NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________
No. 23-2076 ____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JARON DAVIS, Appellant ____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal No. 2-19-cr-00268-002) District Judge: Honorable William S. Stickman, IV ____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on July 12, 2024
Before: BIBAS, FREEMAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 28, 2024)
_______________
OPINION * _______________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. FREEMAN, Circuit Judge.
Jaron Davis was charged with multiple counts of robbery and firearm offenses.
The District Court denied his motion to suppress evidence that was discovered during a
protective sweep of his vehicle, and Davis pleaded guilty to the offenses. He now
appeals, arguing that the District Court erred in its suppression ruling. Because law
enforcement had reasonable suspicion that the vehicle’s occupants might be armed and
dangerous, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I
A
Between December 14 and December 18, 2018, several individuals robbed six
businesses in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Police connected a white Nissan Rogue (license
plate HIM-5269) to three of the robberies. An individual wearing a puffy blue jacket
participated in all six robberies, and on each occasion the perpetrators either brandished
firearms or were believed to be armed.
On December 19, Monroeville Police Detective Robert Renk posted a bulletin on
the regional police network about the robberies. He noted that “at least one firearm” was
used in the crimes and that “a white, Nissan Rogue, Ohio # HIM-5269” was “POSSIBLY
(probably)” involved. Suppl. App. 4. He stated, “We DO NOT have [probable cause] to
stop the vehicle for suspected involvement in the robberies! There are no arrest warrants
nor have any Actors been identified.” Id. Finally, he wrote that if any officers were to
see the vehicle “and observe a traffic violation[,] a traffic stop and ID of the occupants
2 would be appreciated. USE Caution they may be armed.” Id. The bulletin attached
surveillance photographs of the Rogue and the robbery suspects.
Later that evening, a license-plate reader system reported that the Rogue was in
Pittsburgh’s Oakland neighborhood. The Monroeville police notified Pittsburgh Police
Detective Kevin Williams that Renk would be in the area to look for the Rogue. They
described the Rogue to Williams, provided its license plate number, and said the vehicle
was involved in armed robberies. A few minutes later, Williams issued a “be on the
lookout” (BOLO) alert over the radio explaining that the Rogue was wanted in
connection with several armed robberies. Renk heard the BOLO and immediately asked
the communications team to recall it because he had merely wanted to locate and surveil
the vehicle.
Before the BOLO could be recalled, Pittsburgh Police Sergeant Brian
Marckisotto—who had seen Renk’s regional bulletin earlier that day and heard the
BOLO—observed a white Nissan Rogue traveling between 60-65 miles per hour in a 35
mile per hour zone. Marckisotto pursued the Rogue but did not activate his lights or siren
because there was no place for the Rogue to safely pull over. When the Rogue pulled
into a gas station, Marckisotto activated his lights, ordered the occupants to remain in the
car, and confirmed that the Rogue was the subject of the BOLO. Because the BOLO
connected the vehicle to armed robberies, Marckisotto waited for backup to arrive before
approaching. While waiting, he observed two of the occupants “leaning forward, digging
under the seat, [and] going back and forth in . . . a jittery manner.” A373.
3 Before backup arrived, Marckisotto learned that the dispatch was only intended to
request a lookout and alert. Nonetheless, based on the occupants’ movements and the
BOLO, Marckisotto suspected that the occupants might be armed. Therefore, once more
officers arrived on the scene, he detained the vehicle’s occupants (including Davis, the
driver). Officers then conducted a protective sweep of the vehicle and saw a blue puffy
jacket in the trunk and a firearm in the back seat. Police obtained a search warrant for the
Rogue and then recovered clothing worn by the robbery perpetrators, a firearm, and items
stolen during the most recent robbery.
B
Davis moved to suppress the seized evidence, arguing that the vehicle stop was
unlawful and his detention was not supported by probable cause. After a hearing, the
District Court denied the motion. It held that the stop was lawful and that officers had
reasonable suspicion to remove the occupants because, among other things, two
occupants made movements consistent with the concealment of a weapon, the bulletin
message suggested that the occupants could be armed, and the BOLO connected the
vehicle to multiple armed robberies. The Court also concluded that the officers had
reasonable suspicion to conduct the protective sweep. Finally, it noted that even if the
search had been unlawful, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply.
