USCA4 Appeal: 24-4670 Doc: 38 Filed: 06/08/2026 Pg: 1 of 16
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4670
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHNATHAN C. MCCASLAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Donald C. Coggins, Jr., District Judge. (8:23-cr-00749-DCC-1)
Submitted: December 5, 2025 Decided: June 8, 2026
Before BENJAMIN and BERNER, Circuit Judges, and John A. GIBNEY, Jr., Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Christopher W. Adams, ADAMS & BISCHOFF, LLC, Charleston, South Carolina; Matthew K. Winchester, LAW OFFICES OF MATTHEW K. WINCHESTER, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellant. Brook B. Andrews, Acting United States Attorney, William J. Watkins, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4670 Doc: 38 Filed: 06/08/2026 Pg: 2 of 16
PER CURIAM:
In the quiet town of Calhoun Falls, South Carolina, a failing marriage between
Defendant Jonathan McCaslan and his wife Kimberly soon became the center of a strange
and troubling series of events. Allegedly seeking an upper hand in the divorce proceedings,
McCaslan began directing police attention toward Kimberly. McCaslan started with
repeated calls to local police, reporting incidents involving Kimberly. Over time, however,
the situation escalated beyond ordinary complaints. According to the Government, the
chain of events ultimately culminated in McCaslan mailing threatening letters containing
a white powdery substance that were written and addressed to suggest that Kimberly was
the sender. The white powdery substance was later revealed to be benign.
Based on these letters and DNA evidence derived from them, the Government
charged McCaslan in a four-count indictment for cyberstalking, mailing of a threatening
communication, and making a false chemical threat. A jury convicted McCaslan on all
counts.
On appeal, McCaslan argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
conviction for the false chemical threat counts because the letters contained only a powdery
substance and did not explicitly reference any chemical agent or weapons. He also argues
that the district court erred in overruling his chain-of-custody and authentication objections
regarding a letter, envelope, and stamp used to collect the DNA samples. Neither argument
warrants reversal.
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I. Background
A. Events in Calhoun Falls
Defendant Jonathan McCaslan and Kimberly were separated and going through a
divorce during the events giving rise to the indictment. J.A. 229. 1 The Government alleges
that McCaslan engaged in a series of actions intended to gain an advantage in the divorce
proceedings, ultimately culminating in the mailing of anonymous, threatening letters
designed to implicate Kimberly. Id.
1. Events Leading Up to the Letters
One fall evening, Kimberly drove to the Savannah Grill to get dinner. J.A. 257.
The Savannah Grill was one of only two places to eat in town, the other being a 7-Eleven.
Id. As one witness described it, this was “small town South Cackalacky.” Id.
When Kimberly arrived, Officer Jordan Smith was already in the parking lot. Smith,
the narcotics investigator and one of only three full-time officers at the Calhoun Falls
Police Department, knew McCaslan from his time as a volunteer firefighter but knew
Kimberly only by name. J.A. 256–57. Smith was there because McCaslan had tipped him
off, telling him both when Kimberly would be at the restaurant and that she would be
driving on a suspended license. J.A. 264–65.
Smith watched Kimberly enter the restaurant and order her food. Id. When she
came back outside, Smith approached her and asked if she’d “gotten her license fixed.”
1 Citations to “J.A.” refer to the joint appendix filed by the parties. The J.A. contains the record on appeal from the district court. Page numbers for citations to the J.A. utilize the “[J.A. or JA] #” numbering at the bottom of the page on each document.
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J.A. 265. Kimberly initially advised him that she had, but after some light questioning, she
fessed up and told him that she didn’t have a valid license. J.A. 427–28. Rather than
issuing her a ticket, Smith allowed her to call someone with a valid license to pick her up
from the restaurant. Id.
For the moment, the encounter ended quietly. Id. Kimberly later testified that she
believed “that there was nothing else to it.” J.A. 426.
Approximately two weeks later, another strange development surfaced. Kimberly,
a licensed nurse, was purportedly contacted by the state nursing board regarding a prior
traffic stop in which she had been arrested for driving with a suspended license and
possessing pain medication without a valid prescription. J.A. 367, 435. But the board’s
inquiry did not reach Kimberly directly. J.A. 368, 389. Instead, the email requesting a
statement was sent to aparamedic01@hotmail.com, an account belonging to McCaslan.
J.A. 368, 389. Although Kimberly had previously used her own email address to renew
her license, the most recent renewal listed McCaslan’s email instead. J.A. 370–71.
