United States v. Jarrett Howard

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: October 28, 2025
• Docket: 24-5847
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0500n.06

No. 24-5847

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Oct 28, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk

) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED Plaintiff-Appellee, ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR v. ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ) KENTUCKY JARRETT HOWARD, ) ) OPINION Defendant-Appellant. )

Before: READLER, MURPHY, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. An informant told the police that Jarrett Howard kept illegal

drugs in his apartment. After verifying many of the informant’s claims, officers obtained a warrant

to search this apartment. They uncovered cocaine, fentanyl, and firearms. A grand jury charged

Howard with drug and firearm offenses. Before trial, he told a potential witness that she better not

“double-cross” him. A jury later convicted him. Howard now argues that the police lacked

probable cause to search his apartment. And he argues that his statement to the potential witness

did not justify an obstruction-of-justice enhancement. Both arguments lack merit. We thus affirm.

I

On December 16, 2021, an officer with the Richmond Police Department in Madison

County, Kentucky, sought a warrant to search Howard’s apartment. In a supporting affidavit, the

officer explained that a confidential informant had brought Howard to the officer’s attention on No. 24-5847, United States v. Howard

November 29. This informant had provided “accurate and reliable information” in the past and

had completed many “controlled drug transactions” for the police. Aff., R.20-6, PageID 130. The

informant claimed that Howard sold “pound quantities” of “heroin/fentanyl” in Madison County.

Id. Howard allegedly kept his drugs in an “upstairs” “bedroom closet” of his apartment. Id. He

also allegedly kept a handgun in the apartment even though he was a felon. The informant

identified the address of Howard’s apartment complex and said that Howard lived at unit 5 or 6.

The informant also provided many details. Among other things, Howard drove a gray SUV and

worked second shift at Bluegrass Plating. He regularly took work breaks at 6 p.m., 8 p.m., and 10

p.m. “to conduct drug transactions” in his employer’s parking lot and to travel to his apartment to

pick up drugs. Id. He also relied on Kyonna Mundy (who “frequent[ed]” his apartment) to help

him in his drug business. Id. And the informant knew of Howard “smoking marijuana.” Id.

The officer’s affidavit next described his efforts to corroborate the informant’s details. The

officer confirmed Howard’s address at unit 6 of the apartment complex by looking up his driver’s

license. He also confirmed that Howard had a criminal record, including a felony conviction for

trafficking in controlled substances. And he confirmed that Howard drove a gray Honda SUV that

he parked outside his apartment.

The officer’s affidavit lastly disclosed what he had witnessed when monitoring Howard

over December. On December 3, the officer surveilled Howard outside Bluegrass Plating. At

6:00 p.m., Mundy picked Howard up and drove him to his apartment. Howard went inside and

came back out two minutes later. Mundy then drove him back to Bluegrass Plating. On December

8, the officer watched Howard travel to “known drug addresses” in Richmond, Kentucky. Id.,

PageID 131. Howard stayed at one of these addresses for 20 minutes while “multiple vehicles”

2 No. 24-5847, United States v. Howard

made short trips there. Id. The officer viewed this traffic as “indicative of drug trafficking” and

added that the police had received “drug complaints” about the house. Id. A complaining neighbor

had seen a man fitting Howard’s description arrive at the house and suggested that this man might

be its “source of supply[.]” Id. On December 16, another officer pulled Howard over for a traffic

violation (with Mundy in the passenger seat). Id. A police dog alerted to the presence of narcotics,

and a search of the vehicle uncovered marijuana. Howard (who also had $500 on his person) took

ownership of the marijuana. He claimed that they were driving to a friend’s house to smoke it, but

the officer later watched them return to his apartment after the traffic stop.

This affidavit proved successful. A state judge issued a warrant to search Howard’s

apartment. Officers found a substantial amount of incriminating evidence. In the master bedroom

closet, they discovered illegal drugs in several baggies: one baggie contained about 417 grams of

cocaine and others contained about 287 grams of a mixture that included cocaine and fentanyl.

The officers also found (among other things) two handguns, a digital scale, and $34,450 in the

same bedroom.

A grand jury indicted Howard on four counts. It charged him with possessing with the

intent to distribute both fentanyl and cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). It charged him with

illegally possessing firearms as a felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). And it charged him with

possessing the firearms in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. See id. § 924(c)(1)(A).

Howard moved to suppress the evidence found at his apartment. He argued that the

affidavit did not establish probable cause that the officers would find drugs there. The district

court disagreed. It reasoned that the totality of the circumstances alleged in the affidavit provided

a fair probability that officers would uncover illegal contraband at Howard’s home.

