United States v. Jones

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: April 21, 2026
• Docket: 24-2225
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24-2225 United States v. Jones

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 21st day of April, two thousand twenty-six.

PRESENT:

ROBERT D. SACK, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, EUNICE C. LEE, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v. No. 24-2225

GENARO CASTRO,

Defendant, WILLIAM JONES,

Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________________

For Defendant-Appellant: BRENDAN WHITE, New York, NY.

For Appellee: EMILY A. JOHNSON (Justin V. Rodriguez, Christy Slavik, James Ligtenberg, on the brief), for Jay Clayton, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Edgardo Ramos, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the August 14, 2024 judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.

William Jones appeals his conviction following a jury trial at which he was

found guilty of (i) racketeering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d);

(ii) murder in aid of racketeering in violation of § 1959(a)(1); and (iii) murder

through use of a firearm in violation of § 924(j). On appeal, Jones contends that

(i) the government did not present the jury with sufficient evidence to convict him

on the racketeering and murder counts, and (ii) the district court improperly

excluded impeachment evidence that would have undermined the credibility of

2 the government’s cooperating witness. We assume the parties’ familiarity with

the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer

only as necessary to explain our decision.

I. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Jury Verdict.

We review de novo a defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

United States v. Gershman, 31 F.4th 80, 95 (2d Cir. 2022). A defendant “faces an

uphill battle . . . and bears a heavy burden . . . because a reviewing court must

sustain the jury’s verdict if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Kelly, 128 F.4th 387, 408

(2d Cir. 2025) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v.

Cuti, 720 F.3d 453, 461–62 (2d Cir. 2013) (“To avoid usurping the role of the jury,”

we “must also credit every inference that the jury might have drawn in favor of

the government . . . , because the task of choosing among competing, permissible

inferences is for the jury, not for the reviewing court.” (alterations adopted and

citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Jones makes two sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments on appeal. He first

contends that the government presented the jury with insufficient evidence to

establish the existence of a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 3 (“RICO”) enterprise. He likewise argues that there was insufficient evidence from

which the jury could conclude that he shot Frederick Delacruz. We address each

in turn.

A. Evidence That Jones Was a Member of a RICO Enterprise

To sustain a conviction for either racketeering conspiracy or murder in aid

of racketeering, the government must present the jury with sufficient evidence to

find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that, inter alia, the defendant was (or in the case

of the conspiracy count, agreed to become) a member of a RICO enterprise. See

United States v. Capers, 20 F.4th 105, 117–18 (2d Cir. 2021) (for racketeering

conspiracy); United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 105 (2d Cir. 2011) (for murder in

aid of racketeering). An “enterprise” includes any association in fact of

individuals united by “(1) a purpose; (2) relationships among those associated

with the enterprise; and (3) longevity sufficient to permit the associates to pursue

the enterprise’s purpose.” Kelly, 128 F.4th at 408 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Here, the government overwhelmingly demonstrated that the Trinitarios

gang qualified as a RICO enterprise, and that Jones was a member. First, the

Trinitarios clearly possessed the “common purpose” of engaging in drug and gun

trafficking. See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 941, 951 (2009) (finding 4 “common purpose” where defendant participated in group that committed series

of crimes). Second, the gang was also strictly hierarchical, with chapter-level

leaders who enforced discipline within their chapters and represented their

chapters at “universal meetings” of the larger organization. App’x at 103. Third,

the Trinitarios also had sufficient longevity to pursue the gang’s purposes, with

the evidence showing that the organization carried out crimes in New York from

as early as 2016 through as late as the 2019 murder of Delacruz. See Boyle, 556 U.S.

at 941, 946 (finding longevity met where “core group was responsible for” a string

of crimes over three years because “the enterprise had affairs of sufficient duration

to permit an associate to participate in [its] affairs through a pattern of racketeering

activity” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Finally, Jones was not only a

member, but a leader of the gang, representing his local chapter at a meeting at

which he voted to “shoot,” “stab,” “kill,” and “do whatever needed to be done” in

response to conflicts with rivals. App’x at 107. This evidence clearly sufficed for

the jury to find that Jones was a member of a RICO enterprise.

B. Evidence That Jones Shot Delacruz

Committing or aiding and abetting murder is, of course, an element of both

murder in aid of racketeering and murder through the use of a firearm. See Persico,

645 F.3d at 105 (for murder in aid of racketeering); United States v. Wallace, 447 F.3d 5 184, 187 (2d Cir. 2006) (for murder through use of a firearm). On appeal, Jones

argues that the government failed to prove murder beyond a reasonable doubt

because “[t]here was copious evidence that [Albert] Castillo” – a Trinitarios

member and government witness – also “had motive and opportunity to kill

Delacruz.” Def. Br. at 32.

But the government offered ample evidence from which the jury could

conclude that Jones committed or aided and abetted the murder of Delacruz.

Indeed, eyewitnesses testified that they were present when Jones shot Delacruz,

and others heard Jones brag about the murder afterward. Such testimony alone

satisfied this element. That some evidence might have showed that Castillo also

had motive and opportunity to kill Delacruz is of no moment since we must “credit

every inference that the jury might have drawn in favor of the government,”

including that Castillo was telling the truth when he testified that Jones killed

Delacruz. Cuti, 720 F.3d at 62 (alteration adopted and internal quotation marks

II. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding Extrinsic Evidence Concerning Castillo’s Cooperation.

Jones next argues that the district court improperly prevented him from

introducing extrinsic evidence to impeach Castillo. Again, we disagree.

6 We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, which we will find

only where the ruling was “arbitrary and irrational.” United States v. White, 692

F.3d 235, 244 (2d Cir. 2012), as amended (Sept. 28, 2012) (internal quotation marks

omitted). In assessing “the relevancy and unfair prejudice of proffered evidence,”

we give the district court “great deference” because “it sees the witnesses, the

parties, the jurors, and the attorneys, and is thus in a superior position to evaluate

the likely impact of the evidence.” Kelly, 128 F.4th at 424 (internal quotation marks

omitted). And we will affirm even a “manifestly erroneous” evidentiary ruling “if

the error was harmless,” id., which happens when we “can conclude with fair

assurance that the evidence did not substantially influence the jury,” United

States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690 703 (2d Cir. 2012), as amended (Nov. 15, 2012).

A proponent may offer “extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent

statement . . . after the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the

statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 613(b). The proponent, however, may impeach the

witness with “extrinsic proof of a prior inconsistent statement only as to . . . those

matters which are relevant to the issues in the case.” United States v. Blackwood,

456 F.2d 526, 531 (2d Cir. 1972). And even if the extrinsic inconsistent statement is

relevant, a district court may nevertheless exclude it “if its probative value is

7 substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,

misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting

cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. As to those determinations, we generally

defer to the district court’s weighing of probative value and prejudice. See United

States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 220, 245 (2d Cir. 2012) (maximizing evidence’s probative

value and minimizing its prejudicial effect in reviewing decision to admit).

At trial, the government called Castillo to testify about the organization of

the Trinitarios and Jones’s role in the murder of Delacruz. During

cross-examination, Jones’s counsel asked Castillo whether he had told the

government, before trial preparation, that he had been involved in planning to kill

Delacruz. Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 83 at 416. Castillo answered that he had been truthful

with the government “[f]rom the moment that [he] started speaking with the[m].”

Id. Jones’s counsel then asked Castillo to explain or deny whether he had told the

government, before trial preparation, about his role in planning the murder, and

Castillo answered that he could not have known that Jones would actually kill

Delacruz because he had never seen anyone in the Trinitarios kill anyone until

Jones killed Delacruz. Id. at 417.

8 After Castillo’s cross-examination, Jones attempted to call a detective to

testify that, during his first proffer with the government, Castillo did not mention

a conversation he had with Jones in Yonkers during which they discussed

locations where Jones might kill Delacruz. Jones argued that this omission was

inconsistent with Castillo’s earlier testimony about being truthful “from the

moment” he started proffering, and thus undermined his credibility. The district

court precluded the detective’s testimony, concluding that Castillo’s omission was

not inconsistent with his prior testimony and that, in any event, the introduction

of extrinsic evidence concerning possible omissions during the initial proffer was

likely to confuse the jury and waste time.

We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in precluding the

detective’s testimony. For starters, the district court’s finding that there was no

inconsistency between Castillo’s direct testimony and his omission was neither

“arbitrary” nor “irrational,” White, 692 F.3d at 244 (internal quotation marks

omitted), since the failure to mention every detail in an initial proffer is not the

same as making false or misleading statements. But even if it could be argued that

Castillo’s omission of the Yonkers conversation from his first proffer had a bearing

on Castillo’s credibility, the district court’s desire to avoid a mini-trial on that issue

9 was by no means irrational. Given the “great deference” that we owe to the trial

judge’s “superior position” in assessing the probative value and prejudice

associated with such testimony, we find no error in the district court’s decision to

exclude the detective’s testimony. Kelly, 128 F.4th at 424. And even if the district

court had erred manifestly, the error would still have been harmless because the

government presented overwhelming evidence that Jones killed Delacruz. See

United States v. Okatan, 728 F.3d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The strength of the

prosecution’s case is probably the single most critical factor in determining

whether error was harmless.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

* * *

We have considered Jones’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s conviction.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court