The nursing board requested a response by return email, but it received a mailed
letter instead. J.A. 368, 373, 377. The letter appeared to come from Kimberly and read
like a confession. J.A. 375-76. It contained statements admitting to stealing controlled
substances, forging prescriptions, and working outside the state in violation of licensing
regulations. Id. It also urged the board to review the guardian ad litem report from the
divorce proceedings. Id.
Around the same time, another dispute arose involving the divorcing couple.
McCaslan contacted another Calhoun Falls police officer, Officer Perry Hill, and reported
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that Kimberly had sold a generator that belonged to them as marital property. J.A. 355.
Kimberly had in fact sold the generator and asked her son to deliver it to the buyer. J.A.
434. When Hill questioned the son, Kimberly intervened, reminded Hill that her son was
a minor, and asked that all questions be directed to her. J.A. 434–35. This encounter lasted
about twenty minutes. J.A. 356.
During the following week, the officers considered whether criminal charges against
Kimberly might be appropriate based on both the generator dispute and the earlier
Savannah Grill incident. J.A. 268. Smith sought a warrant for the restaurant incident and
Officer Treaco Hoover (who was following up for Hill) sought one for the generator
incident. Id. Only one of those efforts succeeded. Id. Warrants were issued for the
restaurant incident, but the magistrate judge decided that the generator dispute belonged in
family court. Id. McCaslan learned of the magistrate judge’s decision and was upset that
only one set of warrants was issued. J.A. 593; J.A. 357; J.A. 269.
A week after learning about the magistrate judge’s decision, McCaslan spoke with
Smith, passing along bits of cryptic information. J.A. 263. McCaslan claimed Kimberly
had been asking questions about Smith and his duties at the police department. Id. He also
said he’d seen Kimberly and her son drive past Smith’s home, recording the property. J.A.
263–64.
2. The Letters to Law Enforcement
A day later, something arrived in Smith’s mailbox. Smith lived on Rice Street with
his fiancée, Tamera Lee. J.A. 235–36. The envelope contained a typed letter and white
powder. J.A. 258–59. Smith worried that the substance might be something dangerous,
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possibly fentanyl or another harmful agent. Id. He instructed Lee to wash her hands with
cold water and put on protective gloves. Id.
The message itself was threatening:
YOU THINK YOU CAN PRESS CHARGES AGAINST ME. I’VE ALREADY BEAT YOU AT YOUR ON GAME. I GOT CONNECTION TO. YOU CAN NOT TOUCH ME. I KNOW HOW DIRTY YOU ARE. YOU AND THAT DOG YOU LIVE WITH CAN KISS MY ASS. IF I SEE HER WHEN I WORK WITH HER AGAIN I WILL BEAT HER ASS. YOU WILL GET WHATS COMING TO YOU. YOU CAN NOT HIDE BEHIND THAT BADGE.
J.A. 239; S.A. 2.
Given the circumstances, Smith and Lee suspected Kimberly. J.A. 266. Smith had
active warrants connected to the earlier Savannah Grill incident, and Lee had previously
worked with Kimberly at a local nursing home, where the two women had a workplace
dispute. J.A. 260; J.A. 239–40. McCaslan knew about the active warrants and about Lee
and Kimberly’s workplace disagreement. J.A. 584–85. But Kimberly herself did not know
about the active warrants issued for her. J.A. 425–26.
Soon afterward, a second letter surfaced. Postal workers intercepted it before it
could reach the Calhoun Falls Police Department’s post office box. S.A. 4. Like the first
letter, it contained white powder and a typed message. Id.
PERRY I KNOW HOW DIRTY YOU ARE. YOU TRIED TO GET ME LOCKED UP. YOU TIRED TO GET MY KID IN TROUBLE. YOU WILL PAY FOR WHAT YOU DONE. I THOUGHT WE WERE BETTER THAN THAT. I’VE DONE FAVORS FOR YOUR FELLOW OFFICERS AND GET TREATED LIKE THIS. I WILL START TALKING IF I GO TO JAIL. TELL YOUR ASSITANT CHIEF TO PAY ATTENTION.
J.A. 358–59; S.A. 5.
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The letter appeared to be directed at Hill, the officer who had responded to
McCaslan’s complaint about the generator. J.A. 359. Hill, like Smith, suspected Kimberly
might be responsible. Id.
B. Investigation and Chain of Custody of Rice Street Evidence
The situation quickly drew the attention of investigators. Smith reported the Rice
Street letter to his chief of police, who instructed him to contact the Abbeville County
Sheriff’s Office and Assistant Chief Treaco Hoover of the Calhoun Falls Police
Department. J.A. 259. Hoover arrived at Rice Street and helped collect the evidence. Id.
