COLEMAN, Circuit Judge.
Appellants Robert Rowen and John Dohm, along with Brian Martin and Harold Kramer, were charged with conspiracy to sell one kilogram of cocaine and with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1).1
The Court granted a directed verdict of acquittal for Harold Kramer on both counts. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on either count against Brian Martin.2
The jury found Rowen guilty of the conspiracy charge under Count I, but could not reach a verdict on the Count II possession charge. He was sentenced to eighteen months in prison to be followed by three years of special parole.
Dohm was found guilty on all counts. For the conspiracy he was sentenced to three years imprisonment and three years special parole. He was given the same sentence on the possession conviction, the sentences to be served concurrently.
For reversal, Rowen suggests six errors. Dohm points to four. Three errors are asserted in common. Dohm asserts a fourth error which involves evidence concerning himself only. Rowen’s other three points are without merit, necessitating no discussion.
The main events which led to the arrests and convictions of these appellants took place on August 2 and 4, 1977. On August 2 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) undercover agents Jerry Castillo and Michael O’Connor met with appellant Robert [537]*537Rowen and Brian Martin at a restaurant/Iounge in Miami. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss arrangements for the purchase of cocaine by Castillo, who, of course, was acting in his undercover capacity.
On August 4 Castillo received a phone call from Martin at a special unlisted phone at the DEA Regional Offices in Miami. Martin said that everything had been arranged for the drug purchase. In a subsequent conversation, Martin instructed Castillo to drive to his (Martin’s) apartment where they would then drive to the house of his “source of supply”. Castillo and O’Con-nor then drove to Martin’s' apartment. From there they followed Martin and Row-en to Dohm’s home.
While O’Connor waited in the car across the street, Castillo went into Dohm’s house with Martin and Rowen. In the kitchen he met Dohm, and he noticed a quantity of white powder on the top of the kitchen counter. Following a conversation pertaining to the weight and price of a kilogram of cocaine, Castillo and Dohm agreed to a purchase price of $41,200, and Castillo said he would have to get the money out of the car. There was some discussion about Castillo not leaving the house at that moment because suspicious vehicles had been seen outside the house. Castillo, however, told Dohm that he wanted to conclude the deal because he had to catch a plane. He was allowed to leave the house, escorted by Martin.
Once outside the house, Castillo gave the pre-arranged arrest signal to O’Connor and other surveilling agents, and Martin and Kramer were arrested. Castillo and other agents then re-entered the house, where they placed Dohm and Rowen under arrest and seized approximately one kilogram of cocaine.
I. Failure to Suppress Evidence
Appellants Dohm and Rowen contend that the Court erred in denying the motion to suppress the evidence of the cocaine which was found in Dohm’s kitchen after the warrantless entry into the home because it was seized in violation of the “knock and announce” requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3109:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.
Although the statute refers to the execution of search warrants, it has been expressly held that its requirements also apply to entries made without warrants. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 1195, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958). The Supreme Court has applied the statute to any forced opening, including the opening of a locked door with a passkey or even the opening of a closed but unlocked door. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 590, 88 S.Ct. 1755, 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968). In Sabbath the Court did, however, expressly point out that entries obtained by ruse have been viewed as involving no “breaking”. 391 U.S. at 590 n. 7, 88 S.Ct. 1755, citing, e. g., Smith v. United States, 5 Cir. 1966, 357 F.2d 486, 488 n. 1; see also, United States v. DeFeis, 5 Cir. 1976, 530 F.2d 14, cert. den. 429 U.S. 830, 97 S.Ct. 92, 50 L.Ed.2d 95.
The Supreme Court has also stated that although a home is given broad protection under the Fourth Amendment,3 “when . the home is converted into a commercial center to which outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business, that business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or on the street.” Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211, 87 S.Ct. 424, 427, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966). Additional[538]*538ly, the court noted that the government is entitled to employ agents in deceptive roles in the detection of many types of crime, such as illegal drug transactions. 385 U.S. at 209, 87 S.Ct. 424.
Appellants argue that Agent Castillo’s ruse ended when he left the house after Dohm told him not to leave, and therefore, his re-entry without knocking and announcing was a “breaking into” prohibited by § 3109. Castillo testified, however, that he explained to Dohm that it was necessary to complete the transaction as soon as possible, and that he must go to his car to get the money. He even took Martin with him. His deception had not ended.
