USCA4 Appeal: 22-4258 Doc: 35 Filed: 07/31/2023 Pg: 1 of 17
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4258
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JEFFREY M. REED,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Bluefield. David A. Faber, Senior District Judge. (1:20-cr-00066-1)
Argued: March 10, 2023 Decided: July 31, 2023
Before WILKINSON, HARRIS, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Harris joined.
ARGUED: David Robert Bungard, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Erik S. Goes, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Wesley P. Page, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. William S. Thompson, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 22-4258 Doc: 35 Filed: 07/31/2023 Pg: 2 of 17
RUSHING, Circuit Judge:
A jury convicted Jeffrey M. Reed of two crimes arising out of an elaborate ploy to
intimidate an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent into halting her efforts to collect his
delinquent tax debt. On appeal, Reed challenges the validity of both convictions along
with three enhancements the district court imposed at sentencing. We affirm.
I.
Reed owed the IRS a substantial amount in past-due taxes. After the IRS’s ordinary
collection efforts failed, the agency transferred Reed’s case to its Abusive Tax Avoidance
Transactions division, a specialized unit that handles difficult cases involving tax avoiders
and repeat offenders. An IRS agent using the agency-approved pseudonym T.L. Blake was
assigned to pursue Reed’s case. Initially, Blake sent Reed a collection letter and attempted
to visit him at home, but to no avail. Blake also sent a notice of levy to Reed’s employer,
the Holiday Lodge & Conference Center in Oak Hill, West Virginia, directing the hotel to
garnish Reed’s wages. When the Holiday Lodge did not respond, Blake traveled to West
Virginia and visited the hotel. There, she served a final notice of levy directing the hotel
to begin garnishing Reed’s wages or risk facing a penalty.
The hotel’s owner, Sara Nelson, decided to comply with Blake’s directive and
garnish Reed’s wages. When Nelson told Reed her intentions, Reed became upset and
tried to convince Nelson to send a letter on his behalf, written by him, challenging the
garnishment. In one of Reed’s draft letters, he included a thinly veiled threat to sue Nelson
if she garnished his wages. Nelson declined to send a letter for Reed, garnished his wages,
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and soon fired him because of his hostility toward her and threat to sue her. She garnished
approximately $600 from one of Reed’s paychecks.
Around the same time, Reed mailed back to the IRS copies of documents Blake had
served on the hotel and mailed to Reed. In an accompanying letter, Reed claimed the
documents were instruments good for the value of his debt. Frivolous avoidance tactics
like this were not new to Reed. Years prior, in 2013, the IRS sent Reed a letter warning
him against such conduct. Blake referred the mailing to the IRS’s Frivolous Return Unit,
which handles such correspondence.
In response to Blake’s attempts to collect his taxes, Reed filed a lien and various
related documents against Blake and Nelson with the Mercer County, West Virginia clerk
alleging the two owed him nearly $5 million arising from 165 constitutional violations they
supposedly committed against him. Reed then recorded financing statements purporting
to perfect security interests in the lien. The financing statements listed Nelson and Blake
as lien debtors and asserted that Reed, as the creditor, had a security interest in their real
and personal property because of the supposed debt. Reed recorded one financing
statement against Blake in Maryland and one against Nelson in West Virginia, the latter of
which he twice amended. Before he filed the lien and related documents, Reed sent
“courtesy notices” of some of these documents to IRS officials on at least three occasions
to apprise them of “the legal action” he was taking against Blake. J.A. 460. He also sent
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letters to insurance commissioners in several States complaining that Blake and Nelson
had not provided bonding information to cover the amount alleged in the lien. 1
When Blake learned of the financing statement Reed had filed against her, she
referred it to the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, which investigated
the filing. As part of the investigation, two officers interviewed Reed, who voluntarily
spoke with them at his home. Reed admitted creating and filing the lien and financing
statement against Blake, acknowledged receiving the 2013 letter warning him against
frivolous tax-avoidance tactics, and initialed each document. Reed explained he developed
the strategy to file a lien and financing statement by “talk[ing] to individuals and
research[ing] it on the internet and that [he] had concluded that this was going to be the
only way he could get the IRS to leave him alone.” J.A. 151. Although Reed disclaimed
an intention to try to enforce the lien, he told the officers he could enforce it “at any time”
and that the filings “would not go away without him signing off, or making them go away,
that they would exist continuously”; he also acknowledged that the filings could impact
Blake’s credit score and ability to obtain credit. J.A. 152.
