitous. See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Count Twenty-Four or Twenty-Six (“Def.’s 1st Mot. Dismiss”), ECF No. 88. Third, he has also moved to dismiss Counts 1–2 and 7–24 for

failure to state an offense and Counts 9–10 and 19–24 for improper venue. See Def.’s Mot.

Dismiss Hobbs Act Robbery & Related 924(c) Counts (“Def.’s 2d Mot. Dismiss”), ECF No. 89.

The Court heard oral arguments on the motions on June 4, 2026. For the reasons below, it denies

the three motions.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Joyner was arrested on May 2, 2023, and on August 8, 2024, a federal grand jury

issued a Superseding Indictment, charging him with twenty-eight counts arising from ten alleged

armed robberies and two armed carjackings. See Superseding Indictment. Specifically, Mr.

Joyner is charged with ten counts of Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); two

counts of carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1); two counts of interstate transportation

of a stolen vehicle, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312; ten counts of brandishing a firearm during a

crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); two counts of discharge of a

firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii); and two counts

of unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1). The Court summarizes the charges below.

A. Armed Robbery 1

According to the Government, early in the morning of April 12, 2023, Mr. Joyner robbed

a Falcon Fuel gas station in Washington, D.C., at gunpoint. Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot.

Severance Offenses (“Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Severance”) at 2–3, ECF No. 59. Mr.

Joyner allegedly took property belonging to Falcon Fuel and two employees, some of which was

reportedly recovered during a search of Mr. Joyner’s residence in Washington, D.C., on May 2,

2023. Id. at 2. In connection with Armed Robbery 1, the Superseding Indictment charges Mr.

2 Joyner with one count of Hobbs Act robbery (Count 1), one count of discharge of a firearm

during the robbery (Count 2), and one count of unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon

(Count 3). Superseding Indictment at 1–3.

B. Armed Carjacking 1

The next day, Mr. Joyner allegedly approached a Honda HR-V parked on L Street in

Washington, D.C., leaned inside the opened passenger-side window, and, while pointing a gun at

the owner, Z.S.M., demanded that he give Mr. Joyner his car, car fob, and wallet. Gov’t’s Opp’n

to Def.’s Mot. Severance at 3. In connection with Armed Carjacking 1, the Superseding

Indictment charges Mr. Joyner with one count of carjacking (Count 4), one count of brandishing

a firearm during the carjacking (Count 5), and one count of interstate transportation of a stolen

vehicle (Count 6). Superseding Indictment at 3–4.

C. Armed Robbery 2

The Government alleges that two days later, on April 15, 2023, Mr. Joyner robbed a 7-

Eleven on Vermont Avenue in Washington, D.C., at gunpoint and took U.S. currency. Gov’t’s

Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Severance at 8–9. The Government represents that video surveillance

footage from inside the store shows that the perpetrator of Armed Robbery 2 wore shorts,

compression pants, socks, and sneakers consistent with the attire worn by the perpetrator of

Armed Carjacking 1, as depicted in surveillance footage connected to Armed Carjacking 1. Id.

at 8. Video footage reportedly also showed a Honda HR-V similar to the one stolen in Armed

Carjacking 1 leaving the 7-Eleven after Armed Robbery 2. Id. at 9. In connection with Armed

Robbery 2, the Superseding Indictment charges Mr. Joyner with one count of Hobbs Act robbery

(Count 7) and one count of brandishing a firearm during the robbery (Count 8). Superseding

Indictment at 4–5.

3 D. Armed Robbery 3

Shortly after midnight on April 17, 2023, Mr. Joyner purportedly robbed a second 7-

Eleven in Alexandria, Virginia, at gunpoint. Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Severance at 9–11.

According to the Government, Mr. Joyner demanded that two employees empty the register and

their wallets and, growing impatient, fired his gun at the floor. Id. at 9–10. One of the

employees felt a pain in his leg and noticed bleeding. Id. The Government states that video

surveillance footage from inside the store shows that the perpetrator of Armed Robbery 3 wore

sneakers consistent with those worn by the perpetrator of Armed Carjacking 1 and Armed

Robbery 2. Id. at 10. Furthermore, Mr. Joyner allegedly wore a distinctive sweatshirt during

Armed Robbery 3 that was later recovered from the trunk of Z.S.M.’s Honda HR-V. Id. at 11.

In connection with Armed Robbery 3, the Superseding Indictment charges Mr. Joyner with one

count of Hobbs Act robbery (Count 9) and one count of discharge of a firearm during the

robbery (Count 10). Superseding Indictment at 5–6.

E. Armed Robbery 4

On April 30, 2023, Mr. Joyner allegedly robbed a third 7-Eleven on Georgia Avenue in

Washington, D.C., at gunpoint. Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Severance at 11–14. The

Government states that Mr. Joyner took U.S. currency and property belonging to an employee.

Id. at 11–12. In connection with Armed Robbery 4, the Superseding Indictment charges Mr.

Joyner with one count of Hobbs Act robbery (Count 11) and one count of brandishing a firearm

during the robbery (Count 12). Superseding Indictment at 6–7.

F. Armed Robbery 5

The following morning, on May 1, 2023, Mr. Joyner purportedly robbed a fourth

7-Eleven on 2nd Street in Washington, D.C., at gunpoint. Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot.

4 Severance at 14–16. According to the Government, Mr. Joyner struck an employee in the back

of the head with a gun and took U.S. currency. Id. at 14–15. In connection with Armed Robbery

5, the Superseding Indictment charges Mr. Joyner with one count of Hobbs Act robbery

(Count 13) and one count of brandishing a firearm during the robbery (Count 14). Superseding

Indictment at 7–8.

G. Armed Robbery 6

On the same day, Mr. Joyner allegedly then robbed the Shop and Run on H Street in

Washington, D.C., at gunpoint. Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Severance at 16–19. The

Government claims he took U.S. currency belonging to the store and an employee. Id. at 16–17.

In connection with Armed Robbery 6, the Superseding Indictment charges Mr. Joyner with one

count of Hobbs Act robbery (Count 15) and one count of brandishing a firearm during the

robbery (Count 16). Superseding Indictment at 8–9.

H. Armed Robbery 7

The next day, shortly after midnight on May 2, 2023, Mr. Joyner allegedly robbed a fifth

7-Eleven on Connecticut Avenue in Washington, D.C., at gunpoint, taking U.S. currency and an

employee’s wallet. Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Severance at 19–20. In connection with

Armed Robbery 7, the Superseding Indictment charges Mr. Joyner with one count of Hobbs Act

robbery (Count 17) and one count of brandishing a firearm during the robbery (Count 18).

Superseding Indictment at 9–10.

I. Armed Robbery 8

An hour later, Mr. Joyner allegedly crossed into Maryland and robbed a sixth 7-Eleven

on Georgia Avenue in Silver Spring at gunpoint. Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Severance at 20–

21. The Government claims that Mr. Joyner took U.S. currency from the store and fled on foot.

5 Id. at 21. In connection with Armed Robbery 8, the Superseding Indictment charges Mr. Joyner

with one count of Hobbs Act robbery (Count 19) and one count of brandishing a firearm during

the robbery (Count 20). Superseding Indictment at 10–11.

J. Armed Robbery 9

After completing the armed robbery in Silver Spring, Mr. Joyner allegedly drove to

Odenton, Maryland, and robbed a seventh 7-Eleven there at gunpoint. Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s

Mot. Severance at 21. The Government states that he took U.S. currency, packs of cigarettes,

and lighters before fleeing on foot. Id. In connection with Armed Robbery 9, the Superseding

Indictment charges Mr. Joyner with one count of Hobbs Act robbery (Count 21) and one count

of brandishing a firearm during the robbery (Count 22). Superseding Indictment at 11–12.

K. Armed Robbery 10 / Armed Carjacking 2

On that same night, in neighboring Hanover, Maryland, Mr. Joyner then allegedly robbed

an Exxon at gunpoint and stole an Exxon employee’s vehicle. Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot.

