United States v. Jobeth Dejesus

710 F. App'x 333
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 29, 2018
Docket17-50024
StatusUnpublished

This text of 710 F. App'x 333 (United States v. Jobeth Dejesus) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Jobeth Dejesus, 710 F. App'x 333 (9th Cir. 2018).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Jobeth Lester DeJesus appeals from the sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for possession of images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

DeJesus contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to acknowledge its discretion to reject the child pornography guidelines on policy grounds under Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), and by providing an insufficient explanation for the sentence. The record reflects that the district court recognized its Kim-brough discretion, considered Dejesus’s arguments regarding his mental health, and adequately explained the below-Guidelines sentence. See United States v. Ayala-Nicanor, 659 F.3d 744, 752-53 (9th Cir. 2011).

DeJesus next argues that the 51-month term of imprisonment is substantively unreasonable because the district court gave too much weight to the .Guidelines, The district court properly considered the Guidelines as a starting point and initial benchmark, as required by. Molina-Martinez v. United States, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 1338, 1345, 194 L.Ed.2d 444 (2016), and then gave due consideration to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Dejesus’s sentence, which is substantively reasonable in light of the 3553(a) factors and the totality of the circumstances. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).

Finally, DeJesus contends that the 10-year term of supervised release is substantively unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing this term of supervised release in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) factors and the totality of the circumstances, including the need to rehabilitate DeJesus. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586; United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 923-24 (9th Cir. 2008).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Kimbrough v. United States
552 U.S. 85 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Gall v. United States
552 U.S. 38 (Supreme Court, 2007)
United States v. Ayala-Nicanor
659 F.3d 744 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
United States v. Daniels
541 F.3d 915 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Molina-Martinez v. United States
578 U.S. 189 (Supreme Court, 2016)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
710 F. App'x 333, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-jobeth-dejesus-ca9-2018.