Although Reed never attempted to enforce the lien, his filings negatively impacted
both Blake and Nelson. When Blake tried to purchase a home, she had to list her
pseudonym as an alias on her mortgage application. The lender then found Reed’s lien,
requiring Blake to undertake significant efforts to clear up the matter to complete her
1 Reed also sent Blake and two other IRS officials a notice alleging Blake had violated a copyright Reed supposedly owns in his name and owed him $9 million in damages. 4 USCA4 Appeal: 22-4258 Doc: 35 Filed: 07/31/2023 Pg: 5 of 17
purchase. As for Nelson, she perceived the lien and financing statement to be a serious
threat to her business and was afraid Reed would try to take the hotel from her. She later
reemployed Reed as an independent contractor when she needed additional maintenance
staff, reasoning that repairing their relationship might convince him to void the lien.
In May 2020, a grand jury charged Reed with filing or attempting to file a false lien
or encumbrance against a federal employee in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1521. Reed moved
to dismiss, arguing that because he filed the lien against the IRS agent’s pseudonym, T.L.
Blake, he did not file it against an “individual” as required under Section 1521. The district
court denied the motion, concluding the indictment was sufficient and Reed’s arguments
on the merits were premature. The grand jury later returned a superseding indictment that
maintained the Section 1521 charge (Count 1) and added a charge for attempting to
interfere with the administration of internal revenue laws in violation of 26 U.S.C.
§ 7212(a) (Count 2), and the case proceeded to trial.
When the Government concluded its case-in-chief, Reed moved for a judgment of
acquittal. The district court reserved ruling on the motion, and the jury convicted Reed on
both counts. At sentencing, the court denied Reed’s motion for acquittal and explained the
decision in a written order. The court overruled Reed’s objections to various sentencing
enhancements and sentenced Reed to 60 months’ imprisonment on Count 1 and 36 months’
imprisonment on Count 2, to run concurrently, followed by 3 years of supervised release.
Reed appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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II.
Reed contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions on both
counts. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we will
uphold a conviction if substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict. See United States
v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 258 (4th Cir. 2019). “Substantial evidence is evidence that a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of
a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Hackley, 662 F.3d 671,
678 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). We do not “assess witness
credibility,” and we presume “that the jury resolved any conflicting evidence in the
prosecution’s favor.” United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 219 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal
quotation marks omitted). A defendant “bears a heavy burden” to justify reversal under
this standard. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
A.
Count 1 of the superseding indictment charged Reed with filing and attempting to
file a false lien or encumbrance against Blake in retaliation for her efforts to collect his
past-due taxes. At trial, the Government rested on the theory that Reed attempted to file a
false lien against the IRS agent who was working to collect his overdue taxes and only
failed to complete the crime because he used Blake’s pseudonym instead of her real name
on the lien. The jury accepted that argument. On appeal, Reed contends that his attempt
conviction is invalid because he filed the lien against a pseudonym, and so he did not
attempt to file it against an “individual,” as required under Section 1521. We disagree.
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Section 1521 of Title 18 makes it unlawful to “file[], attempt[] to file, or conspire[]
to file, in any public record . . . , any false lien or encumbrance against the real or personal
property of an individual described in section 1114, on account of the performance of
official duties by that individual, knowing or having reason to know that such lien or
encumbrance is false or contains any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation.” An “individual described in section 1114” includes “any officer or
employee of the United States or of any agency in any branch of the United States
Government (including any member of the uniformed services)” as well as “any person
assisting such an officer or employee.” 18 U.S.C. § 1114(a). Congress enacted Section
1521 to prevent attempts to harass and intimidate federal employees in the exercise of their
official duties by filing false liens or encumbrances. See United States v. Neal, 776 F.3d
645, 653 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Reed, 668 F.3d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 2012).