Severance at 21–25. The Government alleges that Mr. Joyner approached the employee, I.B., in

the Exxon’s parking lot, pointed a semi-automatic handgun at him, and took U.S. currency and

the key to I.B.’s gray Toyota RAV4. Id. at 22. The Government further states that video

surveillance footage from the Exxon shows Mr. Joyner leaving on foot after the robbery. Id. at

25. Less than five minutes later, a gold GMC drove up to the Exxon’s parking lot, and footage

purportedly shows an individual exiting the GMC, sprinting toward I.B.’s Toyota RAV4, and

driving away in the Toyota RAV4. Id. at 25–26.

In connection with Armed Robbery 10 / Armed Carjacking 2, the Superseding Indictment

charges Mr. Joyner with one count of Hobbs Act robbery (Count 23), one count of brandishing a

firearm during the robbery (Count 24), one count of carjacking (Count 25), one count of

6 brandishing a firearm during the carjacking (Count 26), and one count of interstate transportation

of a stolen vehicle (Count 27). Superseding Indictment at 12–14. Counts 24 and 26 both arise

from Mr. Joyner’s alleged brandishing of a firearm at Exxon employee I.B.

L. Mr. Joyner’s Arrest

Early in the afternoon of May 2, 2023, law enforcement officers observed a gray Toyota

RAV4 parked in front of 450 Condon Terrace in Washington, D.C. Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s

Mot. Severance at 27. A query of a law enforcement database confirmed to the officers that the

vehicle in question had been stolen earlier that day in Maryland. Id. The responding officers

approached the vehicle and detained two individuals who had been occupying it: the driver, who

later identified himself as Mr. Joyner, and the front-seat passenger, N.L., a relative of Mr.

Joyner. Id. After Mr. Joyner was removed from the vehicle, the officers observed, allegedly in

plain view on the driver’s floorboard, a semi-automatic firearm consistent with the firearm

depicted in video surveillance capturing Armed Robbery 6 and Armed Robbery 10. Id. In

connection with Mr. Joyner’s arrest, the Superseding Indictment charges him with one count of

unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon (Count 28). 1 Superseding

Indictment at 14.

III. ANALYSIS

Mr. Joyner now moves (1) to sever Counts 4–6 from the Superseding Indictment, (2) to

dismiss either Count 24 or 26 as multiplicitous, and (3) to dismiss Counts 1–2 and 7–24 for

1 Although the Government states that “Counts 27–28 address possessory charges from Defendant’s arrest on May 2, 2023,” see Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Severance at 37, the Superseding Indictment charges Mr. Joyner with interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle in Count 27, see Superseding Indictment at 13–14.

7 failure to state an offense and Counts 9–10 and 19–24 for improper venue. The Court addresses

the three motions in turn.

A. Motion to Sever Counts 4–6

Counts 4–6 correspond to Armed Carjacking 1. Mr. Joyner moves to sever them from

the remaining counts of the Superseding Indictment and exclude them from his upcoming trial.

See Def.’s Mot. Severance. He argues that the carjacking, firearm, and transportation of stolen

vehicle offenses charged in Counts 4–6 are “entirely unrelated” to the rest of the charged

offenses and are therefore improperly joined under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a). Id.

at 2. And even if joinder were appropriate under Rule 8(a), he argues that Counts 4–6 should be

severed pursuant to Rule 14 because joinder would prejudice his defense. Id. However, as

explained below, Counts 4–6 are properly joined and severance is not warranted.

1. Counts 4–6 Are Properly Joined Pursuant to Rule 8(a)

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) permits joinder of two or more offenses in one

indictment if the offenses charged “are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same

act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.” Fed.

R. Crim. P. 8(a). The term “similar character” means “nearly corresponding, resembling in

many respects, somewhat alike, or having a general likeness.” United States v. Treadwell, 566 F.

Supp. 80, 86 (D.D.C. 1983); see also United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir. 1980).

The term “transaction” can comprehend “a series of many occurrences, depending not so much

upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship.” Treadwell, 566

F. Supp. at 86. And offenses are deemed to be “connected” when there is commonality of proof.

Id. In evaluating whether joinder is permissible, courts must “focus[ ] solely on the indictment

and pre-trial submissions,” not “the evidence presented at trial.” United States v. Gooch, 665

8 F.3d 1318, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Accordingly, “the Government need merely allege, not prove,

the facts necessary to sustain joinder.” Id.

The Court finds that the offense of Armed Carjacking 1, set forth in Counts 4–6 of the

Superseding Indictment, is properly joined under Rule 8(a). As alleged by the Government,

Armed Carjacking 1 arose out of the same series of interconnected and similar armed offenses

that ultimately culminated in Mr. Joyner’s arrest on May 2, 2023. See Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s

Mot. Severance at 33. The Superseding Indictment charges that Armed Carjacking 1 occurred

on or about April 13, 2023, within the same three-week period as all other charged offenses.

Superseding Indictment at 3–4. Furthermore, according to the Government, the Honda HR-V

vehicle stolen in Armed Carjacking 1 provided a means for Mr. Joyner to facilitate the

commission of Armed Robbery 2. See Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Severance at 33 (noting

that surveillance footage showed a Honda HR-V leaving the scene of Armed Robbery 2, which

occurred only two days after Armed Carjacking 1). These allegations suffice to show that

Armed Carjacking 1 is of a “similar character” as other offenses charged in the Superseding

Indictment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a); see also United States v. Wilkins, 538 F. Supp. 3d 49, 87

(D.D.C. 2021) (denying a motion to sever an assault charge from other sex trafficking charges

due to the “general likeness” between the charges, including because the assault was allegedly

used as a tactic to force victims into sex work); United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 963 (9th

Cir. 2007) (upholding denial of a motion to sever carjacking and robbery charges that were

“correlated” because the carjacking “provided the get-away vehicle” for the robbery).

Furthermore, “[t]he presumption in favor of joinder ‘is especially strong where the

respective charges require presentation of much the same evidence [and] testimony of the same

witnesses,’” which the Government represents is the case here. United States v. McGill, 815

9 F.3d 846, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 167 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C.

Cir. 1999)); see also Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Severance at 33–36. The Government notes,

for example, that Mr. Joyner wore similar articles of clothing during Armed Carjacking 1 and

during Armed Robberies 2 and 3, some of which were later recovered from the Honda HR-V.

See Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Severance at 11, 33–34; cf. United States v. Levi, 45 F.3d 453,

455–56 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding a denial of severance where “the perpetrator . . . wore

similar clothing” in the different bank robberies at issue). And the Government alleges that at

the time of Mr. Joyner’s arrest, law enforcement recovered physical evidence from the Toyota

RAV4 stolen in Armed Carjacking 2 that was relevant to Armed Carjacking 1, including the

cellphone of Mr. Joyner’s relative, N.L., containing a photo of Mr. Joyner inside the stolen

Honda HR-V. See Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Severance at 34–35; cf. United States v. Lewis,

No. 24-cr-144, 2024 WL 4932043, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2024) (holding that joinder was proper

where “the physical and digital evidence underl[y]ing each count were ‘seized simultaneously’

and w[ould] require the same testimony from the law enforcement agents who executed the

arrest [and search] warrant[s]”). Because there is alleged to be “commonality of proof” between

Armed Carjacking 1 and the other charged offenses, joinder of Counts 4–6 is also proper. See

Lewis, 2024 WL 4932043, at *2.

2. Severance Pursuant to Rule 14 Is Not Warranted

Even if joinder is proper under Rule 8(a), severance may be granted pursuant to Rule 14

if “the joinder of offenses . . . appears to prejudice a defendant.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). “In

determining whether offenses should be tried separately, the principal consideration ‘is whether

joinder is so manifestly prejudicial that it outweighs the dominant concern with judicial [and

prosecutorial] economy.’” Treadwell, 566 F. Supp. at 86 (quoting United States v. Brashier, 548

10 F.2d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1976)). “The defendant seeking severance under Rule 14 carries the

burden of demonstrating that failure to sever would result in prejudice.” United States v. Lewis,

No. 19-cr-307, 2022 WL 1090612, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2022).

If there has been no misjoinder under Rule 8(a), the D.C. Circuit recognizes only three

kinds of prejudice that warrant severance under Rule 14: (1) “the jury may cumulate evidence of

the separate crimes,” (2) “the jury may improperly infer a criminal disposition and treat the

inference as evidence of guilt,” and (3) “the defendant may become ‘embarrassed or confounded’

in presenting different defenses to the different charges.” Gooch, 665 F.3d at 1336 (quoting

Blunt v. United States, 404 F.2d 1283, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1968)). But “[j]oinder is the rule rather

than the exception and the burden is upon a moving defendant to show facts demonstrating that

he will be so severely prejudiced by a joint trial that it would in effect deny him a fair trial.”

Treadwell, 566 F. Supp. at 86.

Without much elaboration, Mr. Joyner asserts that joinder here would give rise to the

three recognized forms of prejudice. See Def.’s Mot. Severance at 2. The Court is not

persuaded. First, the risk of cumulation of evidence is “substantially reduced” when, as here,

“the evidence of each crime is simple and distinct.” Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 91

(D.C. Cir. 1964). Although there is some overlapping evidence, the distinctions between the

separate offenses are clear in the Superseding Indictment. The Court believes the Government

will be able to “present the evidence in such a manner that . . . the jury will be able to treat the

evidence relevant to each charge separately and distinctly,” United States v. Lewis, No. 19-cr-

307, 2021 WL 2809819, at *4 (D.D.C. July 6, 2021) (quoting United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d

1111, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1985)), especially “with a proper charge,” Drew, 331 F.2d at 91.

11 Second, although “joinder of offenses in a single trial may be prejudicial when there is a

great disparity in the amount of evidence underlying the joined offenses,” see Lucero v. Kerby,

133 F.3d 1299, 1315 (10th Cir. 1998), the Government represents that the evidence here is

“distributed equally among the charged counts,” see Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Severance at

38. 2 This mitigates the risk that the jury will infer guilt on certain counts based on an improper

belief as to criminal disposition. And “jury instructions are usually sufficient to minimize any

disparities in evidence.” United States v. Manner, 887 F.2d 317, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

Third, Mr. Joyner’s counsel stated at the motions hearing on June 4, 2026, that joinder

would prejudice Mr. Joyner because he may wish to testify on the counts underlying Armed

Robberies 7–10, which took place on May 2, 2023, but not on the counts underlying earlier

charged offenses, including Armed Carjacking 1. Hr’g Tr. at 19:25–20:15. The D.C. Circuit has

“recognized that the accused may become embarrassed or confounded in presenting separate

defenses . . . where the accused desires to testify but to limit his testimony to less than all of the

joined counts.” Robinson v. United States, 459 F.2d 847, 855 n.53 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (citation

modified). This is because a defendant contemplating this course of action often faces “pressure

to testify as to all or none” of the counts, given “the unfavorable appearance of testifying on one

charge while remaining silent on another.” Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 976 (D.C. Cir.

1968). Nevertheless, severance is not required every time a defendant alleges that he wishes to

offer limited testimony. Instead, as the D.C. Circuit has made clear, the defendant must “make[ ]

2 At the motions hearing on June 4, 2026, Defense counsel rejected this representation, noting, for example, that the Government will present testimony from a cooperating witness only for Armed Robberies 7–10. Hr’g Tr. at 18:22–19:19. Nevertheless, the Government has noted that other evidence, including forensic evidence and CCTV footage, will be distributed fairly evenly across the different charged offenses, including Armed Carjacking 1. See id. at 23:14– 24:5. Ultimately, the Court has not been persuaded that there is a “great disparity” of evidence underlying the joined offense. Lucero, 133 F.3d at 1315.

12 a convincing showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and

strong need to refrain from testifying on the other.” Id. at 977. In doing so, “it is essential that

the defendant present enough information—regarding the nature of the testimony he wishes to

give on one count and his reasons for not wishing to testify on the other—to satisfy the court that

the claim of prejudice is genuine and to enable it intelligently to weigh the considerations of

economy and expedition in judicial administration against the defendant’s interest in having a

free choice with respect to testifying.” Id. (citation modified).

According to his counsel, Mr. Joyner may wish to take the stand to rebut the testimony of

the Government’s sole cooperating witness, who is expected to testify that Mr. Joyner carried out

Armed Robberies 7–10 on May 2, 2023. See Hr’g Tr. at 20:3–15. Still, Mr. Joyner would

choose not to testify for the earlier charged offenses—including Carjacking 1 (Counts 4–6) and

Armed Robberies 1–6 (Counts 1–3, 7–16)—because there is no cooperator testimony identifying

him as the perpetrator of those offenses and because of the risk that the Government might seek

to impeach any testimony he gives based on his prior convictions. See id. At this point,

however, Mr. Joyner’s proffer is insufficient to establish a genuine risk of undue prejudice from

the joinder of Counts 4–6. Assuming that Mr. Joyner has sufficiently “important” rebuttal

testimony to provide, see Baker, 401 F.2d at 977, he has not explained how severance of Armed

Carjacking 1 would materially change his calculus in deciding whether to testify on Armed

Robberies 7–10. Prior to those robberies, Mr. Joyner is alleged to have committed not only

Armed Carjacking 1 but also Armed Robberies 1–6, the latter of which he has not moved to

sever. Thus, even if Carjacking 1 is severed, he would still face the same “pressure to testify as

to all or none” of the counts. Id. at 976.

* * *

13 For the reasons above, joinder of Counts 4–6 is proper. Furthermore, Mr. Joyner has

failed to carry his burden to show “a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific

trial right . . . or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.”

Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993). Accordingly, the Court denies Mr. Joyner’s

motion to sever Counts 4–6.

B. Motion to Dismiss Count 24 or 26 as Multiplicitous

The Court next considers Mr. Joyner’s motion to dismiss Count 24 or 26 of the

Superseding Indictment as multiplicitous pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

12(b)(3)(B)(ii). See Def.’s 1st Mot. Dismiss. An indictment is said to be multiplicitous when it

“charges the same offense in more than one count.” United States v. Mahdi, 598 F.3d 883, 887

(D.C. Cir. 2010). A multiplicitous indictment “often creates ‘a problem’” at sentencing due to

the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, id. (quoting

United States v. Weathers, 186 F.3d 948, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1999)), which prohibits “multiple

punishments for the same offense,” id. (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717

(1969)). Mr. Joyner argues that Counts 24 and 26 are multiplicitous because both charge him

with violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), which prohibits brandishing a firearm in furtherance

of a crime of violence. See Def.’s 1st Mot. Dismiss at 1; Superseding Indictment at 12–13.

Specifically, Count 24 charges Mr. Joyner with brandishing a firearm during Armed Robbery 10

(Count 23), while Count 26 charges the same conduct with respect to Armed Carjacking 2

(Count 25). Id.

Although predicated on distinct underlying offenses, the Government acknowledges that

Counts 24 and 26 “arise from a single use of a firearm”—that is, Mr. Joyner’s “brandishing of a

handgun at Exxon employee I.B. while robbing I.B. and the Exxon of cash and taking I.B.’s car

14 keys before fleeing in I.B.’s vehicle.” Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Count Twenty-Four

or Twenty-Six (“Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s 1st Mot. Dismiss”) at 2, ECF No. 91. Under binding

D.C. Circuit precedent, a single use of a firearm cannot support multiple convictions under

§ 924(c), even where the multiple § 924(c) counts are predicated on distinct underlying offenses.

See United States v. Wilson, 160 F.3d 732, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Therefore, and as the

Government concedes, Mr. Joyner “could not be punished” twice for the § 924(c) offense

charged in Counts 24 and 26 without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. Gov’t’s Opp’n to

Def.’s 1st Mot. Dismiss at 2.

Because Counts 24 and 26 are multiplicitous, Mr. Joyner urges the Court to compel the

Government to elect between them and to dismiss the other before trial. Def.’s 1st Mot. Dismiss

at 4. He argues that precedent and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure treat multiplicity as a

“defect in the indictment” that needs to be corrected before trial. See Reply in Supp. of Def.’s

Mot. Dismiss Count Twenty-Four or Twenty-Six (“Def.’s Reply in Supp. 1st Mot. Dismiss”) at

1–2, ECF No. 93 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)). The Government, in contrast, insists

that Mr. Joyner’s multiplicity claim is “better sorted out post-trial.” Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s 1st

Mot. Dismiss at 6 (quoting United States v. Hubbell, 177 F.3d 11, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). In the

Government’s view, because the Double Jeopardy Clause’s prohibition against multiple

punishments for the same offense will not be implicated until sentencing, Mr. Joyner will not

suffer prejudice if the Government is allowed to proceed on both Counts 24 and 26 at trial. Id. at

3–4. The Government notes that if the jury ultimately convicts Mr. Joyner on both counts, the

Court would be able to protect him against multiple punishments by entering judgment on only

one of the counts. Id. at 7.

15 As set forth below, the Court will allow the Government to prosecute Counts 24 and 26

simultaneously. But first, the Court takes the opportunity to clarify that although a multiplicitous

indictment is, in a sense, “defective,” as Mr. Joyner observes, see Def.’s 1st Mot. Dismiss at 4

(quoting United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1992)), this is not because

multiplicitous counts inherently violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. As the Supreme Court

explained in Ohio v. Johnson, “[w]hile the Double Jeopardy Clause may protect a defendant

against cumulative punishments for convictions on the same offense, the Clause does not

prohibit the State from prosecuting [the defendant] for such multiple offenses in a single

prosecution.” 467 U.S. 493, 500 (1984). The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in Ball v.

United States, holding that although the defendant in that case could not be convicted and

punished under two statutes for the “single act” of stealing a revolver—where one statute

criminalized receipt and the other possession of a firearm—the Double Jeopardy Clause

presented no “bar to the Government’s proceeding with prosecution simultaneously under the

two statutes.” 470 U.S. 856, 859–61 (1985).

In Mr. Joyner’s view, Ohio and Ball are inapposite because those cases concerned

challenges to multiplicitous convictions and sentences based on double jeopardy principles,

whereas Mr. Joyner challenges the multiplicitous form of his indictment under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B)(ii). Def.’s Reply in Supp. 1st Mot. Dismiss at 4 & n.2. To be

sure, caselaw “distinguish[es] between objections to multiplicity in the indictment itself and

objections to multiplicitous convictions and sentences.” United States v. Zalapa, 509 F.3d 1060,

1063 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Harris, 959 F.2d at 250 (distinguishing a “defect in the

sentencing” from a defect “in the indictment”). As Mr. Joyner emphasizes, where a multiplicity

“defect appears on the face of the indictment,” Rule 12(b)(3) in fact requires a defendant to

16 challenge this defect before trial on pain of waiver. See Harris, 959 F.2d at 250–51; see also

Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(ii) (“[D]efect[s] in the indictment,” including on “multiplicity”

grounds, “must be raised by pretrial motion if the basis for the motion is then reasonably

available and the motion can be determined without a trial on the merits.”); Def.’s Reply in

Supp. 1st Mot. Dismiss at 4 n.3.

But just because multiplicity in the indictment is a defect that a defendant is obligated to

challenge before trial under Rule 12(b)(3) does not mean that the trial court is required to correct

that defect before trial, as Mr. Joyner further argues. See Def.’s Reply in Supp. 1st Mot. Dismiss

at 3; see also United States v. Sanford, Ltd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 102, 123–24 (D.D.C. 2012) (“While

the defendants are required to assert their argument that charges in the Superseding Indictment

are multiplicitous through pre-trial motion, multiplicity claims are better sorted out post-trial.”

(citation modified)). The purpose of Rule 12(b)(3)’s timing requirement is simply to allow the

trial court the opportunity to “inquir[e] into an alleged defect” and, “if necessary,” cure it before

“go[ing] to the burden and expense of a trial.” Harris, 959 F.2d at 250 (quoting Davis v. United

States, 411 U.S. 233, 241 (1973)). But neither Rule 12(b)(3) nor the precedents Mr. Joyner cites

obligate the Court to cure multiplicitous charges before trial.

On the flip side, Ohio and Ball do not mean that the resolution of multiplicity claims can

presumptively be deferred until sentencing. It is true that multiplicitous counts can often be

remedied at the sentencing phase, “since the primary evil of multiplicity is double punishment

for the same offense.” Sanford, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 121. But multiplicity breeds other evils

too—“[f]or when an indictment charges numerous offenses arising from the same conduct it may

falsely suggest to a jury that a defendant has committed not one but several crimes.” United

States v. Clarridge, 811 F. Supp. 697, 702 (D.D.C. 1992) (citation modified); see also United

17 States v. Phillips, 962 F. Supp. 200, 202 (D.D.C. 1997) (“[A]t least some of the harm from

multiplicitous prosecution occurs during the course of the trial itself, and not merely at

sentencing.” (citation omitted)). In considering Mr. Joyner’s multiplicity challenge, this

secondary harm is foremost in the Court’s mind.

As explained above, Mr. Joyner’s Superseding Indictment is multiplicitous because it

charges the same § 924(c) offense in two counts. “That conclusion having been reached, the

decision whether to compel the prosecution to elect among multiplicitous counts before trial is

within the discretion of the trial court.” Phillips, 962 F. Supp. at 201; see also United States v.

Bowyer, 985 F. Supp. 153, 155 (D.D.C. 1997). Mr. Joyner argues that permitting the

Government to proceed to trial on a concededly defective indictment will prejudice him because,

by charging the same offense twice, the Superseding Indictment will “create[ ] an exaggerated

impression of [his] criminal activity” in jurors’ minds. Def.’s Reply in Supp. 1st Mot. Dismiss at

6 (quoting United States v. Polizzi, 257 F.R.D. 33, 36 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)). The Government

counters that Mr. Joyner’s concerns about multiplicity are premature because the multiplicitous

§ 924(c) counts are predicated on the distinct offenses of robbery and carjacking, which the jury

must find that Mr. Joyner committed before he can be convicted on the associated § 924(c)

counts. Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s 1st Mot. Dismiss at 6. Moreover, the Government maintains

that “any risk that the jury might draw an improper inference from an additional charge . . . can

be addressed through appropriate limiting jury instructions.” Id. at 3.

Upon consideration of the parties’ arguments, the Court finds that any prejudice to Mr.

Joyner from the simultaneous prosecution of Counts 24 and 26 is outweighed by countervailing

considerations. And in any event, the risk of prejudice is minimal. First, Mr. Joyner agrees that

both § 924(c) counts arise from the same alleged conduct—brandishing a handgun at a gas

18 station employee while robbing the gas station and stealing the employee’s vehicle—and the

Government represents that the evidence it intends to introduce to prove the single act of

brandishing will be the same for both the robbery and carjacking counts. See Def.’s 1st Mot.

