United States v. Ji Chaoqun

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedJuly 10, 2024
Docket23-1262
StatusPublished

This text of United States v. Ji Chaoqun (United States v. Ji Chaoqun) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Ji Chaoqun, (7th Cir. 2024).

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-1262 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

JI CHAOQUN, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 18-CR-611 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED APRIL 3, 2024 — DECIDED JULY 10, 2024 ____________________

Before ST. EVE, KIRSCH, and LEE, Circuit Judges. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. This case asks us to answer questions about the meaning of an espionage statute more than a cen- tury old. The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 951, imposes penalties upon anyone acting within the United States as an agent of a foreign government without first registering as such with the Attor- ney General—that is, unless they fall under one of four enu- merated exceptions. The relevant one here excludes anyone “engaged in a legal commercial transaction.” Id. § 951(d)(4). 2 No. 23-1262

Following his conviction as an unregistered foreign agent, Ji Chaoqun argues that the government must negate the legal commercial transaction exception as an element of the of- fense—lifting his burden to prove the exception as an affirm- ative defense. He also urges us to decide that the specific ac- tion a defendant takes on U.S. soil for a foreign principal is an element of the offense and therefore requires jury unanimity. We disagree and hold that a jury need not unanimously decide which act a foreign agent committed when charged with violating § 951. Similarly, we find that the legal commer- cial transaction exception is an affirmative defense. Accord- ingly, Ji’s legal challenges to his § 951 conviction fail. So do the various other challenges he raises to the district court’s ev- identiary and sentencing decisions. I. Background Ji Chaoqun is a Chinese national who came to the United States in 2013 to study electrical engineering at the Illinois In- stitute of Technology in Chicago, Illinois. In May 2022, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment against Ji, charging him with conspiring to commit an offense against or defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, fail- ing to register as a foreign agent in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 951(a), two counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and making a materially false statement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). At Ji’s trial in September 2022, the government presented evidence that the Chinese Ministry of State Security recruited Ji before he left China for his graduate studies in the United States. The Ministry of State Security, or “MSS,” is an arm of the Chinese government engaged in foreign intelligence and No. 23-1262 3

espionage, including stealing foreign technologies. The MSS began courting Ji at a career fair in January 2013 while he was in his last year of university in China. At that career fair, Ji met Zha Rong, an MSS agent looking to recruit for the organiza- tion. Zha asked Ji if he was interested in joining a “confiden- tial unit,” to which Ji expressed interest. Ji’s text messages later that summer show that he first considered joining the MSS’s Counterintelligence Investigation Bureau, which inves- tigates foreign spies in China, but eventually he learned that the MSS would “train [him] to do things on their behalf” in the United States. After meeting with another MSS agent, Geng Zhengjun, Ji departed China in August 2013 to begin his graduate studies at the Illinois Institute of Technology. The MSS, through Geng, paid for Ji’s flight to the United States. In December 2013, Ji returned to China where he had mul- tiple meetings with MSS officers. Xu Yanjun, who specialized in stealing aviation-related secrets, met with Ji twice. Mean- while, Geng took Ji to dinner. The MSS facilitated these meet- ings by paying for some of Ji’s travel within China. Photos from his trip found on Ji’s phone provided addi- tional evidence of Ji’s relationship with the MSS. One photo, taken on December 31, showed stacks of $100 bills. He also had a photo of a document titled “Registration Form for Per- sonnel Working Overseas of the Ministry of State Security” with the heading “Top Secret—Long Term.” The otherwise blank form was already populated with Ji’s name. Ji also had photos of a training manual explaining how to respond to FBI questions. And an additional photo from January 10, 2014, the day of Ji’s second meeting with Xu, showed more stacks of $100 bills. Ji texted his father that day telling him he had re- ceived $6,000 in U.S. currency. 4 No. 23-1262

A few days after his second meeting with Xu and receiving this payment, Ji returned to the United States. He then mes- saged Yu Wenzhi, a friend from high school studying engi- neering at George Washington University. Attaching photos of cash and the MSS registration form, Ji explained that he had been given $20,000, which he would share with Yu if Yu be- friended engineers in aircraft design and aircraft engines. Ji does not appear to have followed up on this conversation. Thereafter, Ji met with MSS officers during two more brief trips to China, one in May 2014 and another in December 2014. In July 2015, Xu checked in to see how Ji was doing; Ji lied and said he had an internship that summer at Motorola (he did receive an offer but had turned it down). Then, in Au- gust 2015, Xu asked Ji to purchase background reports on eight scientists, most born in China or Taiwan, working in the United States on aviation technologies. Ji purchased reports from three specific credit report companies Xu identified, each time using an email address Ji opened under an alias. He then sent Xu those reports from the same email address in a compressed and encrypted file, with the subject “Midterm test questions.” A few weeks later, Xu instructed Ji to do the same thing with a ninth person, which Ji did. In return, Xu paid Ji $1,000. On October 29, 2015, Ji filled out an application for the FBI’s Honors Talent Internship Program but left the citizen- ship field blank. He took no other steps to obtain employment with the FBI. Instead, Ji enlisted in the U.S. Army Reserves on May 20, 2016 as part of the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (“MAVNI”) program, which would expe- dite his application for U.S. citizenship. Although the MSS did not direct him to take this step, Ji informed them he had joined No. 23-1262 5

the U.S. military and told an acquaintance he was “under- cover at the Department of Defense” doing “intelligence stuff” in the army. The acquaintance remembered that this was Ji’s goal in high school. Then, in 2018, U.S. authorities arrested Xu in Belgium. Af- terwards, Ji met three times with someone he believed to be an MSS agent investigating Xu’s arrest and Ji’s potential ex- posure. In reality, that “MSS agent” was an undercover FBI agent. When the agent first approached Ji, Ji expressed some hesitation but ultimately accompanied him to a nearby hotel. At all three meetings, the agent conducted recorded inter- views in one of the guest rooms of the hotel. In those meet- ings, Ji explained he had received cash from MSS officers and signed receipts for the payments. Ji also shared his independ- ent efforts, including how he aimed to get citizenship quickly through the MAVNI program. Once he obtained citizenship, he would look for jobs with top-secret clearance, including positions at the CIA, FBI, and NASA.

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