United States v. John Lofranco

Second Circuit

United States v. John Lofranco

818 F.2d 276, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 6049

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedMay 6, 1987

Docket975, Docket 86-1183

StatusPublished

Cited by24 cases

This text of 818 F.2d 276 (United States v. John Lofranco) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. John Lofranco, 818 F.2d 276, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 6049 (2d Cir. 1987).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

John LoFranco appeals from a judgment of conviction entered following his guilty plea to three counts of a six count indictment. He claims violations of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., and, by virtue of a court-ordered amendment to his indictment, of his fifth amendment right to indictment by a grand jury. Finding no merit in either contention, we affirm.

First, we agree with the eleventh and fifth circuits, which have held that “violations of the defendant’s rights to a speedy trial” are nonjurisdictional and therefore waived by a guilty plea that does not include a court-approved reservation of the issue. Tiemens v. United States, 724 F.2d 928, 929 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837, 105 S.Ct. 134, 83 L.Ed.2d 74 (1984); see United States v. Jackson, 659 F.2d 73, 74 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003, 102 S.Ct. 1637, 71 L.Ed.2d 870 (1982).

In holding that LoFranco’s guilty plea waived any Speedy Trial Act objections he might have had, we do not imply that there was a violation of the act. We do note, however, that Chief Judge Mun-son’s order of September 26, 1985, excluding from computation under the act all time from that date until trial pursuant to § 3161(h)(8), could be interpreted as allowing virtually unlimited delays. We assume that this order was made in anticipation of a particular trial date, thus limiting what might otherwise be a boundless exclusion of time that could undermine the purposes of the Speedy Trial Act. We remind district judges that the length of an exclusion under § 3161(h)(8) for a “complex” case, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii), should reasonably be related to the actual needs of the case, and should not be used either as a calendar control device or as a means of circumventing the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act.

LoFranco also contends that the indictment against him was impermissibly amended when the district court granted the government’s motion to amend the indictment by substituting “Schedule II” for “Schedule III” where it appeared in connection with the charges that LoFranco had dealt in methamphetamines. As a mere error in citation which worked no prejudice *278 on LoFranco, this amendment was permissible under Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(3).

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM:

John LoFranco appeals from a judgment of conviction entered following his guilty plea to three counts of a six count indictment. He claims violations of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., and, by virtue of a court-ordered amendment to his indictment, of his fifth amendment right to indictment by a grand jury. Finding no merit in either contention, we affirm.

First, we agree with the eleventh and fifth circuits, which have held that “violations of the defendant’s rights to a speedy trial” are nonjurisdictional and therefore waived by a guilty plea that does not include a court-approved reservation of the issue. Tiemens v. United States, 724 F.2d 928, 929 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837, 105 S.Ct. 134, 83 L.Ed.2d 74 (1984); see United States v. Jackson, 659 F.2d 73, 74 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003, 102 S.Ct. 1637, 71 L.Ed.2d 870 (1982).

In holding that LoFranco’s guilty plea waived any Speedy Trial Act objections he might have had, we do not imply that there was a violation of the act. We do note, however, that Chief Judge Mun-son’s order of September 26, 1985, excluding from computation under the act all time from that date until trial pursuant to § 3161(h)(8), could be interpreted as allowing virtually unlimited delays. We assume that this order was made in anticipation of a particular trial date, thus limiting what might otherwise be a boundless exclusion of time that could undermine the purposes of the Speedy Trial Act. We remind district judges that the length of an exclusion under § 3161(h)(8) for a “complex” case, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii), should reasonably be related to the actual needs of the case, and should not be used either as a calendar control device or as a means of circumventing the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act.

LoFranco also contends that the indictment against him was impermissibly amended when the district court granted the government’s motion to amend the indictment by substituting “Schedule II” for “Schedule III” where it appeared in connection with the charges that LoFranco had dealt in methamphetamines. As a mere error in citation which worked no prejudice *278 on LoFranco, this amendment was permissible under Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(3).

Affirmed.

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818 F.2d 276, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 6049, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-john-lofranco-ca2-1987.

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