United States v. Jordan Camardese

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 12, 2024
• Docket: 22-30203
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 12 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 22-30203

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 3:20-cr-00525-SI-1

v. MEMORANDUM* JORDAN ANTHONY CAMARDESE,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Michael H. Simon, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 23, 2024 Portland, Oregon

Before: WALLACH,** CHRISTEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Jordan Camardese appeals his convictions for being a felon in possession of

a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); being a felon

in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); possession with the intent to

distribute fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B); and possession with the intent to

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Evan J. Wallach, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation. distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

1. The district court did not err in denying a motion to suppress the drugs

seized from a vehicle in which Camardese was a passenger. Camardese does not

contest that the police had probable cause to stop the vehicle and arrest him for

menacing. Nor does he contest that an initial search of the vehicle during the stop,

which revealed a firearm in the glove compartment, was legal. See United States v.

Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 491 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he existence of probable cause alone

justifies a warrantless search or seizure of a vehicle lawfully parked in a public

place.”); United States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Under the

automobile exception to the warrant requirement, police may conduct a warrantless

search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains

evidence of a crime.”).

Camardese contends however, that once the police found the firearm, they no

longer had probable cause to search the vehicle for other evidence of a crime. We

reject that argument. Discovery of the firearm did not dissipate probable cause to

believe that the vehicle contained evidence of a crime. The police were not required

to assume that the firearm seized was the one Camardese displayed, let alone that

the vehicle would not contain other relevant evidence, such as ammunition or

documents establishing ownership of the seized firearm. The fact that some evidence

2 of a crime was seized did not vitiate the ability of the police under the circumstances

of this case to continue searching for further evidence.

a. Camardese argues that the automobile exception does not apply to the

search of the car, or the Coach bag inside the car, because the police had the vehicle

towed from the scene of the stop with the intent to search it more completely, when

the drugs were uncovered. But the police could legally have searched the vehicle

more fully at the scene, and the authority to conduct a warrantless search under the

automobile exception does “not evanesce simply because the officers decided to

impound the car and search it later.” United States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 649

(9th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Noster, 590 F.3d 624, 634 (9th Cir. 2009)

(“[T]here is no requirement that the warrantless search of a vehicle occur

contemporaneously with its lawful seizure.”) (quoting United States v. Johns, 469

U.S. 478, 484 (1985)).

b. Camardese also argues that even if the seizure of the car was legal under

the automobile exception, the four-day delay between the seizure and search

rendered the seizure unreasonable. We disagree. The vehicle was seized on a

Thursday. On the following Monday, officers obtained and executed a search

warrant of the vehicle. This delay “was not unreasonable under the circumstances.”

United States v. Hernandez, 313 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2002); see also United

States v. Sullivan, 797 F.3d 623, 632–35 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding a 21-day delay

3 in obtaining a warrant to search a laptop seized in a parole search was reasonable);

United States v. Albers, 136 F.3d 670, 674 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding a 7- to 10-

day delay in viewing seized videotapes was reasonable).

2. The district court did not deny Camardese the right to present a complete

defense nor abuse its discretion under the Federal Rules of Evidence by excluding

from evidence body camera footage of Camardese’s arrest. Camardese proffered the

entire body camera footage to support his claim that police planted the drugs in the

Coach bag in which they were found. But the court allowed introduction of the

portions of the footage depicting the bag, which showed that the bag was moved at

some point from the front seat of the vehicle to its roof. None of the excluded footage

showed the officers handling the bag, and the district court did not preclude

Camardese from questioning the officers generally about the confrontational nature

of the arrest, asking them about the locations of the bag, or arguing the officers

planted evidence in retaliation for his conduct. Cf. United States v. Stever, 603 F.3d

747, 755–57 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding the exclusion of evidence denied “a meaningful

opportunity to present a complete defense” because Stever was entirely precluded

from offering his desired defense) (cleaned up). And, the court was reasonably

concerned that allowing more evidence about the nature of the arrest, even assuming

its relevance, carried with it a danger of unfair prejudice to both parties and

confusion of the issues. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.

4 3. The district court did not plainly err in its jury instruction about the dual

role of a testifying police officer. The instruction appropriately distinguished

between percipient and expert testimony, and the prosecution expressly bifurcated

the witness’s testimony “into percipient and expert phases.” United States v.

Holguin, 51 F.4th 841, 862 (9th Cir. 2022).

4. Nor did the district court err in allowing the government to elicit testimony

about Camardese’s prior possession and sale of narcotics. This “other act” evidence

was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to rebut Camardese’s claim

that the drugs in the Coach bag did not belong to him. See United States v.

Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 832 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[E]vidence of a defendant’s prior

possession or sale of narcotics is relevant under Rule 404(b) to issues of intent,

knowledge, motive, opportunity, and absence of mistake or accident in prosecutions

for possession of, importation of, and intent to distribute narcotics.”). The limiting

instruction about the use of this evidence accurately stated the law and was not

materially different from Camardese’s proposed instruction. See United States v.

Soulard, 730 F.2d 1292, 1303 (9th Cir. 1984).

5. The district court did not plainly err in failing to sua sponte give a

cooperating witness instruction. See United States v. Moore, 700 F.2d 535, 536 (9th

Cir. 1983) (“[W]here an accomplice instruction is not requested, it is not plain error

not to give one sua sponte.”) (cleaned up).

5 AFFIRMED.