NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0306n.06
Case No. 25-1620
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Jul 15, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR v. ) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ) MICHIGAN JASON RINCONES, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION )
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; McKEAGUE and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
SUTTON, Chief Judge. Between 2001 and 2007, the State of Michigan convicted Jason
Rincones of several felonies, including armed robbery and distribution of narcotics. In 2024, when
his former girlfriend told him to leave her house, he aimed his pistol’s laser sight at her. Rincones
pleaded guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. At sentencing, the district court
enhanced his sentence based on the fact that Rincones pointed his pistol, not just the laser, at his
victim. We affirm.
I.
On March 2, 2024, Jason Rincones arrived uninvited at the home of his former girlfriend.
When she asked him to leave, he crouched in the bushes outside her residence and aimed the red
laser sight from his pistol at her body. Afraid what he might do next, she called the police. Officers
arrived at the scene, arrested Rincones, and asked him if he had a gun. He denied having a gun. No. 25-1620, United States v. Rincones
It took little time, however, for the officers to find his gun in the bushes beside the house with the
laser sight still attached. That presented a problem for Rincones, whose eight prior felony
convictions barred him from possessing a firearm. Rincones called his former girlfriend from jail
to apologize. When she told him that he had pointed a gun at her as if to try to kill her, he replied
“I can’t understand why I did what I did, man. I didn’t think.” R.54 at 6.
A federal grand jury indicted Rincones on one count of possessing a firearm as a felon.
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pleaded guilty, and the district court accepted his plea. During the
plea proceedings, Rincones admitted that he possessed the gun but denied that he pointed it at
anyone.
The Probation Office prepared a presentence report. Observing that Rincones’s conduct
separately amounted to felony assault with a dangerous weapon under Michigan law, the report
recommended that the district court apply a sentencing enhancement for the use of a gun “in
connection with another felony offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2024 Guidelines). Rincones
initially objected, arguing that he had pointed only the laser, not the gun, at his former girlfriend.
But when the Probation Office circulated an updated presentence report containing the same
recommendation, and when the district court asked whether he had any objections to his sentence,
he told the court that he had no remaining objections. The court applied the enhancement.
After reviewing Rincones’s long criminal history and the dangerousness of his offense, the
district court decided that his sentence should run consecutively to any sentence imposed by the
State of Michigan for Rincones’s parole violations. The court imposed a within-Guidelines
sentence of 126 months.
2 No. 25-1620, United States v. Rincones
II.
Enhancement for using a firearm. Rincones claims that the district court improperly
applied a four-level enhancement for “us[ing] or possess[ing] any firearm or ammunition in
connection with another felony offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Because Rincones forfeited
this argument by failing to raise it before the district court, he must satisfy the stringent
requirements of plain-error review. That is to say, he must show (1) an error, (2) that is plain,
(3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (quotation
omitted).
The § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement applies to defendants who use or possess a firearm or
ammunition “in connection with another felony offense.” Michigan-law assault with a dangerous
weapon, the separate felony at issue, requires: “(1) an assault, (2) with a dangerous weapon, and
(3) with the intent to injure or place the victim in reasonable apprehension of an immediate
battery.” People v. Nix, 836 N.W.2d 224, 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting People v. Avant,
597 N.W.2d 864, 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999)). Rincones disputes the second prong, arguing that
he pointed only a laser, not a gun, at his victim. The evidence at sentencing, however, amply
supports the district court’s contrary finding.
Rincones all but admitted what he now disputes. When he called his former girlfriend from
jail to apologize, she told him that he had aimed a gun at her: “you pointed it at me; from afar,
you were going to do it.” R.54 at 6. Rincones did not deny doing so. “I can’t understand,” he
replied, “why I did what I did.” R.54 at 6. “I didn’t think,” he then lamented. R.54 at 6. On top
of that, the firearm recovered at the scene “was equipped with a laser attachment” when officers
found it. R.54 at 5. “The deferential clear-error standard requires us to defer to the district court’s
3 No. 25-1620, United States v. Rincones
finding about what transpired” if we find it “plausible on the record as a whole.” United States v.
Estrada-Gonzalez, 32 F.4th 607, 614 (6th Cir. 2022). That Rincones pointed the whole pistol, and
not just the laser, at his former girlfriend is surely plausible, indeed exceedingly likely, on this
record. It follows that Rincones cannot show that the district court committed a plain error or
indeed any error in applying this enhancement. See United States v. Lester, 98 F.4th 768, 777 (6th
Cir. 2024).
