United States v. Joel Boyd

Ninth Circuit

United States v. Joel Boyd

480 F.3d 1178, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 6797, 2007 WL 869019

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMarch 23, 2007

Docket06-50051

StatusPublished

Cited by13 cases

This text of 480 F.3d 1178 (United States v. Joel Boyd) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Joel Boyd, 480 F.3d 1178, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 6797, 2007 WL 869019 (9th Cir. 2007).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Boyd and his cohorts robbed Cash Plus at gunpoint of $26,000 and were convicted. Boyd appeals, contending that the government failed to prove two requisite elements of a Hobbs Act conviction: (1) that Cash Plus was engaged in interstate commerce; and (2) that the robbery in any way obstructed, delayed, or affected interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).

The government proved that Cash Plus, although owned by a domestic California corporation, operated a Western Union money transfer business, cashed government checks, and provided ATM services that allowed customers to access bank accounts outside of California. Western Union money transfers generated in the Cash Plus store were cleared electronically through a clearing house in Missouri. The record shows that the robbery caused the Cash Plus store to close early the day of the robbery and left it without funds with which to open the next business day. The district court correctly concluded that the evidence was sufficient to permit any rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cash Plus was engaged in interstate commerce, see Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 9-10, 24 L.Ed. 708 (1877), and that Boyd’s robbery of Cash Plus potentially impacted interstate commerce. See United States v. Atcheson, 94 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir.1996).

The “substantially affects” language in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000), does not displace our cases requiring only a de minimis effect on interstate commerce to support a Hobbs Act prosecution. See United States v. Lynch, 437 F.3d 902, 908-09 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc) (per curiam); United States v. Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir.2004).

AFFIRMED.

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PER CURIAM.

Boyd and his cohorts robbed Cash Plus at gunpoint of $26,000 and were convicted. Boyd appeals, contending that the government failed to prove two requisite elements of a Hobbs Act conviction: (1) that Cash Plus was engaged in interstate commerce; and (2) that the robbery in any way obstructed, delayed, or affected interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).

The government proved that Cash Plus, although owned by a domestic California corporation, operated a Western Union money transfer business, cashed government checks, and provided ATM services that allowed customers to access bank accounts outside of California. Western Union money transfers generated in the Cash Plus store were cleared electronically through a clearing house in Missouri. The record shows that the robbery caused the Cash Plus store to close early the day of the robbery and left it without funds with which to open the next business day. The district court correctly concluded that the evidence was sufficient to permit any rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cash Plus was engaged in interstate commerce, see Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 9-10, 24 L.Ed. 708 (1877), and that Boyd’s robbery of Cash Plus potentially impacted interstate commerce. See United States v. Atcheson, 94 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir.1996).

The “substantially affects” language in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000), does not displace our cases requiring only a de minimis effect on interstate commerce to support a Hobbs Act prosecution. See United States v. Lynch, 437 F.3d 902, 908-09 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc) (per curiam); United States v. Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir.2004).

AFFIRMED.

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480 F.3d 1178, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 6797, 2007 WL 869019, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-joel-boyd-ca9-2007.

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