Because Section 1521 covers attempts and conspiracies, “the statute is not confined
to completed acts” and “can be violated without completed conduct.” Neal, 776 F.3d at
653; see United States v. Jordan, 851 F.3d 393, 397–398 (5th Cir. 2017). To obtain a
conviction on an attempt theory, the Government had to prove that (1) Reed “had culpable
intent to commit the crime” and (2) “he took a substantial step towards completion of the
crime that strongly corroborates that intent.” United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405, 419–
420 (4th Cir. 2012).
The evidence against Reed on Count 1 was overwhelming. Reed admitted to
Treasury Department investigators that he developed his scheme as “retaliation for the
[IRS] going after him” and with the intent “to get the IRS to leave him alone.” J.A. 151,
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182. He then took steps to carry out his plan by filing a lien and related financing statement
against Blake, a federal IRS agent, alleging a nearly $5 million debt. Reed candidly
admitted to investigators that he was responsible for these filings and acknowledged that
they could harm Blake’s credit score and ability to obtain credit. The allegations Reed
included in the lien itself leave no doubt he created and recorded the instrument in
retaliation for Blake’s enforcement actions. And the jury could conclude that Reed knew
or had reason to know the lien was fraudulent, given the arbitrariness of the debt
calculation, the absence of any credible support for it, and Blake’s testimony that she owed
Reed nothing.
Despite this evidence against him, Reed argues that he did not attempt to file a false
lien or encumbrance against an “individual” within the meaning of Section 1521 because
he filed the lien against “T.L. Blake,” the IRS agent’s pseudonym. According to Reed, the
statute does not apply to fictitious persons and his mistake about Blake’s real name
precludes criminal liability.
We agree with the district court that Reed’s argument misses the mark because he
attempted to file the lien against the property of a real federal employee. Even accepting
Reed’s definitions of “individual” for the sake of argument—“a single human being” or “a
private or natural person”—Blake’s use of a pseudonym does not make her any less an
“individual described in section 1114.” Opening Br. 17–18 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Blake was a federal employee and a “natural person” who testified at trial. She
used a pseudonym while on the job pursuant to a statute and IRS rules allowing her to do
so. See IRS Restructuring & Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–206, § 3706, 112 Stat.
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685, 778 (1998); see also Haber v. United States, 823 F.3d 746, 755 n.6 (2d Cir. 2016);
Sanders v. United States, 53 F.3d 343 (Table), 1995 WL 257812, at *1 (10th Cir. 1995).
The pseudonym was a constant feature of her employment as a revenue officer. And it
identified her specifically—for example, it was the name on her badge and business cards.
Indeed, the pseudonym so identified Blake that she felt compelled to list it as a known alias
on a personal mortgage application. Blake did not hide from Reed her identity as an IRS
agent or that she was attempting to enforce federal tax laws against him. She hid only her
real name.
The use of a pseudonym is fundamentally different from the creation of a wholly
fictitious persona. For example, Reed relies on United States v. Haas, 986 F.3d 467 (4th
Cir. 2021), which concerned information about nonexistent children used to lure a suspect
during a sex-trafficking investigation. See id. at 472, 479–480. Interpreting a provision of
the Sentencing Guidelines, we noted that “the term ‘individual’” as used there did not
“unambiguously include[] fictitious victims.” Id. at 479 n.6. The problem for Reed, aside
from the different statutory context, is that Blake is a real person—and a real IRS agent—
working under an alias. She is no more fictitious than George Eliot or Mark Twain.
At best, Reed’s argument amounts to a factual impossibility defense, which “exists
where the objective is proscribed by the criminal law but a factual circumstance unknown
to the actor prevents him from bringing it about.” United States v. Hamrick, 43 F.3d 877,
885 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Reed doesn’t dispute on appeal
that he attempted to file a false lien against the IRS agent who was working to collect his
overdue taxes; he simply argues that his mistake about her real name prevented him from
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completing the crime. But factual impossibility is not a defense to an attempt charge. See
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 300 (2008); Engle, 676 F.3d at 420; Hamrick, 43
F.3d at 885. So Reed’s argument fails. 2
Because the Government presented ample evidence to convict Reed of attempting
to file a retaliatory false lien against Blake, we affirm his conviction on Count 1.
