United States v. Jason Davis

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
• Decided: June 12, 2026
• Docket: 24-3147
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________

No. 24-3147 ___________________________

United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jason Davis

Defendant - Appellant ____________

Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central ____________

Submitted: January 12, 2026 Filed: June 12, 2026 [Unpublished] ____________

Before SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. ____________

PER CURIAM.

Jason Davis challenges an enhancement to a felon-in-possession sentence for having “three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); see id. § 922(g)(1). Although he argues that an Arkansas conviction of second- degree battery should not count, see Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-202(a)(1) (2010), we affirm. The district court1 included it based on its review of a charging document, his plea statement, and the transcript of the plea hearing. See United States v. Dawn, 685 F.3d 790, 794–95 (8th Cir. 2012) (describing the modified categorical approach and explaining it applies to the Arkansas statute at issue here), abrogated on other grounds by Lofton v. United States, 920 F.3d 572, 575 (8th Cir. 2019). Together, they confirmed that Davis pleaded guilty to the version of second-degree battery requiring him to have “purpose[ly] . . . caus[ed]” a “physical injury” that turned out to be “serious.”2 Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-202(a)(1) (2010); see United States v. Harris, 950 F.3d 1015, 1021 (8th Cir. 2020) (making the same determination from a charging document); United States v. Garcia, 946 F.3d 413, 418 (8th Cir. 2019) (same). As we have recognized before, this offense is a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines, Garcia, 946 F.3d at 418, which also makes it a “violent felony,” Dawn, 685 F.3d at 797 n.5 (citation omitted) (treating the two categories interchangeably).

Davis questions the accuracy of the charging document because it lists a habitual-offender enhancement he never received. Cf. United States v. Thornton, 766 F.3d 875, 879 (8th Cir. 2014) (reversing because the charging document reviewed by the district court was not the correct one). The plea-hearing transcript clears up any confusion by revealing that the prosecutor dropped it in the plea deal. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 20 (2005) (explaining that a court may look to the “transcript of [the] plea colloquy”). For us, it means that Davis indeed

1 The Honorable Kristine G. Baker, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. 2 Davis argues that the second-degree-battery conviction at issue here, as well as one other, could not possibly be violent felonies because Arkansas law only requires “causing serious physical injury,” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-202(a)(1), which does not necessarily involve the use of “physical force,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). He raises the argument solely to preserve it, however, given that our precedent squarely forecloses it. See United States v. Rice, 813 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 2016). -2- pleaded guilty to a “violent felony.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court. ______________________________

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