In denying the motion to suppress the evidence the District Court ruled that “[t]his was all part of a single integral transaction that was still in the process of being completed,” and therefore, it was not improper for the agent to depend on his ruse as a narcotics purchaser to re-enter the building without the formality of knocking and announcing his official position. We agree.
It must also be noted, however, that even if Dohm and Rowen had begun to suspect Castillo and even if they saw the arrests of Martin and Kramer by the agents out in front of Dohm’s house (there is no evidence on this point), thus ending the effectiveness of the ruse, there is still justification for Agent Castillo and the others to enter the house unannounced. In this situation one of the “exigent circumstances” exceptions to § 3109, i. e., the reasonable belief of the officers that there will be an attempted escape or that the evidence will be destroyed, would apply. Miller v. United States, supra, 357 U.S. at 309, 78 S.Ct. 1190; Sabbath v. United States, supra, 391 U.S. at 591, 88 S.Ct. 1755; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 39-40, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963).
We hold, as in United States v. Gardner, 5 Cir. 1977, 553 F.2d 946, that when Agent Castillo gave the pre-arranged signal after he came out of the house, there was probable cause for arrest, and because he knew that Dohm and Rowen remained in the house with the cocaine which he had seen, immediate re-entry with minimum disturbance was “necessary to prevent disposal of the cocaine, a powder which can easily be flushed down a toilet,” 553 F.2d at 948, and, also, to prevent the escape of Dohm and Rowen. Therefore, the agents’ failure to “knock and announce” did not make their actions an illegal search and seizure which would require suppression of the cocaine as evidence.
II. Denial of Severance
Martin claimed at trial that he had set up the cocaine transaction because he believed he was working as a government confidential informant. Dohm and Rowen argue that this entrapment defense was inconsistent with and prejudicial to their defense, mandating a severance or mistrial. They made motions for severance or mistrial after all the evidence was in and while jury instructions were being discussed. The judge denied the motions but offered to use a bifurcated procedure by which the jury would hear Dohm and Rowen’s arguments and reach a verdict before hearing Martin’s closing argument. Although appellants maintained their desire for a severance or mistrial, they agreed to the use of the procedure suggested by the Court.
' Appellants now assert that the Court erred in refusing to grant their motion and that the bifurcated procedure did not cure the prejudicial effect of Martin’s entrapment defense. We disagree.
Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure says that a trial court may grant a motion for severance when “a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants . for trial.”4 We have frequently empha[539]*539sized that the disposition of a Rule 14 motion for severance rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge.5
Absent an abuse of discretion, the ruling of the trial judge will not be disturbed. United States v. Crawford, 5 Cir. 1978, 581 F.2d 489, 491; United States v. Morrow, 5 Cir. 1976, 537 F.2d 120, 134; Tillman v. United States, 5 Cir. 1969, 406 F.2d 930, 935. “The failure to grant a severance merely because one codefendant is relying on a defense of entrapment while another is not does not of itself constitute an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Eastwood, 5 Cir. 1974, 489 F.2d 818, 822; see also, Morrow, supra, 537 F.2d at 138; United States v. Russo, 5 Cir. 1972, 455 F.2d 1225, 1227.
The burden is on the movant to convince the court that without a severance he or she will be unable to obtain a fair trial. A mere showing of some prejudice is usually insufficient; the movant must “ ‘demonstrate compelling prejudice against which the trial court [was] unable to afford protection.’ ” Crawford, supra, 581 F.2d at 491, quoting United States v. Swanson, 5 Cir. 1978, 572 F.2d 523, 528; accord, Morrow, supra, 537 F.2d at 136; United States v. Perez, 5 Cir. 1973, 489 F.2d 51, 65. The defendant must show more than the possibility that a separate trial would offer him a better chance of acquittal. Tillman, supra, 406 F.2d at 935.
Neither Dohm nor Rowen has made a showing of specific, compelling prejudice to their cases caused by Martin’s defense of entrapment. Dohm insists that delay in Martin’s assertion of the defense limited his intelligent exercise of important trial rights. We think that it was apparent from Martin’s cross examination of the first witness to take the stand, Agent Castillo, that Martin was presenting an entrapment defense based on his relationship with Agent Castillo and a government informant. Bringing this information out at so early a point in the trial could hardly be considered as prejudicial delay.
Appellants argue that Martin’s entrapment defense was so antagonistic to their positions that they did not get a fair trial, citing United States v. Johnson, 5 Cir. 1973, 478 F.2d 1129. The factual situation in that case is easily distinguishable from this case. In Johnson codefendant Smith had made a confession which directly implicated appellant Johnson and contradicted his defense that he was not present when the crime was committed. When Smith took the stand he further incriminated Johnson in his testimony. This Court held that Johnson should have been granted a severance because Smith turned out to be the government’s best witness against Johnson. In the present case, however, Martin in his testimony made no attempt to implicate the appellants.
Moreover, Dohm’s and Rowen’s “defenses” were not inconsistent with that of Martin. Neither of the appellants asserted any defense. In a recent case, United States v. Marable, 5 Cir. 1978, 574 F.2d 224, we made the following statement:
Before a severance will be granted due to inconsistent defenses, a defendant must demonstrate that the defenses are antagonistic to the point of being mutually exclusive. ... As a defense, Marable denies any involvement in the heroin conspiracy. Horace Jones offered no defense. No conflict between the defenses is apparent.
'574 F.2d at 231.
[540]*540Similarly, in this case since appellants offered no defense at trial, there was no conflict of defenses with Martin.
Additionally, we find that the trial judge did not act improperly in utilizing the bifurcated summation — jury deliberation procedure rather than granting the motion to sever. Judicial economy necessarily exerts strong pressure in favor of upholding a trial court’s decision to conduct a joint trial, Morrow, supra, 537 F.2d at 136. In this case the trial court carefully considered “[t]he degree to which prejudice [could] be lessened by other remedial court action,” United States v. Garza, 5 Cir. 1977, 563 F.2d 1164, 1166, and chose an appropriate and effective remedy.
III. The Judge’s Statements
Appellants claim that the trial court made several errors in ruling on a question asked (by Martin’s attorney on cross examination) of confidential informant Gary Peacock, a government witness. The exchange is as follows:
Q. Where do you live?
MR. CULVERHOUSE: Objection.
That’s irrelevant.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. MARCUS: Judge, I think that a man — everybody who has testified here today has given his address and if he’s a resident here and the means and mode of living, I think is pertinent to this case as to the method that he — and how he lives and what—
THE COURT: Fine.
Then you go ahead and tell me why you’re objecting.
MR. CULVERHOUSE: Your Honor, I object on a couple of grounds; one, it’s irrelevant; number two, the government agents never give their address.
THE COURT: I thought he was going to say he had concern about safety for this witness, that’s why I sustained the objection.
MR. CULVERHOUSE: The reason is that he is a government agent.
THE COURT: But since we are both making speeches in front of the jury, since both of you are, that’s the reason the objection is sustained.
This man has testified in this case, and we all know there are other factors that have not been brought out before the jury.
The objection is sustained. He does not have to give his home address. [Transcript, pp. 325-326].
After these remarks were made, Martin’s attorney asked a few more questions of Peacock and then requested a bench conference. The judge excused the jury, and Rowen’s attorney moved for a mistrial, stating that “the colloquy between the court and counsel improperly suggested] to the jury that Mr. Robert Rowen might be prone to use violence on this witness.” [Transcript, p. 327]. A discussion of what had been said followed, and the judge offered to give an instruction to the jury that the question, objection, and ruling by the court should not be considered against any defendant but Martin. Dohm’s attorney approved of such an instruction. Martin’s attorney and Rowen’s attorney objected to it. The judge so instructed the jury “over the objection of counsel for the defense” [Transcript, p. 334], and the cross examination of Peacock by Martin’s attorney proceeded.
Dohm and Rowen argue that the judge’s comments implied to the jury that perhaps one or more of the defendants were prone to use violence on the confidential informant and that additional evidence incriminating the defendants was being withheld from the jury. They say that by making these comments the judge “added to” the evidence in a way that was proscribed by the Supreme Court in Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1933); see also, United States v. Cisneros, 5 Cir. 1974, 491 F.2d 1068; Moody v. United States, 5 Cir. 1967, 377 F.2d 175. Each of these cases is easily distinguishable from the present case in that the judges in those cases made direct, prejudicial comments in the course of instructing the jury, whereas in this case the judge’s remarks [541]*541were basically directed toward counsel and were not specifically prejudicial to either of the appellants.