3 No. 24-5847, United States v. Howard

Howard stood trial. A jury convicted him of all four charges. At sentencing, the district

court imposed an obstruction-of-justice enhancement because it found that Howard had threatened

a potential witness. After imposing this enhancement, the court calculated a guidelines range of

262 to 327 months’ imprisonment on the first two counts, a guidelines range of 120 months on the

third count, and a statutorily required 60-month consecutive sentence on the fourth count. The

court varied downward by imposing a total punishment of 300 months.

II

Howard raises two issues on appeal. He argues that the police lacked probable cause to

search his apartment. And he argues that the obstruction-of-justice enhancement did not apply.

A. Probable Cause

Under the Fourth Amendment, “no Warrants shall issue” unless an officer identifies facts

establishing “probable cause” to believe that the “place to be searched” will contain the “things to

be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. To meet the probable-cause standard, an affidavit seeking a

warrant must establish a “fair probability” that officers will find evidence of a crime at the

identified location. United States v. Sanders, 106 F.4th 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (citation

omitted). Courts must consider whether this fair probability exists from the perspective of

“reasonable and prudent” people rather than “legal technicians[.]” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,

231 (1983) (citation omitted). And they must follow a “totality-of-the-circumstances” approach.

Id. at 230. So officers may take “[m]any roads” to probable cause. Sanders, 106 F.4th at 462.

The officer in this case took one common road: reliance on “tips from informants” that

suspects have contraband at their homes. United States v. Bell, 2022 WL 59619, at *2 (6th Cir.

Jan. 6, 2022); see Sanders, 106 F.4th at 462. When considering whether an informant’s statements

4 No. 24-5847, United States v. Howard

establish probable cause, courts ask about the informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge. See

Gates, 462 U.S. at 228–39; United States v. Simmons, 129 F.4th 382, 388 (6th Cir. 2025). As for

reliability, we give greater credit to confidential informants known to the police than to unknown

anonymous sources. Bell, 2022 WL 59619, at *2; see Sanders, 106 F.4th at 464. An informant’s

past activities with the police also can bolster the informant’s reliability. See United States v.

Smith, 182 F.3d 473, 478–79 (6th Cir. 1999). So can an officer’s efforts to corroborate the

informant’s details. See id. at 479–81. As for basis of knowledge, we presume that informants

know more about a suspect’s crimes when they provide “detailed statements” rather than

“conclusory accusations[.]” Bell, 2022 WL 59619, at *2; see Smith, 182 F.3d at 477. Ultimately,

though, an informant’s tip need not satisfy both these reliability and basis-of-knowledge factors

with equal force to establish probable cause. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 233–34. Rather, a significant

showing of one can make up for an inadequacy with the other because the final determination

depends on the totality of the circumstances. See id. And we must give “great deference” to the

issuing judge’s conclusion that the tip sufficed. United States v. Christian, 925 F.3d 305, 311–12

(6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236).

Applying this deference here, we conclude that the state judge properly found probable

cause based on the informant’s claims that Howard stored illegal drugs at his apartment. The

officer’s affidavit adequately established the informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge. First,

the affidavit showed the informant’s reliability in two ways. It described the informant’s “past

performance” by explaining that the informant had “always” given reliable information and had

completed “numerous” controlled buys. Smith, 182 F.3d at 478; Aff., R.20-6, PageID 130. It then

discussed the “independent investigative work” that corroborated the informant’s statements.

5 No. 24-5847, United States v. Howard

Gates, 462 U.S. at 244. The officer confirmed that Howard lived at the identified apartment

complex, drove a gray SUV, worked at Bluegrass Plating, and associated with Mundy. The officer

also confirmed that Howard took a break from his job at 6:00 p.m. to travel to his apartment. And

he confirmed that Howard smoked marijuana. Finally, the officer watched Howard make “quick

stops to known drug addresses” where many cars came and went—further corroborating his drug

business. Aff., R.20-6, PageID 131.

Second, the affidavit showed that the informant had an adequate “basis of knowledge” for

the tip. Smith, 182 F.3d at 481. To be sure, the affidavit did not disclose how the informant learned

that Howard distributed “pound quantities” of heroin and fentanyl and kept these illegal drugs in

his apartment. Aff., R.20-6, PageID 130–31. But the informant “describe[d] the accused’s

criminal activity” with the type of detail that showed the informant was relying on something more

than rumors. Smith, 182 F.3d at 481 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969)).