Initial field tests suggested the presence of fentanyl, raising concern that the substance
might be dangerous. Id. The letter, the envelope (bearing outdated 41-cent stamps), and
the remaining powder were placed into an evidence bag. J.A. 247; J.A. 261. Hoover sealed
the bag and put it on his desk at the police department. J.A. 323–24.
That same day, the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (“SLED”), took over
the investigation. Id. SLED’s bomb squad responded to the police department, located the
sealed evidence bag on Hoover’s desk, opened it, and tested the powder. J.A. 325–27.
SLED determined that the powdery substance was harmless. 2 J.A. 326. SLED officers
took the letter and envelope into custody and transported it to the SLED lab in Columbia.
J.A. 393; J.A. 417.
2 Later laboratory analysis indicated the substance in the letter had the presence of milk-based infant formula, water, and linseed oil.
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While the bomb squad addressed the physical evidence, other SLED investigators
interviewed witnesses. J.A. 420. Smith, Lee, and Hoover provided voluntary statements.
Id. SLED investigators also reviewed the doorbell camera footage at Rice Street, which
showed Smith and Lee opening the envelope containing the white powdery substance. Id.
Over the next several weeks, the SLED laboratory conducted forensic analysis on
the evidence. J.A. 516; J.A. 546; J.A. 557. The scientists attempted to test the envelope
flap, but that sample had been contaminated during the forensic analysis and could not be
used. J.A. 522–23; J.A. 546. Although the envelope flap was compromised, SLED
discovered McCaslan’s DNA on the stamps. J.A. 552.
C. Criminal Charges, Objections to Rice Street Evidence, and Post Trial Motions
McCaslan was charged in a four-count second superseding indictment for (1)
cyberstalking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B); (2) mailing of a threatening
communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c); (3) conveying false and misleading
information regarding the unlawful transfer of an agent, toxin, or chemical by mailing a
letter containing a powdery substance to 318 Rice Street in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1038(a)(1); and (4) conveying false and misleading information regarding the unlawful
transfer of an agent toxin, or chemical by mailing a letter containing a powdery substance
to P.O. Box 246 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1038(a)(1). J.A. 18–20. McCaslan pled not
guilty and demanded a jury trial.
A significant focus of McCaslan’s pretrial motions and objections was to exclude
the Rice Street letter from evidence. J.A. 21; J.A. 28; J.A. 35. McCaslan moved in limine
to introduce evidence that the Calhoun Falls Police Department made mistakes during the
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early phase of the investigation and that a Calhoun Falls Police Department officer who
should not have participated in the investigation did in fact participate in the investigation.
J.A. 26–27; J.A. 31–33; J.A. 39. The district court ruled that McCaslan could cross-
examine witnesses concerning the mishandling of evidence and any poor investigative
techniques. J.A. 182–83.
The evidentiary dispute was complicated further when Hoover, the officer who had
first collected and stored the evidence from Rice Street, died before trial and therefore
could not testify about his role in the chain of custody. J.A. 150. At trial, McCaslan raised
several chain-of-custody objections to the Rice Street letter. See, e.g., J.A. 149–152; J.A.
200–03. McCaslan argued that, without Hoover, the Government could not link the
evidence bag that Hoover left Rice Street with to the evidence bag used by SLED. J.A.
200. The district court overruled McCaslan’s objections but allowed him wide latitude to
cross-examine the witnesses on the authenticity of the evidence. J.A. 275.
The jury returned a guilty verdict on all four counts. J.A. 767. McCaslan then
moved for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29. J.A.
57. In his motion, McCaslan argued, among other things, that there was insufficient
evidence to support the conviction on counts three and four because neither letter indicated
a chemical weapons violation was taking place or would take place. Id.
The district court denied McCaslan’s motion. J.A. 79. The district court found that,
although the content of the letters charged in counts three and four did not specifically
reference the powder they contained, the powder’s inclusion in the threatening letters was
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sufficient to convey “the specific presence of a weapon, in the form of an agent, toxin, or
chemical, in the letters.” J.A. 88.
McCaslan now appeals. We have jurisdiction to review the appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
II. Analysis
On appeal, McCaslan argues (A) he cannot be convicted, under counts three and
four, for sending a hoax chemical threat letter in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1038(a)(1)
because the letters did not explicitly threaten chemical agents, and (B) the district court
erred in overruling his chain of custody and authentication objections regarding the letter
used to collect DNA samples. Both arguments fail.
A. Sufficiency of Evidence
Because McCaslan moved for acquittal under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
29, we review his sufficiency of the evidence argument de novo. United States v. Hicks,
64 F.4th 546, 550 (4th Cir. 2023). We inquire whether “any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime [charged] beyond a reasonable doubt” when
the evidence is viewed in light most favorable to the Government. United States v.
Robinson, 855 F.3d 265, 268 (4th Cir. 2017).
McCaslan was charged under counts three and four for sending threatening letters
containing a suspicious substance in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1038(a)(1). The section reads
as follows:
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Whoever engages in any conduct with intent to convey false or misleading information under circumstances where such information may reasonably be believed and where such information indicates that an activity has taken, is taking, or will take place that would constitute a violation of chapter 2, 10, 11B, 39, 40, 44, 111, or 113B of this title.
18 U.S.C. § 1038(a)(1).
In other words, a conviction for conveying false and misleading information
regarding the unlawful transfer of an agent, toxin, or chemical weapon requires (1) that the
defendant knowingly engaged in conduct with the intent to convey false or misleading
information; (2) that the defendant conveyed information under circumstances in which
such information may reasonably have been believed; and (3) that the information
indicated that a violation of biological weapons statutes, chemical weapons statute, or
weapons of mass destruction statute was taking place or would take place. See id.
This section criminalizes fake threats (like hoax anthrax threats and hoax bomb
threats) because, even when the threat is ultimately found to be harmless, it creates public
panic and demands law enforcement and emergency response. See H.R. Rep. No. 107-
306: Anti-Hoax Terrorism Act 2001 (November 29, 2001) (“[A] hoax is designed to instill
fear into the public or its target . . . [and] are a serious threat to the public’s safety on many
levels.”). The law ensures that individuals cannot knowingly incite fear or waste public
resources by creating a false emergency. See id. (“First, such a hoax distracts law
enforcement from the actual threats or actual emergencies and, in effect, assists terrorists.
Second, these hoaxes often cause buildings and businesses to be evacuated and closed.”).
McCaslan argues that no jury could find the mailings constituted a violation of the
federal chemical weapons statute because the two letters underlying the charges against
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him did not indicate violation of the chemical weapons statute or discuss the powder at all.
Appellant’s Br. (ECF No. 12) at 23–26 (hereinafter “Opening Br.”). In essence, McCaslan
argues that the mere act of including a powdery substance in a threatening letter that
otherwise makes no mention of the substance or use of a biological agent, toxin, or
chemical weapon is insufficient to prove that a reasonable person might believe the letter
and its contents constituted a threat in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1038(a)(1). Id.
The Government counters that explicit statements are not required because a jury
could conclude that McCaslan’s conduct intended to convey the false information that the
envelope contained a dangerous chemical substance. Appellee’s Br. (ECF No. 15) at 19–
21 (hereinafter “Response Br.).
Despite McCaslan’s contention, the plain language of the statute does not require
an explicit reference to an attack. Rather, the statute focuses on a defendant’s “conduct”
and the “circumstances” of such conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 1038(a)(1).
Here, a jury could reasonably conclude that McCaslan’s conduct—placing a white
powdery substance into envelopes with a note containing hostile messages—intended to
convey the false information that the envelope contained a dangerous chemical substance. 3
3 The evidence was sufficient to establish that McCaslan sent the threatening letters. McCaslan’s DNA was found on the outdated 41-cent stamp affixed to the Rice Street letter. J.A. 552. Additionally, he knew the information regarding the warrants related to the Savannah Grill incident, but Kimberly did not. J.A. 593, 425–26. At trial, the Government also showed that McCaslan told Smith that Kimberly had been asking questions about him and observing Smith’s house, allowing the jury to infer that McCaslan was preparing to frame Kimberly. See J.A. 263. Additionally, the letter to Hill was also posted with 41- cent stamps. And the information regarding the failed attempt to obtain a warrant related to the generator was only known by McCaslan—not Kimberly. J.A. 593, 425–26.
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Further, a jury could also conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, it was
reasonable for Smith and Lee to see the white powdery substance, read the note, and believe
that an attack was taking place. Under the totality of the circumstances, it was also
reasonable for the United States postal worker who opened the second envelope at the P.O.
box to see the white powdery substance, read the note, and believe that an attack was taking
place. Indeed, the evidence showed that the recipients or interceptors of the letters thought
the contents to be so potentially hazardous that emergency law enforcement was called,
including the state bomb squad.
Given both the statutory language and the evidence presented at trial, we affirm the
district court’s denial of McCaslan’s motion for acquittal.
B. Evidentiary Objections
The court reviews a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence for abuse of
discretion. United States v. McCabe, 103 F.4th 259, 275 (4th Cir. 2024). For the reasons
below, the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling McCaslan’s chain of
custody and authentication objections regarding the Rice Street letter and the DNA
evidence collected from it.
“The ‘chain of custody rule’ is but a variation of the principle that real evidence
must be authenticated prior to its admission into evidence.” United States v. Howard-
Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 366 (4th Cir. 1982). “The purpose of this threshold requirement is to
establish that the item to be introduced. . . is what it purports to be.” Id. “Therefore, the
ultimate question is whether the authentication testimony was sufficiently complete so as
to convince the court that it is improbable that the original item had been exchanged with
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another or otherwise tampered with.” Id. The court has recognized that “a proponent need
not establish a perfect chain of custody or documentary evidence to support their
admissibility.” United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 350 (4th Cir. 2009). “Indeed, the
prima facie showing may be accomplished largely by offering circumstantial evidence that
the documents in questions are what they purport to be.” Id. The trial judge “must merely
be able to conclude that the jury could reasonably find that the evidence is authentic, not
that the jury necessarily would so find.” United States v. Davis, 918 F.3d 397, 402 (4th
Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Recio, 884 F.3d 230, 236–37 (4th Cir. 2018)).
Absent evidence of tampering, a missing link in the chain of custody will not
prohibit the admission of evidence. See Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d at 365–66. In Howard-
Arias, the court found no abuse of discretion when the trial court admitted drug evidence
without testimony for transportation of the evidence. Id. The government called the Coast
Guard officer who seized and tested the marijuana, the officer to whom he surrendered it,
the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) custodian in Norfolk, and the
DEA chemist. Id. The government did not call the officer who received the marijuana
from the Coast Guard officer for transit to the DEA in Norfolk. Id. The court declined to
disturb the district court’s ruling because there was no evidence of tampering. Id.
McCaslan argues that without Hoover there were two material breaks in the chain
of custody of the Rice Street letter: (1) transport from the scene to the Calhoun Falls Police
Department and (2) from the Calhoun Falls Police Department to the SLED forensic
laboratory. Opening Br. at 26–29. For the first alleged break in the chain, McCaslan notes
that Smith did not accompany Hoover to the police department, Hoover did not wear a
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body camera, and there was no documentation regarding the transport from Rice Street to
the police department. Id. at 28. McCaslan argues that without this information, it is
impossible to know whether the evidence bag was tampered with during transportation and
whether it was in a substantially similar condition as when it was initially secured. Id. For
the second alleged break in the chain, McCaslan argues that without Hoover’s testimony
the Government cannot show that the evidence bag found on Hoover’s desk was the same
bag used to collect the items at Rice Street. Id. McCaslan notes that the evidence bag was
not initialed or dated and that the SLED agents who opened the bag to test the powder were
not present when the items were first placed in the bag. Id. McCaslan also argues that the
contamination of the envelope flap shows that the evidence was not in a substantially
similar state when taken for DNA analysis and calls into question the reliability of the DNA
sample collected from the stamps. Id. at 27.
But McCaslan’s arguments miss the point, as they fail to show “that the original
item had been exchanged with another or otherwise tampered with.” Howard-Arias, 679
F.2d at 366 (citing United States v. Brewer, 630 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1980)).
More importantly, the Government introduced sufficient evidence to allow the jury
to reasonably find that the evidence was authentic. While “precision in developing the
‘chain of custody’ is not an iron-clad requirement,” id, the Government introduced, among
other things, the testimony of Lee and Smith (the recipients of the letter) identifying the
letter and explaining that Hoover took it in a sealed evidence bag; doorbell camera footage
showing Lee receiving and reading the letter; photos of the letters taken by Lee and Smith;
and testimony of the SLED agents who opened the evidence bag. J.A. 234, 242–43, 262–
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63, 420, 774. Additionally, McCaslan was afforded wide latitude on cross-examination
and closing arguments to call into question law enforcement investigative techniques and
professionalism. J.A. 275, 340–41, 402–03. McCaslan cross-examined witnesses
regarding the missing links in the chain of custody, including on the fact that Hoover was
alone with the evidence on the trip from Rice Street to the police station. J.A. 160. This
allowed the jury to weigh the credibility of the officers and the reliability of the evidence.
Accordingly, we will not disturb the district court’s ruling on admissibility of the
DNA evidence collected from the stamps.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s denial of McCaslan’s
motion for judgment of acquittal and its evidentiary rulings regarding McCaslan’s chain of
custody and authentication objections.
AFFIRMED