Dismiss at 2; Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s 1st Mot. Dismiss at 4. Allowing the Government to

proceed on both counts will therefore not expose jurors to more evidence of Mr. Joyner’s alleged

criminal activity than the alternative. Cf. Sanford, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 124 (“The defendants have

not demonstrated that they would suffer any prejudice from allowing the government to proceed

on the allegedly multiplicitous counts, particularly since the defendants assert that the charges

encompass the same underlying facts and conduct.”). Second, as the Government remarks, if the

jury finds that Mr. Joyner did not commit the robbery predicate offense for Count 24 or the

carjacking predicate offense for Count 26, he could not be convicted on the corresponding

§ 924(c) counts, which would moot his multiplicity claim. 3 See United States v. Josephberg, 459

F.3d 350, 355 (2d Cir. 2006) (“If the jury convicts on no more than one of the multiplicitous

counts, there has been no violation of the defendant’s right to be free from double jeopardy, for

he will suffer no more than one punishment.”). Third, although the Court accepts that there is

prejudice inherent in “the accumulation of multiple charges,” it finds that “the duplication here

3 Mr. Joyner suggests that because Counts 24 and 26 arise from the same set of facts, his multiplicity claim does not turn on “factual issues requiring development at trial” and can therefore be resolved now. Def.’s Reply in Supp. 1st Mot. Dismiss at 6 (citation modified). Although Mr. Joyner is correct that a single act of brandishing a firearm underlies the § 924(c) offense charged in both counts, the jury has not yet decided whether he committed the robbery predicate offense for Count 24 or the carjacking predicate offense for Count 26. “Section 924(c) crimes are not ordinary substantive offenses [but] depend on the commission of a concurrent— and predicate—‘crime of violence.’” United States v. Abu Khatallah, 151 F. Supp. 3d 116, 136 (D.D.C. 2015). The commission of an underlying crime of violence is therefore an element of a § 924(c) offense, and the jury must separately find that Mr. Joyner committed the robbery charged in Count 23 and the carjacking charged in Count 25 before it can find him guilty on Counts 24 and 26, respectively.

19 does not significantly affect the overall heft of the indictment, and the harm that can flow from

the existence of multiple charges can be ameliorated with proper jury instructions.” United

States v. Manafort, 313 F. Supp. 3d 311, 316 (D.D.C. 2018). Accordingly, Mr. Joyner’s motion

to dismiss Count 24 or 26 is denied.

C. Motion to Dismiss Counts 1–2 and 7–24 for Failure to State an Offense

and Counts 9–10 and 19–24 for Improper Venue

Finally, the Court considers Mr. Joyner’s second motion to dismiss. See Def.’s 2d Mot.

Dismiss. Mr. Joyner moves to dismiss Counts 1–2 and 7–24 for failure to state an offense

pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B)(v), as well as Counts 9–10 and 19–

24 for improper venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3)(A)(i) and the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution. These counts consist of Hobbs Act robbery and related § 924(c) (firearm) offenses.

The Court addresses Mr. Joyner’s two asserted grounds for dismissal in turn.

1. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State an Offense

Under Rule 12(b)(3), a defendant may move to dismiss an indictment in whole or in part

on the grounds that it fails to state an offense. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v). “The

operative question is whether the allegations [of the indictment], if proven, would be sufficient to

permit a jury to find that the crimes charged were committed.” Sanford, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 107.

On a pre-trial motion to dismiss for failure to state an offense, the district court must “presume

the allegations of the indictment to be true.” Id. (quoting United States v. Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d

51, 60 (D.D.C. 2009)). Furthermore, the court “is limited to reviewing the face of the indictment

and, more specifically, the language used to charge the crimes.” Id. (quoting Sunia, 643 F.

Supp. 2d at 60). “Adherence to the language of the indictment is essential because the Fifth

Amendment requires that criminal prosecutions be limited to the unique allegations of the

20 indictments returned by the grand jury.” Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 60 (quoting United States v.

Hitt, 249 F.3d 1010, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). “A valid indictment must: (1) allege the essential

facts constituting the offense, (2) allege each element of the offense, so that fair notice is

provided, and (3) be sufficiently distinctive that a verdict will bar a second prosecution for the

same offense.” United States v. Martinez, 764 F. Supp. 2d 166, 170 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting

Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 77).

Mr. Joyner moves to dismiss Counts 1, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, and 23 (the “Hobbs

Act robbery counts”) for failure to state an offense for Hobbs Act robbery, along with Counts 2,

8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, and 24 (the “related § 924(c) counts”), which allege that Mr. Joyner

brandished or discharged a firearm during those robberies. The Superseding Indictment alleges

in each Hobbs Act robbery count that Mr. Joyner

did unlawfully obstruct, delay, and affect, and attempt to obstruct, delay, and affect, commerce as that term is defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951, and the movement of articles and commodities in such commerce, by robbery as that term is defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951.

Superseding Indictment at 1–12. For each count, the Superseding Indictment then briefly

describes the locations, properties, and individuals Mr. Joyner is alleged to have robbed. For

example, in Count 7, it alleges that Mr. Joyner

did unlawfully take and obtain, and attempt to take and obtain, property belonging to 7-Eleven . . . from the presence of an employee, and against his will by means of actual and threatened force, violence, and fear of injury, immediate and future, to his person . . . .

Id. at 4. The other Hobbs Act robbery counts “follow the same format and include identical

language, other than the items allegedly taken and the locations of the alleged robberies.” Def.’s

2d Mot. Dismiss at 2.

Mr. Joyner asserts that the Hobbs Act robbery counts are deficient because they fail to

allege mens rea, or criminal intent, which is required under the Hobbs Act. See id. at 1. That is,

21 one of the elements that “the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt” to establish

that a defendant committed a Hobbs Act robbery is that “the defendant knowingly and

deliberately obtained or attempted to obtain property from another.” United States v. Edwards,

324 F. Supp. 2d 10, 12 (D.D.C. 2004) (emphasis added). In Mr. Joyner’s Superseding

Indictment, however, the Hobbs Act robbery counts do not allege that Mr. Joyner acted

“knowingly” or “deliberately.” See generally Superseding Indictment.

Although the Government agrees that mens rea is a required element of Hobbs Act

robbery, see Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Hobbs Act Robbery & Related 924(c) Counts

(“Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s 2d Mot. Dismiss”) at 7, ECF No. 92, it argues that the Hobbs Act

robbery counts sufficiently allege the mens rea element because the counts track the statutory

language of the Hobbs Act—which does not use the words “knowingly” or “deliberately”—and

because there is an implied allegation in the counts that Mr. Joyner acted with a culpable mental

state, see id. at 6–8. The Court finds the Government’s arguments persuasive.

As an initial matter, the Hobbs Act robbery counts closely track the statutory language of

the Hobbs Act. Under the Hobbs Act, criminal liability is imposed on anyone who “in any way

or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in

commerce, by robbery or extortion . . . or commits or threatens physical violence to any person

or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose” to do so. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The term

“robbery” is defined as “the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or

in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence,

or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property.” Id. § 1951(b)(1). Similarly, the

Hobbs Act robbery counts in the Superseding Indictment allege that Mr. Joyner “did unlawfully

obstruct, delay, and affect . . . commerce . . . and the movement of articles and commodities in

22 such commerce, by robbery.” Superseding Indictment at 1–12. The Hobbs Act robbery counts

also incorporate the Act’s definition of robbery, alleging that Mr. Joyner “did unlawfully take

and obtain . . . property . . . from the presence of [individuals] against their will by means of

actual and threatened force, violence, and fear of injury.” See id.

As the Government notes, “[i]t is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the

offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as those words of themselves fully, directly, and

expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute

the offence intended to be punished.” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)

(citation modified); see also Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s 2d Mot. Dismiss at 6–7. Mr. Joyner

responds that “[t]he general rule that indictments in the language of the statute are permissible

does not apply where the statute omits an essential element of the offense.” United States v.

Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 123 n.260 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Def.’s

Mot. Dismiss Def.’s Hobbs Act Robbery & Related 924(c) Counts (“Def.’s Reply in Supp. 2d

Mot. Dismiss”) at 2, ECF No. 94. But the Court finds that the language of the Hobbs Act fully

conveys the requisite mens rea element, and that the Hobbs Act robbery counts of the

Superseding Indictment—which reproduce this statutory language nearly verbatim—therefore do

not omit an essential element of the offense.