The informant, for example, revealed the precise spot where Howard kept his drugs in his

apartment: in a “bedroom closet” that was “located upstairs.” Aff., R.20-6, PageID 130. The

informant also revealed the precise times that Howard took work breaks to sell drugs: “at 6pm,

8pm, and 10 pm[.]” Id. These minute details revealed that the informant had a high level of

familiarity with Howard and his drug business. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 245–46.

Howard has only one rebuttal: that the tip could have been “stale” because the affidavit did

not identify the date when drugs were seen in Howard’s apartment. Appellant’s Br. 12. True,

stale information does not provide probable cause. See Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210

(1932); United States v. Frechette, 583 F.3d 374, 377 (6th Cir. 2009). But the affidavit did not

rely on stale information. Although the affidavit did not list dates when the informant saw drugs,

6 No. 24-5847, United States v. Howard

the informant did state that Howard “is responsible” for drug trafficking and “keeps” drugs at his

home. Aff., R.20-6, PageID 130 (emphases added). These present-tense statements showed that

the informant described an ongoing drug-trafficking business—not a one-off transaction in the

past. See United States v. Church, 823 F.3d 351, 356 (6th Cir. 2016). The officer also corroborated

the tip with recent surveillance showing that Howard possessed marijuana and visited known drug

houses. This “[e]vidence of ongoing criminal activity” forecloses Howard’s staleness claim.

United States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 481 (6th Cir. 2001). And his criticism of the lack of dates

improperly reads the affidavit in a “hypertechnical” fashion. Sanders, 106 F.4th at 463 (quoting

Christian, 925 F.3d at 311). When read in the proper commonsense way, the affidavit created

probable cause to search the apartment. See id.

B. Obstruction of Justice

At sentencing, a district court must increase a defendant’s offense level by two if the

defendant has obstructed justice. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. This enhancement requires two things.

The defendant must have “willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the

administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant

offense of conviction[.]” Id. And the defendant’s “obstructive conduct” must relate to “the

defendant’s offense of conviction” or a “closely related offense” (such as a codefendant’s). Id. A

defendant “obstruct[s]” or “impede[s]” a prosecution if the defendant engages in conduct that

“block[s]” or “hinder[s]” it. United States v. Thomas, 933 F.3d 605, 610 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation

omitted). “[T]hreatening” or “intimidating” a potential witness may qualify as the prototypical

conduct that fits this definition. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(A); see United States v. French, 976

F.3d 744, 749 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Robinson, 813 F.3d 251, 263–64 (6th Cir. 2016).

7 No. 24-5847, United States v. Howard

The district court found that this enhancement applied because Howard threatened a

woman named Jennifer Mullins. Although Mullins did not testify, the government viewed her as

a potential witness because she had signed the lease for his apartment and he had spoken to her

while in jail after his arrest. Four days before the trial was set to start, Howard violated the

conditions of his pretrial release by visiting Mullins at her parents’ home. He claimed that this

visit concerned the car insurance for their jointly insured vehicles and asked Mullins if she had

made the payments. While speaking with Howard, Mullins called the insurance company to

confirm that her payments were up to date. Howard then told her “[d]on’t double-cross me”

multiple times. McIntosh Tr., R.117, PageID 982. Mullins (who did not know what Howard had

“got caught with”) interpreted these statements as threatening her to not cooperate with the

government in his criminal case. Id., PageID 982–83. She told an officer about the conversation.

The conversation led the district court to take two actions. Before trial, the court revoked

Howard’s bond. When doing so, it explained that Howard could have simply called Mullins if his

visit had really been about insurance. Howard instead showed up at her home, recognizing that

she might be a “potential witness” at trial because she had “lived with him at the time of the alleged

crime.” Bond Revocation Tr., R.117, PageID 991. The court viewed the insurance questioning as

“code” and found that Howard had “wanted to see her to intimidate her” about his criminal case.

Id., PageID 992. After trial, the court used the conversation to impose the obstruction

enhancement. It relied on what it had “already said on the record” to overrule Howard’s objections.

Sentencing Tr., R.116, PageID 962.

Howard now argues that his statements to Mullins did not obstruct justice under § 3C1.1.

He faces an uphill battle under our standard of review. At one time, our cases had chosen

8 No. 24-5847, United States v. Howard

conflicting standards of review for a district court’s conclusion that the historical facts triggered

§ 3C1.1. See Thomas, 933 F.3d at 608‒10. But we recently clarified that we must review this

decision for clear error when a court imposes the enhancement based on a defendant’s perjury.

See United States v. Jackson, __ F.4th __, 2025 WL 2788124, at *3–4 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2025). And

we see no reason to reach a different result when the obstruction arises from a defendant’s threats.

