United States v. Johnathan Crawford

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: September 10, 2025
• Docket: 24-4272
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4272

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOHNATHAN CRAWFORD,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:23-cr-00128-D-BM-1)

Argued: May 15, 2025 Decided: September 10, 2025

Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, NIEMEYER, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Berner wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Diaz and Judge Niemeyer joined.

ARGUED: Eric Joseph Brignac, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Katherine Simpson Englander, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4272 Doc: 58 Filed: 09/10/2025 Pg: 2 of 11

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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BERNER, Circuit Judge:

Johnathan Crawford pleaded guilty to the federal crime of escape from custody

pursuant to a plea agreement. After entering his plea, Crawford submitted objections to

various statements in his Presentence Investigation Report. Although Crawford refused to

provide support for his objections, he maintained them during his sentencing hearing in

spite of repeated suggestions by the district court that they be withdrawn. Crawford

expressed concern that certain statements in the Presentence Investigation Report, left

without objection, might be viewed as admissions in state court proceedings on separate

felony charges. Although the Government and Crawford jointly recommended a sentence

of 39 months’ imprisonment, the district court imposed a 60-month sentence, the maximum

statutory term.

Crawford argues that, in objecting to statements in the Presentence Investigation

Report, he was invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and that the

district court imposed the maximum statutory sentence in retaliation for his having done

so. In support of his argument, Crawford points to certain remarks made by the district

court during the sentencing hearing. Because we find no nexus between Crawford’s alleged

invocation of the right against self-incrimination and the sentence imposed by the district

court, we affirm.

I. Background

In September 2022, Jonathan Crawford was transferred from prison to a halfway

house in Fayetteville, North Carolina. At the time, Crawford was serving a 77-month

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sentence for distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Several months

after he was transferred, in late November 2022, Crawford was granted a 52-hour pass from

the halfway house to stay temporarily at the home of his then-girlfriend, C.G. 1 C.G. was

not at home when Crawford arrived. Upon her return, the two had a disagreement and

Crawford pulled out a firearm and shot C.G. in the arm. The bullet went through C.G.’s

forearm and lodged in her abdomen.

Crawford transported C.G. to a hospital for treatment of the gunshot wound, but

only after she agreed that she would not contact the police. 2 Crawford left C.G. at the

hospital and fled. After the hospital reported to the police that a shooting victim was being

treated, several police officers arrived to investigate. They interviewed C.G. and she told

them what had taken place. One of the officers then proceeded to C.G.’s home. There he

discovered bullet holes in a door and a window. The police officers next contacted the

halfway house in search of Crawford and, when he could not be located, Crawford was

officially designated as escaped.

Crawford remained at large for several months. During this time, he called C.G. 98

times in a single day. He threatened to shoot her and “shoot up” her home if she continued

to cooperate in the state’s criminal investigation of the shooting. The following March, the

police received a tip that Crawford was staying at a residence in South Carolina. Following

1 We refer to Crawford’s girlfriend at the time as C.G. to protect her anonymity. 2 At the hospital, C.G. learned that she was pregnant. C.G. subsequently gave birth and the child suffered no ill-effects as a result of the shooting. 4 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4272 Doc: 58 Filed: 09/10/2025 Pg: 5 of 11

up on the tip, the police discovered Crawford at the residence and arrested him. Crawford

was indicted for escaping from federal custody pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 751(a).

On July 27, 2024, Crawford appeared before a magistrate judge for a hearing in

accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. During the hearing, the magistrate

judge asked Crawford whether he understood the terms of his plea agreement, including

the appellate waiver. The magistrate judge confirmed Crawford understood that, by signing

the plea agreement, he was “giving up [his] right to appeal or otherwise challenge [his]

conviction or sentence on any ground other than ineffective assistance of counsel or

prosecutorial misconduct.” J.A. 29. The prosecutor set forth the factual basis for the plea

and Crawford pleaded guilty to the escape charge.

A United States Probation Officer filed a draft Presentence Investigation Report

(draft PSR), to which Crawford submitted four written objections. Crawford’s objections

primarily pertained to statements in the draft PSR that relied on C.G.’s accounts that

Crawford shot her and later threatened her for cooperating with the police. Crawford

asserted that C.G.’s statements were “unreliable.” J.A. 39. Crawford also objected to the

draft PSR’s recommendation that the district court impose a 2-level obstruction-of-justice

enhancement because that recommendation was based largely on C.G.’s statements.