Additionally, there is no basis for asserting that the jury would infer from the judge’s remarks that the appellants were prone to use violence against the witness. First, as noted by the Court, the exchange had nothing to do with Dohm and Rowen since the question was propounded by Martin’s attorney. Second, the Court specifically instructed the jury that the comments were to be considered against Martin only and not against the other defendants. Third, any implication of threatened harm toward Peacock by any of the defendants was eliminated when Peacock subsequently testified that he had not been threatened by anyone. Thus, the remarks by the Court were not prejudicial to appellants.
Rowen also argues that Peacock should have been required to give his home address. We disagree under the circumstances, but do not find this matter properly before us on appeal because Rowen did not object to the court’s ruling that Peacock did not have to divulge his address. Rule 50, Fed.R.Crim.P.6
We find the other two arguments raised by Rowen without merit.
IV. Admission of Testimony as to Dohm’s Bond Hearing Statement
Finally, Dohm complains of the admission of testimony by government agents as to statements he had made at his initial appearance (seeking bail) before U. S. Magistrate Peter R. Palermo on August 5, 1977. At that time the magistrate held a bond hearing for Dohm and for the other three defendants. Dohm claims that what he said under oath should not have been admitted against him because the statements were made when he was without assistance of counsel and because they were made in an attempt to secure his Eighth Amendment right to reasonable bail.
At the trial on the merits Agent Castillo, over objection, was allowed to testify [irrelevancies omitted] as follows:
Q. And, before Judge Palermo asked these four defendants any questions, did he advise them of any of their constitutional rights?
A. Yes, he did, sir. He advised each individual of his constitutional rights.
Q. And, what rights would those be, sir?
A. That’s their right to remain silent, right to obtain counsel, a lawyer, if they can’t afford a lawyer would be appointed to them, and—
******
Q. Recalling your attention to Mr. Dohm, do you recall Judge Palermo advising Mr. Dohm of his rights?
A. Yes, I do, sir.
Q. Do you recall Judge Palermo [telling him] that anything he said at the hearing could be used against him in later proceedings?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. And after the Judge admonished him as to these rights, did Mr. Dohm make any statements in your presence?
A. Yes, he did make a statement.
Q. Would you tell the Court and jury what those statements were?
A. Mr. Dohm made a statement to the fact that it took him approximately two weeks to obtain the one kilogram [of cocaine] he handed me on that day in August. [Italics ours].
The testimony of Agent O’Connor is (after the preliminaries) as follows:
Q. And after he was advised of these constitutional rights, did Mr. Dohm make any statements?
[542]*542A. Mr. Dohm stated to the Court that he did negotiate with Agent Castillo to sell him—
MR. BARABAN: Objection, Your Honor. That’s not the statement that was made.
THE COURT: Well, you will be able to cross examine him. He is entitled to state what the statement was, and you can cross examine him on it. That’s all I can do. I don’t know what the statement was. Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: That Mr. Dohm had stated to the Court that he did negotiate with Agent Castillo to sell him approximately one to two kilograms of cocaine at a later date.
At this time, Magistrate Palermo suggested to Mr. Dohm that he not say anything until he had a lawyer present. But Mr. Dohm continued to talk and he did make a further statement that it took him nearly two weeks to collect the one kilogram that he did sell the agent. And that was the last statement that he had made.
In view of the prejudicial nature of this testimony, we ordered up a certified transcript of the tape recording of the hearing before the magistrate.
The transcript revealed that at this initial appearance, which is required by Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,7 Dohm and the other defendants were given a copy of the complaint against them. The magistrate then warned them that they had a right to remain silent and that any statement they made could be used against them in court. He told them that they had a right to an attorney and that the court could appoint an attorney for anyone who could not afford to hire one.8 The magistrate asked each defendant individually if he had an attorney or needed to have one appointed. Dohm replied that he thought he had the money to hire an attorney, but he would have to find one. August 9 was announced as the deadline for the attorney to file an appearance.
The defendants were then sworn in. The magistrate explained that they were entitled to have a preliminary hearing at which the government would be called upon to make a probable cause showing and the defendants could also put on evidence, and that if probable cause were found, the matter would be bound over to the grand jury. Next the bond discussion began, it being specifically explained that this was not the preliminary hearing but that a bond hearing could be given at this time. The defendants were cautioned that they could wait until they had attorneys with them. Once again it was pointed out that anything the men said could be used against them later.