Davis entered a conditional guilty plea to eleven counts and waived all appellate
rights except for his ability to challenge the denial of his suppression motion. The Court
4 imposed a sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment to be followed by three years of
supervised release. Davis timely appealed the denial of his suppression motion.
II 1
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we exercise plenary review over a
district court’s reasonable suspicion determination but review its factual findings for clear
error. United States v. Whitfield, 634 F.3d 741, 743–44 (3d Cir. 2010). When the district
court denies the motion, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the government.
United States v. Stewart, 92 F.4th 461, 466 (3d Cir. 2024).
On appeal, Davis no longer challenges the legality of the vehicle stop. Rather, he
argues that Marckisotto lacked reasonable suspicion that the Rogue’s occupants were
armed and dangerous, making it unlawful for him to order the Rogue’s occupants out of
the car and conduct a protective sweep. We disagree.
During a lawful traffic stop, an officer may frisk the occupants or sweep the
vehicle only if he or she has “a reasonable suspicion that the occupants might be armed
and dangerous.” United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049–50 (1983)); United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d
442, 448–49 (3d Cir. 2010). Reasonable suspicion “can be based on information
gathered from another person,” United States v. Robertson, 305 F.3d 164, 168 (3d Cir.
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________
No. 23-2076 ____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JARON DAVIS, Appellant ____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal No. 2-19-cr-00268-002) District Judge: Honorable William S. Stickman, IV ____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on July 12, 2024
Before: BIBAS, FREEMAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 28, 2024)
_______________
OPINION * _______________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. FREEMAN, Circuit Judge.
Jaron Davis was charged with multiple counts of robbery and firearm offenses.
The District Court denied his motion to suppress evidence that was discovered during a
protective sweep of his vehicle, and Davis pleaded guilty to the offenses. He now
appeals, arguing that the District Court erred in its suppression ruling. Because law
enforcement had reasonable suspicion that the vehicle’s occupants might be armed and
dangerous, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I
A
Between December 14 and December 18, 2018, several individuals robbed six
businesses in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Police connected a white Nissan Rogue (license
plate HIM-5269) to three of the robberies. An individual wearing a puffy blue jacket
participated in all six robberies, and on each occasion the perpetrators either brandished
firearms or were believed to be armed.
On December 19, Monroeville Police Detective Robert Renk posted a bulletin on
the regional police network about the robberies. He noted that “at least one firearm” was
used in the crimes and that “a white, Nissan Rogue, Ohio # HIM-5269” was “POSSIBLY
(probably)” involved. Suppl. App. 4. He stated, “We DO NOT have [probable cause] to
stop the vehicle for suspected involvement in the robberies! There are no arrest warrants
nor have any Actors been identified.” Id. Finally, he wrote that if any officers were to
see the vehicle “and observe a traffic violation[,] a traffic stop and ID of the occupants
2 would be appreciated. USE Caution they may be armed.” Id. The bulletin attached
surveillance photographs of the Rogue and the robbery suspects.
Later that evening, a license-plate reader system reported that the Rogue was in
Pittsburgh’s Oakland neighborhood. The Monroeville police notified Pittsburgh Police
Detective Kevin Williams that Renk would be in the area to look for the Rogue. They
described the Rogue to Williams, provided its license plate number, and said the vehicle
was involved in armed robberies. A few minutes later, Williams issued a “be on the
lookout” (BOLO) alert over the radio explaining that the Rogue was wanted in
connection with several armed robberies. Renk heard the BOLO and immediately asked
the communications team to recall it because he had merely wanted to locate and surveil
the vehicle.
Before the BOLO could be recalled, Pittsburgh Police Sergeant Brian
Marckisotto—who had seen Renk’s regional bulletin earlier that day and heard the
BOLO—observed a white Nissan Rogue traveling between 60-65 miles per hour in a 35
mile per hour zone. Marckisotto pursued the Rogue but did not activate his lights or siren
because there was no place for the Rogue to safely pull over. When the Rogue pulled
into a gas station, Marckisotto activated his lights, ordered the occupants to remain in the
car, and confirmed that the Rogue was the subject of the BOLO. Because the BOLO
connected the vehicle to armed robberies, Marckisotto waited for backup to arrive before
approaching. While waiting, he observed two of the occupants “leaning forward, digging
under the seat, [and] going back and forth in . . . a jittery manner.” A373.
3 Before backup arrived, Marckisotto learned that the dispatch was only intended to
request a lookout and alert. Nonetheless, based on the occupants’ movements and the
BOLO, Marckisotto suspected that the occupants might be armed. Therefore, once more
officers arrived on the scene, he detained the vehicle’s occupants (including Davis, the
driver). Officers then conducted a protective sweep of the vehicle and saw a blue puffy
jacket in the trunk and a firearm in the back seat. Police obtained a search warrant for the
Rogue and then recovered clothing worn by the robbery perpetrators, a firearm, and items
stolen during the most recent robbery.
B
Davis moved to suppress the seized evidence, arguing that the vehicle stop was
unlawful and his detention was not supported by probable cause. After a hearing, the
District Court denied the motion. It held that the stop was lawful and that officers had
reasonable suspicion to remove the occupants because, among other things, two
occupants made movements consistent with the concealment of a weapon, the bulletin
message suggested that the occupants could be armed, and the BOLO connected the
vehicle to multiple armed robberies. The Court also concluded that the officers had
reasonable suspicion to conduct the protective sweep. Finally, it noted that even if the
search had been unlawful, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply.
Davis entered a conditional guilty plea to eleven counts and waived all appellate
rights except for his ability to challenge the denial of his suppression motion. The Court
4 imposed a sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment to be followed by three years of
supervised release. Davis timely appealed the denial of his suppression motion.
II 1
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we exercise plenary review over a
district court’s reasonable suspicion determination but review its factual findings for clear
error. United States v. Whitfield, 634 F.3d 741, 743–44 (3d Cir. 2010). When the district
court denies the motion, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the government.
United States v. Stewart, 92 F.4th 461, 466 (3d Cir. 2024).
On appeal, Davis no longer challenges the legality of the vehicle stop. Rather, he
argues that Marckisotto lacked reasonable suspicion that the Rogue’s occupants were
armed and dangerous, making it unlawful for him to order the Rogue’s occupants out of
the car and conduct a protective sweep. We disagree.
During a lawful traffic stop, an officer may frisk the occupants or sweep the
vehicle only if he or she has “a reasonable suspicion that the occupants might be armed
and dangerous.” United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049–50 (1983)); United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d
442, 448–49 (3d Cir. 2010). Reasonable suspicion “can be based on information
gathered from another person,” United States v. Robertson, 305 F.3d 164, 168 (3d Cir.
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
5 2002), provided that the original source of information had reasonable suspicion, see
United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 248 (3d Cir. 2006).
Here, because Marckisotto saw Renk’s regional bulletin and heard Williams’s
BOLO, he was permitted to rely on both in forming his reasonable suspicion as long as
both Renk and Williams had reasonable suspicion in the first instance.
Renk received reports that a white Nissan Rogue with the license plate HIM-5269
was involved in several armed robberies in the Pittsburgh area and that the robbers had at
least one firearm. This provided him with reasonable suspicion that the Rogue’s
occupants might be armed and dangerous. That Renk disclaimed probable cause to stop
the vehicle for suspected involvement in the robberies does not change this conclusion
because reasonable suspicion is a “lower hurdle” than probable cause. United States v.
Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 999 (3d Cir. 2008).
Because Renk provided the information that led to Williams’s BOLO, Renk’s
knowledge is imputed to Williams under the collective knowledge doctrine. Whitfield,
634 F.3d at 745. In turn, Renk’s and Williams’s knowledge is imputed to Marckisotto,
who thus had reasonable suspicion to conduct a frisk and protective sweep of the Rogue
and its occupants.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction.