24-2372-cr United States v. Johnson
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 2nd day of June, two thousand twenty-five.
Present:
EUNICE C. LEE, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. No. 24-2372-cr
JAMES JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________________
For Appellee: Rajit S. Dosanjh, Assistant United States Attorney, for Daniel Hanlon, Acting United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Syracuse, NY.
For Defendant-Appellant: Molly K. Corbett, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albany, NY.
Appeal from a September 5, 2024 judgment of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York (D’Agostino, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Defendant-Appellant James Johnson appeals from a judgment revoking his supervised
release and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 9 months of imprisonment, along with a new
two-year term of supervised release, after he was found guilty of ten violations of supervised
release. On appeal, Johnson argues that the sentence he received upon revocation of his
supervised release was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
On September 21, 2023, Johnson began serving a three-year term of supervised release
following a 30-month sentence of imprisonment for a conviction of unlawful possession of a
firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Nearly 6 months into Johnson’s
supervised release, the district court imposed a 60-day period of home detention as a modification
to supervision following, inter alia, Johnson’s two positive drug tests and admission of drug use.
Less than a month later, the district court modified Johnson’s supervision again and ordered
Johnson to be placed in a Residential Reentry Center (“RRC”) for 3 months due, in part, to his
failure to report to mental health and substance abuse treatment programs and his leaving his home
during home detention without approval. Thereafter, Johnson’s violative conduct continued, and
the Probation Office subsequently petitioned the district court to revoke his supervised release,
alleging eleven Grade C violations of supervised release, including Johnson’s noncompliance at
the RRC, refusal to report for random drug testing, and failure to submit monthly reports to
2 Probation. Probation’s revocation petition noted that because Johnson’s criminal history
category was III and all violations were Grade C, the applicable Sentencing Guidelines policy
statement suggested a term of imprisonment in the range of 5-11 months, and the district court
could impose an additional term of supervised release up to a three-year term, less any term of
imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) and U.S.S.G. §
7B1.3(g)(2).
Prior to the revocation hearing, defense counsel’s written submission notified the district
court that Johnson would admit to ten of the eleven violations and requested that the court impose
a 4-month term of imprisonment to be followed by an 18-month term of supervised release.
Defense counsel contended that this proposal accounted for the mitigating circumstances in
Johnson’s case, such as his lack of familial guidance and support, as well as learning difficulties
that were likely contributors to Johnson’s criminal history. Defense counsel further explained
that because Johnson’s noncompliance with his conditions of supervised release was not a return
to criminal activity per se, Johnson had demonstrated his evolution and was now committed to
following the rules of supervision. Defense counsel also noted that the current Sentencing
Guidelines recommend giving weight to a defendant’s youth at the time of the offense.
At the revocation hearing, defense counsel additionally argued for leniency based on
another recent amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, under which Johnson would have been
eligible for a lower criminal history score if he had been sentenced for the underlying offense after
the amendment was enacted. The government joined defense counsel’s recommendation of a 4-
month prison term but requested a two-year term of supervised release due to Johnson’s multiple
violations. Johnson addressed the court by apologizing to his probation officer for his conduct.
3 The district court found Johnson in violation and, while recounting Johnson’s history on supervised
release, noted that his noncompliance occurred within the first ten months of his release and stated
that his conditions of supervised release had been modified three times. Ultimately, the district
court sentenced Johnson to 9 months of imprisonment to be followed by a two-year term of
supervised release with special conditions, finding the sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to meet the goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Johnson raised no objections at sentencing.
This appeal followed.
* * *
When a defendant fails to raise objections to a district court’s sentence, including its
consideration of sentencing factors or the factual accuracy of its explanation, we review for plain
error. See United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Davis v.
United States, 589 U.S. 345, 347 (2020) (per curiam) (explaining that factual errors and other
categories of errors are not immunized from plain-error review). “To establish plain error, a
defendant must show (1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to
reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United
States v. Zhang, 135 F.4th 44, 51 (2d Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations
adopted).
Johnson argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court
(1) failed to account for the mitigating factor of his youth and the fact that, in light of recent
amendments to the Guidelines, he would have a reduced criminal history category if he were
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24-2372-cr United States v. Johnson
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 2nd day of June, two thousand twenty-five.
Present:
EUNICE C. LEE, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. No. 24-2372-cr
JAMES JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________________
For Appellee: Rajit S. Dosanjh, Assistant United States Attorney, for Daniel Hanlon, Acting United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Syracuse, NY.
For Defendant-Appellant: Molly K. Corbett, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albany, NY.
Appeal from a September 5, 2024 judgment of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York (D’Agostino, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Defendant-Appellant James Johnson appeals from a judgment revoking his supervised
release and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 9 months of imprisonment, along with a new
two-year term of supervised release, after he was found guilty of ten violations of supervised
release. On appeal, Johnson argues that the sentence he received upon revocation of his
supervised release was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
On September 21, 2023, Johnson began serving a three-year term of supervised release
following a 30-month sentence of imprisonment for a conviction of unlawful possession of a
firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Nearly 6 months into Johnson’s
supervised release, the district court imposed a 60-day period of home detention as a modification
to supervision following, inter alia, Johnson’s two positive drug tests and admission of drug use.