All the defendants went ahead. John Dohm’s hearing was the last. After questioning him about his background, employment, and community ties, Mr. Palermo asked Agent O’Connor how Dohm had participated in the alleged crime. The following exchange took place:
THE COURT: Agent, what is his participation?
AGENT O’CONNOR: Mr. Dohm was the main source of the buy.
Mr. Rowen introduced Agent Castillo to him and during undercover negotiations Mr. Dohm stated to the agent that if this [543]*543went through that he would be able to supply the agent approximately one to two kilos on a steady basis after this.
THE WITNESS: But, your Honor, sir, it wasn’t true, but that’s what I told them.
THE COURT: Who did he tell that to?
AGENT O’CONNOR: Agent Castillo.
THE COURT: Are you here?
AGENT O’CONNOR: Yes, sir.
AGENT CASTILLO: Yes, sir, I am.
THE COURT: Did he tell you that?
AGENT CASTILLO: Yes, sir.
I told him if he would be willing to supply on a steady basis that this was, you know, the first time and I was a good customer and I would come to him, you know, several times afterward, and if there would be any problems in supplying me with additional amounts, and he said it would be no problem.
THE WITNESS: It’s — (inaudible).
THE COURT: Now, remember you don’t have a lawyer with you now and this is just a bond hearing.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: You might hurt yourself to get involved too much, but if you know what you’re doing, what you’re saying, it’s — (inaudible).
THE WITNESS: I would just say that it took me almost two weeks to get what I got, and I don’t think I could get it again.
The Constitution does not require that an accused have an attorney with him at his initial appearance before a magistrate. Indeed, in many cases it is at this point that an accused is informed of his right to an attorney or to have an attorney appointed for him if he cannot afford one and the machinery is set in motion for the appointment of counsel.
As in this case, an accused person is entitled to be warned that any statements he makes can be used against him. If he is not so warned, under Miranda 9 any incriminating statements he makes may not be admitted at trial. The situation here, however, is that the appellant was given his rights and was warned at least thrice that his statements could hurt him.
The Supreme Court has pointed out on several occasions that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination does not preclude a competent witness from testifying voluntarily and of his own free will in matters which may incriminate anyone, including himself. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 186-187, 97 S.Ct. 1814, 1818-1819, 52 L.Ed.2d 238 (1977) [testimony before a grand jury], citing, United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427, 63 S.Ct. 409, 87 L.Ed. 376 (1943) and United States v. Kimball, 117 F. 156, 163 (CC SDNY, 1902); accord, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966).
The Supreme Court noted in Washington, supra, that “[i]ndeed, far from being prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently desirable. . . Absent some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not violated by even the most damning admissions.”
We are entirely confident that the defendant was not coerced in his appearance before the magistrate. It is quite evident that he was anxious to get bail fixed in the hope that he could post it and thus obtain quick release from custody. The defendant had chosen not to wait until Wednesday to see if he could retain counsel. The magistrate had warned him not to make any statements which might harm him later. Nevertheless, Dohm chose to blurt out the statement which he now wishes he had never made.
We see no merit in Dohm’s claim that he was compelled to speak in order to safeguard his Eighth Amendment right to reasonable bail. He wishes to analogize his situation to that of a defendant who wishes to contest the legality of a search and, to do so, may necessarily be required in his testi[544]*544mony to give incriminating evidence against himself, Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). In Simmons the Supreme Court recognized that a defendant should not be forced to give up one Constitutional right in order to preserve another and held that incriminating testimony given on a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds is inadmissible at trial on the merits.
Here, we have a different matter. The Eighth Amendment right to bail, as implemented in Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 18 U.S.C. § 3146, is guaranteed. It was not necessary for the defendant to assert this right affirmatively or to offer testimony in support of the right. The sole issue, was the amount of bail to be assessed, whether secured or unsecured. The magistrate was seeking information relevant to that issue.
When the officer testified that Dohm had said he could furnish more cocaine on a regular basis it must have occurred to Dohm that the magistrate was likely to be reluctant to fix bail at an amount which would release him to pursue the business. Consequently, he elected to make his unfortunate rebuttal.
It might be added, however, that the prosecutor, as a matter of sound trial strategy, would have been well advised to avoid this issue. Dohm had been caught red handed and what he said at some other time and place was hardly essential to a conviction.
The convictions of both appellants are AFFIRMED.