NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 21 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 18-30125
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:17-cr-00188-TOR
v. MEMORANDUM* JOSE MIRANDA-JIMENEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Thomas O. Rice, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 16, 2019** Seattle, Washington
Before: O’SCANNLAIN and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and PAULEY,*** District Judge.
Jose Miranda-Jimenez appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress drug evidence seized following a traffic stop. Miranda-Jimenez pleaded
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable William H. Pauley III, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and heroin in
violation of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(i),
(b)(1)(A)(viii). The district court sentenced him principally to a mandatory
minimum term of 120 months of imprisonment. We affirm.
We review the district court’s underlying findings of fact for clear error.
United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2014). “Review under the
clearly erroneous standard is significantly deferential, requiring for reversal a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
Perkins, 850 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Elliott, 322
F.3d 710, 714 (9th Cir. 2003)). The district court’s credibility determinations are
given “special deference.” United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th
Cir. 2008). The district court found the arresting officer credible and his testimony
“truthful, accurate, [and] complete” during the evidentiary hearing. His body
camera footage and the testimony of his supervising officer corroborated his
account. Miranda-Jimenez offered no witnesses or evidence to the contrary.
Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s factual findings, which were in
accord with the arresting officer’s account.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress de novo. United
States v. Song Ja Cha, 597 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2010). First, we reject Miranda-
Jimenez’s argument that the initial stop was unconstitutional. A traffic stop
2 “constitutes a ‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment, . . . [so] an official must
have individualized ‘reasonable suspicion’ of unlawful conduct to carry out such a
stop.” Tarabochia v. Adkins, 766 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996)). Reasonable suspicion exists if,
under the totality of the circumstances, “specific, articulable facts . . . together with
objective and reasonable inferences” suggest that the detainee is engaged in
criminal activity. United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000)
(quoting United States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 346 (9th Cir. 1996)).
When he initiated the traffic stop, the arresting officer could not see
Miranda-Jimenez’s temporary tag, even with the aid of several high-powered
lights. Therefore, the arresting officer had a reasonable suspicion that Miranda-
Jimenez had violated Wash. Rev. Code § 46.16A.305(2)(b), which requires that a
temporary license plate be displayed “where it is visible from outside of the
vehicle.” And the temporary tag did not come into view until the arresting officer
approached the driver’s side of the vehicle on foot. Based on his experience, the
officer then concluded that the vehicle’s windows were likely improperly tinted in
violation of Wash. Rev. Code § 46.37.430(5)(a). The officer’s mistake as to the
visibility of the temporary tag was reasonable under the circumstances and did not
negate the justification for the stop. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536
(2014). And the officer’s initial exchanges with Miranda-Jimenez—namely,
3 explaining the traffic-related reason for the stop, asking Miranda-Jimenez where he
was traveling, and requesting his license and registration—were permissible,
“ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.” Rodriguez v. United States, 135
S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543
U.S. 405, 408 (2005)).
Second, we find no constitutional violation in the officer’s expansion of the
traffic stop. “A [traffic stop] that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a
warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time
reasonably required to complete that mission.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at
407. However, “an officer may prolong a traffic stop if the prolongation itself is
supported by independent reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d
779, 788 (9th Cir. 2015).
Here, the arresting officer testified that once he spoke to Miranda-Jimenez,
he became suspicious that Miranda-Jimenez was intoxicated. The officer pointed
to specific and articulable facts that underscored his belief—namely, Miranda-
Jimenez’s bloodshot eyes, his disjointed and incoherent responses to the officer’s
basic questions, and his decision to roll down the window only partially, which, in
the officer’s experience, suggested that he was concealing the odor of an
intoxicant. Moreover, Miranda-Jimenez was evasive. First, he claimed he could
not respond because he did not speak English, and then refused to answer the
4 officer’s basic questions when they were posed in Spanish. These observations
amply justified the officer’s expanded investigation into whether Miranda-Jimenez
was driving under the influence. And the officer’s suspicion of independent
criminal activity was reinforced when he observed a “white chalky substance” in
plain view on the passenger seat that he believed to be cocaine. The fact that the
substance was later determined to be powdered donut sugar does not negate the
officer’s reasonable suspicion at the time.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 21 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 18-30125
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:17-cr-00188-TOR
v. MEMORANDUM* JOSE MIRANDA-JIMENEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Thomas O. Rice, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 16, 2019** Seattle, Washington
Before: O’SCANNLAIN and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and PAULEY,*** District Judge.
Jose Miranda-Jimenez appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress drug evidence seized following a traffic stop. Miranda-Jimenez pleaded
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable William H. Pauley III, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and heroin in
violation of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(i),
(b)(1)(A)(viii). The district court sentenced him principally to a mandatory
minimum term of 120 months of imprisonment. We affirm.
We review the district court’s underlying findings of fact for clear error.
United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2014). “Review under the
clearly erroneous standard is significantly deferential, requiring for reversal a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
Perkins, 850 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Elliott, 322
F.3d 710, 714 (9th Cir. 2003)). The district court’s credibility determinations are
given “special deference.” United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th
Cir. 2008). The district court found the arresting officer credible and his testimony
“truthful, accurate, [and] complete” during the evidentiary hearing. His body
camera footage and the testimony of his supervising officer corroborated his
account. Miranda-Jimenez offered no witnesses or evidence to the contrary.
Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s factual findings, which were in
accord with the arresting officer’s account.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress de novo. United
States v. Song Ja Cha, 597 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2010). First, we reject Miranda-
Jimenez’s argument that the initial stop was unconstitutional. A traffic stop
2 “constitutes a ‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment, . . . [so] an official must
have individualized ‘reasonable suspicion’ of unlawful conduct to carry out such a
stop.” Tarabochia v. Adkins, 766 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996)). Reasonable suspicion exists if,
under the totality of the circumstances, “specific, articulable facts . . . together with
objective and reasonable inferences” suggest that the detainee is engaged in
criminal activity. United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000)
(quoting United States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 346 (9th Cir. 1996)).
When he initiated the traffic stop, the arresting officer could not see
Miranda-Jimenez’s temporary tag, even with the aid of several high-powered
lights. Therefore, the arresting officer had a reasonable suspicion that Miranda-
Jimenez had violated Wash. Rev. Code § 46.16A.305(2)(b), which requires that a
temporary license plate be displayed “where it is visible from outside of the
vehicle.” And the temporary tag did not come into view until the arresting officer
approached the driver’s side of the vehicle on foot. Based on his experience, the
officer then concluded that the vehicle’s windows were likely improperly tinted in
violation of Wash. Rev. Code § 46.37.430(5)(a). The officer’s mistake as to the
visibility of the temporary tag was reasonable under the circumstances and did not
negate the justification for the stop. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536
(2014). And the officer’s initial exchanges with Miranda-Jimenez—namely,
3 explaining the traffic-related reason for the stop, asking Miranda-Jimenez where he
was traveling, and requesting his license and registration—were permissible,
“ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.” Rodriguez v. United States, 135
S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543
U.S. 405, 408 (2005)).
Second, we find no constitutional violation in the officer’s expansion of the
traffic stop. “A [traffic stop] that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a
warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time
reasonably required to complete that mission.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at
407. However, “an officer may prolong a traffic stop if the prolongation itself is
supported by independent reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d
779, 788 (9th Cir. 2015).
Here, the arresting officer testified that once he spoke to Miranda-Jimenez,
he became suspicious that Miranda-Jimenez was intoxicated. The officer pointed
to specific and articulable facts that underscored his belief—namely, Miranda-
Jimenez’s bloodshot eyes, his disjointed and incoherent responses to the officer’s
basic questions, and his decision to roll down the window only partially, which, in
the officer’s experience, suggested that he was concealing the odor of an
intoxicant. Moreover, Miranda-Jimenez was evasive. First, he claimed he could
not respond because he did not speak English, and then refused to answer the
4 officer’s basic questions when they were posed in Spanish. These observations
amply justified the officer’s expanded investigation into whether Miranda-Jimenez
was driving under the influence. And the officer’s suspicion of independent
criminal activity was reinforced when he observed a “white chalky substance” in
plain view on the passenger seat that he believed to be cocaine. The fact that the
substance was later determined to be powdered donut sugar does not negate the
officer’s reasonable suspicion at the time. Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1077
(9th Cir. 2011).
Third, we reject Miranda-Jimenez’s contention that his arrest and the search
incident to his arrest were unconstitutional. “Under the Fourth Amendment, a
warrantless arrest requires probable cause . . . [which] exists when officers have
knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of
reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the
[arrestee].” United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981)).
Here, as part of his investigation into Miranda-Jimenez’s possible
intoxication and drug possession, the arresting officer asked Miranda-Jimenez at
least half a dozen times to step out of the vehicle, which was a permissible exercise
of his authority. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997). Miranda-Jimenez
refused to comply with the officer’s repeated requests and “made it impossible for
5 [the officer] to carry out [his] duty.” Lassiter v. City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049,
1053 (9th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the officer had probable cause to arrest
Miranda-Jimenez for obstruction under Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.76.020, which
prohibits the taking of “(1) an action or inaction that hinders, delays, or obstructs
the officers; (2) while the officers are in the midst of their official duties; (3)
[where] the defendant knows the officers are discharging a public duty; [and] (4)
[where] the action or inaction is done knowingly.” Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton,
728 F.3d 1086, 1098 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Lassiter, 556 F.3d at 1053). The
justification for the arrest only increased when Miranda-Jimenez physically
obstructed the officer’s efforts to open the car door.
A police officer may conduct a warrantless search of “the arrestee’s person
and the area within his immediate control” incident to an arrest. Davis v. United
States, 564 U.S. 229, 232 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). This
search is justified “as a means to find weapons the arrestee might use or evidence
the arrestee might conceal or destroy.” United States v. Caseres, 533 F.3d 1064,
1070 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Here, the search of Miranda-Jimenez’s
person incident to his arrest was proper, and the drug evidence found in his pocket
was lawfully obtained. Finally, because we conclude that the arrest was lawful,
Miranda-Jimenez’s argument that the later search of his vehicle should be
suppressed as fruit of an unlawful arrest necessarily fails.
6 Each step—from the traffic stop to the arrest and subsequent searches—
complied with the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
AFFIRMED.