Finally, Crawford objected to the draft PSR’s recommendation of an upward departure

from the Sentencing Guidelines range.

Upon reviewing the objections, the Probation Officer finalized the Presentence

Investigation Report (final PSR). It detailed Crawford’s extensive criminal history,

including multiple convictions for crimes of violence. In the final PSR, the Probation

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Officer recommended a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice and suggested a

Guidelines range of 18 to 24 months’ imprisonment. The Probation Officer also

recommended an upward variance from this range because Crawford used a weapon or

dangerous instrumentality in the commission of the offense.

The Government agreed that an upward variance was warranted because Crawford

used a dangerous weapon, attempted to obstruct justice, and caused a serious injury. The

Government recommended a sentence of 39 months’ incarceration. Crawford conceded

that an upward variance was appropriate. Although he joined the Government in its

recommendation of a 39-month sentence, Crawford maintained his objections to the

aspects of the final PSR that relied upon statements C.G. had provided to the police.

When questioned by the district court about his objections, Crawford responded that

he did not want to be heard on the objections, but he nevertheless declined to withdraw

them. Crawford told the district court that he could not withdraw his objections “because

of the pending nature of the state charges . . . [he] did not want to have it be viewed as an

admission by the State Court.” J.A. 46–47. In considering the objections, the district court

recounted Crawford’s offense conduct in detail and asked the Government if it wished to

introduce any additional evidence. The Government and the law enforcement agent present

at the hearing both confirmed their position that the information in the PSR was accurate.

The district court expressed frustration that Crawford “persisted” in maintaining his

objections to the final PSR. J.A. 50. Although at one point during the hearing the district

court seemed to recognize that Crawford was maintaining his objections to the final PSR

because of pending state criminal charges against him, stating “I get the pending charges,

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fine,” the district court nevertheless deemed the objections as a “waste of time” and

overruled them. J.A. 60.

After hearing from the parties, the district court explained the basis for its sentence.

The district court discussed at length facts relevant to the factors set forth in

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (the Section 3553(a) factors). The district court reviewed Crawford’s

extensive criminal history, including multiple convictions for crimes of violence, stating

that this history demonstrated Crawford had chosen to “live as a criminal.” J.A. 70. The

district court expressed concern that, because of this criminal history, Crawford would

continue to victimize others if he was released from custody. The district court considered

the egregious nature of Crawford’s actions and concluded that an upward departure from

Crawford’s Guidelines range was warranted. The district court noted that Crawford used a

dangerous weapon, obstructed justice, and had caused serious injury. It therefore concluded

that the maximum possible sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment was appropriate. See

18 U.S.C. § 751(a); U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.6, 5K2.2. Notably, in explaining the basis for its

sentence, the district court never referenced Crawford’s objections to the final PSR.

During sentencing, the district court also made a number of remarks about

Crawford’s life and character that Crawford argues were unsupported by the record. For

example, the district court described Crawford as not having “done one redeeming thing in

the entire time he has drawn a breath on this earth . . . .” J.A. 56. Further, the district court

labeled Crawford as “a sociopath,” calling him “a felon to his core” and stating that “there’s

really nothing in [Crawford’s] adult life that I can see that he’s ever done productively.”

J.A. 57, 61. The district court also commented negatively on Crawford’s role as a father,

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proclaiming that “Crawford has brought many children into the world [and] has failed each

of them spectacularly and pathetically.” J.A. 76.

Crawford timely appealed his sentence.

II. Standard of Review

Crawford and the Government dispute what standard of review we should apply.

Crawford argues that the district court committed a constitutional violation by punishing

him for invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Thus, according to

Crawford, we must apply de novo review. See United States v. Lara, 850 F.3d 686, 690

(4th Cir. 2017) (reviewing whether the Government violated a defendant’s Fifth

Amendment right de novo). The Government contends that Crawford never raised a Fifth

Amendment claim below, and therefore we must review the district court’s sentencing

decision for plain error. We need not resolve this dispute, because Crawford cannot prevail

under either standard. See United States v. Perry, 757 F.3d 166, 174 (4th Cir. 2014). Thus

we review Crawford’s appeal de novo. Id.

III. Analysis

As a threshold matter, the Government argues that Crawford’s appeal should be

dismissed because he waived the right to challenge his sentence in his written plea

agreement. Certain claims are carved out from valid appellate waivers, however. See e.g.,

Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232, 238 (2019) (“[N]o appeal waiver serves as an absolute bar

to all appellate claims.”); United States v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217, 225–27 (4th Cir. 2023).

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Our court has yet to resolve the question of whether a valid appellate waiver bars a

challenge to a sentence imposed allegedly in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In Carter,

we assumed without deciding that a similar challenge was not barred. Id. at 225–26. We

take the same tack and assume Crawford’s appellate waiver did not bar his challenge,

reserving the question of the scope of waiver for another day.

We turn now to Crawford’s claim that the district court retaliated against him

because he invoked his right against self-incrimination. The Fifth Amendment provides

that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against

himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. An individual cannot be compelled “to answer official

questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where

the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.” Minnesota v. Murphy,

465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973)).

When questioned at sentencing about the basis for his objections to the final PSR,

Crawford indicated that he was maintaining his objections “out of an abundance of caution,

[so as not] to have it be viewed as an admission by the State Court.” J.A. 46–47. The district

court expressed frustration during the sentencing hearing that Crawford “persisted” with

his objections without offering support. J.A. 46. While the record is murky as to whether

Crawford’s objections can be understood as an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right

against self-incrimination, the record is devoid of evidence suggesting that the district court

imposed the maximum sentence in retaliation for Crawford maintaining his objections. To

the contrary, in imposing Crawford’s sentence, the trial court conducted an individualized

assessment of the relevant sentencing factors based on the facts, as it was required to do.

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United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 518 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Gall v. United States, 552

U.S. 38, 50 (2007)).

In sentencing a criminal defendant, district courts are required to consider the

Section 3553(a) factors, including the nature of the offense, the defendant’s history, the

need for the sentence imposed, the kinds of sentences available, the Guidelines range,

relevant policy statements by the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted

disparities, and the need to provide restitution to any victims. See, e.g., Gall, 552 U.S. at

50–51. Crawford criticizes the district court’s application of these factors. He argues that

the manner in which the district court applied them demonstrates that the district court

imposed the maximum statutory sentence in retaliation for his invoking the right against

self-incrimination. We disagree.

The district court’s application of the Section 3553(a) factors to Crawford’s case

was fully consistent with statutory requirements and this court’s precedent. See Blue, 877

F.3d at 518. In sentencing Crawford, the district court addressed the violent nature of

Crawford’s offense, including his procuring a gun, shooting C.G., and threatening further

violence against her, all while on a pass from a halfway house. The district court further

noted that Crawford escaped from custody and remained at large for over three months

while he should have been completing a sentence for other serious crimes. The district

court described in detail Crawford’s lengthy criminal history. It then considered the

Guidelines range and determined that an upward departure was warranted because

Crawford used a dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense, caused significant

physical injury, and obstructed justice.

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Crawford also contends that certain comments the district court made about him

during the sentencing hearing mischaracterized the record. Crawford points to these

statements as further evidence in support of his argument that the district court retaliated

against him for allegedly invoking his Fifth Amendment right. Here too, we disagree.

While the district court’s comments were harsh, they were untethered to the district court’s

sentencing analysis and do not suggest that the sentence was imposed in retaliation for

Crawford’s alleged Fifth Amendment invocation. 3

The district court expressed frustration with Crawford’s refusal to defend his

objections to the PSR. The record does, however, not support Crawford’s claim that the

district court retaliated against him for invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-

incrimination. Crawford points to no nexus between his alleged invocation and the district

court’s imposition of the maximum statutory sentence, nor can he. The record demonstrates

that, in imposing Crawford’s sentence, the district court properly focused on the nature and

circumstances of the offense, Crawford’s significant criminal history, and the other Section

3553(a) factors.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED

3 Crawford does not allege that the district court’s remarks, on their own, warrant setting aside his sentence.