United States v. Jason Demyers

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0321n.06

Case No. 25-1179

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FILED Jul 21, 2026 ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN JASON DEMYERS, aka Jason Blackman, ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION

Before: DAVIS, MATHIS, and RITZ, Circuit Judges.

DAVIS, Circuit Judge. Jason Demyers pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and

possess with intent to distribute controlled substances and possession with intent to distribute

cocaine. The district court sentenced him to 324 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of his

Guidelines range. On appeal, Demyers argues that his sentence is procedurally and substantively

unreasonable. In particular, he contends that the district court incorrectly calculated the drug

quantity attributable to him, failed to consider his policy disagreement with the Guidelines, erred

in applying two sentencing enhancements, and placed too much weight on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

We AFFIRM. No. 25-1179, United States v. Demyers

I.

A. Factual Background

In the fall of 2022, law enforcement began investigating a large-scale drug-trafficking

organization operating in the Western District of Michigan and other states. From this

investigation, authorities learned that Jason Demyers coordinated deliveries of methamphetamine

and cocaine for the organization.

In October 2022, Demyers organized the shipment of a FedEx package containing about

ten kilograms of methamphetamine to Jomo Grady. Law enforcement intercepted the package,

completed the delivery of a fake controlled substance to Grady, and arrested him. Demyers

maintained contact with Merria Wallace and Grady throughout the delivery. Merria Wallace

tracked the status of the package eighteen times and updated Demyers on its whereabouts. And,

at the time of Grady’s arrest, he was on a FaceTime call with Demyers.

Even as his co-conspirators fell away, Demyers continued his involvement in the

drug-trafficking organization. In November 2022, law enforcement arrested Evette Wallace after

seizing methamphetamine and other drugs from her vehicle during a traffic stop. Evette Wallace

revealed that she assisted Grady, Demyers, and Che Demyers in selling methamphetamine and

that Demyers was a supplier. Throughout 2022 and 2023, Demyers coordinated flights for money

couriers, Lanise Moody and Shirley Starks. Then, in June 2023, Demyers expressed to Franchot

Barnes that he was interested in purchasing two kilograms of cocaine. After Demyers paid,

Jonathan Conner prepared to meet Demyers with the drugs. But before Conner could complete

the delivery, law enforcement conducted a traffic stop and seized cocaine from his vehicle. Conner

informed authorities that he had completed three similar trips on behalf of Jamar Goins, whose

-2- No. 25-1179, United States v. Demyers

supplier was Demyers. This attempted delivery proved to be Demyers’s last, as he was arrested

in September 2023.

B. Procedural Background

A grand jury returned a four-count indictment against Demyers and several co-

conspirators. Demyers was charged in two of the counts: one count of conspiracy to distribute and

possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and

841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii), and (b)(1)(C) (“Count One”), and one count of possession with intent to

distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(ii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (“Count

Three”). Count One alleged that the offense involved 50 grams or more of actual

methamphetamine and 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable

amount of cocaine. Count Three, for its part, alleged that the offense involved 500 grams or more

of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine.

In October 2024, Demyers pleaded guilty to both counts. He conceded his participation in

both the October 2022 and June 2023 episodes. Accordingly, he admitted responsibility for 9,313

grams of pure methamphetamine and 2,009.12 grams of cocaine. The district court accepted his

plea on both counts.

In the presentence report, the probation officer outlined Demyers’s responsibility for a

converted drug weight of 270,162.22 kilograms of methamphetamine and cocaine. The probation

officer therefore calculated Demyers’s base offense level as 38. The presentence report also

recommended sentencing enhancements due to Demyers’s role as an organizer or leader and his

commitment of the offenses as part of a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood.

Demyers objected to the drug-quantity calculation, arguing that he was accountable only for the

9,313 grams of pure methamphetamine and 2,009.12 grams of cocaine that he previously

-3- No. 25-1179, United States v. Demyers

conceded. Accordingly, Demyers agreed that, under the pure-methamphetamine, or “ice,”

Guidelines, he was responsible for a converted drug weight of approximately 186,661 kilograms.