Less than a month later, the district court modified Johnson’s supervision again and ordered
Johnson to be placed in a Residential Reentry Center (“RRC”) for 3 months due, in part, to his
failure to report to mental health and substance abuse treatment programs and his leaving his home
during home detention without approval. Thereafter, Johnson’s violative conduct continued, and
the Probation Office subsequently petitioned the district court to revoke his supervised release,
alleging eleven Grade C violations of supervised release, including Johnson’s noncompliance at
the RRC, refusal to report for random drug testing, and failure to submit monthly reports to
2 Probation. Probation’s revocation petition noted that because Johnson’s criminal history
category was III and all violations were Grade C, the applicable Sentencing Guidelines policy
statement suggested a term of imprisonment in the range of 5-11 months, and the district court
could impose an additional term of supervised release up to a three-year term, less any term of
imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) and U.S.S.G. §
7B1.3(g)(2).
Prior to the revocation hearing, defense counsel’s written submission notified the district
court that Johnson would admit to ten of the eleven violations and requested that the court impose
a 4-month term of imprisonment to be followed by an 18-month term of supervised release.
Defense counsel contended that this proposal accounted for the mitigating circumstances in
Johnson’s case, such as his lack of familial guidance and support, as well as learning difficulties
that were likely contributors to Johnson’s criminal history. Defense counsel further explained
that because Johnson’s noncompliance with his conditions of supervised release was not a return
to criminal activity per se, Johnson had demonstrated his evolution and was now committed to
following the rules of supervision. Defense counsel also noted that the current Sentencing
Guidelines recommend giving weight to a defendant’s youth at the time of the offense.
At the revocation hearing, defense counsel additionally argued for leniency based on
another recent amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, under which Johnson would have been
eligible for a lower criminal history score if he had been sentenced for the underlying offense after
the amendment was enacted. The government joined defense counsel’s recommendation of a 4-
month prison term but requested a two-year term of supervised release due to Johnson’s multiple
violations. Johnson addressed the court by apologizing to his probation officer for his conduct.
3 The district court found Johnson in violation and, while recounting Johnson’s history on supervised
release, noted that his noncompliance occurred within the first ten months of his release and stated
that his conditions of supervised release had been modified three times. Ultimately, the district
court sentenced Johnson to 9 months of imprisonment to be followed by a two-year term of
supervised release with special conditions, finding the sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to meet the goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Johnson raised no objections at sentencing.
This appeal followed.
* * *
When a defendant fails to raise objections to a district court’s sentence, including its
consideration of sentencing factors or the factual accuracy of its explanation, we review for plain
error. See United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Davis v.
United States, 589 U.S. 345, 347 (2020) (per curiam) (explaining that factual errors and other
categories of errors are not immunized from plain-error review). “To establish plain error, a
defendant must show (1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to
reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United
States v. Zhang, 135 F.4th 44, 51 (2d Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations
adopted).
Johnson argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court
(1) failed to account for the mitigating factor of his youth and the fact that, in light of recent
amendments to the Guidelines, he would have a reduced criminal history category if he were
4 sentenced now; and (2) relied on a factual error about the number of modifications to his supervised
release and the escalation of his conduct. However, we conclude that the district court did not
commit procedural error.
“[T]his Court presumes that the sentencing judge has considered all relevant § 3553(a)
factors and arguments unless the record suggests otherwise.” United States v. Rosa, 957 F.3d
113, 118 (2d Cir. 2020). “[T]he weight to be afforded any § 3553(a) factor ‘is a matter firmly
committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge and is beyond our review, as long as the
sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable.’” Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d at 131 (quoting United
States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 32 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007)).
The district court was well within its discretion in imposing Johnson’s sentence. Despite
Johnson’s argument that the district court erred by not considering his youth as a mitigating factor
and the effect of the current Sentencing Guidelines, the district court is not obliged to “expressly
parse or address every argument relating to th[e] [§ 3553(a)] factors that the defendant advanced.”
Fernandez, 443 F.3d at 30. The district court met its procedural obligations to justify the imposed
sentence by discussing its rationale at length, including Johnson’s repeated failure to comply with
the conditions of supervision and his required substance abuse and mental health treatment.
Furthermore, to the extent that the district court misspoke by claiming that Johnson’s release
conditions had been modified three times instead of two, Johnson fails to establish, under plain-
error review, that this error affected his substantial rights, particularly given that the district court
gave an accurate recitation of Johnson’s history of supervised release, including the circumstances
resulting in the two undisputed modifications. See United States v. Moore, 975 F.3d 84, 93 (2d
5 Cir. 2020) (explaining that district court’s minor factual misstatement during sentencing did not
satisfy plain-error review). Lastly, there is no basis to find that the district court’s characterization
of Johnson’s conduct as escalating was procedural error—let alone plain error—in light of the
multiple modifications of his release conditions and continued violations.
Johnson also argues that the imposition of the two-year term of supervised release was
substantively unreasonable because it is longer than necessary for him to demonstrate his
commitment to substance abuse and mental health treatment, and the district court’s perception of
his dangerousness is unfounded. We “set aside a district court’s substantive determination only
in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision cannot be located within the range of
permissible decisions.” United States v. Ingram, 721 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008)). Because
Johnson’s underlying offense authorized a maximum three-year term of supervised release and his
term of imprisonment was 9 months, the two-year supervised release term was statutorily
permitted. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h); 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(a)(2), 3583(b)(2). Given that Johnson’s
sentence is not “shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law,”
it is substantively reasonable. United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009).
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court