Rincones tries to counter this conclusion by pointing out that the district court, in applying
the enhancement, failed to mention the incriminating phone call with his former girlfriend and the
police report. But one reason that the district court did not go into detail about this supporting
evidence is that, by that time in the proceeding, Rincones no longer challenged the enhancement.
Having failed to challenge the enhancement and having failed to identify this issue when the court
asked the Bostic question, Rincones is in no position to criticize the court for not saying more
about the many factual bases for this enhancement. Nothing in sentencing law, at any rate, requires
district courts to reason in the way of a mathematical proof, naming each fact and subsidiary
finding that supports an ultimate conclusion. United States v. Alexander, 59 F.3d 36, 39 (6th
Cir. 1995). If the district court makes the factual basis for the enhancement clear, the failure to
discuss more particularized findings by itself does not establish error, much less plain error. See
United States v. Clay, 162 F.4th 757, 779 (6th Cir. 2025).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0306n.06
Case No. 25-1620
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Jul 15, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR v. ) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ) MICHIGAN JASON RINCONES, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION )
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; McKEAGUE and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
SUTTON, Chief Judge. Between 2001 and 2007, the State of Michigan convicted Jason
Rincones of several felonies, including armed robbery and distribution of narcotics. In 2024, when
his former girlfriend told him to leave her house, he aimed his pistol’s laser sight at her. Rincones
pleaded guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. At sentencing, the district court
enhanced his sentence based on the fact that Rincones pointed his pistol, not just the laser, at his
victim. We affirm.
I.
On March 2, 2024, Jason Rincones arrived uninvited at the home of his former girlfriend.
When she asked him to leave, he crouched in the bushes outside her residence and aimed the red
laser sight from his pistol at her body. Afraid what he might do next, she called the police. Officers
arrived at the scene, arrested Rincones, and asked him if he had a gun. He denied having a gun. No. 25-1620, United States v. Rincones
It took little time, however, for the officers to find his gun in the bushes beside the house with the
laser sight still attached. That presented a problem for Rincones, whose eight prior felony
convictions barred him from possessing a firearm. Rincones called his former girlfriend from jail
to apologize. When she told him that he had pointed a gun at her as if to try to kill her, he replied
“I can’t understand why I did what I did, man. I didn’t think.” R.54 at 6.
A federal grand jury indicted Rincones on one count of possessing a firearm as a felon.
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pleaded guilty, and the district court accepted his plea. During the
plea proceedings, Rincones admitted that he possessed the gun but denied that he pointed it at
anyone.
The Probation Office prepared a presentence report. Observing that Rincones’s conduct
separately amounted to felony assault with a dangerous weapon under Michigan law, the report
recommended that the district court apply a sentencing enhancement for the use of a gun “in
connection with another felony offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2024 Guidelines). Rincones
initially objected, arguing that he had pointed only the laser, not the gun, at his former girlfriend.
But when the Probation Office circulated an updated presentence report containing the same
recommendation, and when the district court asked whether he had any objections to his sentence,
he told the court that he had no remaining objections. The court applied the enhancement.
After reviewing Rincones’s long criminal history and the dangerousness of his offense, the
district court decided that his sentence should run consecutively to any sentence imposed by the
State of Michigan for Rincones’s parole violations. The court imposed a within-Guidelines
sentence of 126 months.
2 No. 25-1620, United States v. Rincones
II.
Enhancement for using a firearm. Rincones claims that the district court improperly
applied a four-level enhancement for “us[ing] or possess[ing] any firearm or ammunition in
connection with another felony offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Because Rincones forfeited
this argument by failing to raise it before the district court, he must satisfy the stringent
requirements of plain-error review. That is to say, he must show (1) an error, (2) that is plain,
(3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (quotation
omitted).
The § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement applies to defendants who use or possess a firearm or
ammunition “in connection with another felony offense.” Michigan-law assault with a dangerous
weapon, the separate felony at issue, requires: “(1) an assault, (2) with a dangerous weapon, and
(3) with the intent to injure or place the victim in reasonable apprehension of an immediate
battery.” People v. Nix, 836 N.W.2d 224, 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting People v. Avant,
597 N.W.2d 864, 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999)). Rincones disputes the second prong, arguing that
he pointed only a laser, not a gun, at his victim. The evidence at sentencing, however, amply
supports the district court’s contrary finding.