But Demyers asserted that the methamphetamine-mixture Guidelines should apply, rather than the

pure-methamphetamine Guidelines, because the pure-methamphetamine Guidelines overstate the

seriousness of his conduct. Demyers also objected to both sentencing enhancements.

At sentencing, the district court found that Demyers’s base offense level was 38 based on

a converted drug weight of approximately 270,000 kilograms attributable to him. After the court

heard Demyers’s objections to the application of the pure-methamphetamine Guidelines and to

both sentencing enhancements, the court explained that it had “considered all arguments in support

of [Demyers’s] request for a lower sentence.” (Sentencing Tr., R. 593, PageID 3446). The district

court determined that Demyers’s Guidelines range was 324 to 405 months’ imprisonment based

on his total offense level of 41 and criminal history category of I. The court then sentenced

Demyers to a within-Guidelines sentence of 324 months’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.

II.

We review the reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. United States v.

Reed, 163 F.4th 338, 369 (6th Cir. 2025). The district court’s legal conclusions, including its

interpretation of the Guidelines, are reviewed de novo, and its findings of fact are reviewed for

clear error. United States v. Nunley, 29 F.4th 824, 830 (6th Cir. 2022). “[W]e affirm a district

court’s finding of fact so long as the finding is ‘plausible in light of the record viewed in its

entirety[.]’” United States v. Grant, 15 F.4th 452, 457 (6th Cir. 2021) (second alteration in

original) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).

Demyers challenges both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.

“A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court did not commit any significant

-4- No. 25-1179, United States v. Demyers

procedural errors, such as failing to properly calculate the Guidelines range, treat that range as

advisory, consider the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), refrain from considering

impermissible factors, select the sentence based on facts that are not clearly erroneous, and

adequately explain why it chose the sentence.” United States v. Zabel, 35 F.4th 493, 504 (6th Cir.

2022) (citation modified). We consider a sentence substantively reasonable, on the other hand, if

the district court “properly weighed the § 3553(a) factors such that it did not place too much weight

on some, and too little on others.” United States v. Hawkins, 165 F.4th 442, 457 (6th Cir. 2026).

III.

A. Procedural Reasonableness

Demyers argues that the district court improperly calculated the drug quantity used to

determine his base offense level. He also asserts that the court failed to consider his policy

disagreement that the Guidelines for pure methamphetamine overstate the seriousness of offenses

involving the drug. And he claims that the district court erred in applying sentencing

enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for his leadership role in the drug conspiracy and

§ 2D1.1(b)(16)(E) for a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood. For its part, the

government argues that the court properly applied the Guidelines, and even if there were any error,

it would be harmless. We agree on both points and address each issue in turn.

1. Drug Quantity

Reliability of the Evidence. While Demyers accepts responsibility for 9,313 grams of

methamphetamine and 2,009.12 grams of cocaine, which amounts to 186,661.82 in converted drug

weight, he specifically contests the additional 83,500.4 kilograms in converted drug weight that

the district court found attributable to him.

-5- No. 25-1179, United States v. Demyers

We will disturb a district court’s drug-quantity determination only if it is “clearly

erroneous.” United States v. Histed, 93 F.4th 948, 955 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). This

means that we will not reverse unless we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that the

district court made a mistake.” Id. at 954 (citation modified). The government must prove the

drug quantity by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Johnson, 732 F.3d 577, 581

(6th Cir. 2013). The district court can “consider any information that may be reliable.” United

States v. Armstrong, 920 F.3d 395, 398 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). For example, the court

may “make a reasonable estimate based on physical evidence or testimony,” United States v.

Tisdale, 980 F.3d 1089, 1096 (6th Cir. 2020), or it “may consider . . . the price generally obtained

for the controlled substance, financial or other records, [or] similar transactions in controlled

substances by the defendant,” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.5. “[B]oth sentencing and reviewing courts

may consider relevant information which is prohibited from being introduced into evidence at trial

in determining a defendant’s sentence.” United States v. Hernandez, 227 F.3d 686, 699 (6th Cir.

2000). Regardless, the evidence should have “‘some evidentiary basis’ to satisfy a ‘minimal

indicium of reliability.’” Armstrong, 920 F.3d at 398 (citation omitted); see also U.S.S.G.

§ 6A1.3(a) (noting that the evidence must have “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its

probable accuracy”).

