United States v. Jose Cabrera, AKA Jose Cabarra

116 F.3d 1243, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 16479, 1997 WL 367310
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedJuly 7, 1997
Docket96-3972
StatusPublished
Cited by44 cases

This text of 116 F.3d 1243 (United States v. Jose Cabrera, AKA Jose Cabarra) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Jose Cabrera, AKA Jose Cabarra, 116 F.3d 1243, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 16479, 1997 WL 367310 (8th Cir. 1997).

Opinion

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

In March 1996, Jose Cabrera was charged with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) (1994) and 846 (1988). Cabrera entered a plea of not guilty, and the case was tried to the district court 2 after Cabrera waived his right to a jury trial. The court found Cabrera guilty as charged, and he was sentenced to a term of 151 months in prison and five years of supervised release. In this appeal, Cabrera alleges that the government failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. He challenges the credibility of the government’s witnesses and argues that the evidence falls short of proving a conspiracy. We affirm the district court’s verdict.

The standard under which we consider whether a criminal conviction is supported by the evidence is well-settled. “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a guilty verdict, we look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and accept as established all reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. We then uphold the conviction only if it is supported by substantial evidence.” United States v. Black Cloud, 101 F.3d 1258, 1263 (8th Cir.1996); see also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469-70, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942).

To obtain a conviction for conspiracy, “the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an agreement to achieve some illegal purpose, that the defendant knew of the agreement, and that the defendant knowingly became a part of the conspiracy.” United States v. Ivey, 915 F.2d 380, 383-84 (8th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Maejia, 928 F.2d 810, 813 (8th Cir.1991). Merely proving that the defendant knew of the existence of the conspiracy is insufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy; “rather, ‘[the government] must establish some degree of knowing involvement and cooperation.’” United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1323 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Casas, 999 F.2d 1225, 1229 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1078, 114 S.Ct. 894, 127 L.Ed.2d 86 (1994)). Moreover, it is “well established that ‘a mere sales agreement with respect to contraband does not constitute a conspiracy; there must be some understanding ‘beyond’ *1245 that before the evidence can support a conviction for conspiracy.’” United States v. Issaghoolian, 42 F.3d 1175, 1178 (8th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. West, 15 F.3d 119, 121 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 863, 115 S.Ct. 177, 130 L.Ed.2d 112 (1994)).

The government is not required to prove that an express agreement existed. “[Rjather the government need only establish a tacit understanding between the parties, and this may be shown wholly through the circumstantial evidence of [the defendant’s] actions.” Fregoso, 60 F.3d at 1325. “[B]ecause the nature of conspiracy entails secrecy, the agreement and members’ participation in it must often be established by way of inference from the surrounding circumstances.” Ivey, 915 F.2d at 384. “Once a conspiracy is established, even slight evidence connecting a defendant to the conspiracy may be sufficient to prove the defendant’s involvement.” Id.

At Cabrera’s two-day trial, the government presented the testimony of two law enforcement officers and five other witnesses. On appeal, Cabrera emphasizes that each of the five other witnesses was a drug user, four of them had prior felony convictions, two had plea agreements with the government and had been granted reductions in their sentences for cooperating, one witness expected a similar arrangement with the government when he was sentenced, and two witnesses had received non-prosecution agreements in exchange for testifying. 3 These facts are, of course, highly relevant in assessing the credibility of the witnesses. See United States v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436, 443-44 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028, 109 S.Ct. 1764, 104 L.Ed.2d 199 (1989). Both the prosecution and the defense presented this evidence to the district court, which is charged with assessing the credibility of the witnesses. An appellate court is “not in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses. It is for [the fact-finder] to assess the credibility of witnesses and resolve conflicting testimony.” United States v. Cunningham, 83 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir.1996). Accordingly, we may reverse the conviction below only if we review the evidence under the standard described above and conclude “that a reasonable fact-finder must have entertained a reasonable doubt about the government’s proof of one of the offense’s essential elements.” Ivey, 915 F.2d at 383.

The government identified the time frame of the conspiracy as January 1994 through September 1995. The Bassetts, Harris, Vieyra, and Olguin were associated with Cabrera during this time period and testified that he sold them methamphetamine which they used or resold to others. Although Cabrera spoke little English, they managed to communicate with limited English or Spanish, with a translation book or computer, or through Cabrera’s wife. The drug transactions were conducted in a Grand Island, Nebraska trailer court, where Cabrera resided, and later at an Alda, Nebraska trailer court after Cabrera moved there. The Grand Island trailer court served as a base of operations for several drug dealers.

Mark Bassett testified that he purchased methamphetamine from various individuals identified as Nacho, Javier Para-Cardenas, and George at the Grand Island trailer court. Cabrera was present on at least one occasion when Bassett purchased methamphetamine from Nacho. Bassett met Cabrera in the summer of 1994 at the Grand Island trailer court and began purchasing methamphetamine from him on a regular basis, approximately every other day. Cabrera then moved to the Alda trailer court, and Bassett purchased methamphetamine from Cabrera at that location every other or every third day.

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Bluebook (online)
116 F.3d 1243, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 16479, 1997 WL 367310, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-jose-cabrera-aka-jose-cabarra-ca8-1997.