United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education

380 F.2d 385
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedMarch 29, 1967
DocketNos. 23345, 23331, 23335, 23274, 23365, 23173, 23192, 23253, 23116
StatusPublished
Cited by83 cases

This text of 380 F.2d 385 (United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967).

Opinions

PER CURIAM:

1. The Court sitting en banc adopts the opinion and decree filed in these cases December 29, 1966, subject to the clarifying statements in this opinion and the changes in the decree attached to this opinion.

2. School desegregation cases involve more than a dispute between certain Negro children and certain schools. If Negroes are ever to enter the mainstream of American life, as school children they must have equal educational opportunities with white children.

3. The Court holds that boards and officials administering public schools in this circuit1 have the affirmative duty under the Fourteenth Amendment to bring about an integrated, unitary school system in which there are no Negro schools and no white schools— just schools. Expressions in our earlier opinions distinguishing between integration and desegregation2 must yield to this affirmative duty we now recognize. In fulfilling this duty it is not enough for school authorities to offer Negro children the opportunity to attend formerly all-white schools. The necessity of overcoming the effects of the dual school system in this circuit requires integration of faculties, facilities, and activities, as well as students. To the extent that earlier decisions of this Court (more in the language of the opinions, than in the effect of the holdings) conflict with this view, the decisions are overruled. We refer specifically to the cases listed in footnote 3 of this opinion.3

[390]*390 4. Freedom of choice is not a goal in itself. It is a means to an end. A schoolchild has no inalienable right to choose his school. A freedom of choice plan is but one of the tools available to school officials at this stage of the process of converting the dual system of separate schools for Negroes and whites into a unitary system. The governmental objective of this conversion is— educational opportunities on equal terms to all. The criterion for determining the validity of a provision in a school desegregation plan is whether the provision is reasonably related to accomplishing this objective.

5. The percentages referred to in the Guidelines and in this Court’s decree are simply a rough rule of thumb for measuring the effectiveness of freedom of choice as a useful tool. The percentages are not a method for setting quotas or striking a balance. If the plan is Ineffective, longer on promises than performance, the school officials charged with initiating and administering a unitary system have not met the constitutional requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment; they should try other tools.

6. In constructing the original and revised decrees, the Court gave great weight to the 1965 and 1966 HEW Guidelines. These Guidelines establish minimum standards clearly applicable to disestablishing state-sanctioned segregation. These Guidelines and our decree are within the decisions of this Court, comply with the letter and spirit of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and meet the requirements of the United States Constitution. Courts in this circuit should give great weight to future HEW Guidelines, when such guidelines are applicable to this circuit and are within lawful limits. We express no opinion as to the applicability of HEW Guidelines in racially imbalanced situations such as occur in some other circuits where it is contended that state action may be found in state tolerance of de facto segregation or in such action as the drawing of attendance boundaries based on a neighborhood school system.

The Court reaffirms the reversal of the judgments below and the remand of each case for entry of the decree attached to this opinion.

The mandate will issue immediately.

CORRECTED DECREE.

It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the defendants, their agents, officers, employees and successors and all those in active concert and participation with them, be and they are permanently enjoined from discriminating on the basis of race or color in the operation of the school system. As set out more particularly in the body of the decree, they shall take affirmative action to disestablish all school segregation and to eliminate the effects of the dual school system:

I.

SPEED OF DESEGREGATION

Commencing with the 1967-68 school year, in accordance with this decree, all grades, including kindergarten grades, shall be desegregated and pupils assigned to schools in these grades without regard to race or color.

II.

EXERCISE OF CHOICE

The following provisions shall apply to all grades:

(a) Who May Exercise Choice. A choice of schools may be exercised by a parent or other adult person serving as the student’s parent. A student may exercise his own choice if he (1) is exercising a choice for the ninth or a higher grade, or (2) has reached the age of fifteen at the time of the exercise [391]*391of choice. Such a choice by a student is controlling unless a different choice is exercised for him by his parent or other adult person serving as his parent during the choice period or at such later time as the student exercises a choice. Each reference in this decree to a student’s exercising a choice means the exercise of the choice, as appropriate, by a parent or such other adult, or by the student himself.

(b) Annual Exercise of Choice. All students, both white and Negro, shall be required to exercise a free choice of schools annually.

(e) Choice Period. The period for exercising choice shall commence May 1, 1967 and end June 1, 1967, and in subsequent years shall commence March 1 and end March 31 preceding the school year for which the choice is to be exercised. No student or prospective student who exercises his choice within the choice period shall be given any preference because of the time within the period when such choice was exercised.

(d) Mandatory Exercise of Choice. A failure to exercise a choice within the choice period shall not preclude any student from exercising a choice at any time before he commences school for the year with respect to which the choice applies, but such choice may be subordinated to the choices of students who exercised choice before the expiration of the choice period. Any student who has not exercised his choice of school within a week after school opens shall be assigned to the school nearest his home where space is available under standards for determining available space which shall be applied uniformly throughout the system.

(e) Public Notice. On or within a week before the date the choice period opens, the defendants shall arrange for the conspicuous publication of a notice describing the provisions of this decree in the newspaper most generally circulated in the community. The text of the notice shall be substantially similar to the text of the explanatory letter sent home to parents. Publication as a legal notice will not be sufficient. Copies of this notice must also be given at that time to all radio and television stations located in the community. Copies of this decree shall be posted in each school in the school system and at the office of the Superintendent of Education.

(f) Mailing of Explanatory Letters and Choice Forms.

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628 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. Texas, 1985)
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Joe L. Lujan v. Franklin County Board of Education
766 F.2d 917 (Sixth Circuit, 1985)
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585 F. Supp. 453 (N.D. Texas, 1984)
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566 F. Supp. 511 (W.D. New York, 1983)
Berry v. Sch. Dist. of City of Benton Harbor
515 F. Supp. 344 (W.D. Michigan, 1981)
Milliken v. Bradley
433 U.S. 267 (Supreme Court, 1977)
Lee v. Chambers County Board of Education
533 F.2d 132 (Fifth Circuit, 1976)
Adams v. Rankin County Board of Education
524 F.2d 928 (Fifth Circuit, 1975)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
380 F.2d 385, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-jefferson-county-board-of-education-ca5-1967.