Specifically, although the Hobbs Act does not denote the required mens rea for robbery

in explicit terms, its statutory language “include[s] an implicit mens rea element of general

intent—or knowledge—as to the actus reus of the offense.” United States v. García-Ortiz, 904

F.3d 102, 108 (1st Cir. 2018) (citation modified). This is because the Hobbs Act’s use of the

term “robbery,” which definitionally requires that property be taken “against [a person’s] will, by

means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury,” see 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1),

23 “necessarily implies knowing and willful conduct,” see United States v. Tobias, 33 F. App’x 547,

549 (2d Cir. 2002). In other words, if an indictment charges a defendant with committing a

robbery by using “actual and threatened force,” as the Superseding Indictment here does, the

indictment plainly imparts an allegation that the defendant committed the robbery “voluntarily

and intentionally, and not because of a mistake or accident.” United States v. Woodruff, 296

F.3d 1041, 1047 (11th Cir. 2002). “Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a person could

‘unlawfully take and obtain personal property . . . by means of actual and threatened force,

violence, and fear of immediate injury’ by mistake or accident,” given that “[t]he very use of the

tools of violence . . . for the specific purpose of taking the property of another can only be

imagined as being done knowingly.” Id.

Mr. Joyner relies on a Ninth Circuit opinion, United States v. Du Bo, 186 F.3d 1177 (9th

Cir. 1999), to press his contrary claim. See Def.’s 2d Mot. Dismiss at 3–4. In Du Bo, the Ninth

Circuit held that an indictment charging Hobbs Act extortion, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), was “fatally

flawed” because it did not “specify the necessary mens rea” for a Hobbs Act conviction: that the

defendant acted “knowingly or willingly.” 186 F.3d at 1179 (citation omitted). Specifically, the

indictment at issue “charge[d] Du Bo only with ‘unlawfully’ affecting commerce by the

‘wrongful’ use of force,” which the Ninth Circuit explained was insufficient to “connote the

proper mens rea.” Id.

However, despite some superficial similarities, the Court believes that Du Bo is

distinguishable from the case at hand. For one, Du Bo dealt with Hobbs Act extortion, which is a

“separate offense[ ]” from Hobbs Act robbery. 4 United States v. Hatley, 61 F.4th 536, 538 (7th

4 The Court is not aware of any case—and Mr. Joyner does not cite any—extending Du Bo beyond the Hobbs Act extortion context to hold that an indictment for Hobbs Act robbery must explicitly allege a mens rea element.

24 Cir. 2023). Whereas the Hobbs Act defines robbery as the “unlawful taking . . . of personal

property” from a person “against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or

fear of injury,” see 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1), extortion is defined as “the obtaining of property

from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence,

or fear, or under color of official right,” see id. § 1951(b)(2). One notable difference between

these definitions is that, unlike extortion, robbery expressly requires that property be taken

“against [the victim’s] will.” In the Court’s view, this distinction lessens Du Bo’s persuasive

force in the Hobbs Act robbery context. Because Hobbs Act robbery cannot be completed unless

the victim’s property is taken “against his will, by means of actual or threatened force,” the Court

finds that, whatever might be said about Hobbs Act extortion, the statutory language setting forth

Hobbs Act robbery definitionally and unambiguously denotes intentionality. 5 See Tobias, 33 F.

App’x at 549 (“[T]he term ‘robbery’ . . . necessarily implies knowing and willful conduct.”).

Moreover, like other courts that have distinguished Du Bo, this Court “do[es] not read Du

Bo as requiring that a Hobbs Act indictment specifically include the word ‘knowingly.’”

Woodruff, 296 F.3d at 1048 n.3. Indeed, there is no requirement that an indictment allege mens

rea in such explicit terms, “so long as the allegation that the crime was committed with the

requisite state of mind may be inferred from other allegations in the indictment.” Id. at 1046

(quoting United States v. Gray, 260 F.3d 1267, 1283 (11th Cir. 2001)); see also United States v.

McLennan, 672 F.2d 239, 242 (1st Cir. 1982) (“Indictments, however, need not always plead

required scienter elements in precise statutory terms such as ‘willfully’ or ‘knowingly’ so long as

other words or facts contained in the indictment necessarily or fairly import guilty knowledge.”

5 The Court expresses no view on whether the statutory language for Hobbs Act extortion necessarily connotes knowing and willful conduct or whether an indictment charging Hobbs Act extortion is deficient if it does not explicitly allege a mens rea element.

25 (citation modified)). Here, the Court finds that the allegations of the Hobbs Act robbery

counts—which accuse Mr. Joyner of taking property from persons “against [their] will by means

of actual and threatened force, violence, and fear of injury”—are sufficient for that purpose.

In any event, to the extent that Du Bo can be read to support a contrary finding, that Ninth

Circuit opinion is not binding on this Court. See City Stores Co. v. Lerner Shops of D.C., Inc.,

410 F.2d 1010, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Nor does it persuade the Court that Mr. Joyner’s

indictment is deficient. Instead, absent contrary guidance from the D.C. Circuit, the Court

follows the lead of the numerous Circuits that have soundly rejected the precise argument Mr.

Joyner advances. See, e.g., Woodruff, 296 F.3d at 1047 (“By alleging that [the defendant] ‘did

unlawfully take and obtain personal property . . . by means of actual and threatened force,

violence, and fear of immediate injury,’ the indictment not only tracked the language of the

Hobbs Act, but also necessarily alerted the defendant that he was charged with having knowingly

committed the [robbery].”); United States v. Jackson, 513 F. App’x 51, 55 (2d Cir. 2013)

(“Although the indictment [for Hobbs Act robbery] did not specifically contain the words

‘knowingly’ or ‘willfully,’ the plain and common-sense reading of the indictment put the

defendant on notice of what the charges against him were.”); United States v. Oliver, No. 01-

3223, 2002 WL 31474532 (3d Cir. Nov. 5, 2002) (“In order to meet the intent requirement of

robbery, [the defendant’s] indictment referred to 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1) for the definition of

robbery. This reference was sufficient.”).

In sum, the Court concludes that the Hobbs Act robbery counts of the Superseding

Indictment adequately allege the requisite mens rea element. These counts are thus not deficient

for failure to state an offense. Consequently, neither are the related § 924(c) counts.

Accordingly, the Court denies Mr. Joyner’s motion to dismiss Counts 1–2 and 7–24.

26 2. Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(A)(i) and the Sixth Amendment,

Mr. Joyner also moves to dismiss Counts 9–10 and 19–24, which charge him with Hobbs Act

robbery and related § 924(c) offenses, for improper venue. See Def.’s 2d Mot. Dismiss at 5–6, 9;

Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(A)(i). Mr. Joyner argues that venue is not proper in the District of

Columbia for these counts because the underlying robberies alleged therein occurred in

Maryland and Virginia. See Def.’s 2d Mot. Dismiss at 6. Yet generally, “the government must

prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was committed.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 18. This

requirement stems from the Sixth Amendment, which provides that “[i]n all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of

the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.

At trial, the Government must prove that venue is proper by a preponderance of the

evidence. United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 301 (D.C. Cir. 1991). But on a pre-

trial motion to dismiss an indictment for improper venue, the district court “assesses only

whether the allegations of the indictment, if true, would suffice to establish venue.” United

States v. Powers, 40 F.4th 129, 134 (4th Cir. 2022). “When a defendant is charged with multiple

counts, venue must be proper on each count.” United States v. Young-Bey, No. 21-cr-661, 2023

WL 3303819, at *3 (D.D.C. May 8, 2023) (quoting United States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d 302, 308

(4th Cir. 2000)).

The Hobbs Act does not contain a specific venue provision. In United States v.

Rodriguez-Moreno, the Supreme Court explained that when Congress is not explicit as to venue,

courts should determine venue “from the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act

or acts constituting it.” 526 U.S. 275, 279 (1999) (quoting United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1,

27 6–7 (1998)). “In performing this inquiry, a court must initially identify the conduct constituting

the offense (the nature of the crime) and then discern the location of the commission of the

criminal acts.” Id. “A crime is ‘committed,’ for venue purposes, where its ‘essential conduct

elements’ are completed.” United States v. Jin, No. 23-cr-091-2, 2025 WL 2409749, at *13

(D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2025) (quoting Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 280–81). To determine which

elements of an offense are “essential conduct elements,” courts “examine ‘the key verbs in the

statute defining the criminal offense,’” see United States v. Crop Growers Corp., 954 F. Supp.

