United States v. Jeffery Lamar Acree

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: July 9, 2024
• Docket: 23-14226
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 23-14226 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 07/09/2024 Page: 1 of 3

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 23-14226 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JEFFERY LAMAR ACREE,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 5:23-cr-00018-MTT-CHW-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-14226 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 07/09/2024 Page: 2 of 3

2 Opinion of the Court 23-14226

Before WILSON, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Jeffery Acree appeals his within-Guidelines, 38-month sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court placed too much weight on his criminal history relative to the other 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. When reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we consider the totality of the circumstances under a deferential abuse- of-discretion standard. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1188–89 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). A district court abuses its discretion by, among other things, committing a “clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors,” including by “balanc[ing] them unreasonably.” Id. at 1189 (quotation omitted). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden to show that it is unreasonable. United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). We will vacate only if “we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (quotation omitted). Further, “we ordinarily expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be reasonable.” United States v. Foster, 878 F.3d 1297, 1309 (11th Cir. 2018) (alteration adopted and quotation omitted). USCA11 Case: 23-14226 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 07/09/2024 Page: 3 of 3

23-14226 Opinion of the Court 3

Acree has not met his burden to show that his 38-month sentence was substantively unreasonable. “The weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” Clay, 483 F.3d at 743 (quotation omitted). The district court may “attach great weight” to any single factor or combination of factors. United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 638 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). And placing “substantial weight on a defendant’s criminal record is entirely consistent with § 3553(a) because five of the factors it requires a court to consider are related to criminal history.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1263 (11th Cir. 2015). Here, the district court properly considered all the § 3553(a) factors when selecting its sentence. Its choice to emphasize Acree’s criminal history when imposing a sentence near the top of his Guidelines range lies well within its discretion. AFFIRMED.