The district court’s factual findings as to the challenged drug quantities were not clearly

erroneous. Importantly, the court “specif[ied] the evidence” it relied on for its drug-quantity

determination and made “specific factual findings.” Histed, 93 F.4th at 955. The district court

also identified “significant corroborating evidence.” (Sentencing Tr., R. 593, PageID 3398); see

United States v. Cohen, 515 F. App’x 405, 413 (6th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases). For example,

the court remarked that Evette Wallace’s statements were consistent across forums and over

-6- No. 25-1179, United States v. Demyers

time—that is, in her conversations with law enforcement, testimony before the grand jury, and

statements she made under oath at her plea hearing. See United States v. Swanberg, 370 F.3d 622,

625 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[T]estimonial evidence from a coconspirator may be sufficient to determine

the amount of drugs for which another coconspirator should be held accountable.” (citation

omitted)). Similarly, regarding Conner’s post-Miranda statements, the court explained that the

addresses in Conner’s phone buttressed his assertions that he completed similar trips at Demyers’s

direction.

Additionally, the court pointed to FedEx records, cellphone records, and surveillance to

verify Demyers’s conduct. See Hernandez, 227 F.3d at 699 (explaining that district courts may

rely on circumstantial evidence to determine drug quantity “as long as they err on the side of

caution”). Based on this evidence, the court noted the “similar weight, similar tracking, similar

methodology, [and] similarly involved individuals” in the August and October 2022 deliveries.

(Sentencing Tr., R. 593, PageID 3399). The court also relied on flight records for Starks and

Moody to establish that they each had accomplished several trips on Demyers’s behalf in 2022 and

2023. Finally, cell phone records confirmed Demyers’s debt to Barnes, his existing tab, and the

remainder of his tab after the attempted cocaine purchase in June 2023. Thus, the out-of-court

statements enjoyed the minimum indicia of reliability required. And the district court did not

clearly err in making factual findings partially reliant on them.

Moreover, as Demyers recognizes, the challenged drug amounts had no impact on his base

offense level in any event. Section 2D1.1 governs the base offense level for violations of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1). To reach a base offense level of 38, the offense must involve 90,000 kilograms or

more of converted drug weight. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1). Because Demyers accepted

responsibility for 186,661.82 kilograms in converted drug weight, his admitted conduct alone

-7- No. 25-1179, United States v. Demyers

placed him at a base offense level of 38. See id. So, regardless of the contested amounts, Demyers

would have faced the same base offense level. Consequently, any error that may have occurred in

attributing additional drug quantities to Demyers was harmless. See United States v. Castro, 960

F.3d 857, 867 (6th Cir. 2020).

Policy Argument. Demyers also faults the district court for allegedly failing to explain why

it declined his proposed downward variance on policy grounds. At sentencing, Demyers argued

that the pure-methamphetamine Guidelines overstate criminal culpability, so the district court

should have applied the methamphetamine-mixture Guidelines instead. And he noted that Grady

received a two-level reduction based on this same policy argument.

“Where a defendant raises a particular argument in seeking a lower sentence, the record

must reflect both that the district judge considered the defendant’s argument and that the judge

explained the basis for rejecting it.” United States v. Thomas-Mathews, 81 F.4th 530, 544 (6th

Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). Particularly where an argument is “nonfrivolous,” the district court

should provide its reasoning. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007). For a within-

Guidelines sentence, the record need only “‘make[] clear that the sentencing judge listened to each

argument,’ ‘considered the supporting evidence,’ was ‘fully aware’ of the defendant’s

circumstances and took ‘them into account’ in sentencing him.” United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d

382, 387 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 358). To be sure, a district court may

vary from the Guidelines based on policy considerations. United States v. Allen, 93 F.4th 350, 359

(6th Cir. 2024); see also Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 501 (2011) (explaining that the

district court may vary from the Guidelines where “the Commission’s views rest on wholly

unconvincing policy rationales”). But it is not required to do so. United States v. Mosley, 53 F.4th

947, 965 (6th Cir. 2022); United States v. Brooks, 628 F.3d 791, 800 (6th Cir. 2011).

