Case: 19-14333 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-14333 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:03-cr-00134-RV-CJK-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAMES VALENTINE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida ________________________
(June 2, 2020)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, LAGOA and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 19-14333 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 Page: 2 of 6
James Valentine, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration of an order denying his motion
collaterally challenging a 21 U.S.C. § 851 enhancement on the ground that the
California conviction underlying the enhancement was recently reduced to a
misdemeanor. He asserts the district court erred by denying his motion to
reconsider because California’s Proposition 64 changed his prior conviction from a
felony to a misdemeanor and, on that basis, his mandatory minimum sentence
should have been 10 years’ imprisonment rather than 20. After review, 1 we affirm
the district court.
A prisoner in federal custody may file a motion to vacate, set aside, or
correct his sentence by asserting “that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction
to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(a). Typically, collateral attacks on the validity of a federal conviction or
sentence must be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Sawyer v. Holder, 326 F.3d
1363, 1365 (11th Cir. 2003).
1 We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration only for abuse of discretion. Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003). We review the district court’s legal conclusions in a § 2255 proceeding de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Id. “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). 2 Case: 19-14333 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 Page: 3 of 6
In 2006, Valentine pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii). When Valentine was sentenced in August
2006, the penalty for violating § 841(a)(1) was a term of imprisonment of 10 years
to life. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) (effective July 27, 2006). However, where an
individual violated § 841(a)(1) after a prior conviction for a “felony drug offense”
had “become final,” the minimum term of imprisonment became 20 years. Id. A
“felony drug offense” is defined as an offense that was “punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a
State or foreign country that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic
drugs,” and cocaine is a narcotic drug. 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) & (17)(D).
Because an § 851 enhancement is imposed by reason of a prior conviction, it
can be applied to an individual’s sentence only if the government filed a notice of
the previous convictions it contends support the enhancement. 21 U.S.C.
§ 851(a)(1). A defendant cannot challenge any prior convictions alleged in the
notice that “occurred more than five years before the date of the information
alleging such prior conviction.” Id. § 851(e).
In Robert Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a federal
prisoner who had received a career offender enhancement could challenge the
enhancement in a § 2255 motion after a prior state conviction underlying the
3 Case: 19-14333 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 Page: 4 of 6
enhancement was vacated by the state court. 544 U.S. 295, 304-05 (2005). The
Supreme Court further held that the state court’s vacatur was a new “fact” within
the meaning of § 2255(f)(4) that triggered a renewed one-year limitations period to
file a § 2255 motion. Id. at 305-08. The Supreme Court noted, however, that a
prisoner must show due diligence in challenging his state court conviction to
trigger the renewed limitations period. Id. at 308-310. We have also recognized
post-judgment challenges to an § 851 enhancement as cognizable through a § 2255
motion. See Boyd v. United States, 754 F.3d 1298, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2014);
Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856, 863-64 (11th Cir. 2011).
While the district court did not appear to consider Valentine’s underlying
motion for relief as having been brought under § 2255, a collateral challenge to an
§ 851 enhancement is cognizable through a § 2255 motion.2 See Johnson, 544
U.S. at 304-05; Stewart, 646 F.3d at 863-64; Boyd, 754 F.3d at 1301-02. Because
there is no dispute that Valentine previously filed a § 2255 motion that was time-
2 As an initial matter, contrary to the Government’s assertions, Valentine’s appeal is timely. Valentine is not attempting to appeal the denial of his underlying motion for relief but only the district court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration. It is undisputed that his notice of appeal was timely as to that latter order. Although Valentine’s motion for reconsideration itself may not have been timely, as he filed it nearly two months after the district court entered its order denying the underlying motion, the district court nonetheless considered and denied it. And Valentine signed and dated his notice of appeal 8 days later, designating the district court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration as the order appealed from, which was well within the 60-day window for doing so. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (providing in civil cases where the United States is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days of entry of the judgment or order appealed from).
4 Case: 19-14333 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 Page: 5 of 6
barred, Valentine is subject to § 2244(a)’s ban on second or successive § 2255
motions without our prior authorization. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (providing in
order to file a second or successive § 2255 motion, a prisoner must first obtain
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Case: 19-14333 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-14333 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:03-cr-00134-RV-CJK-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAMES VALENTINE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida ________________________
(June 2, 2020)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, LAGOA and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 19-14333 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 Page: 2 of 6
James Valentine, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration of an order denying his motion
collaterally challenging a 21 U.S.C. § 851 enhancement on the ground that the
California conviction underlying the enhancement was recently reduced to a
misdemeanor. He asserts the district court erred by denying his motion to
reconsider because California’s Proposition 64 changed his prior conviction from a
felony to a misdemeanor and, on that basis, his mandatory minimum sentence
should have been 10 years’ imprisonment rather than 20. After review, 1 we affirm
the district court.
A prisoner in federal custody may file a motion to vacate, set aside, or
correct his sentence by asserting “that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction
to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(a). Typically, collateral attacks on the validity of a federal conviction or
sentence must be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Sawyer v. Holder, 326 F.3d
1363, 1365 (11th Cir. 2003).
1 We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration only for abuse of discretion. Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003). We review the district court’s legal conclusions in a § 2255 proceeding de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Id. “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). 2 Case: 19-14333 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 Page: 3 of 6
In 2006, Valentine pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii). When Valentine was sentenced in August
2006, the penalty for violating § 841(a)(1) was a term of imprisonment of 10 years
to life. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) (effective July 27, 2006). However, where an
individual violated § 841(a)(1) after a prior conviction for a “felony drug offense”
had “become final,” the minimum term of imprisonment became 20 years. Id. A
“felony drug offense” is defined as an offense that was “punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a
State or foreign country that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic
drugs,” and cocaine is a narcotic drug. 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) & (17)(D).
Because an § 851 enhancement is imposed by reason of a prior conviction, it
can be applied to an individual’s sentence only if the government filed a notice of
the previous convictions it contends support the enhancement. 21 U.S.C.
§ 851(a)(1). A defendant cannot challenge any prior convictions alleged in the
notice that “occurred more than five years before the date of the information
alleging such prior conviction.” Id. § 851(e).
In Robert Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a federal
prisoner who had received a career offender enhancement could challenge the
enhancement in a § 2255 motion after a prior state conviction underlying the
3 Case: 19-14333 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 Page: 4 of 6
enhancement was vacated by the state court. 544 U.S. 295, 304-05 (2005). The
Supreme Court further held that the state court’s vacatur was a new “fact” within
the meaning of § 2255(f)(4) that triggered a renewed one-year limitations period to
file a § 2255 motion. Id. at 305-08. The Supreme Court noted, however, that a
prisoner must show due diligence in challenging his state court conviction to
trigger the renewed limitations period. Id. at 308-310. We have also recognized
post-judgment challenges to an § 851 enhancement as cognizable through a § 2255
motion. See Boyd v. United States, 754 F.3d 1298, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2014);
Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856, 863-64 (11th Cir. 2011).
While the district court did not appear to consider Valentine’s underlying
motion for relief as having been brought under § 2255, a collateral challenge to an
§ 851 enhancement is cognizable through a § 2255 motion.2 See Johnson, 544
U.S. at 304-05; Stewart, 646 F.3d at 863-64; Boyd, 754 F.3d at 1301-02. Because
there is no dispute that Valentine previously filed a § 2255 motion that was time-
2 As an initial matter, contrary to the Government’s assertions, Valentine’s appeal is timely. Valentine is not attempting to appeal the denial of his underlying motion for relief but only the district court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration. It is undisputed that his notice of appeal was timely as to that latter order. Although Valentine’s motion for reconsideration itself may not have been timely, as he filed it nearly two months after the district court entered its order denying the underlying motion, the district court nonetheless considered and denied it. And Valentine signed and dated his notice of appeal 8 days later, designating the district court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration as the order appealed from, which was well within the 60-day window for doing so. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (providing in civil cases where the United States is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days of entry of the judgment or order appealed from).
4 Case: 19-14333 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 Page: 5 of 6
barred, Valentine is subject to § 2244(a)’s ban on second or successive § 2255
motions without our prior authorization. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (providing in
order to file a second or successive § 2255 motion, a prisoner must first obtain
leave from our Court by showing that the motion contains either newly discovered
evidence or a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable); Farris v. United
States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating without our authorization, the
district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive § 2255 motion).
However, the vacatur of a state court conviction can trigger a renewed limitations
period in which to file a second § 2255 motion that is not “second or successive”
within the meaning of § 2244(a). See Stewart, 646 F.3d at 863-64 (acknowledging
a second-in-time § 2255 motion based on a state court’s vacatur of an underlying
conviction was not successive within the meaning of § 2244(a) since, as Johnson
held, the vacatur was a new fact that triggered a renewed limitations period for
filing a § 2255 motion); Boyd, 754 F.3d at 1301-02 (determining a § 2255 motion
based on a state court’s later (after the initial § 2255 proceedings) vacatur of an
underlying conviction could not be successive because such a claim had never
been reviewed on the merits).
Even assuming arguendo that Proposition 64 resulted in a vacatur of
Valentine’s California conviction, he was not entitled to relief from his
5 Case: 19-14333 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 Page: 6 of 6
§ 851-enhanced sentence based on the plain text of § 841(b)(1)(A) and § 851.
First, § 841’s enhanced sentence applies where a prior conviction for a serious
drug felony “has become final.” See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). There is no
dispute that Valentine’s California conviction was “final” prior to his commission
of the § 841 offense. See id. Second, § 851 prohibits challenges to prior
convictions entered more than five years before the Government’s filing of an
§ 851 notice and, here, the Government filed its § 851 notice over six years after
Valentine’s California conviction was entered. See 21 U.S.C. § 851(e). Thus,
regardless of whether Proposition 64 resulted in a vacatur of Valentine’s California
conviction, the district court did not err in determining that he was not entitled to
relief from his § 851 enhancement. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Valentine’s motion to reconsider, and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.