Rincones all but admitted what he now disputes. When he called his former girlfriend from
jail to apologize, she told him that he had aimed a gun at her: “you pointed it at me; from afar,
you were going to do it.” R.54 at 6. Rincones did not deny doing so. “I can’t understand,” he
replied, “why I did what I did.” R.54 at 6. “I didn’t think,” he then lamented. R.54 at 6. On top
of that, the firearm recovered at the scene “was equipped with a laser attachment” when officers
found it. R.54 at 5. “The deferential clear-error standard requires us to defer to the district court’s
3 No. 25-1620, United States v. Rincones
finding about what transpired” if we find it “plausible on the record as a whole.” United States v.
Estrada-Gonzalez, 32 F.4th 607, 614 (6th Cir. 2022). That Rincones pointed the whole pistol, and
not just the laser, at his former girlfriend is surely plausible, indeed exceedingly likely, on this
record. It follows that Rincones cannot show that the district court committed a plain error or
indeed any error in applying this enhancement. See United States v. Lester, 98 F.4th 768, 777 (6th
Cir. 2024).
Rincones tries to counter this conclusion by pointing out that the district court, in applying
the enhancement, failed to mention the incriminating phone call with his former girlfriend and the
police report. But one reason that the district court did not go into detail about this supporting
evidence is that, by that time in the proceeding, Rincones no longer challenged the enhancement.
Having failed to challenge the enhancement and having failed to identify this issue when the court
asked the Bostic question, Rincones is in no position to criticize the court for not saying more
about the many factual bases for this enhancement. Nothing in sentencing law, at any rate, requires
district courts to reason in the way of a mathematical proof, naming each fact and subsidiary
finding that supports an ultimate conclusion. United States v. Alexander, 59 F.3d 36, 39 (6th
Cir. 1995). If the district court makes the factual basis for the enhancement clear, the failure to
discuss more particularized findings by itself does not establish error, much less plain error. See
United States v. Clay, 162 F.4th 757, 779 (6th Cir. 2025).
Consecutive sentence. Rincones separately argues that the district court failed to
adequately explain its decision to make his sentence consecutive to any potential state sentence for
his parole violation. Here, too, Rincones failed to object to the adequacy of the district court’s
reasoning when asked at the end of the sentencing hearing, and we accordingly review the
objection for plain error. See United States v. Harmon, 607 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 2010).
4 No. 25-1620, United States v. Rincones
District courts have considerable discretion in deciding whether to impose a consecutive
sentence. Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 236–38 (2012). “[I]n determining whether the
terms imposed are to be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively,” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b)
requires district courts to consider “the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a).” Section 3553(a),
in turn, instructs district courts to consider a range of factors, including “any pertinent policy
statement” issued by the United States Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5). The
most relevant policy statement says that district courts should structure sentences to achieve
“reasonable punishment for the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d). The application notes
advise courts to consider the § 3553(a) federal sentencing factors. Id. n.4(A). They additionally
recommend that, when the offense separately represents a parole violation, the sentence should
run consecutively to the sentence imposed for the violation. Id. n.4(C).
As for process, a district court “must do two things” in explaining why it imposed a
consecutive sentence. United States v. Gomez, 129 F.4th 954, 964 (6th Cir. 2025). First, it should
“turn[] its attention to” the relevant policy statement and commentary. United States v. Berry, 565
F.3d 332, 342 (6th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). A district court satisfies this obligation “by
reviewing and adopting a presentence report” that cites the relevant policy statement. Gomez, 129
F.4th at 964; United States v. Hartman, 426 F. App’x 395, 399–400 (6th Cir. 2011). Second, it
should make its reasoning “generally clear.” United States v. Johnson, 553 F.3d 990, 998 (6th
Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).
The district court readily satisfied these requirements. It explained that it reviewed the
presentence report, which referred to § 5G1.3(d) and which recommended a consecutive sentence.
And it made its reasoning “generally clear.” Id. (quotation omitted). The court began with a
lengthy discussion of the § 3553(a) factors, emphasizing the seriousness of Rincones’s crime and
5 No. 25-1620, United States v. Rincones
the armed robberies in his three-decade criminal history. It then responded to Rincones’s request
that his sentence run concurrently. “Quite frankly,” the court said, “I don’t know that that’s
appropriate given everything that we’ve talked about.” R.82 at 27. When the court engages “in a
lengthy discussion of the sentencing factors in explaining the sentence itself, it is generally clear
that the decision to impose a consecutive sentence is based on the same factors.” United States v.
Murphy, 591 F. App’x 377, 386 (6th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted); see Berry, 565 F.3d at 343;
United States v. Briggs, 543 F. App’x 583, 584 (6th Cir. 2013). The district court did not err, let
alone plainly.
We affirm.