United States v. John Salazar

5 F.3d 445, 93 Daily Journal DAR 12088, 93 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7126, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 24406, 1993 WL 370521
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 23, 1993
Docket92-50506
StatusPublished
Cited by28 cases

This text of 5 F.3d 445 (United States v. John Salazar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. John Salazar, 5 F.3d 445, 93 Daily Journal DAR 12088, 93 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7126, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 24406, 1993 WL 370521 (9th Cir. 1993).

Opinion

REAVLEY, Senior Circuit Judge:

This is another sentencing appeal. John Salazar, while an inspector at a port of entry from Mexico,- allowed vans containing 1,615 kilograms of cocaine to pass through his inspection lane. He argues that his sentence should not have been computed on the cocaine volume for the reason that he agreed to favor importation of marijuana, but not cocaine. We reject his argument and affirm.

Salazar pleaded' guilty to conspiring to import a controlled substance and to official corruption. There is no fact dispute. From July, 1990, through July, 1991, Salazar accepted bribes in exchange for allowing vehicles containing drugs to enter the United States through his inspection lanes. On June 20, 1991, he allowed two vans through his inspection lane. Federal agents searched the vans later and found secreted inside 170 kilograms of marijuana and 1615 kilograms of cocaine. On this record we assume that Salazar agreed to allow the importation of marijuana, but knew nothing of the cocaine.

In the sentencing the district court began with 42 base offense points by considering only the base offense of importation of more than 1500 kilograms of cocaine. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3) (Nov. 1991). Salazar contends that the cocaine should be disregarded, because he neither knew nor had any reasonable expectation of the importation of any drug other than marijuana. He cites cases where the conspiracy was never completed or where coconspirators committed offenses without the participation or expectation of the defendants. The conduct for which a conspirator is accountable “includes conduct of others in furtherance of the execution of the jointly-undertaken criminal activity that was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.” Id § 1B1.3, comment (n. 1).

The expansion of defendant’s accountability due to the relevant conduct of cocoh-spirators is not what the district court had before it in this sentencing. As the 1992 clarifying change to Guidelines Notes indicates, “[t]he requirement of reasonable foreseeability applies only in respect to the conduct ... of others- It does not apply to conduct that the defendant personally under-tákes_” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment (n. 2) (Nov. 1992). Salazar personally undertook to pass drug-laden vehicles through the checkpoint. He- is responsible for the drugs that came through, even if he did not know what drugs they were.

Salazar conspired, was indicted for, and pleaded guilty to the importation of controlled substance. Cocaine, like marijuana, is a controlled substance. The base offense level for guideline sentencing may be determined by the volume of the drug actually imported, whether or not the defendant knows either the volume or the nature of the substance — if he knows only that he is importing a controlled substance. United *447 States v. Ramirez-Ramirez, 875 F.2d 772 (9th Cir.1989). When sentencing only for a particular drug offense actually executed, the conspirator and the substantive offender are subject to the same penalty. 21. U.S.C. § 963. And the sentencing guidelines prescribe the base offense level of the substantive offense for the conspirator. § 2Xl.l(a). The district court’s computation was correct.

AFFIRMED.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Helm
58 F.4th 75 (Second Circuit, 2023)
United States v. Michael Wright
692 F. App'x 873 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
United States v. George Jefferson
791 F.3d 1013 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
United States v. Salah Dado
759 F.3d 550 (Sixth Circuit, 2014)
United States v. Fabian Mendez
534 F. App'x 585 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Sierra v. Commonwealth
722 S.E.2d 656 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2012)
United States v. Briseno
163 F. App'x 658 (Tenth Circuit, 2006)
United States v. Bass
80 F. App'x 918 (Fifth Circuit, 2003)
United States v. Willis
59 F. App'x 40 (Sixth Circuit, 2003)
United States v. Varela
40 F. App'x 490 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)
United States v. Edward Carranza
289 F.3d 634 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)
United States v. Barbosa
Third Circuit, 2001
United States v. Luis Humberto Barbosa
271 F.3d 438 (Third Circuit, 2001)
United States v. Romero
14 F. App'x 777 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
United States v. Holton
122 F. Supp. 2d 21 (District of Columbia, 2000)
State v. Engen
993 P.2d 161 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1999)
United States v. Barbosa
51 F. Supp. 2d 597 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1999)
United States v. Valencia-Gonzales
172 F.3d 344 (Fifth Circuit, 1999)
United States v. Alfonso Maldonado-Medina
141 F.3d 1181 (Ninth Circuit, 1998)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
5 F.3d 445, 93 Daily Journal DAR 12088, 93 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7126, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 24406, 1993 WL 370521, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-john-salazar-ca9-1993.