United States v. John Watson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: February 2, 2026
• Docket: 24-2475
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 24-2475

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JOHN VINCENT WATSON, Appellant _____________________________ Appeal from the U.S. District Court, M.D. Pa. Judge Robert D. Mariani, No. 3:21-cr-00353-001

Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and BOVE, Circuit Judges Submitted: Jan. 30, 2026; Decided Feb. 2, 2026 _____________________________

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION *

BIBAS, Circuit Judge. John Watson kidnapped a fourteen-year-old girl for three days,

plied her with liquor and marijuana, and used his cellphone to film himself having sex with

her. When he left her alone in a hotel room, she found a phone, called police, and told them

that Watson had kidnapped her. After police interviewed Watson, they held onto his cell-

phone until they could get a warrant the next day to search it. When they did, they found

four videos and one photo of the victim. A jury convicted him of five counts of producing

child pornography. Though Watson challenges his conviction and sentence in four ways,

all fail.

* This is not an opinion of the full Court and, under 3d Cir. IOP 5.7, is not binding precedent. First, the trial court properly admitted the cellphone evidence. We review its factual

findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Caesar, 2 F.4th

160, 167 (3d Cir. 2021). Having just heard the victim’s account of Watson’s kidnapping,

there was probable cause (throughout the seizure) to believe that exigent circumstances

justified hanging on to Watson’s cellphone to prevent him from destroying evidence until

they could get a warrant the next day to search it. And after Watson left the police station,

police interviewed the victim at greater length and got even more information about the

crime. That justified holding the phone until the next day, when the warrant was approved.

The warrant was particularized to evidence on the phone relevant to kidnapping and sexual

assault. And the warrant application noted that Watson had used it for GPS and contacting

others during the relevant days. That was enough for probable cause.

Second, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Watson’s motion for a

new trial. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 33; United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 511 (3d Cir.

2010) (standard of review). District courts need not hold an evidentiary hearing whenever

a defendant cries “new evidence.” United States v. Kelly, 539 F.3d 172, 188 (3d Cir. 2008).

Affidavits usually suffice. Only in exceptional circumstances must a court hear live testi-

mony to decide whether new evidence warrants a new trial. There were none here. Watson

based his motion on newly discovered impeachment evidence: After trial, a police detec-

tive who had testified at his trial was charged in an unrelated case with stealing seized

drugs for his own personal use. But that detective had testified only about logging Watson’s

phone to show chain of custody, not about the merits. He never had the phone. In any event,

2 the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, including the videos, photo, and Watson’s testi-

mony that the phone was his and he had used it to film himself having sex with the victim.

Third, the court’s ninety-year sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment. We

review de novo. United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). As the court

put it, Watson’s “treatment of the victim in this case can only be described as depraved;

that is, evil and corrupt, brutal and barbaric. The damage you inflicted on … this young

girl will likely be permanent.” Supp. App. 39. Watson also had more than a dozen adult

convictions, including indecent assault on a seventeen-year-old, putting him in the highest

criminal-history category. Watson’s sentence, though long, was still below the life impris-

onment recommended by the Guidelines. His sentence was fitting, not grossly dispropor-

tionate to his horrific crimes.

At the end of his brief, Watson tacks on the rule of lenity. But he never points to an

ambiguous legal provision or explains how the rule of lenity should lead us to read it more

narrowly in his favor. Lenity is not a free-floating license for judges to soften criminal

provisions that otherwise pass constitutional muster. Cf. United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d

438, 455 (3d Cir. 2001). Because his conviction and sentence are legally sound, we will

AFFIRM.