B.
The jury also convicted Reed on Count 2, which charged a violation of the so-called
“Omnibus Clause” of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). Specifically, the superseding indictment
charged Reed with “corruptly . . . endeavor[ing] to obstruct or impede[] the due
administration of” the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). Reed argues his
conviction cannot be squared with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Omnibus
Clause in Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018). Again, we disagree.
Under Marinello, the Government had to prove that a “nexus” existed “between
[Reed’s] conduct and a particular administrative proceeding.” Id. at 1109. This is because
the phrase “due administration of [the Tax Code]” in the Omnibus Clause, 26 U.S.C.
§ 7212(a), does not include “routine, day-to-day work carried out in the ordinary course by
the IRS, such as the review of tax returns,” Marinello, 138 S. Ct. at 1110. Rather, the
clause reaches specific interference with “targeted governmental tax-related proceedings,
2 Reed asserts his argument is one of legal impossibility, but we are unconvinced. That defense “is available where the defendant’s acts, even if fully carried out as intended, would not constitute a crime.” Hamrick, 43 F.3d at 885. Reed intended to file a false lien against the IRS agent who was attempting to collect his delinquent taxes. If carried out as intended, that conduct would certainly fall within Section 1521. 10 USCA4 Appeal: 22-4258 Doc: 35 Filed: 07/31/2023 Pg: 11 of 17
such as a particular investigation or audit” or “other targeted administrative action.” Id. at
1104, 1109; see United States v. Prelogar, 996 F.3d 526, 533–534 (8th Cir. 2021)
(discussing Marinello); United States v. Graham, 981 F.3d 1254, 1258–1259 (11th Cir.
2020) (same).
Reed argues only that Blake’s actions were routine IRS work and not the kind of
targeted administrative action that Marinello requires. He does not contest the jury’s
finding that he corruptly endeavored to obstruct or impede Blake’s administration of
federal tax law. Nor does he challenge the jury instructions articulating the elements of the
crime. We conclude that substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that Blake’s
enforcement efforts were a “particular administrative proceeding” such as “an investigation
or audit” and not “routine day-to-day work carried out in the ordinary course of business
by the IRS.” J.A. 385–386 (jury instructions).
By the time Blake was assigned to Reed’s case, the IRS’s regular collection efforts
had already failed, and the IRS had transferred Reed’s case to a specialized division. In
fact, the IRS had been trying to collect taxes from Reed for years. After being assigned to
Reed’s case, Blake completed “an analysis of the case,” “[i]ssued correspondence to
[Reed],” and “[t]ried to make field contact” by visiting Reed at home. J.A. 209. She then
issued a notice of levy to Reed’s employer, and when that produced no response, she
traveled to West Virginia and personally visited the Holiday Lodge to serve a final demand
that the hotel garnish Reed’s wages. These efforts were far from routine IRS work carried
out in the ordinary course and instead were a targeted investigation into and enforcement
action against Reed’s persistent refusal to pay taxes. See Graham, 981 F.3d at 1259
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(upholding Section 7212(a) conviction for obstructing targeted IRS collection efforts that
included assigning revenue officers to the case, issuing notices of levies, and seizing the
defendant’s property for resale).
In response, Reed raises several unpersuasive arguments. First, he contends Blake’s
work was routine because she did no investigation to determine “the nature or amount of
the delinquency.” Opening Br. 25. But the jury heard that Blake inherited Reed’s case
from other revenue officers who had made unsuccessful collection attempts for years. And
Blake testified that she completed “a normal investigation” that included undertaking “an
analysis of the case and all the actions that had taken place prior to [her] assignment.” J.A.
