United States v. John Taylor

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: January 7, 2026
• Docket: 24-4265
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4265

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOHN JAMES TAYLOR,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (2:18-cr-00018-FL-1)

Submitted: December 18, 2025 Decided: January 7, 2026

Before WILKINSON and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Andrew DeSimone, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Lucy Partain Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

John James Taylor pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute a quantity of

cocaine and a quantity of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); and felon

in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). 1 After this

court vacated Taylor’s original sentence and remanded for resentencing in light of United

States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), the district court sentenced him to 164

months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Taylor appealed, and this

court again vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing in light of Rogers. On

remand, the district court reimposed the 164-month term of imprisonment and the three-

year term of supervised release. Taylor appeals, arguing that the district court again

violated Rogers. In response, the Government contends that Taylor waived any claim of

Rogers error and, alternatively, that his claim is subject to, and does not survive, plain error

review. We vacate Taylor’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

Pursuant to Rogers, “all non-mandatory conditions of supervised release must be

announced at a defendant’s sentencing hearing.” United States v. Bullis, 122 F.4th 107,

117 (4th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). Thus, “a material discrepancy between a

discretionary condition as pronounced and as detailed in a written judgment may constitute

Rogers error.” United States v. Mathis, 103 F.4th 193, 197 (4th Cir. 2024) (citation

modified). Taylor argues that certain special conditions of supervised release in the written

1 Section 924(a)(2) was amended following Taylor’s conviction and no longer provides the penalty for § 922(g) convictions. See Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 117-159, § 12004(c), 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022).

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judgment, including one that requires him to engage in mental health treatment, materially

differ from the district court’s oral pronouncement of those conditions at sentencing.

We first address the Government’s contention that Taylor waived his claim of

Rogers error. “A waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known

right.” United States v. Robinson, 744 F.3d 293, 298 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation modified).

For example, “a party who identifies an issue, and then explicitly withdraws it, has waived

the issue.” Id. (citation modified). “When a claim is waived, it is not reviewable on appeal,

even for plain error.” Id. (citation modified).

After the sentencing hearing, but before the district court entered the written

judgment, the courtroom deputy emailed the parties a draft list of the special conditions of

supervision for review. Taylor’s counsel did not object to this list, and—the Government

contends—thereby waived any claim of Rogers error. However, at the time counsel

reviewed the courtroom deputy’s draft of the special conditions, there was no transcript of

the sentencing hearing. Thus, counsel could not review whether the drafted conditions

matched the conditions that the court announced at the hearing. In turn, counsel did not

intentionally relinquish “a known right” by not objecting to the draft conditions—counsel

did not know, without the transcript, whether there was any Rogers error. Id. (citation

modified). Nor did counsel identify a Rogers issue and “then explicitly withdraw[] it.” Id.

(citation modified). Counsel simply declined to raise a Rogers objection. Therefore,

counsel did not waive the issue.

The Government alternatively argues that Taylor forfeited his Rogers claim by not

objecting to the courtroom deputy’s draft list and, therefore, that this claim is subject to

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plain error review. See id. (distinguishing waiver from forfeiture and noting that courts

“may review a forfeited claim for plain error”). However, we need not decide whether

Taylor forfeited his claim because, even assuming plain error review applies, he satisfies

that standard. To succeed on plain error review, a defendant “must establish that (1) an

error occurred; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial

rights.” United States v. Combs, 36 F.4th 502, 505 (4th Cir. 2022) (citation modified).

“Even if all three factors are satisfied, we exercise our discretion to correct the error only

if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

Id. (citation modified).

At the sentencing hearing, the district court ordered Taylor to participate in mental

health treatment if he thought it “would be helpful.” (J.A. 58). 2 In contrast, the written

judgment requires Taylor to participate in mental health treatment at the direction of the

probation office. We conclude that this material discrepancy between the oral and written

sentences amounts to plain error under Rogers and its progeny.

Furthermore, absent this error, the written judgment would have matched the district

court’s oral pronouncement. Thus, Taylor would have been subject to the more permissive,

less onerous mental health treatment condition announced at sentencing. Accordingly, we

conclude that the district court’s plain error affected Taylor’s substantial rights. See

Combs, 36 F.4th at 507 (“To establish the third prong of plain error, [a defendant] must

2 Our citations herein to “J.A. __” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

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show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would

have been different.” (citation modified)). We further conclude that this error seriously

affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings and, thus, we exercise our discretion to

correct the error. See United States v. Maxwell, 285 F.3d 336, 342 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting

that “conditions of supervised release are a substantial imposition on a person’s liberty”).

The remedy for a Rogers error is to vacate the defendant’s sentence in its entirety

and remand for resentencing. United States v. Lassiter, 96 F.4th 629, 640 (4th Cir.) (“Our

precedents are clear: When a Rogers error occurs, we must vacate the entire sentence and

remand for full resentencing.”), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 208 (2024). Accordingly, we

vacate Taylor’s sentence and remand for resentencing. In light of this holding, we do not

address Taylor’s arguments challenging the imposition of a special supervised release

condition requiring warrantless searches. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED