United States v. Jesus Marrufo

381 F. App'x 403
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJune 15, 2010
Docket09-50834
StatusUnpublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 381 F. App'x 403 (United States v. Jesus Marrufo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Jesus Marrufo, 381 F. App'x 403 (5th Cir. 2010).

Opinion

PER CURIAM: *

Jesus Marrufo appeals his conviction for failing to comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SOR-NA), 1 a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Four issues remain, each of which is foreclosed by court precedent.

First, Marrufo makes what he is calling a sufficiency of the evidence claim. The parties agree that the government had to prove that Marrufo (1) was required to register under SORNA, (2) traveled in interstate or foreign commerce, and (3) “knowingly fail[ed] to register or update a registration as required by [SORNA].” 2 Marrufo focuses on the third prong, urging conviction requires proof the defendant “knew” the specific SORNA requirements. We have consistently rejected this type of argument, commenting that “ignorance of the law is not a defense” and “ ‘SORNA’s criminal provision is not a specific intent law.’ ” 3

*405 Second, Marrufo suggests that his conviction -violates due process because Texas has not yet implemented SORNA’s provisions. This court has already rejected that line of attack. 4 Third, Marrufo argues that, with SORNA, Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause. The defendant concedes this argument is foreclosed by United States v. Whaley. 5 Last, Marrufo urges that SORNA violates his due process rights for not giving sex offenders notice of its registration requirements, but concedes that Whaley also forecloses this argument. 6 AFFIRMED.

*

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir R. 47.5.4.

1

. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913.

2

. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).

3

. United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254, 262 n. 6 (5th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 468 (4th Cir.2009)); see also United States v. Contreras, 380 Fed.Appx. 434, 435-36, 2010 WL 2332073, at *1 (5th Cir.2010) (unpublished); United States v. McBroom, 2010 U.S.App. LEXIS 11113, at *2-*3 (5th Cir. June 1, 2010) (unpublished); United States v. Knezek, 376 Fed.Appx. 394, 395 (5th Cir.2010) (unpublished); United States v. Puente, 348 Fed.Appx. 76, 77 (5th Cir.2009) (unpublished).

4

. See United States v. Heth, 596 F.3d 255, 258-60 (5th Cir.2010). "Texas ... had a sex offender registry in which [defendant] could have registered, as was required of him." Id. at 259.

5

. 577 F.3d at 258-61.

6

.Id. at 261-62.

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381 F. App'x 403, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-jesus-marrufo-ca5-2010.