209. Her analysis of the case and subsequent efforts to collect these past-due amounts can
qualify as targeted administrative action without necessitating a recalculation of the
delinquency. Second, Reed relies on Blake’s trial testimony that garnishing wages was a
part of her “day-to-day duties” and her “normal course of business.” J.A. 268. Yet what
constitutes routine work for an officer in a specialized division that handles difficult cases
and repeat tax avoiders does not define what is routine for the whole agency.
Third, Reed cites data indicating that in 2020 and 2021, the IRS sent several hundred
thousand notices of levy annually and argues this shows that garnishing wages is a routine,
day-to-day IRS action. See IRS, Internal Revenue Service Data Book, 2021 59 (2022).
However, data from the same years also shows the IRS received over 157 million
individual income tax returns in 2020 and over 167 million such returns in 2021. See id.
at 4–5. The vast disparity between the total numbers of individual returns and notices of
levy rebuts Reed’s argument that garnishments are akin to “routine administrative
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procedures that are near-universally applied to all taxpayers.” Marinello, 138 S. Ct. at
1104. Finally, Reed points out that the IRS did not seize any of his property for resale.
But neither Marinello nor the jury instructions in this case require such a seizure in order
to bring an administrative action within the Omnibus Clause of Section 7212(a).
Accordingly, we affirm Reed’s conviction on Count 2.
III.
Reed also challenges his sentence on appeal, disputing the district court’s
application of three sentencing enhancements. In assessing whether a sentence is
procedurally unreasonable because of a misapplication of the Guidelines, we review the
district court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. See United
States v. Morehouse, 34 F.4th 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2022). “‘Where a Guidelines application
involves a mixed question of law and fact, the applicable standard turns on the nature of
the circumstances at issue.’” United States v. Dodd, 770 F.3d 306, 309 (4th Cir. 2014)
(quoting United States v. Adepoju, 756 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir. 2014)). “If the application
turns on a question of fact, the clear error standard applies; if it turns on a legal
interpretation, de novo review is appropriate.” Id.; see Adepoju, 756 F.3d at 256 (“If the
application is ‘essentially factual,’ we apply the clearly erroneous standard.” (quoting
United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 1989))).
Reed first argues the district court erroneously applied a six-level enhancement to
Count 1 under U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(1). That Guideline, which applies to “threatening or
harassing communications,” “hoaxes,” and “false liens,” calls for a six-level increase “[i]f
the offense involved any conduct evidencing an intent to carry out such threat.” U.S.S.G.
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§ 2A6.1(b)(1). The word “threat” in Section 2A6.1(b)(1) has “the same meaning” as in
“statutes criminalizing threats.” United States v. Spring, 305 F.3d 276, 280 (4th Cir. 2002).
“The pivotal inquiry” for application of the enhancement “is into the defendant’s intent and
the likelihood that the defendant would carry out the threat,” as evidenced by “any acts”
demonstrating such an intent. United States v. Worrell, 313 F.3d 867, 876 (4th Cir. 2002)
(internal quotations marks and brackets omitted); see United States v. Spencer, 628 Fed.
App. 867, 869 (4th Cir. 2015). Relevant conduct includes “both conduct that occurred
prior to the offense and conduct that occurred during the offense; however, conduct that
occurred prior to the offense must be substantially and directly connected to the offense,
under the facts of the case taken as a whole.” U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1 cmt. n.1. 3
The district court applied Section 2A6.1(b)(1) because Reed sent “courtesy notices”
to various IRS officials advising them of legal action he was initiating against Blake and
demonstrated his intent to carry out those threats by actually filing the false lien and related
financing statement. In support, the court relied on United States v. Jordan, in which the
Fifth Circuit upheld application of the same enhancement to a conviction under Section
1521 for filing false liens against a judge and prosecutor after threatening to do so. 851
F.3d at 395–396, 401–402.
3 Citing United States v. Campbell, 22 F.4th 438 (4th Cir. 2022), Reed claims this commentary is inconsistent with the Guideline’s text and therefore inapplicable. But we considered and rejected a similar argument in United States v. Worrell, 313 F.3d 867, 877– 878 (4th Cir. 2002). Reed does not cite Worrell, much less explain why we should deviate from that decision here. 14 USCA4 Appeal: 22-4258 Doc: 35 Filed: 07/31/2023 Pg: 15 of 17
We find no clear error in the district court’s essentially factual determination that
Reed’s actions justified the enhancement. Reed’s “courtesy notices” to IRS officials
arguably constituted threats to initiate legal action against Blake to attempt to take her
property. And Reed’s public filing of the lien and financing statement were overt acts that
demonstrated his intent to carry out the threat if Blake did not halt her collection efforts
against him. As Reed told the Treasury Department investigators, he believed “he could
enforce [the lien] at any time” and that it “would not go away without him signing off or
making [it] go away.” J.A. 152. Reed’s counterargument that he was not convicted for
making threats is unpersuasive because, as the Guideline commentary explains, the
enhancement includes “prior acts of threatening the victim that have a substantial and direct
connection to the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1 cmt. n.1.
Next, Reed contends the district court erred by applying an eight-level enhancement
to Count 2 for “causing or threatening to cause physical injury to a person, or property
damage, in order to obstruct the administration of justice.” U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B). The
Sentencing Commission included “property damage” in the enhancement “to address cases
in which property damage is caused or threatened as a means of intimidation or retaliation.”
Id. § 2J1.2 cmt. n.5. The district court determined that the lien Reed filed against Blake
and Nelson threatened “property damage” under the Guideline because the lien purported
to create a property right adverse to their ownership of their real and personal property in
order to interfere with and obstruct Blake’s enforcement of the tax laws. See Reed, 668
F.3d at 982. On appeal, Reed asserts that a lien does not damage property, especially
where, as here, it does not actually encumber particular property.
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We find no reversible error in the district court’s analysis. Although Section
2J1.2(b)(1)(B) requires any personal injury to be “physical,” the Guideline does not limit
the term “property damage” in the same way. And the Guideline explicitly encompasses
“threatening” to cause property damage. Thus, we will not disturb the district court’s
determination that, by filing a lien against Blake’s and Nelson’s property, Reed “caus[ed]
or threaten[ed] to cause” damage to their property. See Permanent Mission of India to the
United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 198 (2007) (“[A] lien has an immediate
adverse effect upon the amount which could be received on a sale, constituting a direct
interference with the property.” (internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted));
United States v. Small, 618 Fed. App. 870, 871 (7th Cir. 2015) (reasoning that a threat to
file a lien was “an expressed intent to harm property”).
Finally, Reed contends the district court erred by applying a two-level enhancement
to Count 2 for conduct “otherwise extensive in scope, planning, or preparation.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2J1.2(b)(3)(C). Several factors may be relevant to that assessment, “‘including the length
and scope of the criminal activity as well as the number of persons involved.’” United
States v. Pegg, 812 Fed. App. 851, 860 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Holland,
22 F.3d 1040, 1046 (11th Cir. 1994)). The district court relied on Reed’s efforts to
convince Nelson not to garnish his wages, his numerous frivolous legal filings in multiple
States, and his “campaign of serving notarized documents on Blake” purporting to show
she “personally wronged him” and owed him “millions of dollars.” J.A. 557–558.
Although Reed cites cases suggesting his conduct was less extensive than some other
defendants who received the same enhancement, the district court’s reasoning does not
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leave us with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United
States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 337 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 4
Thus, we affirm the district court’s application of the challenged sentencing enhancements.
IV.
Upon review, we find no reason to disturb the jury’s verdict in this case or the
district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines. Accordingly, the judgment of the
district court is
AFFIRMED.
4 We also note that, because we affirm the Section 2J1.2(b)(1)(B) enhancement, any error under subsection (b)(3)(C) is harmless. Removing the two-level enhancement would still leave Reed’s Guidelines range on Count 2 above the statutory maximum and therefore not call into question his statutory-maximum sentence on that count. See United States v. Kobito, 994 F.3d 696, 700, 704 (4th Cir. 2021) (holding that the proper application of one enhancement rendered any error in the application of another harmless “because, even without that enhancement, the statutory maximum would cap the Guidelines range”). 17