United States v. Jose Salas-Borrego

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: March 9, 2026
• Docket: 23-13741
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-13741 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

JOSE SALAS-BORREGO, a.k.a. Jose Salas Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20473-DPG-2 ____________________

Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and WILSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Jose Salas-Borrego appeals his convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine aboard a vessel subject to USCA11 Case: 23-13741 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 03/09/2026 Page: 2 of 6

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United States jurisdiction and substantive possession with intent to distribute cocaine on board a vessel subject to United States juris- diction. He argues that (1) the government lacked authority to prosecute him for a felony committed on the high seas under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”), as his conduct took place in the Dominican Republic’s exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”), and EEZs are excluded from the high seas under contem- porary international law; and (2) the MDLEA is unconstitutional— both facially and as applied to his circumstances—because it grants the United States jurisdiction based on a definition of “vessel with- out nationality” that includes vessels that are not stateless under international law; and (3) his right to due process was violated be- cause the MDLEA lacks a nexus to the United States. The government moves for summary affirmance, arguing that binding authority forecloses Mr. Salas-Borrego’s claims. We agree with the government. I When a motion to dismiss the indictment is based on subject matter jurisdictional grounds, we review the district court’s denial de novo. See United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 820 (11th Cir. 2024). Likewise, we review “de novo a district court’s interpretation of a statute and whether a statute is constitutional.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The MDLEA makes it a crime to “knowingly or intention- ally . . . possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a con- trolled substance” on board “a [covered] vessel subject to the USCA11 Case: 23-13741 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 03/09/2026 Page: 3 of 6

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jurisdiction of the United States,” and to conspire to do the same. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), (e)(1), 70506(b). It defines a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” as including “a ves- sel without nationality.” § 70502(c)(1)(A). A “vessel without na- tionality” is defined to include “a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge fails, on request of an officer of the United States authorized to enforce applicable provisions of United States law, to make a claim of nationality or registry for that vessel.” § 70502(d)(1)(B). The MDLEA “applies even though the act is com- mitted outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” § 70503(b). Under Article I, § 8, Clause 10 of the Constitution, Congress has “three distinct grants of power: (1) the power to define and punish piracies, (the Piracies Clause); (2) the power to define and punish felonies committed on the high Seas, (the Felonies Clause); and (3) the power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations (the Offences Clause).” Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 820 (quotation marks omitted, alteration adopted); U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. In Alfonso, the defendants appealed their convictions under the MDLEA, when the United States Coast Guard seized a vessel in the Dominican Republic’s EEZ, challenging the constitutionality of the MDLEA as applied to them under the Felonies Clause. See 104 F.4th at 818-19. In response to their constitutional challenges, we noted that we “repeatedly have upheld the MDLEA as a valid exercise of Congress’ power to define and punish . . . Felonies on the high Seas.” Id. at 820 (quotation marks omitted, second USCA11 Case: 23-13741 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 03/09/2026 Page: 4 of 6

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alteration in original). We also held that “international law does not limit the Felonies Clause.” Id. at 826. We further held that a nation’s EEZ is “part of the ‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause in Article I of the Constitution,” and thus, “enforcement of the MDLEA in EEZs is proper.” Id. at 823, 827. We affirmed this holding in a case in which two appellants— one seized in a vessel 37 nautical miles north of Panama, the other seized in a vessel 145 nautical miles north of Colombia—chal- lenged the district court’s jurisdiction, arguing, as relevant here, that the MDLEA exceeds Congress’ authority under the Felonies Clause of the Constitution, and that one appellant’s arrest did not occur on the high seas because he was arrested in Colombia’s EEZ. See United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374, 1376–78 (11th Cir. 2025). We relied on Alfonso and similarly concluded that Con- gress was not constrained by international law in crafting the MDLEA. See id. at 1381. Again relying on Alfonso, we rejected an appellant’s argument “that Congress could not reach him merely because he chose to traffic drugs in Colombia’s EEZ rather than farther out into the open ocean.” Id. at 1382. “Under our prior-panel-precedent rule, a prior panel’s hold- ing is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is over- ruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this Court sitting en banc.” Id. at 1381 (quotation marks omitted, alteration adopted). We have “categorically rejected an overlooked reason or argument exception to the prior-panel prec- edent rule.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). USCA11 Case: 23-13741 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 03/09/2026 Page: 5 of 6

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Here, the government is clearly correct as a matter of law that Mr. Salas-Borrego’s arguments as to this issue are foreclosed by our holdings in Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar that EEZs are part of the high seas and enforcement of the MDLEA in EEZs is proper. We grant the government’s motion as to this issue. II In Canario-Vilomar, we also rejected the appellants’ argu- ment “that the MDLEA’s definition of a vessel without national- ity—specifically, the inclusion of vessels for which a claimed nation can neither confirm nor deny registration—is ultra vires.” 128 F.4th at 1381. Relying on Alfonso’s holding that the Felonies Clause is not limited by customary international law, we reasoned that “[i]t follows that international law cannot limit Congress’s author- ity to define ‘stateless vessel’ for purposes of the MDLEA,” such that appellants’ argument was foreclosed, even though Alfonso did not address this precise issue. Id. (citing Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 826). Here, the government is clearly correct as a matter of law that international law does not limit Congress’ authority to define what constitutes a stateless vessel without nationality for the pur- poses of the MDLEA, and that Salas-Borrego’s instant argument is foreclosed by our precedent. We grant the government’s motion as to this issue as well. III In Canario-Vilomar, an appellant asserted that “that the MDLEA violates principles of due process because it allows the United States to assert jurisdiction over foreign nationals for USCA11 Case: 23-13741 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 03/09/2026 Page: 6 of 6

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conduct that bears no nexus with the United States,” although the appellant acknowledged that we had rejected similar arguments. See 128 F.4th at 1382. We agreed with the appellant that the argu- ment was “plainly foreclosed by [its] binding precedent.” Id. at 1382–83. In so holding, we emphasized that we “ha[d] explained repeatedly” that “the conduct proscribed by the MDLEA need not have a nexus to the United States because universal and protective principles support its extraterritorial reach.” Id. at 1383 (quotation marks omitted, alteration adopted). Here, the government is clearly correct as a matter of law that Mr. Salas-Borrego’s argument as to this issue is foreclosed by controlling authority holding that the MDLEA need not have a nexus to the United States in light of universal and protective prin- ciples. We grant the government’s motion as to this issue too. IV Accordingly, we GRANT the government’s motion for summary affirmance. AFFIRMED.