-8- No. 25-1179, United States v. Demyers

As a preliminary matter, the government suggests that Demyers waived his challenge to

the district court’s alleged failure to address his policy argument or invited error by not asking for

further consideration of his policy-based concerns after the district court asked whether it had

addressed his arguments. Alternatively, the government asserts that plain-error review applies

because Demyers did not object to the district court’s reasoning for denying his proposed variance.

In the end, we need not resolve these questions because, under any applicable standard, Demyers’s

argument fails.

It was within the district court’s discretion to deny Demyers’s request for a downward

variance based on his policy argument. See Mosley, 53 F.4th at 965. And the district court

addressed the policy issue directly. For instance, the district court engaged in a colloquy with

Demyers’s counsel regarding the drug calculation and expressly acknowledged that Demyers

“makes a point, that [a 27- to 33-year sentence] just feels contrary to public policy.” (Sentencing

Tr., R. 593, PageID 3453). Apparently unpersuaded by this point, however, the district court

considered Demyers’s Guidelines calculations to be “a heartland score.” (Id. at PageID 3452).

And after recognizing Demyers’s public-policy argument, the district court went on to iterate that

“this [was] a major multi-million dollar drug trafficking organization that was extensive,” before

ultimately declining to apply the policy-based downward variance. (Id. at PageID 3453). The

district court also explained that because the overall converted drug weight attributed to Demyers

was three times greater than the 90,000 kilograms necessary to place him at an offense level of 38

(before enhancements), it would have made no difference to apply the mixture Guidelines to the

9,313 grams of methamphetamine that Demyers admitted to as part of his guilty plea. True, under

the mixture Guidelines, the converted drug weight of the 9,313 grams of methamphetamine would

have been only 18,626 kilograms. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.8(D). But the overall converted

-9- No. 25-1179, United States v. Demyers

drug weight—including the challenged quantities—still would have been well over the offense-

level-38 threshold at 102,528.22 kilograms. As already discussed, the district court did not clearly

err in attributing the challenged drug quantities to Demyers. So the district court did not abuse its

discretion in rejecting the downward variance and instead imposing a 27-year (bottom-of-the-

Guidelines) sentence, even if another co-conspirator received a variance. See United States v.

Terrell, No. 23-5100, 2024 WL 1180429, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2024) (“[A] district court has no

obligation to reject a properly calculated [G]uidelines range and vary downwards based on a

defendant’s disagreement with [G]uidelines policies.”); United States v. Mitan, Nos. 21-

5834/5836/5849, 2025 WL 1392242, at *7 (6th Cir. Apr. 9, 2025) (“[S]entencing courts need not

impose strict proportionality among co-defendants.”).

Additionally, the district court was not required to “give the reasons for rejecting any and

all arguments by the parties for alternative sentences.” Vonner, 516 F.3d at 387. Where the district

court imposes a within-Guidelines sentence, “[t]he law leaves much, in this respect, to the judge’s

own professional judgment.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 356). Here, the

district court both explained its reason for rejecting Demyers’s policy argument and confirmed

that it had “considered all arguments in support of [his] request for a lower sentence.” (Sentencing

Tr., R. 593, PageID 3446). Therefore, Demyers has not identified a reversible error.

2. Enhancement for Organizer or Leader

Demyers also challenges the district court’s imposition of a four-level enhancement under

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for his role as an organizer or leader in the drug-trafficking organization.

Again, we see no error.

The Guidelines provide that a four-level enhancement should be applied “[i]f the defendant

was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was

- 10 - No. 25-1179, United States v. Demyers

otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). “To qualify as a leader or organizer, the defendant

must have exerted control over at least one participant in a supervisory, managerial, leadership, or

organizational capacity.” United States v. Clay, 162 F.4th 757, 779 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation

modified) (per curiam). The district court should evaluate

the exercise of decisionmaking authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others.

United States v. Messer, 71 F.4th 452, 461 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4). It

is not necessary for the court to discuss every factor before applying this enhancement. United

States v. Castilla-Lugo, 699 F.3d 454, 460 (6th Cir. 2012). We review the district court’s legal

conclusion that a defendant was an organizer or leader “deferentially” and its factual findings for

clear error. Clay, 162 F.4th at 779 (citation omitted).

The government argues that Demyers waived this argument or invited error. At most, says

the government, we should review this argument for plain error. But Demyers objected to the

leadership enhancement at sentencing, explained his reasoning, and stood on this objection later

in the hearing—thereby preserving the issue. Demyers was not required to object again on this

specific basis later in the hearing. See United States v. Mooney, 135 F.4th 486, 501 (6th Cir. 2025)

(rejecting a defendant’s obligation “to object to the sufficiency of the factual findings once the

district court makes those findings”); Vonner, 516 F.3d at 390 (“[N]either the defense nor the

government, in response to the Bostic question, has any obligation to raise objections already

made.”).

Here, the district court discussed the nature of Demyers’s participation, the degree to which

he was involved in planning or organizing, and the degree of control and authority that he exercised

- 11 - No. 25-1179, United States v. Demyers

over others. The district court characterized this drug-trafficking organization as “by far the most

extensive one” that it had encountered. (Sentencing Tr., R. 593, PageID 3423). It described

Demyers as one of two players “at the top of the food chain,” “the leader,” and “a very, very

successful drug trafficking organizer until things went awry.” (Id. at PageID 3423–24, 3426–27).

And in terms of Demyers’s conduct, the court explained that he supplied the drugs, transported

couriers to the airport, served as a point person for issues during deliveries, and had others tracking

and picking up packages on his behalf. Taken together, these actions demonstrated to the district

court that Demyers had “decisionmaking authority,” including “what to do in circumstances

associated with this drug trafficking organization.” (Id. at PageID 3426). Because the record

shows that the district court properly considered Demyers’s conduct and committed no clear

factual error, we defer to the district court’s application of the leadership enhancement.

Resisting this conclusion, Demyers insists that the district court failed to identify any

individuals under his control. He specifically contends that the record does not show that he

exercised authority over Merria Wallace. But the district court pointed to cell phone records as

well as texts and calls between Demyers and Merria Wallace to support its conclusion. For

instance, the record shows that Grady was on a FaceTime call with Demyers when he was arrested

in October 2022 and that Demyers directed Merria Wallace to track the impending delivery that

Demyers had coordinated with Grady. Following Demyers’s text, Merria Wallace tracked the

package eighteen times, and she called Demyers to inform him of the status. Moreover, flight and

telephone call records also suggest that Demyers was responsible for organizing money couriers’

flights. These facts were sufficient to show that Demyers exerted authority over at least one

individual. See Clay, 162 F.4th at 779.

- 12 - No. 25-1179, United States v. Demyers

Demyers also argues that the district court erred in giving him a higher leadership

enhancement than it gave Barnes, considering the similarities between the two defendants. True,

the court described both Demyers and Barnes as “the two at the top of the food chain.” (Sentencing

Tr., R. 593, PageID 3423). But more than one defendant can qualify as a leader in the conspiracy.

See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4. And the court here recognized as much. Likewise, the district

court found facts unique to Demyers to justify the four-level enhancement. For example, the court

stated that Demyers participated in trafficking both cocaine and methamphetamine in Lansing and

Kalamazoo. Thus, the court developed its reasoning for applying the leadership enhancement to

Demyers.

3. Enhancement for Pattern of Criminal Conduct Engaged in as a Livelihood

Demyers further contends that the district court erred in applying a two-level enhancement

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(16)(E) because the record does not show that his pattern of

criminal conduct was his livelihood. We disagree.

We review the district court’s decision to apply this enhancement for an abuse of discretion.

See United States v. Buchanan, 933 F.3d 501, 513 (6th Cir. 2019). We consider the district court’s

legal conclusions regarding this enhancement de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Id.

at 514.

Section 2D1.1(b)(16)(E) provides for a two-level enhancement where the “defendant

committed the offense as part of a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood.” Section

2D1.1(b)(16)(E) cross-references § 4B1.3, which describes the two criteria that satisfy “[e]ngaged

in as a livelihood” in an application note. Id. §§ 2D1.1 cmt. n.20(C), 4B1.3 cmt. n.2. First, the

defendant must have “derived income from the pattern of criminal conduct that in any twelve-

month period exceeded 2,000 times the then existing hourly minimum wage under federal law.”

- 13 - No. 25-1179, United States v. Demyers

Id. § 4B1.3 cmt. n.2(A). Second, “the totality of the circumstances [must] show[] that such

criminal conduct was the defendant’s primary occupation in that twelve-month period.” Id.

§ 4B1.3 cmt. n.2(B); see also Buchanan, 933 F.3d at 514.

The record contains the district court’s findings on both prongs of the livelihood inquiry.

On the first prong, the district court found that the “multi-million dollar” drug-trafficking

conspiracy dated back to at least 2022. (Sentencing Tr., R. 593, PageID 3427). Further, Demyers

pleaded guilty to a drug-trafficking conspiracy starting in or about 2021 and ending in 2024.

Though he objected to participating in the conspiracy for its entire duration, the evidence shows

that he participated in drug deliveries as early as August 2022 and as late as June 2023.

On the second prong, the district court observed that Demyers’s tax returns did not support

his claim that he worked for two different trucking companies, and his reported earnings did not

account for his nearly $400,000 in assets and $1.5 million in casino transactions between 2013 and

2022. Considering this information and the fact that Demyers was unemployed in the six months

leading up to his arrest, the district court concluded that Demyers had “a sketchy employment

history” and imposed the two-level enhancement. (Id. at PageID 3427–28).

Demyers raises several concerns with the district court’s analysis, none of which are

persuasive. First, Demyers suggests that the district court failed to pinpoint the twelve-month

period in which he earned the requisite income. But the district court could have considered any

twelve-month period in its calculation, see United States v. Kellams, 26 F.3d 646, 648 (6th Cir.

1994), and the government offered evidence to show that Demyers was involved in the conspiracy

over the course of 2022 and 2023. Second, citing Buchanan, Demyers asserts that the district court

needed to identify the sales that led to his income of at least $14,500. But in Buchanan, the district

court did not make any factual findings as to whether drug trafficking was the defendant’s primary

- 14 - No. 25-1179, United States v. Demyers

occupation based on the totality of the circumstances. 933 F.3d at 517. By contrast, the district

court here evaluated Demyers’s inconsistent statements about his employment history, his

financial assets, and his tax returns before applying the enhancement. Therefore, the district court

did not abuse its discretion.

B. Substantive Reasonableness

Finally, Demyers asserts that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because the

district court compared his conduct to that of his co-defendant, Barnes, and thereby placed

excessive weight on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

“We presume a within-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable. But a defendant

can rebut this presumption if a district court chose a sentence arbitrarily, ignored

pertinent § 3553(a) factors, or gave unreasonable weight to any single factor.” United States v.

Miller, 73 F.4th 427, 431 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). Section 3553(a)(6) provides that the

court should “avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who

have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). But this provision “concerns

national disparities between defendants with similar criminal histories convicted of similar

criminal conduct—not disparities between codefendants.” United States v. Glover, 167 F.4th 417,

430 (6th Cir. 2026) (citation omitted). In any event, the district court “may exercise [its] discretion

and determine a defendant’s sentence in light of a co-defendant’s sentence.” United States v.

Mahbub, 818 F.3d 213, 233 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

The district court did not assign unreasonable weight to § 3553(a)(6), nor did it abuse its

discretion in comparing Demyers to Barnes. See Miller, 73 F.4th at 431; Mahbub, 818 F.3d at

233. True, the district court noted that Barnes and Demyers were “most closely aligned together.”

(Sentencing Tr., R. 593, PageID 3451). But the court also recognized differences between the

- 15 - No. 25-1179, United States v. Demyers

defendants’ criminal histories, observing that Barnes had a few convictions for driving under the

influence and therefore had a higher criminal history category than Demyers. Moreover, the

district court explained that Demyers and Barnes “end[ed] up with the same score in different

ways,” so it needed to determine the “right score” for Demyers personally. (Id. at PageID 3451–

52). Importantly, the district court emphasized that Demyers continued his criminal conduct, even

as he encountered “close calls” and his co-conspirators were arrested. (Id. at PageID 3452). The

district court also considered other § 3553(a) factors to calculate Demyers’s sentence, including

those that mitigated his conduct. Therefore, nothing in the record suggests that the court arrived

at his sentence unreasonably.

IV.

For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM.

- 16 -