In both situations, the enhancement turns on a question of historical fact: Did the defendant commit

perjury (in Jackson) or threaten a witness (in this case)? See id. at *3; United States v. Johns, 1998

WL 109986, at *5 (6th Cir. Mar. 4, 1998). And we review a district court’s answer to this factual

question under a deferential clear-error standard. See Jackson, 2025 WL 2788124, at *4. In other

words, as long as the record rendered the court’s answer to the question “plausible,” we must

uphold it. United States v. O’Lear, 90 F.4th 519, 536 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted).

The district court gave a plausible answer here. The court “reasonably construed”

Howard’s statements to Mullins “as a threat” not to participate in his trial. Robinson, 813 F.3d at

263 (citation omitted). All agree that he showed up at her house out of the blue a few days before

trial in violation of his conditions of pretrial release. When he did so, he repeatedly told her not to

“double-cross” him. McIntosh Tr., R.117, PageID 982. And Mullins herself took this statement

as a threat about his “court trial.” Id., PageID 983.

Howard’s four responses all come up short. He first claims that he did not know that

Mullins might be “a witness” in his case. Appellant’s Br. 19. This claim has legal and factual

flaws. Legally, the enhancement can apply even when a defendant threatens someone whom the

government has yet to identify “as a witness” if the defendant knows that the person might be

involved. United States v. Huntley, 530 F. App’x 454, 458 (6th Cir. 2013); see Johns, 1998 WL

9 No. 24-5847, United States v. Howard

109986, at *5. Factually, plenty of evidence justified the finding that Howard “believed” Mullins

to be a “potential witness” at his trial. Bond Revocation Tr., R.117, PageID 991. Among other

things, an officer told her that she was a potential witness over a week before the trial. And because

her name was on the apartment lease, Howard even tried to pin the blame on her at trial. In closing

argument, his counsel expressed suspicion that she did not testify while noting that she had “free

[rein]” over the apartment. Trial Tr., R.115, PageID 919. Mullins would have undercut this

defense if she had testified that she knew nothing about the drugs or guns found there. And the

district court reasonably concluded that Howard would have known as much before trial.

Howard also claims that his allegedly ambiguous statements to Mullins did not cross the

line into a “threat.” Appellant’s Br. 20. This claim has similar flaws. The enhancement covers

more than just overt threats. It also covers ambiguous statements that “can be reasonably construed

as” threatening. Robinson, 813 F.3d at 263 (citation omitted). That is, it reaches “subtle” threats

as much as blunt ones. United States v. Cannon, 552 F. App’x 512, 515 (6th Cir. 2014). And the

district court reasonably found that Howard sought to “intimidate” Mullins by showing up at her

home to tell her not to “double-cross” him. Bond Revocation Tr., R.117, PageID 991–92.

This finding also distinguishes the main case that Howard relies on: United States v.

Archer, 671 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2011). There, the defendant called the witness an “unpleasant name”

after learning that he would testify. Id. at 166, 168. The Second Circuit held that nobody could

interpret this name-calling as “code for a threat[.]” Id. at 167. Here, by contrast, the district court

reasonably found such “code” language. Bond Revocation Tr., R.117, PageID 992. Far from

calling Mullins a name, Howard told her not to “double-cross” him and implied that she should

not testify against him. Cf. United States v. Castro, 960 F.3d 857, 867–68 (6th Cir. 2020).

10 No. 24-5847, United States v. Howard

Howard next seeks to rebut the fact that Mullins felt threatened by his statements. He notes

that the enhancement can apply only if he acted with an “intent” to commit a threat—not just if a

reasonable person would have taken his statements as a threat. Appellant’s Br. 21 (citing Elonis

v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 737 (2015)). But Elonis was interpreting the federal threat statute,

not § 3C1.1. See Elonis, 575 U.S. at 726. And § 3C1.1 applies not just to threats but also to efforts

to intimidate or influence witnesses. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(A). Besides, the district court

found that Howard did act with an intent to intimidate Mullins. And that finding was “plausible”

when read against the record evidence. O’Lear, 90 F.4th at 536 (citation omitted).

Howard lastly argues that the district court’s factual findings at his bond revocation hearing

could not “sustain” its later use of the obstruction enhancement. Appellant’s Br. 21‒22. According

to Howard, the court found that he had only “contacted” Mullins when it revoked his bond. This

claim misreads the record. The court instead found that Howard had used “code” language “to

intimidate her.” Bond Revocation Tr., R.117, PageID 992. And these efforts to intimidate a

potential witness trigger the obstruction enhancement. See French, 976 F.3d at 749.

We affirm.