United States v. Joseph Turner

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedApril 20, 2021
Docket20-3595
StatusUnpublished

This text of United States v. Joseph Turner (United States v. Joseph Turner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Joseph Turner, (6th Cir. 2021).

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 21a0206n.06

No. 20-3595

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Apr 20, 2021 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF JOSEPH DERRICK TURNER, ) OHIO ) Defendant-Appellant. ) ) )

BEFORE: SUHRHEINRICH, GRIFFIN, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Joseph Derrick Turner appeals his sentence for drug and firearm offenses.

As set forth below, we AFFIRM.

Turner pleaded guilty to charges of: maintaining a drug-involved premises from May 1,

2019, to June 11, 2019, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1), (b) (Count 1); being a felon in

possession of a firearm and ammunition on May 1, 2019, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)

and 924(a)(2) (Count 2); distributing a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of

heroin, fentanyl, carfentanil, and para-fluoro furanyl fentanyl on June 10, 2019, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (Count 3); and possessing with intent to distribute 10 grams or more

of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of heroin, fentanyl, carfentanil, and

para-fluoro furanyl fentanyl on June 13, 2019, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(vi)

(Count 4). Grouping those counts together, Turner’s presentence report set forth a base offense

level of 24 for the drug quantity involved and a 2-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous No. 20-3595, United States v. Turner

weapon. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(1), (c)(8) (firearms enhancement and offense level); 3D1.2

(grouping of offense conduct). The presentence report went on to designate Turner as a career

offender and calculated his guidelines range under U.S.S.G § 4B1.1. Turner objected to his

designation as a career offender but did not challenge the 2-level weapon enhancement. At

sentencing, the district court sustained Turner’s objection to the career-offender designation and

calculated his guidelines range as 84 to 105 months based on a total offense level of 23, including

the 2-level weapon enhancement, and a criminal history category of V. The district court

sentenced Turner to concurrent prison terms of 105 months for Counts 1, 3, and 4 and 120 months

for Count 2.1 When the district court asked for objections at the conclusion of the sentencing

hearing, Turner did not challenge the weapon enhancement.

On appeal, Turner argues that the district court erred in applying the 2-level enhancement

for possession of a dangerous weapon and using a sentencing range of 84 to 105 months, as

opposed to 70 to 87 months, to sentence him. Because Turner did not object to the weapon

enhancement at sentencing, we review for plain error. United States v. Rios, 830 F.3d 403, 437

1 At sentencing, the district court ordered that Turner “be imprisoned for a term of 105 months on each of Counts 1, 3 and 4 and 120 months on Count 2, all to be served concurrently,” and “be placed on supervised release of three years on Counts 1[, 2] and 3 but four years on Count 4[,] [a]ll to run concurrently.” The written judgment, however, sentenced Turner to concurrent terms of 105 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release on all four counts. “[I]f there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of a criminal sentence and the written judgment, the oral sentence generally controls.” United States v. Cofield, 233 F.3d 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2000). Turner does not address this discrepancy, asserting that the district court sentenced him to 105 months of imprisonment. The government contends that the sentencing transcript reflects a clerical error or misstatement. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a), “[w]ithin 14 days after sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.” But the district court’s oral pronouncement of Turner’s sentence was not invalid or clearly erroneous. See United States v. Arroyo, 434 F.3d 835, 839 (6th Cir. 2006). In contrast, the district court’s written judgment was erroneous because Count 4 required a four-year term of supervised release. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). Turner nevertheless forfeited this issue by failing to address it in his appellate brief. See United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 845-46 (6th Cir. 2006). -2- No. 20-3595, United States v. Turner

(6th Cir. 2016). Turner must “show (1) error (2) that ‘was obvious or clear,’ (3) that ‘affected [his]

substantial rights’ and (4) that ‘affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial

proceedings.’” United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting

United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 459 (6th Cir. 2006)).

Section 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines provides for a 2-level enhancement to the offense

level for a drug-related conviction “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.”

According to the Guidelines, “[t]he enhancement should be applied if the weapon was present,

unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1

cmt. (n.11(A)). Application of the enhancement requires the government to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that (1) the defendant actually or constructively possessed the

weapon and (2) such possession occurred during the commission of the offense or relevant

conduct. United States v. West, 962 F.3d 183, 187 (6th Cir. 2020). Relevant conduct includes “all

acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or

willfully caused by the defendant . . . that occurred during the commission of the offense of

conviction” and “all acts and omissions . . . that were part of the same course of conduct or common

scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). Once the

government establishes that the defendant possessed the weapon during the commission of the

offense or relevant conduct, “a presumption arises that the weapon was connected with the offense

of conviction.” West, 962 F.3d at 188. “The defendant may overcome this presumption only upon

demonstrating that ‘it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.’” Id.

(quoting U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11(A)).

By failing to object to the relevant facts regarding his offense conduct as set forth in the

presentence report, Turner admitted those facts.

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Related

United States v. Keenan Kester Cofield
233 F.3d 405 (Sixth Circuit, 2000)
United States v. Robert L. Arroyo
434 F.3d 835 (Sixth Circuit, 2006)
United States v. Vonner
516 F.3d 382 (Sixth Circuit, 2008)
United States v. David Casillas
830 F.3d 403 (Sixth Circuit, 2016)
United States v. Norman West
962 F.3d 183 (Sixth Circuit, 2020)

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