335, 352 (D.D.C. 1997) (quoting United States v. Georgacarakos, 988 F.2d 1289, 1293 (1st Cir.

1993)), as well as “any other elements that the Government must prove to obtain a conviction,”

see Jin, 2025 WL 2409749, at *13 (citing Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 280).

If venue is proper in the District of Columbia for the Hobbs Act robbery counts, so too is

it for the related § 924(c) counts. See Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 282. Thus, the Court

focuses its venue analysis on the offense of Hobbs Act robbery. The Court begins by identifying

the “essential conduct elements” of substantive Hobbs Act robbery. As noted above, the Hobbs

Act penalizes whoever “in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce . . . by

robbery.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Although the D.C. Circuit has not undertaken the Rodriguez-

Moreno test with respect to Hobbs Act robbery, courts outside of this jurisdiction have observed

that the “key verbs” of § 1951 proscribe not simply “robbery,” but more precisely “obstruct[ing],

delay[ing], or affect[ing] commerce . . . by robbery.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (emphasis added); see

also, e.g., United States v. Davis, 689 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2012). Thus, “[a] conviction for

Hobbs Act robbery requires proving two elements: the underlying robbery and an effect on

interstate commerce.” United States v. Chavis, No. 23-4610, 2025 WL 2170724, at *6 (4th Cir.

July 31, 2025). This means that venue for Hobbs Act robbery is proper wherever the underlying

28 robbery took place—that is, “the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property . . . by means

of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury,” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1)—or

wherever interstate commerce is thereby affected. 6 See Davis, 689 F.3d at 186.

Here, although Counts 9, 19, 21, and 23 describe robberies in Maryland and Virginia, the

Government advances two independent bases for establishing venue in the District of Columbia.

First, it argues that Hobbs Act robbery is a “continuing offense that may be prosecuted in any

district in which a part of the crime was committed.” Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s 2d Mot. Dismiss

at 19. For a “continuing offense,” or one “begun in one district and completed in another, or

committed in more than one district,” Congress has provided that venue is proper “in any district

in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). The

Government contends that venue is proper in the District of Columbia for these counts because

Mr. Joyner committed parts of the robberies charged therein in the District of Columbia. See

Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s 2d Mot. Dismiss at 17–23.

The D.C. Circuit has not addressed whether Hobbs Act robbery is a continuing offense

within the meaning of § 3237(a). 7 Nevertheless, its opinion in United States v. Harrington, 108

6 Mr. Joyner cites United States v. Swann, 441 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1971), for the proposition that impact on commerce alone is insufficient to establish venue. See Def.’s 2d Mot. Dismiss at 8. In Swann, the relevant statute—18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1964)—prohibited “endeavor[ing] to influence, intimidate or impede any witness.” The D.C. Circuit found that venue could not lie in the District of Columbia in a case where, while in Maryland, the defendant shot a woman who was a witness in an ongoing D.C. criminal proceeding, despite the apparent effect of the defendant’s actions in that proceeding. Id. at 1054–55. Swann is distinguishable, however. Unlike § 1503, the Hobbs Act specifically prohibits “affect[ing] commerce” through robbery. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (emphasis added). Thus, venue for Hobbs Act robbery can lie wherever a robbery’s effects on commerce are felt. 7 As the Government notes, courts in other jurisdictions have determined that Hobbs Act robbery is a continuing offense. See Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s 2d Mot. Dismiss at 19–20; see also United States v. Ashley, No. 420-cr-318-ALM-KPJ-1, 2022 WL 4091965, at *2 (E.D. Tex. July 5, 2022) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 4084423 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2022). Nevertheless, these authorities do not establish that Hobbs Act robbery is

29 F.3d 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1997), strongly suggests that a Hobbs Act robbery can continue past the

initial removal, or asportation, of property. In Harrington, the defendant challenged the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for aiding and abetting his partner in the

use of a firearm during a Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2. See

Harrington, 108 F.3d at 1464, 1470. The defendant stressed that he had waited inside a getaway

car while his partner robbed a restaurant, and that he did not know his partner would “actively

employ” a weapon inside the restaurant. Id. at 1470–71. The D.C. Circuit sidestepped this issue,

however, because the evidence established that the defendant had subsequently “tak[en] the

wheel in a high-speed effort to escape the police . . . [even] after he saw [his partner] firing his

gun at pursuing police officers.” Id. at 1471. The D.C. Circuit explained that “the robbery did

not end when [the partner] left the restaurant” but continued during the police chase, by which

time there was no doubt that the defendant had aided and abetted his partner and witnessed his

use of a firearm. Id. In considering whether the robbery was still ongoing, the D.C. Circuit

observed that although the Hobbs Act does not “specify[ ] precisely when an individual robbery

should be considered complete,” robbery at common law was held to continue “as long as the

robber in the immediate aftermath of taking the property indicates by his actions that he is not

satisfied with the location of the stolen property.” Id. Applying that principle, the D.C. Circuit

reasoned that the partner had been “unsatisfied with the location of the stolen money” after

leaving the restaurant, “as manifested by his attempt to reach a getaway car and transport himself

and the stolen money to a safe place.” Id.

“definitionally a continuing offense.” United States v. Gause, No. 23-cr-190, at 11 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2025), ECF No. 217. As another court in this District has observed, “whether any particular Hobbs Act robbery will prove to be a continuous offense will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each offense, including the government’s theory of liability and the evidence that relates to each charge.” Id. at 17.

30 Based on a continuing offense theory, the Government represents that it intends to

present evidence at trial that Mr. Joyner brought stolen property from Maryland and Virginia

back to the District of Columbia; that he lived in the District during all of the challenged

robberies, which would reasonably suggest that the robberies began in the District; and that he

planned, prepared, and took substantial steps in furtherance of the robberies, including by

recruiting an accomplice, while still located in the District. See Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s 2d Mot.

Dismiss at 20–23. As Harrington shows, proof that Mr. Joyner transported stolen property to the

District of Columbia could support the notion that parts of the robberies occurred in the District.

See 108 F.3d at 1471; see also United States v. Ali, 982 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88 (D.D.C. 2013)

(collecting cases and explaining that “the crime of robbery continues beyond a perpetrator’s

initial asportation with the property of another to the point in time when the perpetrator has won

his way to a place of temporary safety” (citation modified)). But the Government has not cited

authorities directly supporting its further contentions that acts taken within the District in the

lead-up to or in preparation of the challenged robberies are also a part of those robberies for

purposes of establishing venue.

For example, the Government cites a Second Circuit case, United States v. Davis, for the

proposition that “[i]n the case of a Hobbs Act robbery,” proper “venue will lie in any district

where a substantial step toward robbery took place.” 689 F.3d at 187; see also Gov’t’s Opp’n to

Def.’s 2d Mot. Dismiss at 19–20. But in Davis, the defendant was “convicted of attempted

rather than completed Hobbs Act robbery.” 689 F.3d at 187. That distinction is significant. See

United States v. Crocker, No. 22-4120, 2023 WL 4247255, at *3 n.1 (10th Cir. June 29, 2023)

(“Hobbs Act robbery and attempted Hobbs Act robbery are different crimes comprising different

elements.”). “Attempt is an inchoate offense, requiring that a defendant have taken a ‘substantial

31 step’ in furtherance of the intended crime to support conviction.” Davis, 689 F.3d at 187

(citation modified). Accordingly, where the crime being charged is attempted Hobbs Act

robbery, venue will lie in any district in which the defendant committed a substantial step in

furtherance of the robbery. Id. But where the crime being charged is completed Hobbs Act

robbery, venue will lie only in a district in which part of the “conduct constituting the offense”

took place—that is, either the underlying robbery or the effect it had on interstate commerce.

See Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 279.

In this case, while Counts 9, 19, 21, and 23 allege that Mr. Joyner “did unlawfully

obstruct, delay, and affect, and attempt to obstruct, delay, and affect, commerce . . . by robbery,”

see Superseding Indictment at 5, 10–12 (emphasis added), the Government’s own narration of

the relevant facts makes clear that it believes that Mr. Joyner completed all of the robberies

charged in those counts, see Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Severance at 9–11, 20–27. Yet Mr.

Joyner “cannot be convicted of both attempt and a substantive [Hobbs Act] offense, let alone be

punished for both.” United States v. Bicaksiz, 194 F.3d 390, 395 n.7 (2d Cir. 1999). In the

interest of avoiding unfair surprise at trial and helping Mr. Joyner prepare an adequate defense,

the Court will order the Government to inform Mr. Joyner, if it has not already, whether it

intends to proceed on an attempt theory as to any of the counts in the Superseding Indictment.

Cf. Gause, No. 23-cr-190, at 17 (“Defendants are entitled to know whether the government is

proceeding on an attempt theory.”). And if the Government intends both to pursue substantive

Hobbs Act charges with respect to Counts 9, 19, 21, and 23, and to rely on preparatory conduct

to establish venue in the District of Columbia for these counts, it will have to justify to the Court

how acts like driving to the site of a planned robbery or recruiting an accomplice for a robbery

are part of the “conduct constituting the offense” of Hobbs Act robbery. At present, the Court

32 doubts that it could do so. As the Second Circuit explained in Davis, under its venue precedents,

“what is begun or continued in a district” to support venue under § 3237(a) “must be a part of the

actual charged crime, not merely steps preparatory to the crime.” 689 F.3d at 186.

Another issue with the Government’s continuing offense argument is that, at this stage, it

may not rely on “evidence beyond the indictment” to defeat a venue-based challenge to the facial

adequacy of the indictment. Powers, 40 F.4th at 134. Yet the Government did not explain in its

brief whether it believes that the allegations of the Superseding Indictment alone are sufficient to

establish venue in the District of Columbia on a continuing offense theory.

The Court nevertheless reviews the pertinent allegations. Counts 9, 19, 21, and 23 of the

Superseding Indictment all charge that “within the District of Columbia and elsewhere,” Mr.

Joyner “did unlawfully obstruct, delay, and affect, and attempt to obstruct, delay, and affect,

commerce . . . by robbery . . . in that [he] did unlawfully take and obtain, and attempt to take and

obtain, property belonging to” stores and individuals located in Maryland and Virginia.

Superseding Indictment at 5, 10–12. To establish venue in the District of Columbia for these

counts pursuant to § 3237(a), the counts must include allegations that at least some part of the

charged conduct transpired in the District of Columbia. See United States v. Parker, No. 25-cr-

96, 2026 WL 523841, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2026).

Mr. Joyner argues that these counts fail to do so because no facts are alleged “supporting

the government’s contention that Mr. Joyner committed any portion of the robberies in D.C.”

Def.’s Reply in Supp. 2d Mot. Dismiss at 5. But that is not exactly the case. Although the

Superseding Indictment charges that Mr. Joyner took property from locations in Maryland and

Virginia, it further alleges that “within the District of Columbia and elsewhere,” Mr. Joyner

affected interstate commerce by robbery. Cf. Young-Bey, 2023 WL 3303819, at *6 (deeming

33 sufficient to establish venue an indictment for money laundering alleging that “the acts at issue

took place ‘in the District of Columbia and elsewhere’”). Admittedly, the Superseding

Indictment does not explain precisely how Mr. Joyner did so, or which parts of the charged

conduct (the robbery, the effect on interstate commerce, or both) occurred “within the District of

Columbia.” But “[t]here is no requirement that the indictment make out the government’s case

or provide any details as to the logistics of the alleged offense.” United States v. McHugh, No.

21-cr-453, 2023 WL 2384444, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2023). Nor is there a requirement, as far as

the Court can tell, that an indictment charging that an offense occurred within a particular district

“and elsewhere” specify which parts of the offense occurred in that district and which parts

occurred elsewhere. On that point, it bears emphasizing that the allegations in the Superseding

Indictment that Mr. Joyner took property from stores and individuals in Maryland and Virginia

do not foreclose the possibility that at least some of the conduct comprising those underlying

robberies occurred in the District of Columbia, too. Cf. Carter v. United States, 223 F.2d 332,

334 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (“[S]o long as the essential ingredient of asportation continues, the crime of

robbery is still in progress.”).

In any event, the Superseding Indictment plainly alleges proper venue in the District of

Columbia under the Government’s second theory: that by robbing stores and individuals in

Maryland and Virginia, Mr. Joyner affected commerce in the District of Columbia. See Gov’t’s

Opp’n to Def.’s 2d Mot. Dismiss at 23–29. As discussed, venue for substantive Hobbs Act

robbery lies not only wherever the underlying robbery took place, but also wherever interstate

commerce is thereby affected. See Davis, 689 F.3d at 186; Bowens, 224 F.3d at 313 (“[I]n a

prosecution under the Hobbs Act, venue is proper in any district where commerce is affected

because the terms of the statute itself forbid affecting commerce in particular ways.”). “This is

34 consistent with Congress’s ability to ‘provide that the locality of a crime shall extend over the

whole area through which force propelled by an offender operates.’” Davis, 689 F.3d at 186–87

(quoting United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275 (1944)). The Superseding Indictment’s

allegations that Mr. Joyner “obstruct[ed], delay[ed], and affect[ed] . . . commerce” within the

District of Columbia “by robbery” thus independently suffice to establish venue in the District,

regardless of where the underlying robberies took place. See Ramirez v. United States, 898 F.

Supp. 2d 659, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that venue for a Hobbs Act robbery charge was

proper in the Southern District of New York because the defendants “affected interstate

commerce” in the district by selling stolen cocaine in the Bronx, “even though the robbery itself

did not take place” in that district).

The Government also explains that it intends to prove the interstate commerce element

with evidence that the stores in Maryland and Virginia that Mr. Joyner robbed served residents

from the District of Columbia, that Mr. Joyner deprived a specific District resident of the ability

to engage in commerce by stealing his wallet, and that Mr. Joyner brought stolen property back

to the District. See Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s 2d Mot. Dismiss at 24–27. Such evidence certainly

could establish the required effect on interstate commerce, which, under the Hobbs Act, need

only be “minimal.” United States v. Lopez, 860 F.3d 201, 214 (4th Cir. 2017); see also United

States v. Rose, 891 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2018) (“If the defendants’ conduct produces any

interference with or effect upon interstate commerce, whether slight, subtle or even potential, it

is sufficient to uphold a prosecution under the Hobbs Act.” (citation modified)). “As the

standard jury instructions for Hobbs Act offenses make clear, either monetizing the spoils of

criminal conduct or depriving local residents of the ability to engage in commerce may suffice to

show the de minimis effect required by the statute.” Gause, No. 23-cr-190, at 17; see also

35 O’Malley, 2A Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. § 53:04 (6th ed. 2026 update) (“The term ‘obstructs,

delays, or affects commerce’ means any action which, in any manner or to any degree, interferes

with, changes, or alters the movement or transportation or flow of goods, merchandise, money,

or other property in commerce.”).

Again, though, while the Government must prove venue at trial by a preponderance of the

evidence, “[a]ll that is required [at this point] is that the Government allege venue without a

facially obvious defect.” Young-Bey, 2023 WL 3303819, at *6. The Government has done so

here. If Mr. Joyner “wishes to argue that venue is improper by challenging the Government’s

factual assertions” and evidence, “he may do so at trial.” Parker, 2026 WL 523841, at *5. But

for the moment, because the Superseding Indictment adequately alleges venue in the District of

Columbia, the Court denies Mr. Joyner’s motion to dismiss Counts 9–10 and 19–24.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to sever Counts 4–6 (ECF No. 51) is

DENIED; Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count 24 or 26 (ECF No. 88) is DENIED; and

Defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts 1–2 and 7–24 and Counts 9–10 and 19–24 (ECF No. 89)

is DENIED. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and

contemporaneously issued.

Dated: June 5, 2026 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge