United States v. Johnson

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit·Decided July 9, 2026·No. 25-3266·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUL 9 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-3266 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:24-cr-08016-SMB-1 District of Arizona, v. Prescott MORONI JOHNSON, ORDER

Defendant - Appellant.

Before: GOULD, NGUYEN, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges. The memorandum disposition filed on June 11, 2026, is hereby amended. The

superseding amended memorandum disposition will be filed concurrently with this

order.

The panel has unanimously voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc.

The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing en banc (Dkt. No. 37),

and no judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R.

App. P. 40.

The petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED. No further petitions for panel

rehearing or petitions for rehearing en banc will be entertained. NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 9 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-3266 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:24-cr-08016-SMB-1 v. AMENDED MEMORANDUM*

MORONI JOHNSON,

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Susan M. Brnovich, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 10, 2026** San Francisco, California

Before: GOULD, NGUYEN, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Defendant-Appellant Moroni Johnson (“Johnson”) was a founding member

of a child sex abuse ring that victimized ten minor girls, including Johnson’s own

daughters. After pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit transportation

of a minor for criminal sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), (e),

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Johnson was sentenced to twenty-five years in federal prison followed by a lifetime

term of supervised release. Johnson appeals the district court’s sentence, arguing

(1) that the district court erred by imposing a supervised release condition that

requires him to obtain permission before “directly or indirectly contact[ing] any

victim(s) and victim(s) family,” and (2) that his sentencing counsel provided

ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to that condition. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

1. Johnson’s challenge to Special Condition 8 is not yet ripe. A claim is

unripe if it involves “contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or

indeed may not occur at all.” Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S.

568, 580–81 (1985) (citing 13A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice

and Procedure § 3532 (1984)). To determine if a dispute is ripe, we are required to

“evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the

parties of withholding court consideration.” Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S.

136, 149 (1967), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99

(1977).

When imposing a condition of supervised release that intrudes upon intimate

relationships, a court “must consider the history and characteristics of the defendant

and the history of his relationship with the affected intimate family members as well

as the need for deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation.” United States

2 25-3266 v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1094 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Because the nature of intimate relationships can

change dramatically with time, a court must evaluate the “present circumstances and

relationship” when the involved parties have the potential to interact. United States

v. Napulou, 593 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2010).

Here, Johnson’s intimate relationships before his conviction, or even his

relationships as they exist now, will not necessarily resemble his intimate

relationships as they may exist at the end of his decades-long prison sentence. “We

thus affirm the sentence the district court imposed, but without prejudice as to the

challenged condition of supervised release such that [Johnson] may raise the

argument again by asking the district court to modify the condition when the issue

is no longer speculative.” United States v. Vinge, 85 F.4th 1285, 1291 (9th Cir.

2023).1

2. “Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are generally inappropriate on

direct appeal.” United States v. McKenna, 327 F.3d 830, 845 (9th Cir. 2003). “Such

claims normally should be raised in habeas corpus proceedings, which permit

1 Because we affirm without prejudice, the district court in reviewing any future modification request may construe that request as part of Johnson’s direct appeal because that claim was not yet ripe when asserted on direct appeal. See United States v. Gross, 307 F.3d 1043, 1044 (9th Cir. 2002) (identifying (1) direct appeal, (2) § 2255 habeas corpus, and (3) Rule 35(c) motions as three ways for defendants to challenge the legality of supervised release conditions).

3 25-3266 counsel to develop a record as to what counsel did, why it was done, and what, if

any, prejudice resulted.” Id. (quoting United States v. Ross, 206 F.3d 896, 900 (9th

Cir. 2000)). Nevertheless, review on direct appeal may be appropriate “when the

record on appeal is sufficiently developed to permit review and determination of the

issue” or “when the legal representation is so inadequate that it obviously denies a

defendant his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Id. (quoting Ross, 206 F.3d at

900).

Here, direct review of Johnson’s counsel’s performance is unwarranted. The

record is entirely silent regarding the reasons counsel did not challenge Special

Condition 8 during sentencing. In light of Johnson’s guilty plea, his acceptance of

responsibility, and the family-related nature of his offenses, counsel’s decision not

to seek unmonitored familial contact could certainly have been a reasonable strategic

choice. Nothing in the record rebuts the “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct

fell within the wide range of reasonable representation,” United States v. Ferreira-

Alameda, 815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1986), much less suggests that Johnson was

“obviously denie[d] . . . his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” McKenna, 327 F.3d

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